Mitchell v. Hutchinson

CourtListener 10626843Calctapp10 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 6/11/25; Certified for Publication 7/10/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANTHONY MITCHELL et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063331

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01173441)
GAIL B. HUTCHINSON,
OPINION
Individually and as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Walter P. Schwarm, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Gene J. Goldsman, Gene J. Goldsman and Ernest
J. Lingenfelter for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, and Daniel R.
Velladao for Defendant and Respondent.
This tort case involves application of the alternative liability
theory of causation—first approved by the California Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Summers v. Tice (1948) 33 Cal.2d 80 (Summers)—in the
context of a summary judgment motion. While driving his Ferrari on a street
in Dana Point, plaintiff Anthony Mitchell ran over and dragged with the
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underside of his vehicle one or more large rocks that had rolled onto the
roadway from the adjacent slope, causing extensive damage to Mitchell’s car
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and unspecified personal injuries. Unable to determine the precise location
from which the rocks fell, plaintiffs elected to sue multiple parties, each of
whom owns a portion of the slope, for negligence and premises liability,
including defendant Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family
Trust (Hutchinson).3

1
Plaintiffs refer to the rocks that Mitchell drove over as boulders,
and Hutchinson refers to them as rocks. The difference in terminology has no
bearing on the resolution of this appeal. Accordingly, for the sake of
simplicity and consistency, we refer to them as rocks.

2
Mitchell’s passenger, Scott Sieverts, also was named as a
plaintiff in the action. It is unclear from the record what, if any, personal
injuries he and Mitchell are alleged to have suffered.

3 Plaintiffs named Gail B. Hutchinson and the Gail B.

Hutchinson Trust as defendants in the action, and alleged both are the
owners of certain property adjacent to the roadway where the incident
occurred. “[A] trust itself can neither sue nor be sued in its own name.
Instead, the real party in interest in litigation involving a trust is always the
trustee.” (Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909, 914.) Hutchinson
submitted evidence in support of the summary judgment motion that the
property is an asset of the trust, which was not disputed by plaintiffs. We
assume, therefore, that plaintiffs intended to sue Hutchinson solely in her
capacity as trustee.

2
Hutchinson moved for summary judgment on the issue of
causation. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor
of Hutchinson. Plaintiffs appeal that order and the resulting judgment in
favor of Hutchinson.
We affirm. Hutchinson met her initial burden pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2) of showing plaintiffs cannot
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prove the element of causation as to both of their causes of action. The
burden then shifted to plaintiffs to show the existence of a triable issue of
material fact as to (1) whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or,
alternatively, (2) whether Hutchinson and the other owners of the adjacent
hillside acted negligently in maintaining their slopes such that the burden of
proof on the issue of causation would shift to defendants at trial under
Summers. Because plaintiffs did neither, Hutchinson was entitled to
summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In their operative first amended complaint filed January 29,
2021, plaintiffs alleged the subject rocks came from “one of” several
properties and that defendants “breached their duty of care when they failed
to maintain their property . . . to prevent boulders from becoming hazards to
motorists by failing to erect fencing or barriers to keep said boulders from
rolling down the hill.” Plaintiffs further alleged defendants “had notice of the
boulders on their property and failed to protect against them rolling into the

4
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated.

3
below roadway” and that it was “foreseeable that boulders would roll onto the
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roadway.”
After conducting discovery on the issue of causation and securing
an expert to opine that “[t]he physical location of the rocks prior to the
accident will never be known with any certainty” and the rocks “could have
come from any number of properties,” Hutchinson moved for summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and included
a declaration from an expert who opined that “the subject rocks . . . likely
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came from one of the three Defendants’ properties.” (Italics added.) Plaintiffs’
expert also opined that the movement of the rocks down the hillside slope
was triggered by rain preceding the incident, the rocks entered the roadway
“due to unencumbered passage from a lack of barriers and/or landslide
suppression methods,” and defendants were aware the hillside is prone to
releasing rocks due to earth shifting, irrigation, or a myriad of other factors
that contribute to loose bedrock.
The motion was heard concurrently with motions for summary
judgment filed by the other owners of the adjacent hillside. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of all of the property owners, including
Hutchinson. As to Hutchinson, the court concluded she had met her initial
burden on summary judgment and the evidence “show[ed] only that

5
Plaintiffs also sued the city of Dana Point.

6
We notified the parties of our intent to augment the record on
appeal to include plaintiffs’ opposition to Hutchinson’s motion for summary
judgment pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A), and
invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing these
additional documents. Hutchinson filed supplemental briefing and objected to
the augmentation. We overrule the objection.

