CourtListener 10634525•People v. Turner CA1/3
Testo completo
Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Turner CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168908
v.
DEMAREALE TURNER, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05009611955)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1997, a jury found defendant Demareale Turner guilty of first-degree
murder and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and
committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In 2022,
defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, but
the trial court determined defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief. On appeal, defendant contends the court
erred in summarily denying his petition because the jury instructions, which
referred to various uncharged crimes other than murder, did not preclude as
a matter of law that the jury may have convicted him of murder without a
finding of malice. We reject this contention and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We provide the following factual summary solely for background
purposes and context for the parties’ arguments. (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Patton
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(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569, fn. 12.) We also rely on the procedural history of
the case as recited in the unpublished opinion affirming defendant’s
conviction (People v. Turner (Jul. 20, 1999, A078786) [nonpub. opn.].) (Pen.
Code, § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).1)
A. Underlying Offense and Conviction
Defendant and Gerald Robinson were members of the Project Trojans
gang operating in North Richmond and San Pablo. In October 1995,
Robinson was arrested and jailed for assaulting his girlfriend after seeing her
in a car with victim Christopher Miles. The following month, Miles was
approached on the street by three men and shot several times. While
hospitalized, Miles told a physician and a police officer the shooter was a
person named Johnnie. Miles also identified defendant in a photographic
lineup and claimed he was the second person to fire at him. A witness to the
crime selected Johnnie Simon’s photograph as the first person to shoot Miles,
but he would later disavow this identification. Miles died of complications
from his gunshot wounds.
The police sought defendant and Simon for the shootings and soon
apprehended defendant. The police also recovered a firearm used in the
shooting. Defendant’s sister (“E.T.”) purchased the gun in September 1995,
and defendant’s brother had hidden the weapon in his bedroom. Sometime in
September 1995, defendant went into the brother’s room and left with a bulge
under his jacket.
In 1996, Simon called E.T. and asked whether “Lisa” (defendant’s other
sister and Simon’s stepmother) had gotten rid of the gun. Simon was
eventually apprehended in New Mexico, and he admitted being a member of
the Project Trojans.
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant, along with Simon and Demetrius Antoine Thompson, were
jointly charged by information with murder (§ 187). The information further
alleged that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the
offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and committed the offense with the specific
intent to benefit, promote, further, or assist the unlawful conduct of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Defendant was tried alone. Street gang experts testified that members
of Project Trojans would assault a man for dating a member’s girlfriend, and
that the Project Trojans controlled sales of drugs in North Richmond. The
prosecution presented evidence that defendant, Simon, and other Project
Trojan members sold or possessed drugs in North Richmond on six separate
occasions, and that in January 1992, defendant threw a bottle at a police car.
Defendant testified and presented witnesses claiming he was with friends on
the day of Miles’s shooting.
The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and found true
allegations that he personally used a firearm and committed the murder for
the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant received a prison term of 31
years to life. He appealed, and in 1999, this court affirmed defendant’s
conviction but modified the sentence to strike the two-year gang
enhancement and instead impose a minimum parole eligibility date of 15
years. (People v. Turner (Jul. 20, 1999, A078786) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Petition for Resentencing
In March 2022, defendant filed a pro per petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. On the form petition, defendant checked boxes alleging
that he had been charged with murder under the felony murder rule, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or another theory under which
malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime, and
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that he could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes to
sections 188 and 189. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, and
the parties briefed the matter. After a prima facie hearing in August 2023,
the trial court took the matter under submission.
In its written order denying the petition, the trial court first noted it
had not considered the factual recitation in the unpublished appellate opinion
or defendant’s alleged statements in a Comprehensive Risk Assessment
prepared for his parole hearing. The court then turned to the jury
instructions given in this case and observed that the jurors were not
instructed on the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; that the instructions for first degree murder expressly
indicated a guilty verdict required a finding that defendant harbored malice
aforethought; and that no other theory of first degree murder was presented
to the jury. Concluding defendant had been convicted of murder on a valid
theory upon a finding of actual malice, the court found him ineligible for
resentencing relief as a matter of law. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
Prior to the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice could be imputed to a person under two
theories: (1) the felony murder rule, and (2) the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Under the felony murder rule, a defendant could be
liable for first or second degree murder if the defendant or an accomplice
killed someone during the commission or attempted commission of an
inherently dangerous felony. (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942.)
And under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and
abettor could be found “guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but
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also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the
nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the target
crime.” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611.)
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended
sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[] natural and probable consequences
liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, “which
creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under
the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p.957.)
