People v. Sullivan CA1/5

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Testo completo

Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Sullivan CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, A163607
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Francisco City & County
v. Super. Ct. Nos. CRI-13035657,
SCN 221448-02)
LEE G. SULLIVAN,
Defendant and Appellant. ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING AND
MODIFYING OPINION

THE COURT:

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(1), the
opinion filed on May 30, 2025, shall be MODIFIED as follows:

1. On page 25, the two paragraphs in Discussion section
B.4 are replaced in their entirety with the following:
Sullivan also contends that the use of rap
lyrics at trial violated the RJA. As he
concedes, however, his counsel forfeited this
issue by failing to make an RJA objection
before sentencing. Further, because the issue
was not litigated in trial court, the appellate
record is inadequate to establish that his
counsel’s failure was deficient.

1
As our Supreme Court recently observed
in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 (Hin),
the admission of rap lyrics into evidence can
invoke racist stereotypes and “inject[] racial
bias into jury decisionmaking.” (Id. at p. 477.)
Here, in arguing that the use of rap evidence
violated the RJA, Sullivan relies on multiple
academic articles and studies on
discrimination that are outside the appellate
record. Contentions based on extra record
reports or articles “can be raised only in a
habeas corpus petition.” (People v. Seaton
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 697; see also People v.
Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 208 [explaining
that “to the extent defendant would like to
pursue his allegations based on extra-record
evidence of discrimination . . . , this appeal is
not the proper vehicle to do so”; that is,
“instead, precisely what habeas corpus
proceedings are designed to accommodate”];
People v. Wagstaff (2025) ___ Cal.App.5th ___
[declining to consider “multiple citations to
sources outside the record” in connection with
the appellant’s RJA claim].) The record is also
silent as to the reasons for defense counsel’s
failure to act. For these reasons, Sullivan’s
claim is more appropriately resolved in his
habeas corpus petition. Absent further record
development, Sullivan is unable to establish
for purposes of this appeal that he had a
meritorious RJA claim based on the use of rap
evidence or that, relatedly, his counsel was
deficient in failing to preserve the claim.
2. In the last paragraph on page 95, which continues
into page 96 (Discussion section J.6), the following
sentence and parenthetical citation are deleted:

A trial court exercises broad discretion at each
step, and its rulings will not be disturbed

2
absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v.
Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1260.)

The modifications make no change to the judgment.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

People v. Sullivan (A163607)

3
Filed 5/30/25 P. v. Sullivan CA1/5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, A163607
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco City & County
LEE G. SULLIVAN, Super. Ct. Nos. CRI-13035657,
SCN 221448-02)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2013, Jaquan Rice, Jr., was killed and his girlfriend,
B.K., a minor at the time, was seriously wounded in a gang-
related drive-by shooting. A jury found Lee G. Sullivan guilty of
murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
assault with a firearm, simple mayhem, and participation in a
criminal street gang as one of two shooters. The jury also found
true attendant firearm- and gang-related sentencing
enhancements. The same jury acquitted Sullivan’s codefendant,
Derrick Hunter, of the most serious charges but hung on other
charges. At Sullivan’s sentencing, the trial court struck the
substantive gang offense and all gang-related enhancements but
imposed a 25-year term for one of his firearm enhancements.
The court sentenced Sullivan to an aggregate prison term of 83
years to life.

Sullivan now appeals, arguing that his convictions must be
reversed (at least in part) on the following grounds: (1) the trial
court erred under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson)
1
and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler); (2) the
court’s rulings during jury selection, and in admitting rap
evidence, violated the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Pen. Code, §
745; RJA);1 (3) the court erroneously admitted unduly prejudicial
gang evidence, including rap videos and rap lyrics; (4) the court
erroneously admitted lay opinion identification testimony; (5) the
court failed to provide a remedy after social media providers
refused to produce private content in response to Sullivan’s
subpoena duces tecum; (6) the court improperly admitted an
anonymous tip; (7) the kill zone instruction was incomplete; (8)
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (9) the court inadvertently
gave the jury access to extrinsic evidence; (10) the court failed to
conduct an adequate inquiry into jury intimidation or misconduct
after excusing a deliberating juror; and (11) cumulative error.
Sullivan also contends that remand for resentencing is required
due to postjudgment amendments to the relevant sentencing
laws.

