People v. Clark CA2/4

CourtListener 10626871Calctapp10 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/10/25 P. v. Clark CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336955

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A760105
v.

ROBERT CLARK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Muller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann and Stacy S.
Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Robert Clark appeals the trial
court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.61 petition for
resentencing. Clark argues the trial court erred by concluding he
had not shown prima facie eligibility for section 1172.6 relief and
denying his petition. Specifically, he contends the jury
instructions at trial allowed the jury to convict him of murder if
they found the homicide underlying the charge was a natural and
probable consequence of a conspiracy to commit arson.
We reject Clark’s contention. The jury instructions, read in
conjunction with the prosecution’s closing argument, demonstrate
as a matter of law that Clark was prosecuted and convicted of
murder on the theory that he acted with the intent to kill the
victim. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying him
relief.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal set forth the
following statement of facts:2

On the morning of November 24, 1984, Madeia
Hester, her four-year-old son and Evonne Cakos were
at home in their duplex apartment. [Charles Lavell]
Turner, a drug dealer, went to the duplex with Clark,

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 We rely on this information as background only. We base
our assessment as to whether Clark is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6 on our independent review of the record of
conviction. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222,
fn. 2.)

2
Larry Neal and another man, “Smash,” to discuss
setting up a cocaine selling operation. Turner was
“the boss”; both Clark and Neal were employed by
him. At the duplex they began to drink, and Turner
cooked cocaine at the kitchen table.
Sometime later Joe Johnson, who had
attempted to rob Turner a month earlier, entered the
duplex. Turner expressed anger and surprise when
he saw Johnson, and Turner had a gun in his hand at
that time. After finding out about Johnson’s robbery
attempt, Clark, Neal and Smash pulled Johnson into
the house. Neal hit Johnson in the face with a bottle.
Johnson was dragged to the couch and beaten by all
four men. Cakos tried to stop them but was told by
Turner to go to the back room. The beating
continued. Neal hit Johnson with a second bottle.
Johnson tried to escape but was knocked to the floor
by Neal. While he was on the floor Turner hit him in
the head with the gun and Clark hit him in the head
with a frying pan. Part of the time the beating and
killing of Johnson was taking place, Turner stood
behind the door with a pistol in his hand which he
pointed at the ceiling.
After Cakos complained a second time Turner
told the others to stop and then allowed Cakos,
Hester and the child to go to his car. As Hester
carried her son out of the duplex, Clark, Neal and
Tony were holding Johnson; Turner was standing
nearby holding a gun pointed toward the ceiling.
Turner followed Hester out to his car and stayed in
the car for a few minutes.
While Turner was gone Clark wrapped an
extension cord around Johnson’s neck. Turner
returned to the house. Turner went back to the car
and said, “The boy is dying.” Clark left the house and

3
returned while Turner was still outside. Clark told
the others that Turner wanted Johnson killed. Clark
handed Smash a knife, and Smash repeatedly
stabbed Johnson. Clark attempted to start a fire in a
bedroom closet. Turner returned to the house and
discussed buying gasoline with Clark.
Eventually Turner, Clark and the women drove
to a gas station. Turner bought gas in a container
and returned to the duplex. Turner and Clark went
in and shortly after came running out, along with
Neal and Smash. There was an explosion, and they
all drove off in Turner’s car.
Johnson died from strangulation and the 41
stab wounds he received. Firefighters called to the
duplex discovered Johnson’s body along with a two-
gallon can which was found to contain a flammable
liquid, probably gasoline.
Clark testified in his own defense. He admitted
to being in the duplex, drinking and using drugs, on
the day of the murder. He testified to an argument
between Turner and Johnson which turned into a
fight. He denied being involved in the fighting. He
claimed that he became sick from the combination of
drugs and alcohol and went into the bathroom during
the fighting. When he came out he saw Turner
stabbing Johnson, and at that point he left the
duplex. He admitted going to the gas station with
Turner but denied going back into the house.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1985, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
Clark and two co-defendants with murder (§ 187) and arson
(§ 451, subd. (b).) A jury convicted Clark of first degree murder

4
and arson.3 The trial court sentenced Clark to 25 years to life on
the murder and a concurrent five-year term on the arson. A
different panel of this court affirmed the judgment on direct
appeal. (People v. Clark (Jul. 20, 1989, B020052) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, Clark filed pro per a section 1172.6 resentencing
petition, and the trial court appointed counsel on his behalf. The
prosecution filed a response, along with the jury instructions,
transcripts of closing arguments, and verdict forms from Clark’s
trial, as well as this court’s opinion resolving Clark’s direct
appeal. In its response, the prosecution argued that neither the
jury instructions nor the closing argument showed that the jury
convicted Clark of murder based on an imputed-malice theory of
liability. Rather, the record of conviction demonstrated Clark’s
ineligibility for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. In reply,
Clark argued the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict him
of murder on the theory that the homicide was a natural and
probable consequence of a conspiracy to commit arson. Thus,
Clark contended, he had established a prima facie case for
resentencing.
In February 2024, the trial court denied Clark’s 1172.6
petition for resentencing on the ground that Clark had not made
a prima facie case for relief. Specifically, the court concluded the
record of conviction demonstrated as a matter of law that Clark
was not convicted of imputed-malice murder. Clark timely
appealed.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

3 The jury also convicted co-defendant Turner on both
counts.

5
In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), amended section 188 to
eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for murder liability. Subject to certain exceptions under the
felony murder rule, section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now requires
that a defendant act with malice to be convicted of murder.4
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6, “which provides a
procedure for defendants convicted of murder to seek
resentencing if they are able to establish they could not be
convicted of murder under the amendments to section 188 and
189 effective January 1, 2019.” (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1250, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted
of imputed-malice murder first must attest to the following: “(1)
A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under [an
imputed-malice theory of murder liability] . . . . [¶] (2) The
petitioner was convicted of murder . . . following a trial . . . at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder . . . .
[and] [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder . . . [under current law].” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a).) Once a
petitioner files a petition that so attests, the trial court must
determine whether the petitioner has shown prima facie
eligibility for relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) If the trial court determines that the petitioner has

4 In 2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551), the Legislature clarified that the
amendments made by Senate Bill No. 1437 were also intended to
apply to attempted murder and manslaughter. (People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 441.)

