CourtListener 10622148•In re N.W. CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 7/2/25 In re N.W. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.W. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH D085210
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521099AB)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.W.,
Defendant and Respondent;
N.W. et al.,
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant, Na.W.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant, Ni.W.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent.
Na.W. and Ni.W. (Children) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders of
legal guardianship as the permanent plan at the Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 366.26 hearing. At the hearing, the court found the Children
adoptable but ruled that the beneficial parental relationship exception
applied to R.W. (Father).
The Children contend, and the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) agrees, that the juvenile court erred by finding that
exception applied because: (1) Father was not consistently visiting and
contacting the Children by the end of the case; (2) the Children’s relationship
with Father was not a substantial, positive, and emotional one given that
they feared being alone with Father and suffered emotional trauma from
earlier experiences with him; and (3) the detriment of severing that
relationship did not outweigh the security and stability of an adoptive home.
We agree with the Children and the Agency. Therefore, we reverse the
court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention and Initial Hearings
On September 3, 2022, the Agency detained the Children, ages eight
and two, after Father was transported to the hospital by paramedics due to
heavy intoxication. At the time, the home was unsanitary and unsafe, with
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
open liquor bottles and pill bottles accessible to the Children. The Children’s
mother (Mother) no longer lived in the home and was unable to care for
them.2 On those bases, the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions under
section 300, subdivision (b).
After detention, Father admitted to drinking a pint and a half of
alcohol daily. He also admitted using prescription pills. Na.W. stated that
Father “sometimes . . . takes too many pills and sleeps all day,” and she takes
care of her younger sister and cleans the home. Father continued drinking
after removal of the Children. The Agency also believed that Father had
mental health issues, including suicidal ideations, and had been abusive
toward Mother.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that the Agency
made a prima facie showing under section 300, subdivision (b) and ordered
continued placement of the Children outside of Father’s home, with liberal
supervised visitation with the parents. Father visited the Children and
registered for parenting classes. The Children looked forward to seeing him
for visits.
Several months later, the court held a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. At the hearing, the court made a true finding on the
petition, declared the Children dependents of the court, found clear and
convincing evidence to remove the Children from the parents’ custody under
section 361, subdivision (c), and maintained the Children’s placement. The
court also ordered reunification services and visitation for the parents, which
for Father would be structured, unsupervised visitation.
B. Six-Month Review Period
2 We do not discuss Mother in detail because she is not involved in this
appeal.
3
After the initial hearings, Father worked toward maintaining sobriety.
He completed a 30-day substance abuse program and began a six-month
residential treatment program. He continued consistently visiting the
Children. Na.W. was sad at the end of these visits.
By the continued six-month review hearing in August 2023, Father
made adequate progress toward resolving the issues causing detention. The
court maintained the Children’s placement and ordered liberal unsupervised
visitation for Father.
C. Twelve-Month Review Period
Following the six-month hearing, Father maintained consistent
visitation, remained in inpatient substance abuse services, and completed
parenting classes. The Children looked forward to and enjoyed Father’s
visits. The Agency noted that he “consistently participat[ed] in visits and
utilize[d] the skills from his case plan services.”
At the end of August 2023, the Children were placed with maternal
relative caregivers Steve and Shavonte and did well in the home.
At the 12-month review hearing in November 2023, the court noted
that Father had consistent contact and visits with the Children and made
significant progress on the issues leading to removal. Accordingly, the court
ordered overnight visits for Father and set an 18-month review hearing.
D. The Agency’s Section 388 Petition
On January 5, 2024, Father successfully completed his inpatient
treatment program. On January 18, 2024, Father tested positive for alcohol
use. He denied having consumed alcohol, blaming the positive result on
energy drinks.
Na.W. felt anxious about returning to Father’s care. During an
overnight visit with Father on January 26, 2024, Na.W. called her Mother,
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asking to be picked up by her caregivers because of Father’s alcohol use.
Na.W. stated, “Dad is scaring us, he is throwing up and sick.” Father had
ordered pizza and then fallen asleep. Police arrived to remove the Children
from his care. Father was extremely intoxicated and appeared unable to care
for the Children. He was verbally aggressive toward the officers.
