People v. Gray CA2/1

CourtListener 10635195Calctapp17 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 9/20/24 P. v. Gray CA2/1
Review denied 7/16/25; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B330525

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A365859)
v.

DERRICK ELLIOT GRAY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Petitioner Derrick Elliot Gray appeals from an order
denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition.1 He argues the
felony murder special circumstance instruction “given at Gray’s
trial did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found
Gray intended to kill.” Gray further contends the jury could have
concluded he intended only to commit robbery and burglary, not
murder. Following People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471
(Warren), which held that no reasonable jury would adopt the
interpretation of the instruction Gray espouses, we reject his
arguments and affirm the resentencing court’s order.2

BACKGROUND3

1. Record of conviction and procedural history
The People alleged that in 1981, Gray murdered George
Latronis. The People further alleged the murder was committed
while Gray was engaged in a burglary and robbery within the
meaning of the felony murder special circumstance. The People
alleged Gray committed a burglary and robbery. Gray was tried
separately from his confederate Alvin Bobo. A jury convicted
Gray of burglary, robbery, and the first degree murder of George
Latronis. (People v. Bobo et al. (Oct. 4, 1983, 2 Crim. No. 42179)
at p. 2 (Gray I).) The jury found true the alleged felony murder

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the original sentencing court as the trial
court and the court that considered Gray’s resentencing petition
as the resentencing court.
3 We summarize only those facts relevant to the issue on
appeal. The transcript of Gray’s trial is not available and is not
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

2
special circumstance that the murder was committed during the
course of the robbery and burglary.4 (Gray I, supra, 2 Crim. No.
42179 at p. 2.)
The felony murder special circumstance instruction
included the following language, the meaning of which the
parties dispute: “If defendant, Derrick Gray, was not the actual
killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of the murder in the first degree . . . .” The trial court
further instructed the jury that it could find the special
circumstance true only if “the proved facts not only are consistent
with the theory that the defendant had the required mental state
but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.”
The only theory of first degree murder on which the jury
was instructed was first degree felony murder, that is where the
murder was “intentional, unintentional or accidental, which
occurs as a result of the commission of or attempt to commit the
crime of burglary or robbery, and where there was in the mind of
the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime . . . .”
The trial court further instructed the jury on felony murder: “If a
human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, the crime of
burglary or robbery, all persons who either directly and actively
commit the act constituting such crime or who with knowledge of

4 In 1990, Proposition 115 extended the felony-murder
special-circumstance liability to major participants who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 705 (Strong).) Gray was tried before this
extension of felony murder.

3
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, aid,
promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission,
are guilty of murder of the first degree, whether the killing is
intentional, unintentional, or accidental.”
Following conviction, Gray filed a motion to strike the
special circumstance. The trial court denied the motion, finding
the following factors in aggravation: (1) the crime involved great
violence; (2) the crime involved a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness, (3) because of his age, the victim
was particularly vulnerable; (4) Gray was on probation when he
committed the crime; and (5) Gray’s crimes were of increasing
seriousness. (Gray I, supra, 2 Crim. No. 42179 at p. 16.)
In 1982, the trial court sentenced Gray to life without the
possibility of parole for the murder. (Gray I, supra, 2 Crim. No.
42179 at p. 2.) Gray appealed from the judgment and this court
modified Gray’s sentence to stay the sentences on the burglary
and robbery pending service of the sentence on murder. (Id. at
p. 19.) As modified, we affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)

2. Gray petitions for resentencing and the resentencing
court denies his petition
On September 17, 2021, Gray petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. The resentencing court appointed
counsel for Gray and issued an order to show cause. No witness
testified at the order to show cause hearing. The People could
not locate the transcript of Gray’s trial and for that reason,
conceded Gray should be resentenced. The resentencing court
rejected the People’s concession. Relying on the special
circumstance instruction, the resentencing court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Gray was guilty of murder because either
he was the actual killer or given the instruction on the felony

4
murder special circumstance, the jury had to have found he had
the intent to kill when he committed the felony murder. Gray
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
“In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the
felony-murder rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants
who had previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant
neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 703, citing Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(3); see Pen.
Code, § 1172.6; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 3–4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 held that a criminal
defendant who petitions for resentencing under section 1172.6
puts at issue all elements of murder. (Curiel, at p. 462.)
Respondent argues the jury found all elements of felony
murder as it is currently defined under section 189,
subdivision (e)(2), which provides: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) [including robbery and burglary] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder” if the “person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.” (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2); see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 [current
felony murder includes person with the intent to kill aids and

