CourtListener 10620154•Kaplan v. Kaplan CA2/4
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Filed 6/30/25 Kaplan v. Kaplan CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JEFFREY A. KAPLAN, B329507
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. D231222,
v. BC529916, BC532950)
DONNA L. KAPLAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eli Chernow, Judge. Affirmed.
Cooksey, Toolen, Gage, Duffy & Woog, Phil Woog, Matthew
R. Pahl for Plaintiff and Appellant.
PB Law Group, Luan K. Phan, Jody Borrelli; Complex
Appellate Litigation Group, Jens B. Koepke for Defendant and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jeff Kaplan and Donna Kaplan divorced in 1996. As part
of the dissolution proceeding, the Kaplans’ partial ownership of
several mobile home parks was divided. According to the court
order, Jeff1 would continue to manage these assets, and he would
act as Donna’s fiduciary in doing so.
As part of an ongoing proceeding, Donna filed a cross-
complaint against Jeff for breach of fiduciary duty, asserting that
Jeff was subjecting Donna to substantial tax consequences
through his interpretation of an agreement between Jeff and his
business partner involving the mobile home parks. Jeff filed a
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16.2 Jeff asserted that Donna’s claim
arose out of Jeff’s filings in litigation regarding the business
agreement, which was protected activity. Jeff’s motion was
denied, and Jeff appealed.
We affirm. Donna alleged that Jeff breached his fiduciary
duties by pursuing a course of action that would subject Donna to
serious tax consequences. Although Jeff asserted this position in
litigation, breaching one’s fiduciary duties is not protected
activity. The legal filings were merely evidence supporting
Donna’s claim. Thus, Donna’s claim did not arise from Jeff’s
actions in the litigation, and the motion was correctly denied.
1 We follow the parties’ lead and refer to them by their first
names. No disrespect is intended.
2 All undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits against public
participation.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 133, 139.)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Divorce, FJRI, and buy-sell agreements
Jeff and Donna were married from 1969 to 1996. In 1999,
the couple’s distribution of community property was finalized in a
stipulated “Further Judgment on Reserved Issues” (FJRI). The
couple maintained ownership interests in several mobile home
parks in California, which the FJRI called “divided assets.”
Under the FJRI, Jeff would continue to manage the divided
assets and act as Donna’s fiduciary, as follows: “[Jeff] shall hold
[Donna’s] interests as a trustee in trust, and he shall have the
duty to act with utmost good faith as trustee for [Donna’s] assets
in the highest sense possible as a fiduciary. He shall act as a
fiduciary with respect to [Donna’s] interests with the same
fiduciary duty to [Donna] that a husband would have to a wife . . .
and that business partners have to each other.”
The FJRI also stated that Jeff “shall have the unilateral
right to manage and control” the divided assets, including “the
sole right to make all day-to-day and all other management
decisions.” Subject to Jeff’s fiduciary duties to Donna, Jeff also
had the “unilateral and sole right to make all decisions relating
to any sale or financing” of the divided assets, and if Jeff “desires
to sell or finance any of the Divided Assets, he must seek the
prior consent of [Donna] if, but only if [sic], the transaction will
generate a material adverse tax consequence” to Donna.
Jeff and Donna stipulated to have Judge Eli Chernow,
retired, preside over any further disputes under section 638,3 and
3 Under section 638, parties may consent to have any
controversy heard by a referee in an ongoing litigation. The
decision of the referee will then “stand as the decision of the
court.” (§ 644, subd. (a).)
3
they agreed that the superior court would retain jurisdiction to
resolve any additional issues.
Jeff’s business partner in the divided assets is Thomas T.
