CourtListener 10622885•In re C.R.
Testo completo
Filed 6/12/25; certified for publication 7/3/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re C.R., a Person Coming B341335, B341338
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00340
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
G.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Juan M. Valles, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying
her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and
terminating parental rights to her daughter C.R. (born December
2020). Father is not a party to this appeal. Mother does not
challenge the merits of the court’s rulings. Rather, mother solely
contends we must conditionally reverse the order terminating
her parental rights because the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) initial inquiry under
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA), and the California statutes implementing ICWA
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) (Cal-ICWA), was deficient.1
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. Summary of C.R.’s dependency case
Mother gave birth to C.R. in December 2020, less than a
month before she turned 16 years old. The father was mother’s
adult boyfriend. Mother herself was a minor dependent of the
juvenile court. The Department had filed a section 300 petition
on her behalf in January 2020.2
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. “[W]e use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to
reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) We intend no disrespect.
2 Mother was detained from maternal grandmother in March
2020. In July 2020 the court sustained the petition’s allegations
that maternal grandmother could not properly care for or
supervise mother due to mother’s behavioral issues, including
running away to be with her adult boyfriend, who was abusive.
Maternal grandmother’s reunification services were terminated
in October 2021.
2
Mother, who was pregnant, had been placed in a short-term
residential program (STRP). Mother had a “history of running
away/being AWOL” from her placement to be with father. Father
abused mother, had forced mother to have sex with him, and
reportedly used methamphetamines. In August 2020, the court
issued a ten-year criminal protective order protecting mother
from father, but she continued to run away to be with him.
Shortly after C.R.’s birth in December 2020, the
Department received a report of general neglect of C.R.
The reporting party expressed a concern that mother would
“AWOL” and take the baby to see father and that mother
“lack[ed] the capacity to protect [C.R.] from witnessing future
abuse from father onto minor mother.” These concerns, reports
of mother and father having ongoing arguments over the phone,
and an incident where C.R. fell, led the Department to detain
C.R. from mother in January 2021. On January 22, 2021, the
Department filed a section 300 petition on C.R.’s behalf based
on mother’s and father’s history of violent altercations, and
mother’s failure to enforce—and father’s failure to comply with
—the criminal protective order, as well as father’s drug abuse.
At the January 27, 2021 detention hearing, the court
detained C.R. from parents. The court gave the Department
discretion to place C.R. with “any appropriate, assessed”
maternal relative, other than maternal grandmother. The
Department assessed both maternal aunt and maternal cousin
for C.R.’s possible placement. Maternal aunt decided against
placement, and the Department could not immediately place
C.R. with maternal cousin.
Mother entered a waiver of rights and no-contest plea
at the May 21, 2021 adjudication and disposition hearing. The
3
court sustained the petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and
removed her from parents’ custody. The court granted mother
reunification services. C.R. remained in foster care.
The court continued mother’s reunification services
several times. The Department again asked maternal cousin
and aunt about becoming C.R.’s caregiver, but they declined.
Mother continued to run away from her STRP to be with father.
On September 20, 2023, the court terminated mother’s
reunification services.
On September 24, 2024, the court denied the section 388
petition mother had filed earlier, asking for more reunification
services and for a bonding study. At the same hearing, the
court terminated mother’s parental rights to C.R. Mother filed
separate notices of appeal from the court’s orders. On mother’s
motion, we consolidated the appeals under case number B341338
for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.3
2. ICWA inquiry and findings
When the Department social worker first visited mother
and C.R. on December 24, 2020, mother denied Native American
ancestry. The Department’s January 22, 2021 detention report—
referring to mother’s earlier denial of Native American ancestry
—stated ICWA “does not apply.” On January 26, 2021, mother
filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020)
stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.”
A year earlier—as part of mother’s dependency case—
maternal grandmother filed, on January 22, 2020, an ICWA-020
3 Mother’s appeal from the court’s denial of her section 388
petition had been assigned case number B341335.
4
form also stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.”4
Maternal grandfather was deceased. That same day, the juvenile
court found it had “no reason to know” mother “is an Indian
Child, as defined under ICWA.” The court acknowledged
maternal grandmother’s ICWA-020 form was “signed and filed,”
and ordered her to keep the Department, her attorney, and
the court aware of any new information relating to possible
ICWA status. The court noted it made its no-ICWA finding
“after inquiry of [maternal grandmother] regarding her
knowledge of any possible American Indian ancestry on
[maternal grandfather’s] side.” The Department’s jurisdiction
report noted the court’s January 22, 2020 finding. The report
also stated that, on January 29, 2020, maternal grandmother
told the Department she didn’t have contact information for
maternal grandfather’s family, and she didn’t believe he had
any American Indian heritage.