5
abets the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree].)
Gray disputes only the element of intent to kill.5 He argues
the resentencing court erred in concluding beyond a reasonable
doubt he harbored intent to kill. According to Gray, under the
special circumstance instruction given at his trial, the jury could
have concluded he intentionally aided and abetted a robbery and
burglary, not a murder. He emphasizes that “other instructions
explained that [the] actual killer could commit first degree
murder by merely participating in an underlying robbery or
burglary and without intending to kill.” (Italics omitted.)
Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d 471 considered the same issue
and rejected Gray’s argument. (Id. at pp. 487–488.) Warren
involved two defendants and two victims. Robert Warren, one
defendant, ordered the murder victim, Antonio Herrera, to lie
down. (Id. at p. 476.) An unidentified man pulled Homero
Flores, the other murder victim, from a car and pushed him
down. (Id. at pp. 476–477.) Woodrow Warren, another
defendant, tried unsuccessfully to start Flores’s car. (Id. at
p. 477.) When the unidentified person began to search Herrera,
Herrera tried to protect his pockets. Robert asked, “Can I shoot?”

5 Gray does not dispute and the jury necessarily found the
other elements of felony murder as currently defined. As noted,
the jury convicted Gray of first degree murder and the only
theory of first degree murder was that a human being was killed
in the commission of a burglary or robbery. The jury also
convicted Gray of burglary and robbery. The special
circumstance instruction, which the jury found true, showed that
the jury found that Gray “intentionally aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree . . . .”

6
and Woodrow replied, “Yes.” (Id. at p. 477.) Robert shot Herrera
in the head and then shot Flores in the side. (Ibid.) Flores and
Herrera died of the gunshot wounds. (Ibid.)
As relevant here, the jury convicted Robert and Woodrow of
two first degree murders, a robbery, and a felony murder robbery
special circumstance. (Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 476.) With
respect to the felony murder special circumstance the jury
instruction provided that “the defendant was either the actual
killer or a person who intentionally aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.’ ” (Id. at
p. 486.) As in this case, the trial court also instructed on felony
murder as follows: “ ‘The unlawful killing of a human being,
whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as
a result of the commission of or attempt to commit the crime of
robbery, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the
specific intent to commit the crime of robbery, is murder of the
first degree.’ ” (Id. at p. 487.)
In our high court, Woodrow argued the trial court “failed to
inform the jurors that they were required to find that he acted
with intent to kill if they determined he was not the actual
killer.” (Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) The court indicated
that it was required to consider “how would a reasonable juror
understand the instruction” and “if necessary, the charge in its
entirety.” (Ibid.) The court found a “reasonable juror” would
understand the special circumstance instruction as requiring
intent to kill to be found true. (Ibid.) The court recognized that
based on the language of the felony murder instruction, the
special circumstance instruction “might conceivably be
understood to mean that a special-circumstance finding could be

7
made as to an aider and abettor if he acted merely with the
intent to commit robbery and not with the intent to kill.” (Id. at
pp. 487–488.) The high court, however, concluded that the
“instructions here would not be so construed by a reasonable
juror.” (Id. at p. 488.) “A reasonable juror . . . would not
undertake such tortuous analysis.” (Ibid.)
Justice Arguelles, in a concurring opinion signed by two
other justices, indicated “there is a serious question whether the
instructions satisfactorily informed the jury it must find
Woodrow intended to kill before sustaining the two special
circumstance allegations against him.” (Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d
at p. 490, italics omitted.) Notwithstanding the concurring
opinion (on which Gray relies), our high court has repeatedly
reaffirmed Warren’s majority holding. (People v. Pinholster
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 954, overruled on another ground in People
v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 458–459.) In People v.
Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, our Supreme Court explained
Warren held a reasonable juror would understand the special
circumstance instruction given in the present case to require that
if the defendant was not the actual killer, he “acted with the
intent to kill.” (Sanders, at pp. 516–517.) In People v. Champion
(1995) 9 Cal. 4th 879, the high court reiterated that it has
“repeatedly held that a reasonable juror would construe [the
special circumstance instruction given in this case] as imposing a
requirement of intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 929, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860.)
Although Warren involved a direct appeal and not a
petition for resentencing, the issue in Warren is identical to the
disputed issue before us—whether the special circumstance
instruction as given in Gray’s case required the jury to find a

