CourtListener 10618662•People v. Perry CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 6/27/25 P. v. Perry CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publi-
cation or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or-
dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169113
v.
JOSHUA LEE PERRY, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05001314970)
Defendant and Appellant.
After defendant Joshua Lee Perry pleaded no contest to one count of
voluntary manslaughter and admitted suffering a prior strike conviction, the
trial court sentenced him to 22 years in prison. Seven years later, defendant
petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Before
the evidentiary hearing on the petition, defendant moved for discovery of
personnel records of two Antioch police officers involved in the investigation
of his underlying case pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d
531 (Pitchess). Following two in camera hearings, the trial court ordered a
limited disclosure of information contained in one of the officer’s personnel
records and ultimately denied his petition for resentencing.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
1
On appeal, defendant requests that we conduct an independent review
of the sealed transcript of the in camera hearings on his Pitchess motion to
ensure that all discoverable material was turned over to him. The Attorney
General does not object to an independent review.
On our record, we cannot conclude whether the court’s in camera
Pitchess hearing conformed with prescribed procedures as to one of the
officer’s records and thus conditionally reverse the order denying the
defendant’s petition for resentencing.
BACKGROUND2
In November 2012, Risa Peoples found her live-in boyfriend Vaughn
Walker shot on their front porch. “[P]anicked” and “scared,” Peoples
managed to drive a still-conscious Walker to the hospital. During the drive,
Walker stated “Felicia and Joshua shot him.” While awaiting information at
the hospital, Peoples was contacted by Antioch police officers and informed
that Walker had died. An autopsy later revealed a .22-caliber projectile in
Walker’s right rib area.
Peoples was interviewed several times. Initially, Antioch Police
Detective Jiseok Jeong spoke with her at the hospital. Peoples informed
Detective Jeong that Walker said, “ “I’m shot. I’m shot. They shot me. They
shot me.’ ” Detective Jeong did not ask Peoples if Walker told her who shot
him, and Peoples did not tell him. She recalled that, earlier in the day, two
people introducing themselves as Joshua, later identified as defendant, and
Felicia Viscaina had arrived at her home asking to see Walker. Walker
declined to speak with them.
2The following factual background is taken from the section 1172.6
hearing. We relate only those facts relevant to the issue on appeal.
2
Later that same evening, defendant returned to the house, and Walker
went outside to meet him. While Walker was outside, Peoples’s son, Durell
Anderson,3 and her cousin, Christopher Darby, arrived and came inside the
house, remarking to Peoples that they did not recognize the individuals with
Walker. When Anderson and Darby left shortly thereafter, Peoples walked
them outside. Peoples saw Walker, defendant and another man, later
identified as Forest Murray, standing on the porch, and Viscaina standing in
the driveway.
During a second interview, at the Antioch Police Department, Peoples
recounted that, while driving Walker to the hospital, he told her he was dying
and that “Felicia and Joshua shot him.” She also identified defendant from a
photographic lineup as the person who had introduced himself to her earlier
that day as Joshua. Christopher Darby later identified Viscaina in a
photographic lineup as possibly the woman in the driveway the day Walker
was shot.
The police recovered a cell phone from People’s driveway and a .22-
caliber casing with a “Super X” headstamp from the front porch.
The day after the shooting, Viscaina and defendant were with a second
woman, Maria Quijano. Quijano reached out to their mutual friend Gary
Smith. Smith agreed to take the three passengers (Quijano, defendant, and
Viscaina) from one motel near Antioch to another one in Pittsburg in
exchange for methamphetamine. The police, who had been monitoring the
motel, executed a traffic stop of Smith’s car shortly after the group left. One
of the officers recognized defendant, who provided a fake name. The police
recovered a backpack from the “rear passenger area” of the car—where
defendant and Viscaina were sitting. Inside the backpack, police officers
3 Anderson had passed away by the time of section 1172.6 hearing.
3
located 18 rounds of .22-caliber ammunition and documents containing
Viscaina’s name.
In July 2013,4 the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an
information alleging one count of murder (§ 187; count 1). The information
further alleged defendant suffered a prior prison conviction (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) as
well as an on-bail enhancement. The district attorney later amended the
information to add a count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a);
count 2).