Tatum. In 1983, Jeff and Tatum entered into a “buy-sell
agreement” intended to “protect the management and control of
the Partnerships against intrusion by persons not active in the
business of the Partnerships or not acceptable to the Partners as
a co-manager and co-owner of the partnerships.” The 1983 buy-
sell agreement stated that upon the death of Jeff or Tatum, “the
surviving Partner shall purchase, and the estate of the deceased
partner shall sell to the surviving Partner, all of the deceased
partner’s right, title and interest” in the assets. The buy-sell
agreement was amended several times. The 1998 version
specifically acknowledged that a portion of Jeff’s interests were
held in trust for Donna. Donna was not a party to the buy-sell
agreement.
The FJRI acknowledges the buy-sell agreement, stating
that upon Jeff’s death his interests must be sold to Tatum, and
upon Tatum’s death his interests must be sold to Jeff. Pursuant
to the buy-sell agreement, Jeff maintained a life insurance policy
on Tatum to facilitate a purchase in the event of Tatum’s death,
and the FJRI allowed Donna to “have the right to purchase one-
half of Tatum’s interest in the existing Divided Interests at the
time of Tatum’s death,” as long as she contributed to the life
insurance premiums. The FJRI also stated that upon Donna’s
death, Jeff had the right to purchase her shares of the divided
assets.
According to Donna, the buy-sell agreement and the FJRI
say nothing “about forcing Donna to involuntarily sell her
beneficial interests” in the divided assets. She asserts that the
4
buy-sell agreement states that upon Jeff’s death, Tatum must
buy out all interests, which “would have the effect of
involuntarily forcing Donna’s beneficial stake into a sale while
she was alive, causing . . . tens of millions in negative tax
consequences to her.” Donna notes that the FJRI requires
Donna’s consent to any sale or financing of the divided assets
that would cause her negative tax consequences.
B. Current litigation
1. Background
Donna filed two lawsuits in 2013 and 2014. The subject
matter of these lawsuits is generally irrelevant to this appeal, so
we describe them only briefly. First, in December 2013 Donna
filed a complaint against the mobile home parks’ management
company (an entity controlled by Jeff), alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty in the management of the parks. Second, in
January 2014, Donna filed a complaint against Jeff for breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and accounting. The superior court
transferred the matters to Judge Chernow pursuant to the FJRI
and section 638.
After two “trial” phases before Judge Chernow, a “phase 1”
ruling was issued on March 26, 2019, and a tentative statement
of decision for “phase 2” was issued on October 30, 2019. In the
phase 1 ruling Judge Chernow found in favor of Jeff, and in the
phase 2 tentative ruling he partially found in favor of Donna.
There is no final ruling as to phase 2.
2. Cross-complaint
On May 11, 2023, in the matters that remained pending
before Judge Chernow, Jeff filed a document titled “Statement of
Claim for Declaratory Relief re Buy-Sell Agreement.” Jeff stated
that following the conclusion of the previous phases, new conflicts
5
had arisen that needed to be addressed by Judge Chernow. One
issue was that Tatum and his children, acting on behalf of
Tatum’s deceased ex-wife, had challenged the buy-sell agreement
in a lawsuit we will call the Tatum action. In the Tatum action,
Jeff filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity and
declaratory relief. Donna was named as a defendant in the
Tatum action, and Jeff filed a motion for leave to intervene as
trustee of Donna’s interests.
In his request for declaratory relief before Judge Chernow,
Jeff stated that he was seeking a declaration “that Donna Kaplan
is bound by the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, which means
that if Jeff Kaplan were to die before Tom Tatum, Donna Kaplan
would be obligated to sell her financial interest in the Divided
Asset parks to the Tatums, and conversely, if Mr. Tatum were to
die first, Donna Kaplan and Jeff Kaplan are both obligated to
purchase all of the interests of the Tatums.”
