CourtListener 10633896•In re J.T. CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 7/16/25 In re J.T. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re J.T., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B335916
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 2020032421)
Law. (Ventura County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
J.T. appeals from the juvenile court’s order sustaining the
allegations of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602
petition that he committed attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 664, count 1) and first degree residential robbery (Pen.
Code, § 211, count 2). Appellant, who had just turned 16 years
old five days prior to the offenses, contends the juvenile court
erred by admitting his post-Miranda1 statements to the police in
violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We
affirm.
The Crime and Police Investigation
On November 1, 2020, around noon, appellant entered the
home of 86-year-old Nancy McAtee armed with a knife and a BB
gun. McAtee lived with her son, Kenneth McAtee, who was at
work at the time. As McAtee walked to her bathroom, appellant
grabbed her and pulled her inside the bathroom. He had what
appeared to McAtee to be a silver metal gun. Appellant
demanded money and threatened to shoot McAtee when she said
she did not have any money. Appellant then stabbed McAtee
several times. When McAtee fell to the floor, appellant continued
to stab her and threatened to shoot her if she screamed. He said
he would call 911 if she cooperated. He demanded drugs and
McAtee’s car keys.
While McAtee remained in the bathroom, appellant
ransacked her home. He returned to the bathroom multiple
times to ask for additional information about other items in the
house. He plugged the sink and attempted to flood the bathroom.
He disconnected the landline phone by yanking it out of the wall.
A neighbor called police to report a burglary after she observed
appellant trying to get into McAtee’s car. When neighbors later
entered McAtee’s home, they found her laying in the hallway.
She was conscious and able to communicate. She believed she
had been in the bathroom for approximately two-and-half hours
before paramedics arrived.
Dr. Barry Sanchez, a trauma surgeon, reviewed McAtee’s
medical records related to her injuries. McAtee suffered
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
2
numerous lacerations, including to her face, neck, arms, back,
and shoulder. She also suffered chest wounds, fractured ribs, and
blunt force trauma to her legs. Dr. Sanchez opined that several
of the lacerations were near arteries and veins, which if
damaged, could have caused death by blood loss “very quickly.”
Dr. Sanchez also opined that due to McAtee’s advanced age, she
was much more vulnerable to fatal injuries than someone who
was under the age of 65.
Port Hueneme Police Department Officer Rocque Lopez
responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress. The
description of the suspect was “a Hispanic male; black hat; black
mask; . . . gray, white, and black jacket; . . . dark pants that were
cuffed at the legs; black shoes.” When Officer Lopez arrived at
the residence, he observed a person matching the description of
the suspect “exiting the side of the residence” and “walking out
through a cut in the . . . chain-link fence from the rear yard to the
front yard.” When appellant saw Officer Lopez, he attempted to
flee on foot. Appellant’s BB gun was later found along the path of
the foot chase.
After a brief pursuit, Officer Lopez detained appellant.
When Officer Lopez searched appellant, he found several items,
including: a pocketknife with a four-inch blade and four-inch
handle that was locked in the open position; a receipt from Jack-
in-the-Box located near the area for a sandwich purchased at
11:07 a.m.; a bindle of what appeared to be methamphetamine in
appellant’s sock, a glass methamphetamine pipe, two cell phones,
and three sets of keys, the victim’s diabetic logbook, a pass for
Magic Mountain with Kenneth’s name on it, and various other
bank cards belonging to a “German Juarez.”
3
Appellant was wearing a mask during the pursuit and
when he was apprehended. He wore a black cloth glove on his
right hand and a tube sock on the other. Officer Lopez identified
a photograph depicting appellant’s clothing, which was either
black and white, or gray and black. Appellant was wearing a
“Raiders” hat, a bandana, an oversized “Pendleton” jacket and
shirt, baggy jean pants with the pant legs cuffed, and black
shoes. There was a stain on appellant’s pant leg.
When Kenneth arrived home, he saw that appellant was
wearing his jacket that he kept in his bedroom closet. Kenneth
looked over the possessions seized from appellant and recognized
his Magic Mountain season pass, car keys that belonged to his
mother, and a set of keys that belonged to his grandmother from
approximately 15-20 years prior. Kenneth also noticed his guns
and bass guitar were sitting next to his mother’s vehicle on the
driveway. He recognized additional items that had been inside
his home that morning and observed that the house had been
ransacked.
Officer Lopez transported appellant to the police station in
his patrol car. When they reached the station, appellant asked
Officer Lopez whether “the lady” would be “okay” and “make it,”
and whether he would be “charged for the guns.” Appellant was
not being questioned at the time.
