CourtListener 10633359•People v. Rodriguez CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 7/14/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064309
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2304427)
DAVID ANDREW RODRIGUEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Frederick Paul Dickerson III, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Randall D. Einhorn, Susan Elizabeth Miller and Daniel Hilton,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
This appeal stems from David Andrew Rodriguez’s (Rodriguez)
conviction for robbery. The facts underlying the robbery are not in dispute.
The victim was on the phone when an assailant approached him, knocked
him down, took his phone, and fled. The issue at trial was the assailant’s
identity. During his testimony, the victim could not identify Rodriguez as the
assailant. However, the prosecution offered evidence that the victim made an
in-field identification of Rodriguez to an officer who did not testify. A
different officer, who was not present during the in-field identification,
relayed the in-field identification officer’s statements to the jury. Over
objection, the court admitted the identification at trial. All parties agree, as
do we, this was error. Because we cannot conclude that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In an amended information, the prosecution charged Rodriguez
with one felony count of robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; count 1) as well as two
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two strike priors
(§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)).
During the jury trial, the prosecution called the responding
officer to testify. The prosecution introduced a portion of this officer’s
interview with the victim. In the interview, the victim stated a man came
over to him, asked for a lighter, knocked him down, grabbed his phone, and
ran. The victim told the officer he could identify his attacker.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The following is an excerpt of the officer’s trial testimony
regarding the in-field identification:
“Q. Okay. Do you know if there was any in-field identification
ever done?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. What was an in-field identification? How does that
process work?
“A. Essentially, a deputy will take the victim to where a suspect
was located to identify whether or not that was the suspect or if it wasn’t the
suspect that committed the crime.
“Q. Okay. And to your knowledge of the investigation, this sort of
in-field lineup process occurred with [the victim]?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And to your knowledge, was he able to identify a specific
individual?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. Do you know that individual’s name that he was able
to identify?
“A. Mr. Rodriguez.
“[DEFENSE]: Objection. Lack of foundation.
“THE COURT: Overruled.”
During cross-examination, the officer testified he “did not take
place in the in-field lineup. It was other deputies.” He did not know if the
officers gave an admonishment to the victim prior to the identification. The
testifying officer was not present during the in-field identification, and he
was not present when Rodriguez was detained.
3
The victim testified at trial and confirmed the assailant pushed
him down and stole his phone. The victim did not recall speaking with the
police that day. He could not recall what the attacker was wearing or the
attacker’s age. The victim testified he would remember his attacker if he saw
that person again. But when questioned at trial: “Do you see [your attacker]
in this room right now,” the victim responded: “No.”
The victim’s niece testified at trial that she was on the phone
with her uncle when he was attacked. She heard the attack and called 911.
She then drove to her uncle’s house which was about ten minutes from her
home. She did not witness the crime. A neighbor who “witnessed everything”
told her what the attacker was wearing, however, she did not know who
attacked her uncle and could not identify the attacker. She did not observe
the police arrest anyone nor did she observe the in-field identification.
Another officer who arrived at the scene testified the victim’s
niece told him that someone described the suspect as “a male . . . wearing a
white shirt and gray shorts.” This officer located Rodriguez who was “wearing
black pants and [a] black jacket.” The officer said Rodriguez appeared
“apprehensive” and “very cautious.” Rodriguez was walking with another
man. At first, Rodriguez started walking towards the officer, but then the
victim’s niece saw Rodriguez, pointed, and said, ‘“That’s him. That’s him.’”
Rodriguez then took off running and the officer gave chase. After
locating Rodriguez, Rodriguez told the officer, ‘“I did not hit that man.’” The
officer did not recall locating a cell phone on Rodriguez. The victim’s niece or
“somebody else from [the police] department” told the officer, “‘That’s him,
and he changed his clothes.’” The officer did not see any discarded clothing in
the area aside from a jacket hanging on a railing.
4
During closing argument, the prosecution told the jury the police
were “able to provide for us the confirmation of a positive ID” which came
from the victim. The prosecution reiterated, “We know that [the victim]
identified who attacked him.”
In its closing, the defense argued the case was about
identification. The defense told the jury “there was never a positive
identification of [Rodriguez],” let alone evidence of a positive identification
from the victim. “[U]nfortunately, in this case, somebody is wrongfully
arrested for—wrongfully detained, wrongfully arrested, wrongfully charged
for robbery.” In rebuttal the prosecution again told the jury the victim
“[made] a positive ID” of Rodriguez.
