People v. Hadaegh CA2/2

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Filed 7/3/25 P. v. Hadaegh CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B337945
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. LA096713)

HESAM DEAN HADAEGH, REDACTED PUBLIC
Defendant and Appellant. VERSION*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed.
Bases & Bases and Arielle Bases for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Lauren Sanchez and Viet H.
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________

* This case involves material from a sealed record. In
accordance with California Rules of Court, rules 8.45, 8.46(g)(1)
and (2), we have prepared both public (redacted) and sealed
(unredacted) versions of this opinion. We order the unredacted
version of this opinion sealed.
Defendant Hesam Dean Hadaegh appeals from a final
judgment following the denial of his motion for mental health
diversion and no contest pleas to misdemeanor stalking (Pen.
Code1, § 646.9, subd. (a)), violating a restraining order (§ 273.6,
subd. (a)), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). Hadaegh contends
the trial court erred in denying his request for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hadaegh’s no contest pleas stem from his failed
relationship with the victim, Lucia W.2
Hadaegh and Lucia were law school classmates who began
dating after graduation, in the summer of 2020.3 They split up
after about four months because Lucia discovered Hadaegh was
addicted to methamphetamines. He had also been emotionally
abusive towards her. Nevertheless, Lucia continued to see
Hadaegh “on and off” for a few more months. During this time,
Hadaegh bounced from threatening her to expressing contrition
and promising to change.
His threats were at times dire. In audio text messages, he
told her he would punch her in the face until she was dead and
make it his life’s mission to ruin her financially and
professionally. He told her she “deserved the worst kind of
torture.”

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 To protect her privacy, we refer to the victim by her first
name and last initial only. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3 We take these facts from the preliminary hearing
transcript and the documents Hadaegh submitted to the trial
court in support of his motion for mental health diversion.

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Exhausted by the cycle of abuse, Lucia broke things off for
good in July 2021. Hadaegh refused to let go. He became obsessed
with the ideas—which would later form the basis for his
diagnosis of delusional disorder—that Lucia, together with her
brother, had his computers, rendering them inaccessible, and
engaged in other hacking activities directed towards him. He
continued to call Lucia. When she blocked his number, he used
“spoofed” phone numbers to trick her into answering his calls or
to send her text messages. Some of the messages contained
threats and false accusations against her. At one point, he sent
her a video of himself holding a gun. Lucia, who knew he owned
multiple guns, interpreted this as a threat on her life.
Lucia repeatedly warned Hadaegh she would seek a
restraining order if he continued to contact her. Hadaegh failed to
heed her warnings. Lucia sought and obtained a civil restraining
order in November 2021. The day prior, Hadaegh had claimed
Lucia broke into his apartment and destroyed property .
Hadaegh reported the alleged break-in to police but they did not
find the report credible. Even as she drove to the courthouse to
get the restraining order, Hadaegh chased her in his car, honking
and speeding to catch up with her.
Hadaegh was served with the restraining order on
December 1, 2021. He did not comply with the order. Less than a
week after it was served, police notified Lucia that he had placed
a tracking device on her car. This helped to explain why she
frequently noticed Hadaegh’s red Jeep with a distinctive sticker
on its hood or saw Hadaegh himself when she was out—on the
freeway, at church, at restaurants, at the farmer’s market; in
Lucia’s words, “he was everywhere.”
Even after police removed the tracking device, Hadaegh
continued to lurk around Lucia’s apartment. She installed

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security cameras and noticed he often parked on a side street
adjoining her bedroom window. From that vantage point, he
would shine lasers through her window in the middle of the
night. On two occasions, he shot at the window with a pellet gun.
The glass never broke but Lucia discovered a hole beneath the
exterior window frame she suspected was caused by Hadaegh’s
shooting. Lucia also suffered flat tires caused by someone placing
objects under her car’s wheels while parked that punctured the
tires when she drove off; on other occasions, the car’s antennas
had been cut and its gas tank tampered with.
In February 2022, Lucia spotted a man resembling
Hadaegh on her surveillance footage with tools trying to break
into her apartment while she was home. On another occasion,
Hadaegh smeared feces on her door.
Hadaegh also continued contacting Lucia by e-mail, phone,
and text. He called her at all hours, interfering with her sleep. He
relentlessly demanded she withdraw the restraining order,
complaining it was interfering with his efforts to be admitted to
the Washington, D.C. bar. His language was threatening. For
example: “ ‘Know you want to go report me to the cops, Lucia. I F-
ing dare you to let me go to jail one more time and get out with
the rage I had the first time plus some.[4] Let that happen. Let it
happen because I already know I’m not going to give a F about
life. I’m not going to give a F about life when I walk out that jail.
Let it happen. Let it happen so I can go walk out of jail again at
midnight, walk all the way from Van Nuys, all the way to North