At the January 27, 2021 detention hearing in C.R.’s case,5
the juvenile court confirmed with mother that her statement
in the ICWA-020 form was correct. The juvenile court found
4 We granted the Department’s unopposed request that
we take judicial notice of documents from mother’s juvenile
dependency court case file (Case No. 20CCJP00371A), including
maternal grandmother’s January 22, 2020 ICWA-020 form;
the court’s January 22, 2020 minute order; and the first two
(redacted) pages of the Department’s jurisdiction report filed
February 28, 2020.
5 C.R.’s dependency case was assigned to the same
department as mother’s case, but a different judicial officer was
presiding over that department by the time C.R.’s case was filed.
5
it did “not have a reason to know that ICWA applies as to
[m]other.”6 Before detaining C.R., the court—over mother’s
objection—admitted into evidence three reports from mother’s
dependency case. One of those reports—the report for the
January 15, 2021 section 366.21, subdivision (e) status review
hearing—stated the court, on January 22, 2020, had found ICWA
did not apply in mother’s dependency case (status review report).
The court admitted the same three reports in evidence
at the May 21, 2021 adjudication hearing. At mother’s request,
the court again admitted the status review report into evidence
at permanency review hearings in October 2022. At the
September 2023 hearing, the court admitted three reports
from mother’s case into evidence, including the status review
report, on the Department’s request.
At the initial section 388/366.26 hearing on June 5, 2024,
the court found it had “no reason to know or believe” that C.R.’s
case was governed by ICWA.7 At the continued hearing on
September 24, 2024, the court noted it had “reviewed the file”
and “continu[ed] to find no reason to know or believe that this
case is governed by [ICWA].” The court also noted it had read
both the Department’s and mother’s exhibits and was “very
mindful of mother’s own dependency history.”
6 The Department’s subsequent reports repeated this
finding.
7 Mother claims no error as to the Department’s ICWA
inquiry of father’s relatives. In brief, father filed an ICWA-020
form denying Indian ancestry. Paternal great grandfather had
no knowledge of Indian ancestry in the family, and family
members told paternal great grandmother there was none.
6
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
ICWA was enacted “ ‘to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which
will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ ” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129, quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902.)
An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined as “any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 903(4); former § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definition].)8
Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a
child is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at pp. 1131–1132, quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) “This continuing
duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire,
the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA
notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) Only the
initial duty is at issue here.
“The [D]epartment’s duty arises when a report of abuse
or neglect is made and/or when the county takes the child into
its temporary custody.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087,
8 Section 224.1 was amended, effective September 27, 2024.
(Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 2.) We refer to the definitions in effect
during mother’s earlier hearings.
7
1099 (Kenneth D.).) This initial inquiry “includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults
who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); former § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting federal definition].) And “on the first
appearance upon a petition, ‘the court shall ask each participant
present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ ” (Kenneth D.,
at p. 1099, quoting § 224.2, subd. (c).)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided
no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply thus “ ‘ “implies that . . .
social workers and the court did not know or have a reason to
know the children were Indian children and that social workers
had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” ’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding
that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2) [juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
to the proceedings is “subject to reversal based on sufficiency of
the evidence”]; see also In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
984, 1004–1005 (Ezequiel G.) [reviewing juvenile court’s finding
8
that it had no reason to know a child is an Indian child for
substantial evidence but reviewing decision that ICWA inquiry
was adequate for abuse of discretion], disapproved on another
ground in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18; Dezi C.,
at p. 1134 [declining to decide applicable standard of review].)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination
that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1141, quoting Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.)
“ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at pp. 1101–1102.) Our high court thus has held, “[i]f, upon
review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate
and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported
by sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by
California law [citation], there is no error.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
2. Initial inquiry
Mother contends the Department’s ICWA inquiry was
inadequate because the record does not indicate the Department
interviewed maternal relatives about C.R.’s potential Indian
ancestry, specifically, maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and
maternal cousin. The Department’s reports relating to C.R.’s
case show it asked mother, father, and paternal relatives about
possible Indian ancestry, all of whom denied having any. As
mother notes, the Department was in contact with maternal aunt
—mother’s sister—and maternal cousin, but there is no record
9
of the Department having asked them about C.R.’s potential
Indian ancestry. We also acknowledge there is no record of
the Department having asked maternal grandmother about the
family’s potential Indian ancestry in C.R.’s dependency case.