We accept the People’s concession that Sullivan is entitled
to be resentenced, under postjudgment amendments to the
relevant statutes, and otherwise affirm.2

BACKGROUND

The shooting occurred on June 24, 2013, just before 1:00
p.m., at the intersection of West Point Road and Middle Point
Road in the Bayview/Hunter’s Point neighborhood of San
Francisco. B.K. had been sitting in Rice’s lap at a bus shelter.
This intersection was “ground zero” for an active criminal street
gang—Westmobb. Big Block (also called Harbor Road) was a
rival gang in the same neighborhood, but its territory was
centered around the 700 block of Kirkwood. Rice was a member

1Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2Sullivan has filed a related petition for a writ of habeas
corpus (No. A170251), which we address by separate order.
2
of the Westmobb gang. Before the shooting, he had told B.K.
about trouble with “the Harbor crew.”

The car used in the shooting, a green Ford Escape, was
identified within minutes by law enforcement watching
surveillance video. One of the two videos played for the jury
shows the two shooters—the first shooter wore a grey hoodie and
shot out of the Escape’s driver’s side rear window, and the second
shooter wore a black hoodie, white t-shirt, a baseball cap, black
and white sneakers, and gloves, and shot after exiting the rear
passenger side door. The first shooter used a revolver. The
second used a semiautomatic nine-millimeter gun with an
extended magazine and fired 23 rounds. Despite the videos’
somewhat poor resolution, the first shooter can be seen pretty
clearly. The second shooter’s face is less clear and partly
obscured by his cap. The driver of the vehicle is not visible at all.
Eyewitnesses provided inconsistent descriptions of the driver’s
gender.

Within minutes, police stopped prosecution witness
Renesha Lee3 driving the rental car used during the shooting.
She was its sole occupant. Renesha and Sullivan had been
casually dating at the time. When interviewed by police that day,
Renesha initially lied, making up names and a story because she
did not want anyone to get in trouble. Eventually she identified
codefendant Hunter and his 14-year-old brother (Q.H.) as two of
three men who had borrowed her car that afternoon. Renesha
did not mention Sullivan’s name until August 2013.

In the interim, two juvenile eyewitnesses (E.F. and Y.J.)
told police that the first shooter—who fired from the driver’s side
window and yelled, “ ‘Ha, bitch ass [ni**a]—MOB!’ ”—was Q.H.

3Because her last name is the same as Sullivan’s first
name, we use Renesha throughout this opinion to avoid any
confusion.
3
Q.H. was ultimately charged with murder in juvenile court,
where a wardship petition was sustained.

Police officers asked Renesha if one of several men
affiliated with the Big Block gang had been the third man to
borrow her car. However, after receiving an anonymous tip that
Sullivan was one of the shooters, the police showed Renesha a
photo lineup with Sullivan’s photo. She said she knew him but
that he did not get in her car.

On August 13, 2013, Renesha told the police “the truth”—
which she repeated in her testimony at trial under a grant of
immunity: Sullivan had borrowed the car from her to go to the
store along with Hunter and Q.H. Sullivan was dressed in a
black jacket and baseball cap. Minutes after they left, Renesha
heard two different kinds of gunfire. A few minutes after that,
Hunter and Q.H. returned in the car without Sullivan. Hunter
was now driving. Renesha then drove the car to pick up Sullivan
nearby, and he sat in the front passenger seat. He was no longer
wearing the black jacket or baseball hat that he had been
wearing when he borrowed the car; he was wearing a white t-
shirt. She dropped all three men off with some friends, and
Renesha overheard Sullivan say to another man affiliated with
Big Block, “ ‘I blow Dutch when I smoke.’ ” Rice was known as
“Dutch.” At trial a gang expert testified the comment meant “I
blow Dutch away with my gun” (which smokes after being fired).

Police found Sullivan’s fingerprints inside the car on the
front passenger door lever. Police also recovered three cell
phones (Hunter’s, Sullivan’s, and Renesha’s) from the Escape, a
black and grey North Face jacket, and a black and grey glove
found inside the jacket’s front pocket. Sullivan’s fingerprints
were found on his phone. Renesha testified that, although she
was not sure, she thought the jacket was Sullivan’s.

Sullivan’s DNA was found on the glove, along with at least
three other individuals’ DNA. Hunter and Q.H. were excluded
4
from the DNA mixture. Gunshot residue was found on the
glove’s outside surface.

Before the shooting, Rice had made numerous gang-related
posts on social media. In March 2012, Rice posted a video to his
Facebook account challenging rival gang members to come and
find him on Westmobb’s home turf. He showed the bus shelter at
the intersection of West Point Road and Middle Point Road and
warned that they were “ ‘strapped up,’ ” or armed. After the
video was posted, rival gang members posted photos of
themselves driving through the area.

Renesha testified that Rice’s postings had upset Sullivan.
Rice also had a personal feud with Q.H. that was waged, at least
in part, through social media posts.

