People v. Ross CA3

CourtListener 10621023Calctapp1 lug 2025

Testo completo

Filed 7/1/25 P. v. Ross CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101510

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
P19CRF04422)
v.

CHRISTOPHER GARY ROSS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Christopher Gary Ross filed a petition for resentencing on his March
2022 manslaughter conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. (Statutory section
citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.) The trial court
denied the petition, finding defendant was ineligible for relief as he was charged and
pleaded guilty after section 1172.6 became effective.
Defendant appeals the order denying him postconviction relief, and defendant’s
appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
asking this court to independently review the record to determine if there are any
arguable errors that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. Defendant

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filed a supplemental brief in which he argues he meets the requirements for relief under
section 1172.6. Having considered defendant’s supplemental brief in accordance with
Delgadillo, we affirm the order.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In October 2019, the People filed a complaint against defendant alleging he and
his codefendants committed murder and that defendant committed involuntary
manslaughter of a police officer. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 192, sub. (b).) In March of 2022, the
People filed an amended complaint that charged defendant with voluntary manslaughter
and possession of cannabis for sale. (§ 192, subd. (a), Health & Saf. Code, § 11359,
subd. (d).)
Defendant pleaded no contest to manslaughter and possession of cannabis for sale
on March 1, 2022. (§ 192, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (d).)
The factual basis for defendant’s plea stipulated that defendant misled responding
sheriff’s deputies and placed them in harm’s way. As a result of his actions, one deputy
was shot and killed and a second was shot and injured. As more fully described in the
probation report, defendant called the dispatch to report he saw five unknown suspects in
his legal marijuana grow and that they were attempting to steal his marijuana. Deputy
sheriffs responded and contacted defendant who directed them to the “garden,” and was
described as “inappropriately calm.” Despite the quiet scene, the deputies were soon
subject to deadly fire from men in the garden that killed one officer and injured another.
After giving several versions of his story, defendant admitted he called the sheriff’s
department because he believed men were stealing his marijuana and would not pay him.
He hoped the deputies would show up and catch the men stealing marijuana and arrest
them for trespassing. He did not want to handle the matter himself because he was afraid
the thieves might kill him.

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Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term
of 11 years in state prison on the voluntary manslaughter charge and a consecutive term
of eight months for the possession of cannabis for sale.
In 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 alleging
he had been charged with murder under a pleading that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime; he had been convicted murder, attempted
murder or manslaughter after trial or a plea; and he could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.
The People opposed the motion, arguing, “The defendant’s argument lacks merit
as the law had already changed prior to his having even committed the offense.” At the
hearing on the motion, defendant’s attorney conceded, “Because [defendant] entered a
plea after the effective date of the statute, the procedure does not apply to him[.]”
The trial court denied the motion finding the defendant was not eligible for relief
because at the time defendant entered his plea (March 2022), the law had already been
changed (in 2019) and counsel and the courts were aware of this change.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
The independent review procedures in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 are
not constitutionally required in an appeal from a postconviction order denying a section
1172.6 petition for resentencing. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 222,
224-225.) Where, as here, defendant has been notified that his appeal may be dismissed
pursuant to Delgadillo and he files a supplemental brief raising issues he wants
considered, we must evaluate the specific arguments presented in the defendant’s

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supplemental brief, but we are not required to independently review the record, although
we may exercise our discretion to do so. (Id. at pp. 228-232.)
We turn to the issue raised in defendant’s supplemental brief that he was eligible
for relief under section 1172.6. Defendant repeats his contention he was charged under
the law that existed prior to the enactment of section 1172.6. He further asserts he was
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, and was not a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference. Based on this, he asserts he was charged with
second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and he
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter based on his fear of being convicted of murder.
Effective January 1, 2019 [10 months before defendant was originally charged],
the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437),
which amended sections 188 and 189 to significantly limit the scope of the felony-murder
rule and eliminate second degree murder liability predicated on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 587; People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 & fn. 1.) Senate Bill 1437 also created “a special
procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive
relief,” codified at former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). (Strong, at p. 708.)
Later, effective January 1, 2022 [three months prior to his plea], Senate Bill No.
775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) expanded the categories of offenders
eligible to petition for resentencing to include those convicted of attempted murder and
manslaughter.
Thus, at the time of his plea in March 2022 and continuing to this day, section
1172.6 specified that a person convicted of manslaughter must meet the following three
conditions to seek resentencing: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a

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crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶]
(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following
a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been
convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he fails to satisfy
the first and third conditions of section 1172.6. The People charged defendant with
murder in October 2019 -- 10 months after Senate Bill 1437 had already changed murder
liability under sections 188 and 189. Therefore, it was not possible for “the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that [defendant’s] participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Those
theories of murder liability were no longer legally permitted when the People charged
him. (Cf. People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 298 [holding that the defendant
was ineligible for resentencing under § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1) because “when th[e] criminal
proceeding was initiated [in 2020], the prosecution was precluded from proving the
murder charge under a theory of imputed malice”].)
Moreover, because defendant pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter in
March of 2022 after both Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill 775 were in effect, he cannot
establish that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 [by Senate Bill1437] made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see also People v. Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 590, fn. omitted [concluding that resentencing is unavailable as a matter of law under
§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3) to a defendant “who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time
when imputed malice theories had already been statutorily eliminated”]; People v.

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Gallegos (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434, 443; cf. People v. Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298.)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

,
HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE, J.

DUARTE, J.

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