8
defendant convicted of felony murder who was not the actual
killer intended to kill. The Warren majority held that the special
circumstance instruction required such a finding of intent to kill.
Gray contends, “[H]ere there were no facts and no jury
instructions to indicate the jury was likely to have understood”
the special circumstance instruction “to require the jury to find
that Gray intended to kill.” Gray’s argument misconstrues
Warren. Our high court did not rely on any specific fact when it
concluded that the language of the special circumstance
instruction given at Gray’s trial required the jury find he
intended to kill when it found the special circumstance true.
Instead, the Warren court looked to the language of the special
circumstance instruction, not the particular facts underlying
Robert and Woodrow Warren’s crimes. Gray’s assertion that
other jury instructions did not also require a finding that Gray
intended to kill does not alter the conclusion that under Warren,
the jury necessarily found intent to kill when it convicted Gray of
the special circumstance.
Gray correctly points out the trial court did not instruct his
jury on express malice. Had the jury in Warren found express
malice, i.e., specific intent to kill, under other instructions, there
would have been no issue whether the special circumstance
instruction required a finding of intent to kill. The fact that the
trial court in this case did not instruct the jury on express malice
thus does not assist in answering the key question: Did the
special circumstance instruction require the jury find Gray
harbored intent to kill when it found the special circumstance
true. Warren answers that question in the affirmative as to an
identical instruction.

9
In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, relied on
by Gray, our high court considered “whether a defendant can be
charged or convicted of murder with the special circumstance of
felony murder under the 1978 death penalty initiative if he did
not intend to kill or to aid in the commission of a killing.” (Id. at
p. 134.) The court indicated that the initiative “should be
construed to require an intent to kill or to aid in a killing as an
element of the felony murder special circumstance.” (Id. at
p. 135.) The court issued a writ barring trial on a special
circumstance where no evidence suggested that the defendant
intended to kill the victim. (Id. at p. 136.) The Supreme Court
later overruled Carlos explaining “that the broad holding of
Carlos that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder
special circumstance cannot stand, and that the following narrow
holding must be put in its place: intent to kill is not an element
of the felony-murder special circumstance; but when the
defendant is an aider and abettor rather than the actual killer,
intent must be proved before the trier of fact can find the special
circumstance to be true.” (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1104, 1138–1139.)6 Gray’s reliance on Carlos is misplaced
because Carlos considered a different issue and does not cast

6 Subsequent to Anderson, “the voters adopted
Proposition 115, modifying aider-and-abettor liability under the
felony-murder special circumstance to provide that ‘a person
other than the actual killer is subject to the death penalty or life
without parole if that person was a major participant in the
underlying felony . . . and either intended to kill or acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 163, fn. 20.)

10
doubt on Warren, a subsequent case, or the many Supreme Court
cases following Warren.
Gray correctly states that the current special circumstance
felony murder instruction differs from the one given in his trial.7

7 CALJIC No. 8.80.1 currently provides in relevant part:
“If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human
being, [or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was
the actual killer or [an aider and abettor] [or] [co-conspirator],]
you cannot find the special circumstance to be true [as to that
defendant] unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that such defendant with the intent to kill [aided,] [abetted,]
[counseled,] [commanded,] [induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or]
[assisted] any actor in the commission of the murder in the first
degree] [.] [, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a
major participant, [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,] [commanded,]
[induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted] in the
commission of the crime of (Penal Code, § 190.2(a)(17) crime)
which resulted in the death of a human being, namely _______.]
“[In determining whether a defendant as an aider and
abettor was a ‘major’ participant to a first degree felony murder,
you must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime, including but not limited to the
following:
“1. What role, if any, did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to [one or more] death[s] of the
victim[s]?
“2. What role, if any, did the defendant have in supplying
or using lethal weapons?
“3. What awareness, if any, did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?