After the incident, Na.W. reported to the Agency that Father was
drunk during the visit and, when she asked him if he was drunk, he told her
to “mind your own business before I slap you.” She stated he swore at the
police when they arrived and she did not feel safe during visits with Father.
She did not want to be left alone with him.
Ni.W. also stated that Father was drunk and mimicked throwing up.
She indicated that he scared her.
Based on this incident, the Agency brought a petition under section 388
requesting a change in the court’s order from overnight visits back to
supervised visitation for Father. The Agency also reported that, a few days
after the overnight visit, law enforcement responded to a domestic violence
call involving Father, who had grabbed Mother’s throat and appeared to be
under the influence of alcohol. Police arrested him for battery.
After the overnight visit incident, Father stopped participating in
weekly visits. The Agency made multiple telephone and in-person attempts
to contact Father, but he did not respond, and the Agency was unsure of his
whereabouts until February 22, 2024. He did not participate in two child and
family team meetings, despite the Agency’s request that he participate.
In February 2024, the court held a hearing on the Agency’s section 388
petition, granting the petition and ordering Father’s visitation to revert to
supervised visits.
E. Eighteen-Month Review Period
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When the Agency reached Father, he expressed an intention to visit
with the Children and explained he recently had back surgery. The Agency
acknowledged that may have affected his ability to visit. Beginning in early
March, Father maintained regular contact with the Agency and participated
in twice weekly telephonic visits. He expressed the intention to re-engage
substance abuse services but was unable to do so immediately. Father
declined to take a drug test as requested by the Agency. During a
March 14, 2024, telephonic call, the supervising social worker was concerned
that Father had been drinking alcohol. Father denied the claim, explaining
he was sleepy and on medication following his surgery.
The Children continued to express concern about being alone with
Father and displayed signs of emotional trauma, such as sadness and anger,
when discussing him.
The Agency was concerned about Father’s relapse shortly after
completing his program when outside of a structured program, his lack of
insight regarding his ability to maintain sobriety and its effect on the
Children, and his continued contact with Mother after the domestic violence
incident. Consequently, by the time of the 18-month review hearing, the
Agency did not believe there was a substantial probability that the Children
would reunify with Father or that extending the reunification period to
24 months was in the best interest of the Children. It recommended
terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The
Children agreed with the Agency’s recommendation to terminate services.
Father sought an extension of the reunification period, contending the
Children would likely be returned to Father with additional services given
his prior progress toward reunification. His counsel noted Father took
responsibility for his relapse and explained that he had an upcoming
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scheduled intake for additional services, but there is a waiting list for
residential services.
At the contested 18-month review hearing, the court found Father’s
progress in the case to be minimal, terminated reunification services, and set
a section 366.26 hearing. Because Father had not continued substance abuse
treatment after completing the inpatient program, the court declined to find
a substantial probability that the Children would be returned within
24 months or other good cause to extend services. The court noted the
Children’s fear related to Father’s behavior after consuming alcohol.
F. Post-service Termination Period and the Section 366.26 Hearing
In June 2024, police responded to another domestic violence incident
after Mother slapped Father. Police reported that Father was visibly
intoxicated. Mother was arrested.
In September 2024, Father brought a section 388 petition requesting
the court to change its order terminating reunification services. Father
asserted that the change was proper because he completed additional
inpatient treatment in May 2024. The Agency noted that the 24-month date
had passed, which would result in the return of the Children to Father if the
court granted the petition. Given the absence of evidence supporting a
change in circumstances aside from the five-month-old completion of
treatment, the Agency opposed a prima facie finding on the motion and the
return of the Children to Father. According to the Agency, that circumstance
did not amount to a resolution of the outstanding alcohol issue. The Children
agreed, also noting the petition did not allege Father had been visiting
consistently since his visits reverted to supervised visits. After a hearing, the
court found that Father did not make a prima facie case on the section 388
motion.