Defendant pleaded no contest to the voluntary manslaughter count and
admitted a prior strike conviction. The trial court granted the district
attorney’s motion to dismiss the remaining count of murder. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 22 years in prison.
Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Perry,
supra, A144901.)
In January 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). The trial court appointed counsel to
represent defendant, and the parties submitted briefing. After a hearing, the
trial court determined defendant had made a prima facie case and issued an
order to show cause (OSC).
Before the scheduled OSC hearing, the prosecution notified defendant,
pursuant to Brady,5 that “running Pitchess motions on former Antioch Police
4 We grant the parties’ request for judicial notice of the record in the
prior appeal, People v. Perry (July 25, 2016, A144901) [nonpub. opn.]. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
5 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
4
Department Officers Castillo (2961) and Meads (3917) may produce
discoverable information.”
Accordingly, defense counsel moved for discovery of records involving
former Detective Castillo and Officer Meads of the Antioch Police
Department (Department). Counsel included a statement of facts describing
Officers Castillo’s and Meads’s involvement in the case.6 Specifically, Officer
Meads interviewed Anderson, Peoples’s son, and Gary Smith, who was
driving defendant and Viscaina when they were arrested. Officer Meads also
prepared the photo lineups presented to Anderson. Detective Castillo
“supervised other officers conducting” the investigation, including
supervising the interview of Quijano, who acknowledged arranging the ride
between defendant and Smith. He participated in the subsequent search of
Smith’s impounded vehicle and conducted the custodial interview of Forrest
Murray, who was identified as the second man on the porch with defendant
and took part in portions of the custodial interview of Viscaina.
Relying on case law (Brady, Johnson,7 Pitchess), Evidence Code
sections 1043 through 1046, and state and federal due process protections,
counsel requested the court conduct an in camera review of the officers’
personnel files for indications of misconduct and criminal history records for
arrests or convictions involving crimes of moral turpitude. Counsel declared
the good cause requirements of Pitchess and the materiality standards of
Brady had been met. Specifically, “[g]ood cause exists to require the
production of this material in that it is necessary to prove former
Officers Castillo and Meads tendencies to fabricate evidence and/or probable
6 It does not appear Officers Castillo or Meads testified at the
preliminary hearing or the section 1172.6 hearing.
7 People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696.
5
cause, provide false testimony, or engage in other conduct unbecoming of an
officer and/or evincing moral turpitude. This evidence is relevant and
material to the presentation of the defense or, in the alternative, it may lead
to admissible impeachment evidence.” Counsel further asserted it was
“essential” to obtain such records “in order to evaluate the officer’s customs,
habits, and credibility, to enable us to present a defense.” Counsel
maintained the detectives’ credibility and past conduct are relevant to the
extent they could have affected the reliability of key witnesses’ testimony, as
those recollections may have been tainted during their prior interviews with
Detective Castillo and Officer Meads.
The Department submitted an opposition to the motion, asserting
defendant “did not present sufficient good cause or materiality to the Court
when attempting to challenge the officer’s credibility when the key witnesses’
credibility is at issue and relevant to his defense.” The Department also
asserted the discovery request was “overly broad” and “should be limited to
police misconduct related to inappropriate or tainted witness interviews.”
(Italics omitted.) The opposition specifically stated the prosecution’s Brady
letter was not a demonstration of relevancy sufficient to support the
sustaining the Pitchess motion.
The court determined “a sufficient showing” had been made to conduct
an in camera hearing to “review the personnel records of the two named
officers for any evidence of dishonesty, moral turpitude, which would include
concerns raised here about any altering or tampering with witness
statements or any improprieties in conducting searches. But any evidence of
moral turpitude will come within that scope.” Regarding Detective Castillo,
the court ordered the “the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the
complaining party and the witnesses” to three events be disclosed under a
6
protective order.8 The court required further research on the records
regarding Officer Meads and set a hearing on the matter for June. After the
June in camera hearing, the court determined there were “no disclosures
required as to Detective Meads pursuant to the Pitchess and Brady
processes.”