6
made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing (unless waived) at
which the prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder” under
current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) In conducting this review, we assess the
record of conviction as a whole. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971 [“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless”].) Reviewing Clark’s record of conviction as
a whole, we reject his contention that the jury instructions left
open the possibility that the jury could have convicted him of
imputed-malice murder. Thus, we find the trial court did not err
in concluding Clark’s record of conviction demonstrates he is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.

A. Relevant instructions given at Clark’s trial
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.11,
which defined express malice as “an intention unlawfully to kill a
human being.” The version of CALJIC No. 8.11 the court
provided did not reference or define implied malice. The court
also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.20, which defined
first degree murder as follows:

All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with

7
express malice aforethought is murder of the first
degree.
The world “willful,” as used in this instruction,
means intentional.
The word “deliberate” means formed or arrived
at or determined upon as a result of careful thought
and weighing of considerations for and against the
proposed course of action. The word “premeditated”
means considered beforehand.
If you find that the killing was preceded and
accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part
of the defendant to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have
been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not
under a sudden heat of passion or other condition
precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the
first degree.
The trial court also instructed the jury on principles of
direct aider and abettor liability, using CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and
3.01, and on uncharged conspiracy to commit murder or arson.
For uncharged conspiracy, the court gave CALJIC No. 6.10.5,
which provided as follows:

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or
more persons with the specific intent to agree to
commit a public offense such as murder or arson, and
with the further specific intent to commit such offense,
followed by an overt act committed in this state by
one or more of the parties for the purpose of
accomplishing the object of the agreement.
Conspiracy is a crime, but is not charged as an
offense in the [information] in this case.

8
In order to find a defendant to be a member of a
conspiracy, in addition to proof of the unlawful
agreement and specific intent, there must be proof of
the commission of at least one overt act. It is not
necessary to such a finding as to any particular
defendant that he himself committed the overt act, if
he was one of the conspirators when such an act was
committed.
(Italics added.)
In addition, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 6.11, which described conspiracy liability as follows:

Each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for
each act and bound by each declaration of every other
member of the conspiracy if said act or said
declaration is in furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy.
The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in
furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy is
the act of all conspirators. Every conspirator is
legally responsible for an act of a coconspirator that
follows as one of the probable and natural[5]
consequences of the object of the conspiracy even
though it was not intended as part of the original plan
and even though he was not present at the time of the
commission of such act.[6]

5 In so instructing, the trial court phrased “the natural and
probable consequences” theory of liability as “probable and
natural consequences.” The parties do not argue, nor do we
imbue, any legal consequence to the court’s phrasing.
6 This italicized language is the basis of Clark’s argument on
appeal that the instructions left open the possibility for the jury

9
(Italics added.)

B. Closing arguments
The prosecution did not argue to the jury that Clark was
liable for murder as a natural and probable consequence of a
conspiracy to commit arson. Rather, the prosecution argued that
Clark and co-defendant Turner were both guilty of murder
because they, while harboring the intent to kill, aided and
abetted each other and conspired with each other to murder the
victim.

C. Analysis
We conclude the trial court correctly found that the record
of conviction establishes as a matter of law that Clark was not
convicted of murder under an imputed-malice theory of liability.
As set forth above, the jury was instructed that it could convict
Clark of murder either as a direct aider and abettor or as a
participant in a conspiracy to commit murder. Under either
theory, in order to convict Clark of murder, the jury was
instructed that it must find that he harbored the intent to kill the
victim.
We reject Clark’s contention that the “probable and natural
consequences” language from CALJIC No. 6.11 allowed the jury
to convict him of imputed-malice murder, thus rendering him
prima facie eligible for section 1172.6 relief and entitled to an
order to show cause and evidentiary hearing. CALJIC No. 6.11,
read in conjunction with CAJIC No. 6.10.5 and the other
instructions given, show that in order to convict Clark of murder

to convict him of murder under a now-invalid imputed-malice
theory of liability.

10
under a theory of conspiracy liability, the jury was required to
find he acted with an intent to kill. Indeed, CAJIC No. 6.10.5
defined conspiracy liability as an agreement between two or more
persons to commit a charged offense, with the specific intent to
commit that crime, followed by an overt act. And, critically, the
instructions defining first degree murder defined the specific
intent element of the offense as requiring the express intent to
kill. In summary, the instructions, read as a whole, demonstrate
as a matter of law that the jury necessarily convicted Clark of
murder on the theory that he harbored the intent to kill the
victim.
Moreover, the prosecution’s closing argument renders a
nullity any theoretical possibility that the jury could have used
CALJIC No. 6.11 to convict Clark of imputed-malice murder as a
natural and probable consequence of a conspiracy to commit
arson. As described above, the prosecutor only argued to the jury
that Clark was guilty of murder because he harbored the intent
to kill the victim. The record reveals no reference to imputed-
malice murder as a theory of liability or as a basis for conviction
on the murder charge.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding
that Clark is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.

11
DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Clark section
1172.6 relief.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GARCIA UHRIG, J.*
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

12

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.