11
That assertion does not assist Gray because it does not elucidate
the meaning of the instruction given in his case—the issue
Warren considered. We are required to follow Warren. (See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
We have focused on Gray’s intent if he was not the actual
killer. The resentencing court found that either Gray was the
actual killer or he acted with intent to kill. ~(RT 6)~ Gray does
not argue that if he were the actual killer, he would be entitled to
resentencing. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.) Any such
argument would be incorrect because under the current definition
of murder, a participant in a robbery or burglary “in which a
death occurs is liable for murder” if “[t]he person was the actual
killer.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) In sum, the resentencing court did

“4. Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in
a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder?
“5. Did the defendant’s actions or inactions play a
particular role in the death?
“6. What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?
“No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one
of them necessarily sufficient. All must be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, namely, whether the
defendant’s involvement in the criminal enterprise was
sufficiently significant to be a ‘major participant’.]
“[A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life
when that defendant knows or is aware that [his] [her] acts
involve a grave risk of death to an innocent human being. By
participating in a violent felony with lethal weaponry, one should
reasonably foresee that bloodshed is a possibility. However
awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent
in any armed crime is insufficient; only knowingly creating a
‘grave risk of death’ is sufficient.]”

12
not err in denying Gray’s resentencing petition because Gray
participated in a robbery and burglary in which a death occurred
and was either the actual killer or with intent to kill, aided and
abetted the killer.
Finally, we recognize that section 1172.6 provides a
procedure for the parties to “waive a resentencing hearing and
stipulate that the petitioner is eligible” for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(2).) However, we reject Gray’s argument that
the People’s concession that it could not establish its burden at
the evidentiary hearing should be deemed a stipulation that Gray
was eligible for resentencing.8 Stipulations generally are
“agreements between counsel that the facts stipulated to are
true.” (People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 308; In re Horton
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 94 [stipulation “normally refers to an
agreement between attorneys”].) In this case, the prosecutor and
defense counsel neither entered an agreement that resentencing
was warranted nor waived the evidentiary hearing.9 Because the
prosecutor and defense counsel did not stipulate to resentencing,
we need not consider Gray’s argument that had the parties so
stipulated, the resentencing court would have been required to
accept such stipulation.

8 Gray makes this argument in a supplemental brief
requested by this court on the following question: “What impact,
if any, does the resentencing of Derrick Elliot Gray’s codefendant
Alvin Bobo and the People’s concession in the trial court that
Gray is entitled to resentencing have in evaluating Gray’s appeal
from the denial of his Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing
petition.”
9 Although Gray states that the prosecutor “waived a
hearing,” the record does not support that assertion.

13
DISPOSITION
The order denying Derrick Elliot Gray’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 resentencing petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

14
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One - No. B330525

S290716

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DERRICK ELLIOT GRAY, Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________

The petition for review is denied.

Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted.

(See Dissenting Statement by Justice Evans.)

_____________/s/________________
Chief Justice
PEOPLE v. GRAY
S290716

Dissenting Statement by Justice Evans

In 1982, Defendant Derrick Elliott Gray was convicted of
felony murder with a special circumstance finding that the
murder was committed during a felony, in this case, a robbery
or burglary. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17); subsequent
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) According to the
factual recitation set forth in the decision on direct appeal, Gray
(who was 18 years old at the time of offense) and a codefendant
committed a robbery and burglary, during which they bound
and gagged the 77-year-old victim, who died from strangulation
or suffocation. (People v. Gray (Oct. 4, 1983, 2 Crim. No. 42179)
[nonpub. opn.] (Gray I).) Gray was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole for the murder.
At the time of Gray’s trial and conviction, “[f]elony-murder
liability [did] not require an intent to kill, or even implied
malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654.) With the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3), however, the
Legislature overhauled the state’s murder statutes. (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867.) “Pertinent here, Senate Bill
No. 1437 significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder
rule by adding subdivision (e) to Penal Code section 189.” (Id.
at p. 880.) Pursuant to that provision, “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the