4 It is not clear from the parties’ briefs or the record when
Hadaegh went to jail “the first time,” as described in this
February 2022 text message. The only period of incarceration the
parties discuss is from April 2022 to October 2022.

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Hollywood where my car was[,] not having S or eat[en] in days.
[¶] . . . It’s going to be a F-ing hot night.’ ” He later continued,
“ ‘I’m going to be the worst memory of your life. Fix the F-ing
restraining order tomorrow, otherwise, you’re going to see me
every F-ing day one way or another.’ ”
In February 2022, Hadaegh started harassing a male
acquaintance of Lucia’s. Hadaegh accused him, too, of hacking
Hadaegh’s computers, and threatened to cause him harm as well.
In a message to Lucia, Hadaegh mused, “ ‘Do I kill you both or
just have him or just put you both behind bars. None of these
satisfy me.’ ”
In March 2022, another tracking device was found on
Lucia’s car. Surveillance footage from a restaurant she was
eating at showed a man Lucia believed to be Hadaegh (based on
various characteristics, including the Jeep he arrived in)
tampering with her car.
In April 2022, Hadaegh sent Lucia a photograph depicting
a dead body on the floor of his kitchen with a bracelet she had
given him. He followed up with a text message: “ ‘I don’t think
you know you’re doomed. You are the most wicked person I’ve
ever seen and you don’t even think you’re back and look at your
partner. That son of a B is more evil than you and his head will
be dipped in wax and brought before my feet.’ ” Later that day,
police arrested Hadaegh on the street adjoining Lucia’s bedroom
window. In his Jeep parked nearby, they found a two-foot
machete, a paint gun, a pellet gun, and a laser pointer.
Two days later, Hadaegh was served with a criminal
protective order prohibiting him from contacting Lucia. He
violated this protective order, too, by continuing to contact Lucia
by phone and text.

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Following his arrest, Hadaegh spent six months in state
custody.
Hadaegh was released from jail in late October 2022. From
the time of this release to the date of the determination of the
motion that is the subject of this appeal, Hadaegh was free on
bond and did not violate any restraining orders.
About a week later
Immediately upon the conclusion .
Beginning in Pacific Neuroscience Institute.
In July 2023, Hadaegh filed a motion for pretrial mental
health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion was
supported by a report by Dr. Emin Gharibian, a psychologist
diagnosed Hadaegh with delusional disorder, persecutory type .
Dr. Gharibian’s discussion supporting his conclusions was
much more equivocal than the conclusions themselves.
Regarding Hadaegh’s amenability to treatment (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(1))
Second, Dr. Gharibian reported delusional disorders are
oftentimes intractable: “Delusional disorders are very difficult to
treat since they involve fixed and ingrained beliefs that continue
to persist despite evidence to the contrary. But he tempered
expectations of what such treatment could reasonably be
expected to accomplish
Regarding the risk Hadaegh would pose if treated in the
community (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4))
The People opposed Hadaegh’s motion. After the motion
was filed, the trial court requested additional information from
the defense during a July 2023 hearing, asking whether Hadaegh
has “delusions that he’ll never surrender” and, “[i]f so, [whether
this means] there’s a continued risk if [the court] were to grant