When Sullivan was arrested, he denied both knowledge of
the shooting as well as any romantic relationship with Renesha.
He did not believe he had ever been in Renesha’s car. No
eyewitness identified Sullivan as the shooter. At trial, B.K. did
not recall being shot or how Rice died. However, the prosecution
played excerpts from her June 30, 2013 statement to police—in
which she described the second shooter as a light-skinned African
American man, who was about 5 feet, 7 inches tall, skinny, and
wearing a black hoodie.

Consistent with B.K.’s description, in the surveillance
video, the second shooter appears to be just slightly taller than
the vehicle, which the parties stipulated was about 5 feet, 6
inches high. Sullivan was approximately 5 feet, 7 inches tall and
weighed between 134 and 145 pounds.

At trial, three San Francisco Police Department officers,
viewing the surveillance video, testified that they recognized
Sullivan as the second shooter. Each of the officers had known
Sullivan for many years—15 years, in Sergeant Daniel Manning’s
case. Manning had been monitoring gang members on

5
surveillance cameras for about six months before the shooting as
part of an investigation. Manning had no doubt that the shooter
was Sullivan.

Officer Ochoa testified that he recognized Sullivan’s
mannerisms, movements, build, and shoes in the video. Ochoa
said he knew Sullivan had the same shoes as the shooter
because, a few weeks previously, he had noticed Sullivan’s
sneakers and the two had a conversation about how Ochoa had
worn the same brand and style of shoes when he was younger.

Sullivan called an eyewitness—a member of Westmobb,
Tony Befford—who testified that Sullivan was not the second
shooter. Two other eyewitnesses, R.B. and E.F., indicated in out-
of-court statements that Q.H. and Hunter were the two shooters.
Although she did not witness the shooting, a woman who had
been in a relationship with Sullivan at the time, Murlani Jones,
was shown a screen shot from the video and testified that the
second shooter did not look like Sullivan.

Sullivan also argued that neither the glove nor the jacket
recovered from the car were the ones worn by the second shooter
in the video. Although the gloves in the video appear to be white,
the glove recovered from the car was black and gray. Police
witnesses testified, however, based on their experience with the
surveillance video footage and comparisons with other videos,
that some colors of the gloves and other items in the video change
and appear distorted.

The defense also argued that the size double-XL black and
gray jacket found in the car was not Sullivan’s size and appeared
different than the black jacket (or hoodie) worn by the second
shooter in the video. The defense presented evidence that other
members of Big Block, Westmobb, and other gangs wore the same
or similar styles of the shoes worn by the second shooter.

6
Several police officers testified about Sullivan’s and
Hunter’s police contacts, congregation with each other and other
known Big Block members (while throwing gang signs), and their
proximity to or possession of firearms.

In reliance on this and other evidence, Sergeant Manning,
the prosecution’s gang expert, opined that Sullivan, Hunter, and
Q.H. were members of Big Block, a criminal street gang, and that
Rice was killed for Big Block’s benefit. He explained that Rice
was killed to send “a strong message to . . . other Westmobb gang
members that if you’re going to challenge Big Block . . . you were
going to be killed.”

Several hours after Rice’s murder, a Westmobb member,
Terrell Blay, went to Hunter and Q.H.’s home armed with an
assault rifle but was intercepted by a police officer. The following
evening, Westmobb members shot at Big Block members
Matthew Higginbotham and Anthony Brown. Both incidents
appeared to be retaliatory.

DISCUSSION

A. Batson/Wheeler Motion

Sullivan, who is African American, contends the trial
court improperly denied his Batson/Wheeler motion, which
asserted that the prosecutor’s exclusion of a prospective
juror was discriminatory. We disagree.

1.

Both our state and federal constitutions forbid a
prosecutor from striking even a single prospective juror on
account of race. (Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. 488,
499; People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1071.)

A trial court must analyze a defendant’s
Batson/Wheeler motion using a three-prong test. First, the
defendant must make out a prima facie case with facts

7
sufficient to support an inference that the prosecutor had a
discriminatory purpose in striking the juror at issue.
Second, if the defendant succeeds in making such a showing, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason
for the strike. Third, assuming the prosecutor does so, the court
evaluates the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and determines
whether they are legitimate or pretextual. (People v. Baker,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1071; accord, Johnson v. California (2005)
545 U.S. 162, 168.) The ultimate burden of persuading the
court—that purposeful discrimination has occurred—rests with,
and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. (People v. Lenix
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612–613.) Generally, we review a trial
court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “ ‘ “ ‘with great
restraint,’ ” ’ ” considering “only whether substantial evidence
supports its conclusions.” (Lenix, at p. 613.)