Donna then filed a cross complaint for breach of fiduciary
duty and removal of Jeff as her trustee. Donna alleged that she
“is not bound by the Buy-Sell Agreement . . . . Ms. Kaplan never
signed the agreement, or knew of it when it was negotiated. Nor
did she ratify it.” She further asserted, “Critically, Donna
Kaplan would suffer severe financial losses running in the tens of
millions of dollars, if the Buy-Sell Agreement were enforced
against her, as Jeff Kaplan seeks by his Claim. Any effort by Jeff
Kaplan to enforce the Buy-Sell Agreement against Donna
therefore constitutes an independent, further breach of his
fiduciary duties to her, given the extreme harm it would cause
her.” Donna alleged that Jeff had “charted a course and taken
actions motivated by revenge and malice instead of abiding by
the fiduciary duties he owes to Donna Kaplan. He has done so in
6
the actions he seeks to impose in relation to the Buy-Sell
Agreement here, and in the prior-filed Tatum Action in which
Donna Kaplan is also sued as a defendant.”
Donna’s cross-complaint noted that at “a hearing held in
this matter on March 1, 2022, Judge Chernow raised sua sponte
that it may well constitute a breach of fiduciary duty for Jeff
Kaplan to seek to impose the Buy-Sell Agreement against Ms.
Kaplan now, in light of the circumstances that exist today.”
Donna also alleged that she would face tax liabilities of over $51
million if the buy-sell agreement was imposed against her, as
stated in a deposition by her tax expert. Donna further alleged
that Tatum agreed that Donna was not subject to the buy-sell
agreement, and therefore “[a]ll parties except Mr. Kaplan oppose
the interpretation of the Buy-Sell Agreement that Mr. Kaplan
seeks to impose by his Claim. There is no necessity or discernible
justification for Jeff to continue to push for this.” Donna alleged
that “unless restrained, Jeff will continue to breach fiduciary
duties he owes to Donna and interfere with Donna’s right to the
full and complete benefits of her ownership interests in the
Divided Assets, thus engendering a multiplicity of judicial
proceedings.” Donna further alleged that “the animosity and
breakdown in communication between Donna and Jeff render it
impossible for him to exercise any discretionary powers fairly and
act impartially toward her.” She therefore sought Jeff’s removal
as trustee of the divided assets.
3. Special motion to strike
Jeff filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike Donna’s
cross-complaint under section 425.16. Under that statute, “[a]
cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the
‘right of petition or free speech under the United States
7
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster Energy Co.
v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788, citing § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
First, the [moving party] must establish that the challenged
claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.]
If the [moving party] makes the required showing, the burden
shifts to the [opposing party] to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Protected activity includes
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)
Jeff argued that Donna’s cross-complaint arose from
protected activity in that the cross-complaint “alleges two ‘acts’
by Jeff that [constitute a] breach of fiduciary duty: First, Jeff has
filed [his declaratory relief claim] seeking a declaration that
Donna’s interests are subject to the Buy-Sell Agreement; and
second, Jeff has asserted in the Tatum Action that the Buy-Sell
Agreement is enforceable.”4 He asserted that his filing of the
declaratory relief claim “was by definition an act in furtherance
of the right to petition or free speech,” because it “quite literally
constitutes direct petitioning activity to the court for a ruling in
the ongoing action.” He asserted that his declaratory relief claim
“concerns whether Donna’s financial interests are bound by the
4 Jeff also filed a request for judicial notice that included
documents from the Tatum action, deposition transcripts, and
documents filed in the dissolution proceeding.
8
terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, a simple ‘yes-or-no’ proposition
that should be resolved under the dispute resolution terms of the
FJRI. Donna has pounced on the opportunity to make another
misguided stab at punitive damages by reframing the
[declaratory relief claim] and Jeff’s successful efforts to defend
the enforceability of the Buy-Sell Agreement from Tatum as some
type of ‘breach of fiduciary duty.’” Jeff continued, “With regard to
the Tatum Action, Jeff’s statements, arguments, and pleadings in
furtherance of defending the enforceability of the Buy-Sell
Agreement likewise arose from protected petitioning activity.”
He argued, “Statements made with a good faith belief in a legally
viable claim will be protected by both the litigation privilege and
the anti-SLAPP statute.”
