People v. Martinez CA4/1

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Filed 6/27/25 P. v. Martinez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083984

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD299378)

MARK MARTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

A jury convicted Mark Martinez of being an accessory after the fact in
violation of Penal Code section 32 and the trial court sentenced Martinez to
three years in state prison.1 The conviction arose after Martinez helped an
associate, who shot a police officer, escape apprehension. On appeal,
Martinez argues reversal is required because there was no evidence he knew
the associate had committed a felony. We reject this argument and affirm
the conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2023 around 11:00 a.m., San Diego Police Officer James
Romero was on duty in a high-crime area when he noticed a white pickup
truck that looked suspicious. Romero began following the truck in his patrol
car and looked up the license plate in law enforcement databases. Romero
discovered the truck was stolen and relayed this information to police
dispatch, which sent additional police units towards Romero. Romero
continued to follow the stolen truck, but did not initiate a traffic stop right
away to allow time for additional police to get closer.
Romero eventually turned on his patrol car’s lights to initiate a stop.
He saw the driver “fidgeting in the car,” and thought the driver might be
having car trouble. The driver then abruptly jumped out of the car and
began running while the abandoned truck rolled into another car. Romero
stopped his car, jumped out, and began pursuing the driver on foot. As
Romero pursued the driver into a walkway between buildings, the driver
fired a gunshot at Romero, hitting him in the right arm. Romero testified the
shot was fired from an alley. Romero took cover under a nearby stairwell and
then heard a second gunshot. He applied a tourniquet to his arm and began
to retreat back to his patrol car.
Around the same time, a witness, Jamie M., was walking from her
home to her car, which was parked in the alley, to leave for work. Jamie

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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noticed a black four-door, flat-back Honda driving east slowly through the
alley toward its dead-end. Jamie got into her car and then saw the Honda
turn around and drive west past Jamie towards the alley’s exit. Jamie
described the driver as a Hispanic man in his 20s with dark hair above his
shoulders. The Honda remained parked at the end of the alley, blocking
traffic, including Jamie, from exiting the alley to the street.
Jamie continued to watch the Honda, waiting for it to clear so she could
leave, and then heard the first gunshot. Jamie saw a man run out from a
building in her rearview mirror. She described the man as medium build,
five-eight or nine, and light-skinned Hispanic or white. She said he was
carrying a blue reusable Wal-Mart bag, and holding a black handgun with a
square barrel. Jamie then saw the man fire a second shot, and watched him
run towards the exit of the alley. Another neighbor came out of her garage
and Jamie looked to the neighbor to see if she was injured. When Jamie
looked back to see where the shooter was, both the shooter and the black
Honda were gone. During her testimony, Jamie identified Martinez as the

driver of the Honda.2
Thereafter, investigators determined the white truck had been reported
stolen two days before the shooting. After the shooting, the police processed
the truck for fingerprints to try to identify the driver. Martinez’s palm print
and the fingerprints of J.C. Sartor were found on a box in the truck.
Investigators also recovered surveillance videos from several nearby

2 At the preliminary hearing, Jamie testified that she did not recognize
Martinez as the driver. However, after that testimony she spoke with the
District Attorney’s investigator and confessed that she did not identify
Martinez because she feared for her safety and the safety of her family. She
told the investigator she “was 100 percent sure that [Martinez] was the guy
she saw in the car, but she was too scared to admit it.”
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residences and businesses. The videos showed the black Honda driving in
front of the stolen truck before Romero attempted to stop the truck. Another
surveillance video showed the black Honda and the truck both driving
eastbound on University Avenue. Before the shooting, the video surveillance
showed the white truck and patrol car turning left onto Wightman. Around
11:09 a.m., video surveillance captured gun shots, followed shortly after by
the black Honda driving through a stop sign and speeding away from the
scene of the shooting.
After investigators identified Sartor as the suspect in the shooting, they
identified a phone number that belonged to Sartor’s previous girlfriend. This
led investigators to a house on Livingston Street, where they conducted
surveillance over two days. On June 13, 2023, investigators stopped a car
Martinez was riding in leaving the Livingston Street house. The
investigators arrested Martinez and obtained a warrant to search his cell
phone. This search revealed an address in Kearny Mesa where Sartor had
been located and arrested.
A subsequent analysis of phone records from Sartor and Martinez’s cell
phones revealed they communicated with each other over 121 times between
June 7, 2023, and June 10, 2023. The communications included completed
calls, text messages, and attempted calls that went to voicemail. On June 7,
2023, Sartor and Martinez communicated 61 times. On June 8, 2023, the day
of the shooting, they communicated 40 times. On June 9, 2023, they
communicated 14 times and on June 10, 2023, the day of Sartor’s arrest, they
communicated 6 times.
Shortly before the shooting, between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., Sartor
called Martinez three times and Martinez called Sartor once. The cell phone
towers that their phones connected to indicated Sartor and Martinez were in