Following the rulings on the Pitchess/Brady motion, the court
continued with and ultimately denied defendant’s petition for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant requests this court independently review the record,
including the sealed transcripts to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to release all pertinent information—essentially,
whether the trial court properly applied the Pitchess standards. The
Attorney General “does not object to appellant’s request.”
In Pitchess, our Supreme Court held “a criminal defendant [can]
‘compel discovery’ of certain relevant information in the personnel files of
police officers by making ‘general allegations which establish some cause for
discovery’ of that information and by showing how it would support a defense
to the charge [or charges] against [the defendant].” (Warrick v. Superior
Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018–1019 (Warrick); People v. Nguyen (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 44, 47–48.) This holding was later codified in sections 832.5,
832.7, and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1047. (People v.
Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 (Mooc); Warrick, at p. 1019.) Pitchess and
this resulting statutory scheme seeks to balance a criminal defendant’s “due
8 The protective order provided that “any personnel records delivered
to or copied by the Court” of the Department’s personnel records pertaining to
Detective Castillo be sealed, and the City and the Department “shall
provide,” within five business days, “the name, address, and telephone
number of complainants or witnesses ordered to be produced by the Court.”
7
process right to a fair trial” with an officer’s “strong privacy interest.” (Mooc,
at p. 1227.)
The procedures for obtaining disclosure of otherwise confidential
personnel records are outlined in the Evidence Code. To obtain discovery of
an officer’s personnel records, a defendant must file a motion that includes an
affidavit establishing “good cause” for the discovery, “setting forth the
materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation
and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified
has the records or information from the records.” (Evid. Code, § 1043,
subd. (b)(3).) When the trial court concludes defendant has “made a showing
of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents
‘potentially relevant’ to the defendant’s motion.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1226.) If the custodian “does not produce the entire personnel file for the
court’s review,” the custodian must establish under oath “what documents or
category of documents” were excluded and explain the decision to exclude
them. (People v. Guevara (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 62, 69; Mooc, at p. 1229 &
fn. 4.)
The court then conducts an in camera review of the documents and,
subject to various “statutory exceptions and limitations,” discloses to the
defense any “ ‘information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending litigation.’ ” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226, quoting Evid.
Code, § 1045, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court held, to permit meaningful
appellate review of a Pitchess claim, the trial court must make a sufficient
record of the documents it reviewed in determining whether the requested
police personnel records are discoverable. (Mooc, at p. 1228.) “If the
documents produced by the custodian are not voluminous, the court can
photocopy them and place them in a confidential file. Alternatively, the court
8
can prepare a list of the documents it considered, or simply state for the
record what documents it examined. Without some record of the documents
examined by the trial court, a party’s ability to obtain appellate review of the
trial court’s decision, whether to disclose or not disclose, would be
nonexistent.” (Id. at p. 1229.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for an abuse of
discretion. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1228.)
Upon review, we conclude the trial court examined Officer Meads’
entire personnel file, and the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
from disclosure any of the officer’s personnel records.
However, it is unclear whether the custodian of records produced
Detective Castillo’s complete personnel file for the court to review. The
custodian did not elucidate whether he had brought the entire file, nor was
he asked. Although the trial court indicated it had at least three files of
materials relating to Detective Castillo, we are unable, on the record before
us, to determine whether these materials comprised the entirety of the file or
merely a portion.
Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order denying defendant’s
petition for resentencing and remand for the trial court to conduct a new
Pitchess hearing of Detective Castillo’s personnel files, where it may either,
“photocopy them and place them in a confidential file,” if the records are not
voluminous; “prepare a list of the documents it considered, or simply state for
the record what documents it examined.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1229.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is conditionally
reversed and the matter is remanded to the court with directions to hold a
9
new Pitchess hearing regarding Officer Castillo’s records. If the court
determines additional information must be disclosed to defendant, it shall
order disclosure and allow defendant an opportunity to demonstrate
prejudice and order a new section 1172.6 evidence hearing if there is a
reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had the
evidence been disclosed. If the court confirms the lack of discoverable
evidence or finds defendant was not prejudiced from the denial of discovery,
the order denying the petition shall be reinstated.
10
_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A169113, People v. Perry
11
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.