Jeff further asserted that Donna could not meet the second
prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because she could not
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. He
asserted that Donna could not show that Jeff’s actions
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. Jeff further asserted that
Donna’s speculation about the tax implications of a possible
future scenario did not constitute damages. Jeff further
discussed several defenses to Donna’s claims, including laches,
ratification, and litigation privilege.
4. Opposition
In her opposition, Donna asserted that her cross-complaint
was not based on protected activity. She argued, “The activity
giving rise to Donna’s harm is Jeff’s breach of his fiduciary duties
by formulating the plan whereby he asserts that Donna is bound
by the 1998 Buy-Sell Agreement, and seeking to impose that
contract on her though its terms are extremely detrimental.” She
asserted that although Jeff’s litigation activities were evidence of
9
his breach of fiduciary duties, Donna’s claim did not arise from
that activity. Donna also argued that breaching one’s fiduciary
duties is not protected activity under section 425.16. She further
contended that she could meet her burden on the second step of
the analysis, because she was likely to prevail on the merits of
her claims.
Jeff filed a reply in support of his motion.
5. Ruling
After a hearing, Judge Chernow issued a short written
decision denying Jeff’s motion “for the reasons stated in the
opposition.” The court further stated that although Donna’s cross-
complaint was “not perfect, the clear fair reading of” her cross-
complaint demonstrated that the “issue is not the form of Mr.
Jeffrey Kaplan[’s] pleading, but the substance behind it.”
Jeff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Jeff contends Judge Chernow erred in denying his special
motion to strike at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. He
argues that Donna’s claims did arise out of protected activity, and
therefore we should consider the second step of the analysis,
which he contends we should also resolve in his favor. We find no
error.
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion. [Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in
determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the
challenged claims arise from protected activity. [Citations.] In
addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning
the facts upon which liability is based. [Citations.] We do not,
however, weigh the evidence, but accept [the opposing party’s]
submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary
10
evidence from [the moving party] establishes its entitlement to
prevail as a matter of law.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)
The appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating
error. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
“The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting
factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the [cross-
complainant] has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a
prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment. It accepts the [cross-complainant’s] evidence as true,
and evaluates the [cross-]defendant’s showing only to determine
if it defeats the [cross-complainant’s] claim as a matter of law.
[Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may
proceed.’” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385.)
In the first step under the anti-SLAPP analysis the court
determines whether the claims arise from protected activity.
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009
(Bonni).) As noted above, protected activity includes “any written
or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) “A claim arises from protected
activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the
claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) “[A] claim may be
struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading
to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Id. at p.
1060.)
Here, Donna alleged two causes of action: breach of
fiduciary duty, and “removal of Jeffrey Kaplan as trustee.” The
second claim is more a remedy than a cause of action. Thus, we
11
examine the elements of Donna’s breach of fiduciary duty cause
of action. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009 [“At th[e] first
step [in the anti-SLAPP analysis], courts are to ‘consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the [cross-
]defendant supply those elements and consequently form the
basis for liability’”].)
“‘The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1)
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3)
damage proximately caused by that breach.’” (O’Neal v.
Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1184, 1215.) The parties agree that Jeff had a
fiduciary duty to Donna under the FJRI. The relevant question,
therefore, is whether Jeff’s alleged breaches of his fiduciary duty
constituted protected activity.
Donna alleged that Jeff breached his duties under the FJRI
by taking the position that Donna was subject to the buy-sell
agreement. Donna alleged that this position was detrimental to
her interests, because it would subject her to serious tax
consequences she would not otherwise be subject to. Jeff asserts
that there are only two “acts” alleged in the cross-complaint, and
they both constitute protected activity: Jeff’s filing of the
declaratory relief claim, and Jeff’s motion in the Tatum action
seeking leave to intervene as Donna’s trustee. However, Donna
cited these two acts as evidence that Jeff, as Donna’s fiduciary,
was failing to adequately protect Donna’s interests under the
FJRI. Donna’s cross-complaint did not arise from those two acts.