The resentencing procedures originally applied only to “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory.” (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4).) Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170.95 was amended to extend the
resentencing procedures to a person convicted under any “other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Former section 1170.95
has since been renumbered as section 1172.6, with no substantive changes.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all required information (e.g.,
declaration of eligibility, case information, any request for appointed
counsel), the trial court “must ‘review the petition and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the
provisions of [section 1172.6].’ [Citation.] If the petitioner has made this
initial prima facie showing, he or she is entitled to appointed counsel, if
requested, and the prosecutor must file a response, and the petitioner may
file a reply. [Citation.] The court then reviews the petition a second time. If
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it concludes in light of this briefing that the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts.” (People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1003
(Roldan).)
In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6, “a trial court may look to the record of conviction
and the court file.” (Roldan, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) The record of
conviction generally includes the charging documents, the plea form or
verdict forms, the jury instructions, and closing arguments. (See People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1247, fn. 3; People v. Flores (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170 (Flores).) Such record “will necessarily inform the
trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether
the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A]
court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) A petitioner is not eligible for relief when the
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contents of the record demonstrate, as a matter of law, that a prima facie
showing has not been made. (Roldan, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.)
Whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief is a
question of law, which is reviewed de novo. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
B. Analysis
Defendant concedes that during his criminal trial, the jury was not
instructed on the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He further acknowledges the jury “heard the crime of
murder correctly defined,” including “a proper definition of first degree
murder based on premeditation and deliberation.” He nevertheless contends
the “ ‘collective effect’ ” of other “generic, imprecise, and overlapping
instructions” was to enable the jury to convict him of murder without finding
that he harbored malice, and thus, the instructions did not preclude his
eligibility to resentencing relief as a matter of law.
Specifically, defendant highlights CALJIC 3.00, which told the jury
that the “principals” equally guilty for “the crime” include direct perpetrators
and those who aid and abet the commission of “the crime,” while CALJIC
3.01 instructed that in order to convict defendant of aiding and abetting, the
jury had to find that he aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the
commission of “the crime” with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of “the crime.” Defendant emphasizes that these
instructions generally referred to “the crime” without mentioning murder.
Defendant then points to other instructions that referred to various
uncharged offenses. For instance, the instructions on general intent (CALJIC
3.30), specific intent (CALJIC 3.31), and concurrence of acts and mental
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states (CALJIC 3.31.5) included references to multiple offenses other than
murder (e.g., “the predicate crime[s] of possession of a concealable firearm on
the person by a minor[,] sale of a controlled substance[,] or assault with a
deadly or dangerous weapon”; “the predicate crime of possession of a
controlled substance for sale”; “the predicate crimes of sale of a controlled
substance, possession of a controlled substance for sale and possession by a
minor of a firearm capable of being concealed on the person”). Similarly, as
part of the gang enhancement instruction, the jury heard references to
multiple uncharged offenses including “assault with [a] deadly weapon or by
means likely to produce great bodily injury, as defined in Penal Code Section
245”; “sale of controlled substances as defined in . . . Health and Safety Code
section 11352”; “possession for sale of controlled substance, as defined in
Health and Safety [Code] section 11351.5”; and “possession of a firearm
capable of being concealed on the person by a person under 18 years old, as
defined in Penal Code section 12101.” Additionally, specific instructions
defined felony assault, simple assault, sale of a controlled substance,
possession for sale of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a
concealable firearm by a minor.
From this, defendant argues it cannot be ruled out as a matter of law
that his conviction rested on a theory by which malice was imputed to him
based solely on his participation in the uncharged crimes. He posits that
without examining the trial evidence,2 one can only speculate as to whether
2 Here, defendant emphasizes that factual recitations in a prior appellate
opinion cannot be considered for purposes of evaluating his eligibility for
relief. A number of appellate courts have concluded that because section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) permits courts to consider specifically the
“procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion,” the
Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of the factual recitations of
that opinion. (See People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238;
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the referenced drug sale or firearm possession offenses “might have been
viewed by the jury as ‘the crime’ as that term is used in CALJIC 3.01.”
As mentioned, jury instructions are part of the record of conviction that
a court examines in determining whether a petitioner has satisfied the
conditions for relief under section 1176.2. (Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1170.) In general, “[c]hallenges to the wording of jury instructions are
resolved by determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury misapplied or misconstrued the instruction.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31
Cal.4th 822, 848.) “[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined
from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1202, internal quotation marks omitted.) “ ‘ “It is fundamental
that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of understanding and
applying the court’s instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 905.)