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mental health diversion.” The court also solicited Lucia’s views on
the motion.
In September 2023, the defense had still not provided the
trial court with answers to the questions it asked in July 2023.
The court delayed resolution of the motion another two months to
allow the defense to respond.
At the next hearing, at the end of October 2023, the defense
still had not managed to answer the trial court’s questions. It
assured the court that answers would be forthcoming from a
psychiatric care provider called Mindpath Health, but that
Mindpath was still in the process of evaluating Hadaegh. The
court continued the matter for another month.
The day before that hearing, the defense offered a series of
reports from Mindpath Health. These reports are not opinions.
Instead, they They did not provide direct answers to the
questions the trial court posed in July 2023, i.e., whether
Hadaegh has “delusions that he’ll never surrender” and, “[i]f so,
[whether this means] there’s a continued risk if [the court] were
to grant mental health diversion.”
The first report,
The second report,
The third report,
The fourth report,
The fifth and final report before the trial court ruled on
Hadaegh’s motion concerned a session on November 22, 2023. In
the report, the words “ruling out” appear after the words and
“Status of prior diagnosis Delusional disorder persecutory type.”
At the November 30, 2023 hearing, the trial court inquired with
defense counsel about the meaning of these words. Counsel
agreed they “[did]n’t make sense in conjunction with the
narrative, which shows that he has these disorders . . . .”

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The trial court denied Hadaegh’s motion, concluding he was
unsuitable for diversion. It was not satisfied the evidence showed
the symptoms of Hadaegh’s mental disorder contributing to his
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)) or that, if treated in the community, he
would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in section 1170.18 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)).
Hadaegh thereafter pled no contest to three misdemeanors,
again: violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a) (stalking);
violation of section 273.6, subdivision (a) (violating a restraining
order); and violation of section 594, subdivision (a) (vandalism).
The trial court sentenced Hadaegh to three years’ probation,
including conditions for therapy, sobriety and domestic violence
training, and issued a 10-year protective order in favor of Lucia.
Upon a certificate of probable cause, Hadaegh timely
appealed denial of his motion for pretrial mental health
diversion. (§ 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36 to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants
with certain mental health disorders. [Citation.] Pretrial
diversion ‘allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and
potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of
mental health treatment.’ [Citation.] The statute expressly
promotes ‘[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the
criminal justice system while protecting public safety.’ ” (Vaughn
v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).)
To qualify for diversion, a defendant bears the burden of
making a prima facie case that (i) he is “eligible” for diversion;

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and (ii) he, and the charged offense, are “suitable” for diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (e).)
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b) sets forth the two
requirements for eligibility: that (1) the defendant has been
diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder; and (2) the
qualifying mental disorder “was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.” (Ibid.)
Suitable offenses are any not listed in section 1001.36,
subdivision (d).
A defendant is suitable for diversion if he satisfies the
four criteria set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c). As it is
undisputed that Hadaegh satisfied two of these—he consented to
diversion and waived his right to a speedy trial (id., subd. (c)(2));
and agreed to comply with treatment (id., subd. (c)(3))—we are
concerned here only with two: first, whether “[i]n the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment”
(id., subd. (c)(1)); and second, whether “[t]he defendant will not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined
in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4)).
The statute also gives the trial court discretion to deny
diversion even if the statutory requirements are met. (See
§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) However, such discretion must be
“ ‘consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing
law’ ” (People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891) and
the court’s statement of reasons for denying diversion “ ‘should
reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute
and explain why diversion would not meet those goals’ ” (Vaughn,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135).

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We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion, and its related factual
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) “A trial court has ‘broad discretion to
determine whether a given defendant is a good candidate for
mental health diversion.’ ” (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the
wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
II. Analysis
As the suitability factors are conjunctive, we may affirm if
the trial court did not err in its conclusion as to either disputed
factor. (See People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 837.) For
the reasons that follow, we find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that Hadaegh failed to show the symptoms of his
delusional disorder would respond to treatment. We need not
consider whether the court erred in finding Hadaegh would pose
an unreasonable risk if treated in the community as any such
error would necessarily be harmless. (See ibid.)
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding
Hadaegh Failed to Make a Prima Facie Case of
Suitability Under Section 1001.36,
Subdivision (c)(4)
That Hadaegh lacked an opinion of a qualified mental
health expert that the symptoms of his mental disorder would
respond to treatment is a factual finding reviewable only for
substantial evidence. This is because the question “involves
evaluating expert testimony and making conclusions based
thereon.” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079.)