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the same general location during this time. Between 10:50 a.m. and 11:04
a.m., which was approximately five minutes before the shooting, their phones
showed that they were in the same general location in City Heights. In this
14-minute window of time, Sartor called Martinez three times and Martinez
called Sartor twice. Both phones were connected to cell phone towers in the
same general area where the shooting occurred.
Further, Sartor had a 4 minute and 15 second phone call with Martinez
“that started at 11:05:17 ... and ... ended at 11:09:32.” This call began around
the time Officer Romero started following Sartor. The shooting occurred at
approximately 11:09 a.m., around the time the phone call ended. The phones
continued to be connected to cell phone towers in the area of the shooting.
Cell phone tower data also showed that both phones were connecting to the
same cell phone tower at 11:24 a.m., indicating the two men remained in the
same area.
After his arrest, Martinez was charged with being an accessory after
the fact. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Martinez guilty and the
trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison. Martinez timely
appealed from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
Martinez’s sole contention on appeal is that insufficient evidence
supported the jury’s finding that he knew Sartor had committed a felony.
I
Legal Standards
When we consider a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction we apply the familiar substantial evidence standard of review.
Under that standard we review the entire record, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the jury’s findings. We do not make credibility

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decisions nor do we reweigh the evidence. We determine whether there is
sufficient substantial evidence in the record from which a rational jury could
have found the elements of each offense were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We apply the same
standard of review whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. (People
v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792.)
The crime of accessory after the fact is defined in section 32, which
provides: “Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors,
conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal
may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having
knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged
with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.” Thus,
the elements of the crime are: (1) someone other than the defendant
committed a specific, completed felony; (2) the defendant harbored, aided or
abetted the principal; (3) the defendant had knowledge that the principal had
committed a felony, or was charged or convicted of a felony; and (4) the
defendant harbored, concealed, or aided the principal with the specific intent
that she avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. (People
v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 607.)
II
Analysis
Martinez argues there is insufficient evidence to support the finding
that he aided Sartor with knowledge that he committed a felony. As
discussed, to be convicted of accessory after the fact, the prosecution must
show the defendant had “[k]nowledge that the principle committed a felony or
has been charged with the commission of one.” (People v. Wilson (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 271, 275.) “In determining whether the alleged accessory had

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such knowledge, ‘the jury may consider such factors as his possible presence
at the crime or other means of knowledge of its commission, as well as his
companionship and relationship with the principal before and after the
offense.’ ” (People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 858 (Moomey).) In
this case, the jurors were instructed on the underlying felonies of assault
with a firearm and vehicle theft.
“ ‘Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably
circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence
to support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.)
Here, the circumstantial evidence presented to the jury concerning
Martinez’s conduct before and after the shooting, and his contact with Sartor
in the days surrounding the shooting, constituted substantial evidence that
Martinez knew Sartor had committed a felony when he picked him up after
the shooting. Specifically, the evidence showed Martinez was driving in front
of Sartor at the time Romero turned on his lights and pursued Sartor in the
stolen truck. Sartor then called Martinez while Romero pursued Sartor, and
the phone call lasted until 11:09 a.m., the approximate time of the shooting.
The phone records also showed Martinez and Sartor were in the same area of
the shooting at that time. After the shooting, at around 11:24 a.m., the cell
phone tower records showed Sartor and Martinez continued to be in the same
area.
In addition, an eyewitness saw Martinez driving the black Honda and
waiting at the end of the alley where Sartor fled after the shooting. Although
the eyewitness did not see Sartor get inside the Honda, when she looked
back, both Sartor and the Honda were gone, strongly suggesting Martinez
picked up Sartor. The Honda was then seen speeding through stop signs in
an attempt to flee the scene. Critically, the evidence showed Martinez and

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Sartor communicated over 100 times in the days surrounding the felonies at
issue, including a phone call that ended almost simultaneously with the first
gunshot. Further, when Martinez was arrested, officers found in Martinez’s
phone the address of the empty apartment where Sartor was hiding after the
shooting. Finally, Martinez’s fingerprints were on a box located in the stolen
vehicle Sartor was driving. There is no question this evidence was sufficient
to support the jury’s finding that Martinez had knowledge of the felony
shooting.
Though perhaps not as strong, circumstantial evidence also supported
a finding that Martinez knew Sartor committed vehicle theft. The white
truck was reported stolen two days before the shooting and, as discussed,
Martinez and Sartor were in very close contact from June 7, 2023 until
Sartor’s arrest on June 10, 2023. Further, the handprints and fingerprints
found on the box in the truck, and the fact that Martinez was driving
alongside Sartor just before the shooting, supported this finding. Given these
facts, it was reasonable for the jury to infer Martinez knew Sartor committed
vehicle theft. Simply because the jury could have reached a different
conclusion does not mean insufficient evidence supported the conviction. (See
People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [“In deciding the sufficiency of
the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies
in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”].)
Although the evidence supporting the element of Martinez’s knowledge
is circumstantial, “the cumulative evidence, viewed in its entirety, is
sufficient to support a reasonable inference” that Martinez helped Sartor flee
the scene of the shooting knowing Sartor had committed a felony. (Moomey,

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supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 859.) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports
Martinez’s conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

RUBIN, J.

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