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[Hutchinson’s] property was a potential source of the rocks that rolled onto
the roadway.” The trial court also concluded plaintiffs’ evidence did not create
a triable issue of material fact that defendants negligently maintained their
respective properties so as to shift the burden on the issue of causation to
defendants.
Plaintiffs timely appealed the order and resulting judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted if “there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).) “A defendant seeking
summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one
element of the cause of action.” (Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the
defendant makes this showing, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“‘On review of an order granting or denying summary judgment,
we examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect
as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] We review the entire record, ‘considering all
the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to
which objections have been made and sustained.’ [Citation.] Evidence
presented in opposition to summary judgment is liberally construed, with any
doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.”
(Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 618.) “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable issue of

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material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” (Ibid.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF HUTCHINSON

The pleadings frame the issues for summary judgment. (CDF
Firefighters v. Maldonado (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1237.) Here,
plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and premises liability
against Hutchinson and the other landowners based on a theory they were
joint tortfeasors.
“‘[The way in which] the parties moving for, and opposing,
summary judgment may each carry their burden of persuasion and/or
production depends on which [party] would bear what burden of proof at
trial.’” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 469.)
With respect to their claim for negligence, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving Hutchinson owed them a legal duty, breached that duty, and the
breach was a proximate or legal cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) The elements of a claim for
premises liability are the same as those for negligence. (Castellon v. U.S.
Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)
“Generally, the burden falls on the plaintiff to establish
causation.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968.) In
cases where the evidence shows multiple defendants acted tortiously toward
the plaintiffs, however, the burden of proof on causation may shift at trial to
the defendants. (Summers, supra, 33 Cal.2d 80.) In Summers, two hunters
negligently fired their guns in the direction of the plaintiff at about the same
time. Plaintiff was hit in the eye by a single pellet, and although it was

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impossible to determine which of the two hunters had fired the shot that
struck plaintiff, it was clear only one of them caused the injury. (Id. at p. 86.)
The California Supreme Court concluded both hunters could be held jointly
and severally liable to plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 84, 87–88.) As the Supreme Court
later explained: “Under the then applicable traditional proximate cause
standards, the plaintiff [in Summers] would have been unable to establish
which defendant had caused his eye injury. To remedy this problem, the
lower court shifted to each defendant the burden of proving, if he could, that
he was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury. [The Summers court] approved of
the procedure.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p.
970.)7
The key to shifting the burden in alternative causation cases is
proof of defendants’ negligence. “The alternative liability theory acts only to
shift the burden of proof from plaintiff to proven wrongdoers—plaintiff must
still prove that all defendants acted tortiously.” (Dumin v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 650, 657–658.)
In accordance with the requirements of section 437c, subdivision
(p)(2), Hutchinson bore the initial burden on summary judgment of showing
plaintiffs cannot prove causation. Hutchinson’s motion for summary
judgment was straightforward and raised the issue of plaintiffs’ inability to
prove causation, i.e., which of the multiple defendants who owned portions of
the hillside were responsible for the rocks rolling onto the road. As the trial

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“Justice Traynor characterized the Summers’ shift of the burden
of proof as ‘based on the policy that it is preferable to hold liable a negligent
defendant who did not in fact cause the injury than to deny an innocent
plaintiff any remedy when it cannot be determined which of the defendants is
responsible for the harm but it appears that one of them was.’” (Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 774, fn. 19.)