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Leading up to the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency reported that
Father’s contact with the Children had decreased. After the termination of
reunification services, Father only visited in person once. He called the
Children approximately once a month. He appeared to the caregivers to be
under the influence during some calls, which upset the Children at times.
Calls were “sporadic” and lasted “less than 10 minutes.”
The Agency reported that Na.W. “did not want to return to living with
her father because it was too much for her to take care of her father and her
little sister.” Na.W. wanted to be adopted. According to her therapist, Na.W.
“shut down” and would not engage with the therapist after visits with the
parents. Ni.W.’s therapist reported she screamed and had difficulty calming
down after in-person visitation.
After a continuance to determine the most appropriate permanent plan
for the Children, the section 366.26 hearing took place in October 2024.
Father testified that the Children love him, love seeing him, and had fun
during their unsupervised visits. He believed they would be sad if they never
saw him again. After his visitation reverted to supervised visits, he
explained he did not visit certain times because he had no money to spend on
the Children. He also explained that the caregiver sometimes does not pick
up the phone when he calls to speak to the Children, even during his set time
to call. He denied being under the influence of alcohol during calls with
them.
Father contended that the beneficial parental relationship exception
applied and sought the permanent plan of adoption. He argued the exception
to adoption applied because: (1) his attempt to make phone calls evidenced a
“consistent effort of visitation” to the extent permitted by the caregiver;
(2) the calls were positive and the Children’s enjoyment of earlier in-person
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visitation demonstrated their bond with Father; and (3) the bond outweighed
the benefit of placement.
The Agency contended that the exception did not apply because:
(1) Father had only one in-person visit since visitation reverted to supervised
and only occasional calls, not always calling during his twice weekly times;
(2) there was not a substantial positive emotional attachment after the
Children’s “painful” and “disappoint[ing]” experiences with Father such that
Na.W. expressed the desire to be adopted; and (3) any bond did not outweigh
permanency of adoption. According to the Agency, the quality of Father’s
relationship with the Children suffered as a result of the infrequent contact
and contact occurring while Father was under the influence of alcohol. The
Children were thriving in their placement, and the caregivers were willing to
adopt them and “eager to provide them with a permanent, safe and loving
home.”
The Children agreed with the Agency, with Na.W. stating she would
like to be adopted but have contact with Father.
The court found that the Children were adoptable but ordered legal
guardianship as the permanent plan, finding the beneficial parental
relationship exception applied. First, the court stated that Father had
consistent visitation “during the majority of the case,” including phone
contact since reunification services terminated. Based on Father’s credible
testimony and supporting text messages, the court found that the caregiver’s
actions limited his phone contact with the Children. Second, the court found
that a substantial positive relationship existed benefitting the Children
because they loved Father, enjoyed and looked forward to in-person visits,
and wanted to continue to have visits and contact with him. Third, the court
found, the Children’s desire to have a continued relationship with Father
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demonstrated that the harm of severing the relationship outweighed
placement in an adoptive home.
G. Post-section 366.26 Hearing Period
The Children filed this appeal of the legal guardianship order. We
issued an order deeming Father a respondent.
Meanwhile, the Agency filed a section 388 petition with the juvenile
court to change the order of legal guardianship as the permanent plan. The
change in circumstances were “the children’s really strong emotional reaction
to learning of a legal guardianship order [and] the continued phone calls to
the home with the parents having fights and being drunk.” The Children
joined in the Agency’s argument. Na.W. in particular was “really upset about
the court’s ruling” and “really wishes to be adopted.” She wanted “to be done
with this legal process . . . and fe[lt] really frustrated and disappointed that
her father continues to call her while drunk.” The court found that the
Agency had met its prima facie burden and set a contested section 388
hearing. At the January 24, 2025, contested hearing, the court granted the
section 388 petition to permit the Agency to conduct a further assessment
regarding the permanent plan and set a new section 366.26 hearing.3
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Children each contend that the juvenile court erred in
applying all elements of the beneficial parental relationship exception. The
Agency submitted a letter joining with the Children’s argument. In his
respondent’s brief, Father contends only that the Children’s appeal is moot
3 As requested by the Agency, we take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s January 24, 2025, ruling as background for the parties’ arguments on
appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459.) We also take judicial notice of
the court’s May 27, 2025, order setting the contested section 366.26 hearing
for July 22, 2025.
