CourtListener 10637979•People v. Reyes CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Reyes CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B334117
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA426418
v.
JULIO CESAR REYES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded with instructions.
Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg and Derek K. Kowata
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, defendant and appellant Julio Cesar Reyes was
convicted by jury trial of murder and robbery in adult court.
Reyes was 17 years old when those crimes occurred. As the
parties correctly explain on appeal, under the Public Safety and
Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57), which took effect
before Reyes’s judgment became final, Reyes is now entitled to a
transfer hearing in juvenile court. Because the parties agree on
the proper resolution of this appeal, and because we agree with
the parties, we resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
BACKGROUND1
The electorate passed Proposition 57 on November 8, 2016,
and it took effect the next day. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) 4
Cal.5th 299, 304 (Lara).) “Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors
from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court.”
(Lara, supra, at p. 303.) “Instead, they must commence the
action in juvenile court.” (Ibid.) “If the prosecution wishes to try
the juvenile as an adult, the juvenile court must conduct . . . a
‘transfer hearing’ to determine whether the matter should remain
in juvenile court or be transferred to adult court.” (Ibid.) “Only if
the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the
juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult. (See Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 707, subd. (a).)” (Lara, supra, at p. 303, fn. omitted.)
Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments.
(Lara, supra, at pp. 303−304.)
1 We limit our recitation of background information to that
needed to provide context for and resolve the issues on appeal.
2
In October 2016, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
filed an amended information in adult court charging Reyes with
murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211). The
amended information also charged Reyes with various gang and
firearm allegations. As mentioned above, Reyes was 17 years old
when the charged offenses occurred. The jury convicted Reyes on
both counts and found gang and firearm allegations true on each
count. The jury reached its verdicts on November 10, 2016, the
day after Proposition 57 took effect. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.
304.) Reyes filed a Proposition 57 motion to transfer the matter
to the juvenile court, which the trial court denied in February
2017. On direct appeal, Reyes’s counsel neglected to argue that
Proposition 57 applied to his client’s nonfinal judgment, and a
different panel of this court affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Sailor, et al. (Apr. 15, 2020, B287411 [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2022, Reyes filed a resentencing petition under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).3 In August 2023,
after appointing counsel on Reyes’s behalf and allowing briefing,
the trial court issued a written order denying Reyes section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law. In denying relief, the court
explained, among other things, that the record of conviction
demonstrated Reyes’s jury was never instructed on any imputed-
malice theory of homicide liability.4
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3 Section 1172.6 provides relief for certain individuals
convicted of murder under a now-invalid imputed-malice theory
of liability. (See Ibid.)
4 On appeal, Reyes does not challenge the denial of his
section 1172.6 petition.
3
The same day the trial court denied Reyes’s section 1172.6
petition, he filed a motion in the trial court to correct his
unauthorized sentence, arguing that he is entitled to a juvenile
transfer hearing under Proposition 57 and Lara. The trial court
denied that motion two days later. In doing so, the court
explained that the motion raised the same issue the court had
already rejected in 2023 in a previous habeas corpus proceeding
brought by Reyes.
In September 2023, Reyes timely appealed the denial of
both his section 1172.6 petition and his Proposition 57 motion to
correct his unauthorized sentence.
In April 2024, this court denied Reyes’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed on January 8, 2024 in case number B334320.
The court denied the writ petition “without prejudice because the
issues raised intertwine with issues on appeal” in the instant
case. In his habeas petition, Reyes argued that he is entitled to a
juvenile transfer hearing under Proposition 57.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the parties agree, and we agree with the
parties, that Reyes is entitled to a transfer hearing under
Proposition 57. Because Reyes was 17 years old when he
committed the charged offenses, and because his judgment was
not yet final when Proposition 57 took effect, Reyes was and is
entitled to its benefit. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303−304
[Proposition 57 applies to nonfinal judgments]; People v.
Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 206 [a case is not final until
the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari has passed]; U.S.
Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 13(1) [petition for writ of certiorari is
timely if filed with the clerk of the United States Supreme Court
within 90 days after entry of judgment of a state court of last
4
resort].) In the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our
discretion to construe this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus (see People v. Byron (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 657, 666;
Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895; § 1260), and we
remand the matter to the juvenile court to hold a transfer
hearing in accordance with Proposition 57.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the adult criminal court is conditionally
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for a
transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section
707.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P.J.
COLLINS, J.
5
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