However, the Department and the court had questioned
maternal grandmother about both her and deceased maternal
grandfather’s Indian ancestry during mother’s dependency case,
only a year before C.R.’s case began. The undisputed evidence
shows maternal grandmother denied Indian ancestry in her
ICWA-20 form and again when questioned by the court about
it. She also told the Department she didn’t believe maternal
grandfather (mother’s father) had any Indian ancestry and
had no contact information for any of his relatives, as he had
been deceased for some time.
Mother’s dependency case was ongoing at the time C.R.’s
case began. Both cases were assigned to the same dependency
court department. Moreover, records from mother’s dependency
case were introduced and admitted into evidence in C.R.’s case at
several hearings, albeit not for the purpose of establishing ICWA
did not apply. Nevertheless, the status review report containing
the court’s earlier January 2020 finding that ICWA did not apply
to mother’s case was among the records admitted into evidence
and—as the Department argues—was before the court when it
found ICWA did not apply to C.R.’s case. Accordingly, this is not
a situation where the Department is relying on evidence showing
it made its ICWA inquiry after the juvenile court had issued its
no-ICWA finding. (Cf. Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1096,
1100–1101, 1107 [appellate court could not consider evidence
of postjudgment inquiry of father’s and paternal grandmother’s
tribal heritage to conclude failure to conduct a proper inquiry was
10
harmless].) Moreover, in Kenneth D., the child welfare agency
and court never inquired into the father’s Indian ancestry before
the court terminated parental rights. (Id. at pp. 1095–1096.)
Here, both the Department and the court asked mother and
maternal grandmother about their potential Indian ancestry
long before the September 24, 2024 hearing. And, as the
Department also notes, the same attorney represented mother
in both her own and C.R.’s cases, and the same attorney
represented the Department in mother’s case—at least in 2021
—and in C.R.’s case. In other words, everyone knew maternal
grandmother had denied Indian ancestry and that the court
already had found it had no reason to know mother was an
Indian child under ICWA.
As the Department and the court already had inquired
of maternal grandmother—and the court had found ICWA did
not apply to mother—the court reasonably could conclude there
was no reason to duplicate inquiry efforts as to mother’s side of
the family by asking maternal grandmother about her potential
Indian ancestry yet again. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1140 [compliance with ICWA early in the proceedings “avoid[s]
. . . duplicative efforts”].) The court also reasonably could find
mother’s sister (maternal aunt) would not have had any more
information about the family’s potential Indian ancestry than
their own mother (maternal grandmother) had. Similarly, given
maternal grandmother’s denial of Indian ancestry, the court
reasonably could conclude asking maternal cousin about C.R.’s
Indian ancestry was unnecessary. (See Ibid. [reversal is not
required where “every possible extended family member has
not been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry”].) Nor has
mother identified any other maternal relatives who would have
11
information about the family’s possible Indian ancestry superior
to maternal grandmother’s knowledge. (See In re D.S. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 [department “is not required to ‘cast
about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative
leads”].)
Accordingly, we agree with the Department that the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply to C.R.’s case
was based on a well-developed record demonstrating substantial
evidence supported its finding: maternal grandmother
repeatedly denied Indian ancestry in mother’s case; maternal
grandfather was deceased and maternal grandmother had
no contact information for his family; and mother repeatedly
denied Indian ancestry in C.R.’s case. In the unusual
circumstances presented here, we thus conclude the court did
not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding the Department
made an adequate inquiry into C.R.’s potential Indian ancestry
under ICWA and Cal-ICWA, and substantial evidence supported
the court’s finding that ICWA did not apply.
12
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s September 24, 2024 orders.
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
CODY, J.
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
13
Filed 7/3/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re C.R., a Person Coming Under B341338, B341335
the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00340
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES, ORDER CERTIFYING
FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff and Respondent, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
v.
G.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on June 12, 2025,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause,
it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.
There is no change in the judgment.
________________________________________________________________________
EGERTON, J. EDMON, P. J. CODY, J.
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
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