Defendant contends the above instructional error principles do not
apply here because he “does not allege ‘error’ in the instructions.” He is
mistaken. The appellate courts of this state have consistently applied these
principles in evaluating whether jury instructions established or precluded a
prima face case for resentencing relief. (See, e.g., People v. Love (2025) 107
Cal.App.5th 1280, 1290; People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 146 (Carr);
People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 713; People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 292;) As mentioned, however, our factual summary above is
intended solely to provide background and context. Neither we nor the trial
court considered the prior appellate opinion’s factual recitations in deciding
whether defendant made a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing
relief.
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People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1256; People v. Estrada (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 941, 948.)
Viewing the jury instructions in their entirety, and presuming the jury
understood and applied them according to their terms, we conclude defendant
fails to demonstrate that the jury was permitted to convict him of murder
based on his participation in the uncharged crimes and without a finding of
malice. We reiterate that the trial court never instructed the jury on felony
murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
by which malice could be imputed to defendant based on his participation in
another crime. To the contrary, the jury was expressly instructed that
murder requires malice aforethought and that malice could be express or
implied, both of which remain valid theories of liability for murder after
Senate Bill No. 1437. (See § 188, subds. (a), (b); Carr, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 144.) The jury was also instructed on the willful, deliberate and
premeditated state of mind required for first degree murder. As such, the
jurors knew that in order to convict defendant of first-degree murder—which
they did—they had to find that he acted willfully and with the intent to kill.
We see no reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied these instructions
in the manner urged by defendant simply because the instructions included
references to uncharged offenses. As the record of conviction confirms, the
jury knew that defendant was charged with one count of murder, and it
received clear and unambiguous instructions regarding the mental state
required for that crime. Though instructions for general intent, specific
intent, and mental states were also given with reference to uncharged crimes,
the instructions as a whole made sufficiently clear that the evidence of
uncharged crimes was being offered for specifically stated purposes that did
not pertain to the murder charge. Importantly, the trial court instructed that
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certain “evidence was admitted for a limited purpose” and that it could “not
consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which
it was admitted.” For instance, the jury was told that “[e]vidence has been
introduced for the purpose of showing that a witness, [t]he defendant,
engaged in past criminal conduct amounting to a crime or crimes[.] This
evidence may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the
believability of that witness. . . . [¶] The prior crimes alleged are: [a]ssault
with a deadly or dangerous weapon and sale of a controlled substance.” We
assume the jury adhered to the instruction limiting the purposes for which
the evidence of uncharged crimes could be considered.
Likewise, the gang enhancement instruction made clear the distinction
between the charged and the uncharged offenses, the latter of which had a
specific purpose delineated in the instruction. The jury was told that “if you
find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged in count one or a
lesser felony,” the jury “must further determine whether said crime was
committed by the defendant for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang.” The jury was then instructed that
in order to find that a gang was a “criminal street gang,” the jury had to find
that its members engaged in “a pattern of criminal activity,” and that the
crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great
bodily injury, possession for sale and sale of controlled substances, and
possession of a concealed firearm by a minor could be used to establish the
“pattern of criminal gang activity.” The verdict form reinforced this
distinction by providing a separate space for the jury to mark whether it
found defendant guilty of either first or second degree murder, and then
setting forth a separate section listing the uncharged crimes as the “act or
acts you unanimously found as a primary activity of the gang.”
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In sum, the instructions and verdict forms made clear that the
references to and evidence of the other crimes were for the limited purposes
stated in the instructions, including whether a pattern of criminal activity
had been established for the criminal street gang finding. (E.g., CALJIC
2.23.1, 3.30, 3.31, 3.31.5.) On this record, we will not assume that the jury
disregarded the relevant instructions or that it concluded the evidence of
uncharged offenses could be used for the uninstructed purpose of convicting
him of murder under an imputed malice theory.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428 is
unavailing. In DeHuff, the jury was instructed on two murder theories—“one
valid (implied malice murder), and one invalid (second degree felony
murder)” arising out of the defendant’s act of reckless driving to evade a
police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). (DeHuff, at p. 437.) The DeHuff court
held that because “there is no way to ascertain from the record upon which
theory the jury based its finding of guilt,” and the defendant could not be
convicted of second degree felony murder based on a violation of Vehicle Code
section 2800.2, the defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief under the predecessor to section 1172.6. (Id., at p. 442.) Here, in
contrast, the jury was not instructed on any invalid theory of murder, and for
the reasons discussed, we find no reasonable likelihood that the instructions
invited the jury to convict defendant of murder based merely upon evidence of
his participation in other crimes like drug sales or firearm possession.
In sum, based on the record of conviction, including the entire set of
instructions given to the jury, we conclude the trial court correctly found
defendant ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
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_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________
Tucher, P. J.
________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. Turner (A168908)
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