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due to the court setting a new section 366.26 hearing. We conclude the
appeal is not moot because, at the time of this opinion, the court’s ruling is
still in effect4 and the alleged error could affect the outcome of the
subsequent proceedings. (In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [“An
issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent
proceedings”].)
At section 366.26 hearings, the court’s goal is to select and implement a
permanent plan for the Children. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
630.) If “there has been a previous determination that reunification services
be terminated” and the court “determine[s] by clear and convincing
evidence . . . the child is likely to be adopted,” the court must terminate
parental rights unless a statutory exception applies. (Id. at pp. 630–631.)
One such exception is the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)
beneficial parental relationship exception, which requires a parent to prove
three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) This exception “is limited in scope.” (Id. at p. 631.) It
applies when “ ‘severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive
the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even
considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’
the child.” (Id. at p. 633.) In other words, “[w]hen the relationship with a
parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new
home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the
4 The court granted the section 388 petition to permit the Agency to
conduct a further assessment regarding the permanent plan, which the court
will evaluate at another section 366.26 hearing. The court does not appear to
have set aside the prior order.
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child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Id. at
pp. 633–634.) Throughout this analysis, “the focus is on the best interests of
the child.” (Id. at p. 632.)
1. Regular Visitation and Contact
In examining the regular visitation and contact element, “[t]he
question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the
extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.) We review the court’s determination as to this element for
substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 639.) “In reviewing factual determinations
for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Id. at
p. 640.)
Here, it is questionable whether substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that Father had consistent visitation and contact with
the Children to the extent permitted throughout the case. Court orders
permitted weekly in-person visits and twice weekly telephone calls. While
Father visited consistently until the January 26, 2024 overnight visit, he
visited in person only once between that date and the October 2024 hearing,
cancelling or failing to schedule other visits. After having back surgery,
Father resumed twice weekly telephonic visits in early March 2024. The
Agency reported, however, by the July 2024 reporting period, Father’s calls
during to the Children decreased to once a month.
The juvenile court found Father’s testimony credible that he attempted
to call the Children more frequently, but the caregiver did not allow it. Even
considering these attempts to call, the evidence shows irregular attempts to
contact, fewer than the twice weekly calls permitted by court order. The text
messages Father provided show that he attempted to call the caregiver to
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speak with the Children on April 30, May 6, June 10, June 17, June 18,
July 4, July 15, July 29, August 6, August 7, August 14, September 23,
September 25, October 7, October 9, October 10, October 14, October 16, and
October 17. Although this amounts to less than half the twice-weekly calls
permitted by the court order, we cannot discount the possibility that Father
was deterred from calling more frequently because his attempts were
unsuccessful.
We need not decide this question, however, because we conclude that
Father failed to meet his burden of proving the other two elements of the
beneficial parental relationship exception.
2. Substantial, Positive Attachment
To satisfy the second element, “the parent must show that the child has
a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Factors involved
in determining the benefit of the relationship include “ ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs,’ ” as well as “how children feel about, interact with, look to,
or talk about their parents.” (Id. at p. 632.) “A positive attachment between
parent and child . . . is nurturing and provides the child with a sense of
security and stability,” and “an emotional attachment is one where the child
views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate.” (In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) The required “significant attachment” arises
from an “adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment,
comfort, affection and stimulation.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
567, 575.)
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We review the court’s determination on this element for substantial
evidence. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)
Although the record shows that the Children had some relationship
with Father and wanted to continue to have contact with him, substantial
evidence does not support the finding that the relationship was a substantial,
positive, and nurturing one that benefitted the Children at the time of the
section 366.26 hearing. Rather, the record demonstrates the Children
experienced significant negative effects from interactions with Father arising
out of their exposure to his substance abuse. While “[a] parent’s continued
struggles with the issues leading to dependency are not a categorical bar to
applying the exception,” they may have a negative effect on the children such
that they are relevant to determining the benefit of continuing the
relationship. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637–638.)