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court found, Hutchinson met her initial burden by introducing evidence in
the form of deposition testimony and discovery responses, as well as an
expert declaration demonstrating there is no way to tell from which property
the rocks fell and plaintiffs have no evidence to prove the rocks came from
Hutchinson’s property.
Because Hutchinson met her initial burden, the burden shifted to
plaintiffs to produce admissible evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of
material fact as to whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or,
alternatively, whether the property owner defendants, including Hutchinson,
acted tortiously toward plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did neither.
Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Gregory Axten, did not offer any
opinion on the origin of the rocks other than that they likely came from one of
three properties, including Hutchinson’s. As to why the rocks rolled onto the
roadway, Dr. Axten opined they entered the roadway due to “unencumbered
passage from a lack of barriers and/or landslide suppression methods.”
Plaintiffs submitted an unauthenticated copy of a report entitled, Residential
Geologic Evaluation (the Report) as evidence to show Hutchinson was aware
the slope was prone to landslide activity. Hutchinson did not object to the
admissibility of the Report. Even so, the Report does not support Dr. Axten’s
conclusion that Hutchinson had notice the slope was prone to landslide
activity, and plaintiffs introduced no other evidence to support this opinion.
For instance, plaintiffs did not introduce evidence that Hutchinson received
the Report or evidence explaining the significance of what it said with respect

8
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to rock slides that may occur some 24 years later. Moreover, the Report
showed Hutchinson’s property was susceptible to a low propensity for a
landslide, and there was no evidence of any rocks rolling down the hillside
after 1996 and leading up to the incident.
In addition, although Dr. Axten stated in his declaration he
reviewed Hutchinson’s deposition testimony and the exhibits to her
deposition in preparing his declaration, he did not refer to or attach any
testimony by Hutchinson, Hutchinson’s deposition transcript was not filed
with the opposition, and Dr. Axten did not mention the Report in his
declaration and attempt to tie it to his opinions. Accordingly, Dr. Axten’s
opinion that defendants were on notice the hillside was prone to releasing
rocks was without foundation and speculative, and we find no error in the
trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ evidence failed to create a triable issue
of material fact that defendants negligently maintained their property. In a
summary judgment proceeding, an expert’s opinion may be rejected if it is
conclusory, speculative or without foundation. (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc.
v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 769 [discussing
trial court’s gatekeeping role regarding admissibility of expert testimony];
Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 146, 155 [“‘[A]n expert’s opinion based on assumptions of fact
without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors
[citation], has no evidentiary value [citation] and may be excluded from
evidence’”]; Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 253 [“An

8 Plaintiffs’ counsel represented during appellate arguments that

Hutchinson’s deposition establishes that she at least received the report.
Plaintiffs did not, however, submit Hutchinson’s deposition testimony as part
of their opposition to the summary judgment motion.

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expert’s opinion is only as good as the facts on which it is built”].)
Finally, there was some suggestion by plaintiffs that there was a
tattered tarp on the hillside seen by Mitchell and photographed by plaintiffs’
expert, but there was no admissible evidence tying this tarp to Hutchinson’s
property or explaining how the existence of the tarp alone supports plaintiffs’
theories of negligence and premises liability. Plaintiffs’ argument that the
tarp “constituted an attempt, albeit insufficient, at stopping these known
rolling rocks” is entirely without foundation and speculative.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ opposition did not shift the burden back to
Hutchinson to prove the rocks did not come from her property.9

9
Although the court reached the correct conclusion in ruling on
the motion, the court incorrectly stated Hutchinson “met [her] initial burden
of demonstrating that the rocks in the roadway did not originate from [her]
property.” The expert declaration submitted by Hutchinson did not actually
exclude the possibility the rocks came from her property, but rather stated
that “[n]o one can say with certainty that the rocks came from the
Hutchinson property.” The court’s statement is of no consequence, however,
because as a matter of law Hutchinson did not have the burden to
conclusively negate the issue of causation. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) All Hutchinson needed to do was show that one
or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, which she did.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in favor of respondent Gail B.
Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust. Respondent to recover
her costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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Filed 7/10/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANTHONY MITCHELL et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063331

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01173441)
GAIL B. HUTCHINSON,
Individually and as Trustee, etc., ORDER

Defendant and Respondent.

The Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and the
Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada, third
parties to the litigation, have requested that our opinion, filed June 11, 2025,
be certified for publication. It appears that the opinion meets the standards
set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The request is
GRANTED.
The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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