1
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedural mechanism
for those previously convicted of murder under a theory
amended in the bill to petition for resentencing. (See § 1172.6;
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel).) A trial
court acting on such a petition first must evaluate whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) “ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 450, citing
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “ ‘If, instead, the defendant has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Curiel, at p. 450, quoting
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At an evidentiary hearing, “the burden of
proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder” under state law
as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If
the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the murder
conviction “shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
Some 40 years after his conviction, Gray petitioned for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. After the trial court
determined that Gray stated a prima facie case for relief and
2
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be
granted, the People conceded that Gray was entitled to relief.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court summarily rejected
the People’s concession and, without prior notice to the parties,
sua sponte reconsidered its prima facie finding. Although much
of the original trial record had been lost, the court took the view
that jury instructions purportedly given at Gray’s trial
established conclusively that he was ineligible for relief.1
Those jury instructions provide that murder “is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”
The instruction on express malice is struck through. The
implied malice instruction states: “Malice is implied when the
killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or the attempt
to perpetrate a burglary or robbery.” The only theory of murder
presented in the instructions is first degree felony murder.
Consistent with the law in effect at that time, the instruction
imposes liability for a killing, “whether intentional,
unintentional or accidental, which occurs as a result of the
commission of or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or
robbery, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the
specific intent to commit such crime.” Lastly, the felony-murder

1 Aside from a handful of pages not relevant here, the
original trial records have been lost. Attached as exhibit 2 to the
“People’s Response to Petition for Resentencing Pursuant to
Penal Code Section 1172.6” is a set of jury instructions
purportedly given in the case. The filing is not accompanied by a
declaration, and thus, the provenance of the instructions —
which are not separately available as part of either the clerk’s or
reporter’s transcripts — is unknown. The document is file
stamped May 17, 1982. The People describe it as “Jury
Instructions – Given,” although the exhibit itself includes the
markings “Given” and “Refused.”
3
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

special-circumstance instruction states that the jury may return
a true finding thereon only if it is proved that Gray
“intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of the murder in the first degree.”
The trial court found Gray ineligible for relief based solely
on the special circumstance instruction, from which the court
concluded that the jury necessarily found “intent to kill.” The
trial court gave preclusive effect to this purported finding
without conducting any issue preclusion analysis. (Cf. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th 433.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s order denying Gray’s resentencing petition, also without
conducting such an analysis. (People v. Gray (Sept. 20, 2024,
B330525) [nonpub. opn.] (Gray II).) The Court of Appeal relied
instead on People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 (Warren)
for the proposition that this version of the special circumstance
instruction is not erroneous for failure to require intent to kill.
(Gray II, B330525.) We granted Gray’s petition for review and
transferred the case to the Court of Appeal to reconsider in light
of Curiel. Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded
that Curiel does not compel a different result. (People v. Gray
(Mar. 25, 2025, B330525) [nonpub. opn.] (Gray III).) The Court
of Appeal again bypassed an analysis of the state of the law at
the time of Gray’s trial and conviction, instead invoking Warren
to conclude that the special circumstance instruction “could only
be interpreted to require the jury to find intent to kill.” (Gray
III, B330525.) As explained below, this approach is subject to
question.
In Curiel, we explained that issue preclusion bars
relitigation of issues earlier decided only if several threshold
4
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

requirements are fulfilled. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.)
As pertinent here, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former
proceeding; it must have been actually litigated in the former
proceeding; and it must have been necessarily decided in the
former proceeding. (Ibid.) “ ‘An issue is actually litigated
“[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and
is submitted for determination, and is determined . . . .” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 452.) “An issue is necessarily decided so long as it was
not ‘ “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment in the initial
proceeding.’ ” (Ibid.) The party asserting collateral estoppel
bears the burden of establishing these requirements. (Ibid.)2
“ ‘In considering whether these criteria have been met, courts
look carefully at the entire record from the prior proceeding,
including the pleadings, the evidence, the jury instructions, and
any special jury findings or verdicts.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 451.)
Here, setting aside any threshold concern that the lower
courts did not look carefully at the entire record from Gray’s
trial — because it no longer exists — the special circumstance
instruction given at Gray’s trial did not expressly require “intent
to kill.” This is not surprising, given that, at the time of Gray’s
trial and conviction, the special circumstance statute was not
thought to require intent to kill. (See Carlos v. Superior Court
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 139–143, overruled by People v. Anderson
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 (Anderson) [see fn. 1, post].) The statute,
as rewritten by voters in 1978, specifically eliminated an earlier
requirement that a defendant “ ‘with intent to cause death