Here, the Agency reported both Children were afraid of being with
Father. Na.W. was anxious about beginning overnight visits and refused to
be alone with Father after the January 24, 2024, overnight incident when he
threatened to slap her and was too intoxicated to take care of the Children.
After that night, the Agency reported that Children displayed signs of
emotional trauma, such as sadness and anger, when discussing Father.
Father continued to call the Children while under the influence, leaving them
upset at times. Na.W. consistently expressed a preference for adoption. She
did not want to live with Father “because it was too much for her to take care
of her father and her little sister.” While four-year-old Ni.W. was too young
to understand the difference between adoption and legal guardianship, she
wanted to remain living with her caregivers as her “forever home” rather
than living with her parents. In sum, while we acknowledge Father loves the
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Children, they lacked the sense of security and stability with Father to
establish the type of positive relationship required to apply this exception.
The juvenile court failed to mention this evidence of negative effects of
the parental relationship on the Children. Instead, it based its finding of a
substantial, positive relationship on the Children’s enjoyment of visits with
Father before the January 24, 2024, overnight. That evidence does not
establish a substantial emotional attachment to Father as a nurturing
parental figure who provides a sense of security and stability, but rather a
relationship more akin to that of a friend or playmate. Nor does that
evidence negate the trauma experienced by the Children when Father was
too intoxicated to care for them. Further, after visitation reverted to
supervised visits, Father’s short, sporadic phone calls in lieu of in-person
visits did not provide the opportunity for the Children to establish or
maintain the requisite significant relationship with him.
3. Detriment from Termination
To determine whether “termination would be detrimental, the trial
court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship
with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new
adoptive home.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) This
determination is based on “how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) “In
many cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’
will substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose that
relationship, which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive
home.” (Id. at p. 634.) Some “relationship[s] involve[ ] tangled benefits and
burdens” which the court must “disentangl[e].” (Ibid.) Courts may “find that
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terminating a relationship with negative aspects would have some positive
effects that weigh in the balance—and may tip it in favor of severing the
parental relationship to make way for adoption.” (Id. at p. 635.) As with the
second element of the exception, the parent’s struggles leading to dependency
may be relevant to determining whether terminating the relationship would
be detrimental to the child. (Id. at pp. 637–638.)
We review underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence,
but “the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (In re Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Although we appreciate the difficulty of a decision that could terminate
the relationship between a father and his children, we conclude the court
abused its discretion by finding that the harm of severing the relationship
outweighed placement in an adoptive home merely because the Children had
experienced enjoyable visits many months prior and wanted to continue to
have some contact with Father. “A ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive
some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of
visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference
for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818.) At this
stage of the proceedings, after reunification services have been terminated,
“to justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘ “sense of belonging a
new family would confer[,]” ’ ” there must be “some type of harm beyond the
fact that [a parent’s] loving visits would cease.” (Id. at p. 820.) Here, the
record contains no evidence of anything other than enjoyable visits between
the Children and Father during the first part of the case, when he was in an
inpatient program and maintained his sobriety. There is no evidence, for
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example, that the Children were upset when Father stopped visiting in
person or called less frequently. (Id. at p. 819.) And they became upset if he
called after drinking alcohol. Nor was there any evidence Father “played a
meaningful role” by taking part in medical appointments or child and family
team meetings. (Ibid.)
In sum, considering the totality of the evidence, the only reasonable
conclusion in this case is that the benefits of adoption—security and
stability—outweighed the harm of severing the parental relationship—loss of
the potential for enjoyable visits, which had already decreased in frequency
and duration, had become remote rather than in person, and were only
enjoyable when Father was sober.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders under section 366.26 are reversed, and the
matter is remanded. The court shall hold a new permanency planning
hearing. Absent an appropriate showing under section 388 that changed
circumstances justify different orders, the court shall terminate parental
rights and order a permanent plan of adoption.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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