During deliberations, the jury asked for a readback of the officer’s
testimony who testified the victim made a positive in-field identification of
Rodriguez. Following the readback, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Rodriguez admitted the remaining allegations. The trial court sentenced
Rodriguez to 25 years to life on count one and five years on each of the prior
serious felony convictions to run consecutive to count one.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
The Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred in
overruling Rodriguez’s foundation objection which led to the introduction of
testimony that the victim made an in-field identification of him. We accept
that concession. The Attorney General also concedes the error prevented
Rodriguez from confronting witnesses in violation of his federal constitutional
rights. As the prosecution introduced the statements of the officer who
conducted the in-field identification, and that officer did not testify, we agree.
5
II.
THE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL
Because the officer who conducted the in-field identification in
which the victim identified Rodriguez did not testify, the introduction of that
officer’s statements violated Rodriguez’s right to confront witnesses against
him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. (People v. Ogaz (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 280, 295.) “Violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation
right requires reversal of the judgment against a criminal defendant unless
the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was
harmless.” (People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661.)
We “look[] to the ‘whole record’ to evaluate the error’s effect on
the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367.) “When
there is “‘a reasonable possibility”’ that the error might have contributed to
the verdict, reversal is required.” (Ibid.) In determining whether witness
testimony admitted in violation of a defendant’s confrontation rights was
harmless we consider, ‘“the importance of the witness’ testimony in the
prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’”
(People v. Mitchell (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1225.)
Here, the error was not harmless. Identity was the sole issue
presented to the jury. There was no dispute a robbery occurred. The defense
was Rodriguez did not commit it—someone else did. The testimony
introducing the victim’s in-field identification was the sole piece of evidence
directly identifying Rodriguez as the assailant.
6
The Attorney General argues there was “overwhelming” evidence
showing Rodriguez was the robber. We agree there certainly was evidence
identifying Rodriguez as the robber. The victim’s niece received a description
of the robber from other witnesses and when she saw Rodriguez, she shouted
to police, ‘“[t]hat’s him.”’ Hearing this, Rodriguez fled and when he was
apprehended, Rodriguez spontaneously stated, ‘“I did not hit that man.”’
But given that the issue in the case was identity, the jury likely
gave great weight to the victim’s in-field identification. This is especially true
as other evidence showed Rodriguez was not the robber. Rodriguez’s clothes
did not match the description of what the assailant was wearing nor was
Rodriguez found with the stolen property. The victim was the only person
who witnessed the crime and testified at trial, but the victim could not
identify Rodriguez in court as his attacker.
Consider People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145
(Livingston). There, the prosecution admitted a videotape of a police
interview where a witness, who had died by the time of trial, identified a
vehicle involved in a shooting, described the shooter in a manner consistent
with the defendant’s appearance, and selected the defendant from a
photographic lineup as the shooter. (Id. at p. 1158.) The defendant never had
an opportunity to cross-examine this witness. (Ibid.) The California Supreme
Court held the admission of the videotape violated the defendant’s
confrontation clause rights. (Ibid.) But given other evidence, the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 1159.) Notably, two other
witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter. (Ibid.) One of the witnesses
identified the defendant’s car as the car involved in the shooting. (Ibid.)
Other witnesses testified the defendant and his car were in the area of the
crime at the time it occurred. (Ibid.) Moreover, given the nature of the
7
defendant’s appearance, he was “distinctive and easy to identify.” (Id. at
p. 1160.) The prosecution also did not heavily rely on the videotape during
trial. (Ibid.) The prosecutor only briefly mentioned it during opening and
closing and “said nothing to distinguish it from the other positive
identifications by witnesses who actually testified.” (Ibid.) Last, “[n]othing in
the record suggest[ed] the videotape was important to the jury or had any
effect on its verdict. During deliberations, the jury asked no questions and
requested no readback of testimony.” (Ibid.)
Here, unlike in Livingston, the in-field identification testimony
was not cumulative. There were no other witnesses who identified Rodriguez
as the assailant. The prosecutor relied heavily on that testimony during
closing argument and repeatedly reminded the jury that the victim made a
positive in-field identification of Rodriguez. The jury’s request for a readback
of that testimony gives us further reason to believe it placed great weight on
the in-field identification. On this record, we conclude there is a reasonable
possibility its introduction contributed to the verdict.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new
trial.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
9
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.