2 Although, in this case, that burden seemingly would
have fallen to the trial court after it rejected the People’s
concession.
5
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death.’ ”
(Carlos, at p. 139, quoting former § 190.2, subd. (c); see Carlos,
at pp. 140, 143.) Instead, the voters chose to impose liability
where “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of” an
enumerated felony, including robbery and burglary. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978),
eff. Nov. 8, 1978 [commonly known as Prop. 7].) “The absence of
any express requirement of intentionality” in this section
suggested that the special circumstance applied to a defendant
“whether or not he intended to kill.” (Carlos, at p. 140; see also
People v. Silbertson (1985) 41 Cal.3d 296, 304 [noting, in a “pre-
Carlos case, intent to kill seemed irrelevant to both the felony-
murder charge and the robbery special circumstance”].) On
December 12, 1983, after Gray’s trial and conviction — and,
indeed, after his direct appeal was decided — this court
interpreted subdivision (a)(17) of section 190.2, together with
former subdivision (b) of the same section, to conclude that the
felony-murder special circumstance requires intent to kill.
(Carlos, at pp. 142–143, 153–154.) That decision was based, in
part, on the (partially erroneous) conclusion that the statute had
to be so construed to avoid serious constitutional questions. (Id.
at pp. 136, 147–153; see Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1141
[explaining “one of the bases on which we rested our decision in
Carlos” proved to be unsound].)3
Given the state of the law at the time of Gray’s trial and
conviction, I question whether the threshold requirements of

3 In Anderson, this court overruled “the broad holding
of Carlos that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder

6
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

issue preclusion are met. The issue of whether Gray acted with
intent to kill was not properly raised, by the pleadings or
otherwise, because none of the charged crimes or special
circumstance required such a finding. If there is any doubt that
the felony-murder special circumstance was not thought to
require intent to kill when the jury in this case rendered its
verdict, such doubt is resolved by the fact that no express malice
instruction was given. The jury was never instructed on “intent
to kill,” and those words appear nowhere in the charge.4

special circumstance” and replaced it with a narrower holding:
“when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the
actual killer, intent must be proved before the trier of fact can
find the special circumstance to be true.” (Anderson, supra, 43
Cal.3d at pp. 1138–1139.) Former subdivision (b) of section
190.2, since redesignated as subdivision (c), now imposes liability
for “[e]very person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to
kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests,
or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first
degree.” (§ 190.2, subd. (c), italics added.) The standard jury
instructions have been modified accordingly, expressly requiring
“intent to kill.” (CALJIC No. 8.80; CALCRIM No. 701.)
4 Gray noted below that the trial court did not instruct
his jury on express malice. (See Gray III, supra, B330525.) The
Court of Appeal observed that this does not assist in answering
the “key question,” i.e., whether the special circumstance
instruction required a finding of intent to kill, a matter on which
it found Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 488 conclusive. (Gray
III, supra, B330525.) The Court of Appeal observed that, “[h]ad
the jury in Warren found express malice, i.e., specific intent to
kill, then it would not have been necessary to decide whether the
special circumstance instruction required a finding of intent to
kill.” (Ibid.) This confuses two distinct questions: (1) whether
the jury’s verdict in Warren necessarily reflected a finding of
express malice, as opposed to reliance on some alternative theory

7
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

However a reasonable jury might understand the special
circumstance instruction under different circumstances (see
post, discussing Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 488), it is difficult
to conclude that the jury in this case would have thought a
finding of intent to kill was required or that it necessarily made
such a finding. It is indeed difficult to reach such a conclusion,
given that nobody else in the room — not the presiding judge,
the prosecutor, or the defense attorney — likely would have
shared the view that a finding of intent to kill was required
under the law in effect at that time. Accordingly, the issue of
intent to kill was not “ ‘ “actually litigated” ’ ” or “ ‘ “necessarily
decided.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451, 452.) Rather,
it was “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment. (Ibid.)
Even where the threshold requirements of issue
preclusion are satisfied, “ ‘ “the doctrine will not be applied if
such application would not serve its underlying fundamental
principles” of promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the
parties.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 454.) We recognized
one well-settled exception to the general rule of issue preclusion
in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716, that is, “when
there has been a significant change in the law since the factual
findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the
issue.” (Cf. Curiel, at p. 455 [noting the “intent to kill finding
that was required at the time of Curiel’s trial was governed by
the same standards that exist today”].) Although the concept of
express malice has not undergone a significant reformation,

of guilt; and (2) whether the jury in Warren was instructed on
express malice at all. I agree with Gray that the complete
absence of an express malice instruction in this case is
informative.
8
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