At the station, appellant was searched and a bindle of
drugs fell out of his shoe. His clothing and the knife were booked
into evidence.
A forensic analyst with the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office
Forensics Services Bureau tested the stains found on the knife
and jeans seized from appellant. The blood on appellant’s pants
was determined to be McAtee’s blood. However, the laboratory
4
was not able to properly test the blood-like substance on the
knife.
Appellant was taken into custody at 2:42 p.m. He arrived
at the station at 3:00 p.m. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Officer
Tapia and Sergeant Torpey noticed appellant appeared to be
sleeping. They woke him up and walked him to an interview
room. The interview was audio recorded and lasted
approximately one hour. At the outset of the interview, appellant
was read his Miranda rights. When asked if he understood,
appellant responded, “hm-mmm.” He repeated this response
each time he was asked if he understood. When asked to clarify
whether his responses meant “yes” or “no,” appellant indicated he
meant “yes.” Appellant proceeded to talk with the officers and
answer their questions.
After establishing that appellant was 16 years old, lived
with his mother, and was on probation, Sergeant Torpey told
appellant to “wake up” and asked if he was “coming down from
something right now?” Appellant replied, “No.” Appellant denied
using heroin or pills. The officers asked appellant to keep his
eyes open.
Appellant told the officers that prior to the burglary, he had
been “smoking weed” and “listening to music” at a friend’s house.
Afterward, he ate food from Jack-in-the-Box and searched for an
empty house. Appellant admitted that he entered McAtee’s home
through an unlocked back door. When the woman discovered his
presence, she tried to “disarm [him],” so he “assaulted her.” He
admitted to stabbing McAtee with a knife but denied punching or
kicking her. He kept stabbing her even though he did not want
to and speculated that it was because he “already had a warrant”
and was concerned McAtee might scream and attract attention.
5
Appellant knew that he could possibly kill McAtee by stabbing
her, but he also “didn’t realize [he] had stabbed her that many
times.”
Appellant remained in the house looking for guns and
ammunition. He admitted he took McAtee’s car keys because he
was planning to take her car but ran away when he saw a police
officer in the area. Appellant disconnected the land line because
he did not want to hear it ringing. He swore he was going to call
an ambulance for McAtee.
Appellant was emotional and cried during parts of the
interview and at one point, he told the officers that he had just
found out his girlfriend was pregnant.
The officers told appellant he was “being a man” by telling
the truth and they would help him “work through it” even though
it was difficult to take responsibility for his actions.
When asked, appellant indicated that he did not want to
know McAtee’s physical condition. Appellant stated, “Guess I’ll
find out when I see the charge. I know it’s not going to be assault
with a deadly weapon.” The officers told appellant he stabbed
McAtee 29 times, and asked why he stabbed her so many times.
Appellant said, “Right now, that’s why I answered all the, you
know, possibly . . . she’s dead.” Near the end of the interview, the
officers informed appellant that McAtee was still alive and asked
appellant to pray for her.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
The defense filed a motion to exclude appellant’s
statements made to police officers in violation of his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. After hearing from both parties,
the juvenile court denied the motion. The juvenile court
explained that although it had several concerns, it found
6
appellant’s waiver of his right against self-incrimination was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the petition. As to count 1, the juvenile court found the
allegation that appellant committed the offense willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation not true. The juvenile court
found true the special allegations that appellant inflicted great
bodily injury on a person 70 years of age and older (Pen. Code, §
12022.7, subd. (c)) and personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon (id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
The juvenile court ordered appellant to a Secured Youth
Treatment Facility with a maximum confinement time of 21
years and 10 months but subject to a maximum age of
confinement of 25 years. The juvenile court set the baseline term
at five years.
Discussion
Appellant’s sole contention is that his Miranda waiver was
not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Specifically, he contends
his waiver: (1) was not knowing or intelligent because he was
sleep deprived, under the influence of narcotics, and his young
age “greatly impacted” his ability to comprehend his Miranda
rights, (2) was not voluntary because police used coercive tactics,
and (3) was prejudicial. As we shall explain, none of appellant’s
contentions have merit.
“The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .’ [Citation.] In Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court ‘“adopted
a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect’s Fifth
Amendment right from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of
7
custodial interrogation.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Under Miranda
and its progeny, ‘“a suspect [may] not be subjected to custodial
interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has
waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney,
and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.”’ [Citation.] To be valid, a
Miranda ‘waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception” [citation], and knowing in the sense that it
was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.” . . . ’” (People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 809 (Jones).)