The reasoning of Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
864 (Gaynor) demonstrates this point. There, a man died and left
a trust for his children and grandchildren. When some of the
beneficiaries sued the trustees, the trustees filed a special motion
12
to strike, asserting that the gravamen of the beneficiaries’
petition arose from the trustees’ protected activity in probate
litigation. (Gaynor, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 875.) For
example, the beneficiaries asserted that the trustees “violated
their statutory duties of loyalty and fair treatment by ‘wasting
Trust assets’ on legal fees and costs to pursue” certain litigation
actions, and “wrongfully forced the . . . beneficiaries to spend
funds to oppose/defend these petitions and activities.” (Id. at p.
879.)
The Court of Appeal held that the beneficiaries’ claims did
not arise from protected activity. “We agree that filing petitions,
motions, and briefs in court (and/or assisting in the filing) are
protected petitioning activities under the anti-SLAPP statute.
[Citations.] But the . . . beneficiaries’ breach of fiduciary claim
was not based on these protected activities.” (Gaynor, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 880.) Rather, the beneficiaries alleged that the
trustees had a “plan to change the trustee succession rules to
allow the [trustees] to operate and control the Trust to advantage
a select portion of the beneficiaries. Thus, the activity giving rise
to the . . . beneficiaries’ alleged harm was the breach of loyalty in
formulating and pursuing this plan and the improper use of
Trust assets to wrongfully benefit [the trustees]. Although the
alleged breach of loyalty may have been carried out by the filing
of probate petitions, it was not the petitioning activity itself that
is the basis for the breach of fiduciary claim.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999
(Starr), the trustee of a father’s trust authorized trust funds to be
used for a lawsuit alleging elder abuse against the father’s sons.
(Starr, supra, at pp. 1010-1011.) A guardian ad litem in the case
found that the father’s cognitive issues left him susceptible to
13
undue influence, and that the father had no conflict with his
children. (Id. at p. 1011.) One son, Jonathan, then filed a
petition against the trustee, Ashbrook, for breach of trust.
Ashbrook filed a special motion to strike, alleging that Jonathan
was suing him “for bringing and funding litigation, which are
protected activities under section 425.16(e)(1) and (2).” (Id. at pp.
1012-1013.)
Relying in part on Gaynor, the trial court denied the motion
at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Starr, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. It noted
that “[a]t first glance, [Ashbrook’s] actions appear to constitute
the constitutionally protected activities of filing and pursuing
[litigation] and using trust assets to fund the elder abuse
lawsuit.” (Id. at p. 1020.) However, “[c]loser analysis” revealed
that “the basis of liability is not the filing and funding of
litigation, but is, as Jonathan contends, the waste and misuse of
trust money.” (Ibid.) The court continued, “The core injury-
producing conduct asserted by Jonathan . . . is the waste and
misuse of trust assets. Jonathan does not allege that [the
litigation] itself produced the injury or gave rise to liability. The
injury allegedly suffered is the loss of trust assets and the
reduction of the trust corpus, and that injury was produced by
the waste and misuse of those assets by Ashbrook . . . . The
[litigation] merely serve[s] as evidentiary support for Jonathan's
claim.” (Ibid.)
The reasoning of Gaynor and Starr applies here. The
purported “protected activity”—Jeff’s filing of documents in the
Tatum action and this action—was not the basis of Donna’s
claim. Rather, this was evidence supporting Donna’s claim that
Jeff engaged in a course of conduct that undermined Donna’s
14
interests and therefore violated Jeff’s fiduciary duties to her.