intent to kill simply was not required for a true finding on the
felony-murder special circumstance at the time of Gray’s trial
and conviction. It is therefore doubtful that Gray had either the
opportunity or incentive to litigate the issue of intent to kill,
which was likewise not required for his underlying felony-
murder conviction. (Cf. Id. at p. 459 [noting that Curiel “had
more than adequate incentive to litigate his intent to kill”
because, even setting aside the consequences of the special
circumstance, “it was an element of the crime of murder” under
one of the theories pursued by the prosecution].)
As stated above, the Court of Appeal did not conduct a
comprehensive issue preclusion analysis, relying instead on
Warren, another case decided years after Gray’s trial and
conviction. Our task in Warren was to consider how a
reasonable juror would understand the special circumstance
instruction given in that case and, “if necessary, the charge in
its entirety.” (Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) The Warren
majority recognized that the language of the special
circumstance instruction, considered together with the felony-
murder instruction, “might conceivably be understood to mean
that a special-circumstance finding could be made as to an aider
and abetter if he acted merely with the intent to commit robbery
and not with the intent to kill.” (Id. at pp. 487–488.) The
majority nonetheless held that a reasonable juror would
construe the instruction to require intent to kill. (Ibid.) A three-
justice concurrence noted that there was a “serious question
whether the instructions satisfactorily informed the jury” that
it had to find an aider and abettor intended to kill before
sustaining the special circumstance allegation. (Id. at p. 490
(conc. opn. of Arguelles, J.).) The concurrence found it

9
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

unnecessary to resolve that question, however, because even
assuming the instructions were inadequate, the error was not
prejudicial. (Ibid. [noting that the defendant answered in the
affirmative when his coparticipant asked, “ ‘Can I shoot?’ ”].)
As noted by Gray, Warren raised a claim of instructional
error, asking whether a reasonable jury would have understood
the instructions given in that case to require intent to kill.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s assertion (Gray III, supra,
B330525 [“the issue in Warren is identical to the issue before
us”]), Warren did not decide the issue relevant here — whether
Gray’s jury necessarily found that he acted with intent to kill.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467 [in order to find an element
satisfied at the prima facie stage of §1172.6 proceedings, “we
must be confident the jury necessarily found” that element].)
Bare reliance on Warren is therefore misguided, as it overlooks
whether intent to kill was required by law at the time of Gray’s
trial and conviction. (See People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th
719, 730–731 [the defendant was not categorically ineligible for
relief under § 1172.6 because the law in effect at the time of his
trial and conviction did not require proof that he personally
harbor malice].) Eligibility for relief under section 1172.6
generally “will turn on an examination of both the governing law
at the time of trial and the record of conviction, including the
jury instructions.” (Antonelli, at p. 731.) The Court of Appeal
dismissed Gray’s reliance on Carlos, suggesting it was
“misplaced” because Carlos “does not cast doubt on Warren, a
subsequent case.” (Gray III, B330525.) But Carlos imposed the
requirement of intent to kill only after Gray’s trial and
conviction. Thus, it should be central to the issue preclusion
analysis. (See Antonelli, at pp. 727–731; id. at p. 729

10
PEOPLE v. GRAY
Evans, J., dissenting statement upon denial of review

[identifying People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, which first
held that provocative act murder requires a finding that the
defendant personally harbored malice, as “the relevant turning
point” in the law].)
Because the law frequently undergoes revision, I urge
lower courts to conduct a considered issue preclusion analysis
before concluding that a defendant is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 based on jury findings rendered decades ago. In
my view, the failure to do so in this case constitutes a
miscarriage of justice. Gray was 18 years old at the time of the
offense and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for
a murder that, according to the facts laid out in the decision on
direct appeal, could have been unintentional. (Gray I, supra, 2
Crim. No. 42179.) In view of the foregoing, I would grant review
of this matter, notwithstanding that there is no published
conflict on the issue. I note that our denial of review does not
necessarily preclude other forms of relief, including recall and
resentencing upon the recommendation of the district attorney
(§ 1172.1), or pursuant to a commutation recommendation
(§ 4801, subd. (a) [“The Board of Parole Hearings may report to
the Governor, from time to time, the names of any and all
persons imprisoned in any state prison who, in its judgment,
ought to have a commutation of sentence or be pardoned and set
at liberty on account of good conduct, or unusual term of
sentence, or any other cause”]).
EVANS, J.

I Concur:
LIU, J.

11

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