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As the trial court determined there was a failure of proof on
Hadaegh’s part, our deferential review permits us to find error
only if the evidence compels a finding in his favor as a matter of
law. (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570–571.) Such a
finding is compelled only if Hadaegh’s evidence was
(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” (Id.
at p. 571.)
Dr. Gharibian opined, tracking the language of
section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1), But the trial court properly
looked beyond this conclusion to evaluate the substance of
Dr. Gharibian’s assessment of Hadaegh’s disorder. “The value of
an expert’s testimony depends on the material upon which the
opinion is based and the reasoning used to form that opinion
[citations], and a trial court is not obligated to accept even
unanimous or uncontradicted expert opinion. [Citations.] The
trial court may reject completely the testimony of an expert
witness, as long as its decision to do so is not arbitrary.” (People
v. McCoy (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 778, 785.)
As noted above, Dr. Gharibian diagnosed Hadaegh with
both delusional disorder . Hadaegh argues the trial court failed to
address his “other [mental health] disorders” . However, the
question in considering eligibility for mental health diversion is
not whether any disorder a defendant may have would respond to
treatment but whether the symptoms of “the mental disorder
causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior
would respond to mental health treatment.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
The trial court interpreted Dr. Gharibian’s report as
identifying delusional disorder as the only disorder significantly

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factoring into Hadaegh’s criminality. This interpretation is not
arbitrary. Dr. Gharibian . It was these beliefs which Dr.
Gharibian Dr. Gharibian expressly noted . Indeed,
In contrast, Dr. Gharibian . Short of offering an opinion
that they factored into Hadaegh’s criminality,
Hadaegh directs us to no opinion from a qualifying mental
health expert that or bipolar disorder significantly contributed to
his commission of the charged offenses. Indeed, Dr. Gharibian,
the only expert who offered an opinion for purposes of
section 1001.36 eligibility, Therefore, the trial court did not need
to address the other disorders or improvements in the symptoms
of those disorders reported by other psychiatrists, psychologists,
therapists or case managers.
Dr. Gharibian’s ultimate conclusion notwithstanding, he
was not optimistic about the prospects for treating the symptoms
of Hadaegh’s delusional disorder. But elsewhere in Dr.
Gharibian’s report, he noted there had been “no change in
[Hadaegh’s] symptoms, even with medications . . . .”
Hadaegh urges us to find the trial court erred in
overlooking progress Dr. Gharibian But does not necessarily
show improvement from treatment. And , such as when the
restraining order his behavior had earned him interfered with his
efforts to be admitted to the Washington, D.C. bar.
Following a preliminary review of Dr. Gharibian’s opinion,
the trial court asked the defense to provide answers to two
questions it felt Dr. Gharibian did not adequately address:
whether Hadaegh has “delusions that he’ll never surrender” and,
“[i]f so, [whether this means] there’s a continued risk if [the
court] were to grant mental health diversion.” The defense
promised answers, and ultimately had four months to provide
them. What they finally provided—the Mindpath reports—not

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only validated Dr. Gharibian’s pessimism about Hadaegh’s
prospects for recovery from his delusional disorder, but also cast
doubt on other aspects of Dr. Gharibian’s analysis.
The Mindpath reports showed Hadaegh still harbored his
paranoid delusions about Lucia. He admitted The reports
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not
act arbitrarily in rejecting Dr. Gharibian’s opinion that
Hadaegh’s mental disorder would respond to treatment.
Dr. Gharibian’s opinion itself called that conclusion into question
and the Mindpath notes cast further doubt upon it. By the time
the court denied his request for diversion, Hadaegh had
undergone extensive mental health treatment and been seen by
numerous professionals but the delusions that animated his
criminality were unchanged. (Cf. Sarmiento v. Superior
Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 894 [“On this record, where her
mental health disorders were never treated comprehensively,
there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that Sarmiento’s symptoms would not respond to
treatment.”].) Indeed, despite all of the professional help, a
definitive diagnosis remained elusive. These circumstances do
not compel a conclusion that Hadaegh’s symptoms of the mental
disorder his proffered expert identified as causing, contributing
to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental
health treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

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ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

CHAVEZ, J.

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