Had Jeff, as Donna’s trustee, privately asserted that Donna was
bound by the buy-sell agreement and acted upon that
determination—for example, in private negotiations with Tatum
and without any court involvement—Donna’s breach of fiduciary
duty cause of action would remain the same, despite the lack of
any protected activity.5 As the court stated in Starr, “Misconduct
in the administration of a trust and preservation of trust assets is
not action ‘in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution.’ (§ 425.16(b)(1).)” (Starr, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1021; see also Talega Maintenance Corp. v. Standard Pacific
Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 730 [breach of fiduciary duty is
not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute when the protected activity
is “merely incidental” to the claim]; Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 1004, 1019-1020 [alleged breach of fiduciary duty by
diverting money did not constitute protected activity, even if the
diverted funds were used to further protected activity].)
It follows that allegations regarding a breach of fiduciary
duty are not subject to a motion to strike simply because the
allegedly wrongful “action or decision . . . was thereafter
communicated by means of speech or petitioning activity.” (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) Indeed, the Supreme Court warned
5 Jeff also acknowledged in a declaration filed below, for
example, that “[o]ver the years, Donna has . . . contacted [him] on
several occasions to try [to] change the terms of the life
insurance” policy she holds “in order to deal with potential tax
consequences given the application of the Buy-Sell Agreement.”
Such private conversations are not “in connection with a public
issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
15
in Park that “[f]ailing to distinguish between . . . challenged
decisions and the speech that leads to them or thereafter
expresses them ‘would chill the resort to legitimate judicial
oversight over potential abuses of legislative and administrative
power.’” (Id. at p. 1067.) Thus, courts must be mindful of the
“distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and
those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide
evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064.) Here,
although Jeff’s petitioning activity may constitute evidence that
he was failing to protect Donna’s interests, the petitioning
activity itself is not the alleged breach.
Jeff compares this case to Wilson v. Cable News Network,
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871 (Wilson), in which the Supreme Court
stated that in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, courts
examine “the conduct of defendants without relying on whatever
improper motive the plaintiff alleged.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 888.) Jeff asserts that here, it was “error to consider
arguments concerning Jeff’s motives,” and instead the focus
should have been only on Jeff’s actions.
The comparison to Wilson is not apt. In Wilson, “a
journalist allege[d] that his employer denied him promotions,
gave him unfavorable assignments, and ultimately fired him for
unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory reasons.” (Wilson, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 881.) Addressing the first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis in relation to employer CNN’s motion, the Supreme
Court noted that “all of Wilson’s employment-related claims
depend on two kinds of allegations: (1) that CNN subjected
Wilson to an adverse employment action or actions, and (2) that
it took these adverse actions for discriminatory or retaliatory
reasons.” (Id. at p. 885.) The court stated, “It is ordinarily
16
perfectly permissible for an employer to decide not to hire, not to
promote, or to fire an employee. The employer may not, however,
act based on ‘the race, religious creed, color, national origin,’ or
other protected characteristic of the employee. . . .” (Id. at p.
886.) The court held that a plaintiff may not defeat an anti-
SLAPP motion by simply alleging that “ordinarily perfectly
permissible” actions were based on improper motives. Rather,
“[i]f the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff's claim are of the
sort protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, then anti-SLAPP
protections apply.” (Id. at p. 887.)
Here, by contrast, motive is not an element of Donna’s
fiduciary duty cause of action. (See, e.g., Manlin v. Milner, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1020 [the reason for a breach of fiduciary
duty is not an element of such a claim].) It is not “ordinarily
perfectly permissible” for a trustee to undermine a beneficiary’s
interests, as long as the trustee maintains a neutral motive.
Thus, the reasons for focusing on actions rather than motivations
in Wilson do not apply in the context of this case.
We therefore find no error in Judge Chernow’s conclusion
that Jeff failed to demonstrate that Donna’s claims arose out of
protected activity. As such, the motion was appropriately denied
at the first step, and we need not proceed to the second step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis.
DISPOSITION
The ruling on the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Donna Kaplan is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
17
We concur:
MORI, J.
UHRIG GARCIA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
18
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