“Juveniles, like adults, may validly waive their Miranda
rights.” (Jones, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 809.) “To establish a
valid waiver of Miranda rights, the prosecution must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary. [Citation.] Determining the validity of
a Miranda rights waiver requires an evaluation of the
defendant’s state of mind and an inquiry into the circumstances
of the interrogation. [Citation.] When a juvenile’s waiver is at
issue, consideration must be given to factors such as “the
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and whether he or she has the capacity to
understand the Miranda warnings, the nature of their Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights.” (In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 1189.) The
“totality-of-the-circumstances” test applies in determining the
validity of a minor’s waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S.
707, 725; People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson).)
“In reviewing the validity of a Miranda waiver, ‘“we accept
the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by
8
substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the
challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.”
[Citation.]’” (Jones, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 809, quoting
People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 809; M.S., supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 1189.)
Here, the juvenile court determined that appellant made a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.
The record supports this determination.
Although appellant was somewhat “sleepy” at the outset of
the interview, nothing in the record suggests that he did not
understand his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving
those rights. When Sergeant Torpey read appellant his Miranda
rights, appellant responded affirmatively that he understood
those rights. At no time did appellant ask to speak with a parent
or ask to stop the interview. When the officers expressed concern
that appellant might be “coming down from something” like
“heroin” or “pills,” appellant replied, “No.”
The juvenile court noted that other than the “mh-mms in
the beginning,” appellant did not have “slurred speech” and was
not “unintelligible.” Rather, his demeanor was “wholly
consistent” with someone who was “sleepy” and had just woken
up. After a few minutes, his voice was “stronger [and] more
clear.” He “expressed remorse” and “showed emotion.” He had
no difficulty relaying “specific details,” including conversations he
had with the victim, the layout of the house, street names, and
why he disposed of the BB gun. As the juvenile court observed,
“It’s clear he understood what he was saying. It’s clear he
understood the magnitude.”
Appellant next contends his “young age” precluded him
from making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. We
9
disagree. Although appellant had just turned 16 years old five
days before his custodial interrogation, he was familiar with law
enforcement and the criminal justice system. He had a
significant criminal record and was “on the run” when he
committed the instant offenses after failing to appear for a prior
offense. He also displayed some understanding of the law when
he correctly predicted that he would not merely be charged with
“assault with a deadly weapon” given the nature of the offenses
in this case.
Moreover, appellant’s contention overlooks that courts have
found a valid waiver in cases involving juveniles even younger
than appellant. (See, e.g., Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 374-
375; In re Anthony J. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 962, 970-972; People
v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384; In re Jessie L. (1982) 131
Cal.App.3d 202, 215; In re Abdul Y. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 847,
867.)
Appellant asserts policy considerations, citing Welfare and
Institutions Code section 625.6. He contends that around the
time of his interrogation, the law on a minor’s right to counsel
before a Miranda waiver “was completely overhauled in favor of
minors.” (Welf. Inst. Code, § 625.6, subd. (a), as amended by
Stats. 2020, ch. 335, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.) But at the time of
appellant’s interrogation, the statutory requirement that a minor
shall consult with counsel before any Miranda waiver only
applied to minors up until the age of 16. Thus, by its own terms,
the statute did not apply here. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 625.6,
subd. (a), Stats. 2017, ch. 681, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)
Appellant further contends his waiver was not voluntary
because police used coercive tactics. For example, he contends
police (1) kept the interview room cold, (2) did not tell him the
10
victim was still alive, (3) used appellant’s statement that his
girlfriend was pregnant to get him to confess, (4) appealed to
appellant’s religious beliefs and asked him to pray for the victim.
Many of these “tactics” are alleged deviations from the
Port Hueneme Police Department policies rather than federal
constitutional standards. In any event, the juvenile court found
that although the police did use “some tactics,” there was no
coercion or questioning that “resulted in the minor’s will being
overborne.”
Our review of the record supports this determination.
Here, the interview was not lengthy and lasted approximately
one hour. The officers spoke to appellant in “level” tones. He was
not restrained. The officers offered appellant something to drink,
which he declined. At no time did he say he was hungry or
complain that he was cold. Nor did he complain of any physical
ailments other than that he was “tired.” Finally, to the extent
the officers’ reference to religion was improper, the juvenile court
noted it did not occur until the interview was “essentially” over.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the
prosecution met its burden of establishing that appellant’s waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in admitting appellant’s post-Miranda
statements.
Disposition
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
11
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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F. Dino Inumerable, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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