In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill Number No.
3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which enacted Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7. (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, §§ 1-3.) Among
other changes, the new statute makes certain reasons for
exercising a peremptory challenge—including having a negative
experience with law enforcement—presumptively invalid. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (e)-(g), (j).) It also provides that the
court must sustain the objection if “there is a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race
. . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., §
231.7, subd. (d)(1).) However, the new law only applies to trials
in which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022. (Id., §
231.7, subd. (i).) Because jury selection in this case occurred in
2019, this statute does not lessen Sullivan’s burden.

8
2.

In his responses to the juror questionnaire, J.W.
(Juror Badge No. 5057694) reported that he owned a
funeral home, where he served as mortician and grief
counselor. He wrote that he could not be fair and impartial
because of his work attending to the families of violent
crime victims. J.W. responded to one question—asking
whether he listened to rap music—by stating that it was
“absurd!” He responded similarly to another question
asking whether he had any “strong opinions” about people
who live in public housing. Finally, J.W. wrote that he had
“a genuine concern” about his ability to serve, based on the
questionnaire itself, and worried that serving would
potentially impact his business.

When the court asked J.W. about his ability to be fair
and impartial, J.W. expressed reservations, citing his work
as a mortician and saying he had “been on both sides of
this.” He explained that he viewed his frequent work with
the victims and families of violent crimes as a “direct
conflict” with serving as a juror in this case. He added that
he needed to preserve his “peace of mind.”

Asked by the court to elaborate, J.W. said that there
was the potential that he could not be objective because,
through his grief counseling, he felt overly sympathetic to
victims and their families. J.W. further noted that the
charges brought up memories of his god brother’s murder
(from 12 years prior), which J.W. believed was “a personal
conflict.”

Another prospective juror (Juror Badge No. 4802469)
“[a]gree[d] [s]omewhat” with a statement in the juror
questionnaire—that African Americans commit more crime
than people of other races or ethnic groups. Hunter’s
counsel then asked Juror No. 4802469 whether he crosses
9
the street to avoid African Americans and he responded, “I
imagine I do to some extent[,] but probably not any more
than a lot of other people.”

After questioning this juror, Hunter’s counsel gave J.W. the
floor to comment. Referring to Juror No. 4802469’s comments,
J.W. said he felt “really torn” about serving as a juror. J.W.
mentioned his struggles, as an African American man, being
subject to racial biases and misperceptions. Apparently referring
to the juror questionnaire, he said the statements about African
Americans and crime were “completely absurd.”

In response to questions from Sullivan’s counsel, J.W.
explained that he could give a defendant a fair trial. But he
quickly reiterated that his work as a grief counselor would make
serving as a fair juror “real tough.” Asked if he would convict
someone because he felt bad for the victim, J.W. said, “No, no.”
But J.W. again brought up his “peace of mind,” adding that the
trial was “the last thing” he wanted to “have on [him].” He
readily agreed that he could sit on a jury if, after hearing the
evidence, he believed the prosecution had not met its burden and
had charged the wrong person.

The prosecutor asked J.W. whether he could give the
prosecution a fair trial, but he never directly answered the
question. J.W. first asked for clarification. The prosecutor
explained that jurors were expected to be impartial. When asked
if the victims’ race would influence his ability to objectively sit as
a juror, J.W. said that the subject matter would be difficult for
him (having worked with gunshot victims) and that he felt far too
many young African American people die from gun violence.

The prosecutor asked J.W. if he believed that serving on
the jury in a homicide case would impact future business. J.W.
said that “makes it tough” and repeated that he primarily works
with victims’ families. The prosecutor commented that if J.W.
were to serve on the jury, he would not be allowed to discuss his
10
occupation and background during deliberations. J.W. said
he would comply but added that he would be “thinking
about [his work]” and that “weigh[ed] on” him. J.W. also
said he was in a “tough position” because, in his mind, “it
cuts both ways.”

Over Sullivan’s Batson/Wheeler objection, the
prosecutor used his seventh and final peremptory challenge
to remove J.W. The matter was heard outside the presence
of the jurors. Sullivan’s counsel argued the court excused
three of the five African American prospective jurors for
cause or hardship. Sullivan’s counsel said J.W. was “a
perfectly fine juror, African American, owns a funeral
home, well-educated, well-spoken.” She did not specifically
address J.W.’s statements.

Hunter’s counsel joined in the motion and similarly
noted the three African Americans excused for cause by the
court over defense objection. He argued there was “no
justification” to exercise a peremptory challenge against
J.W. and that the challenge must be racially motivated.
Hunter’s counsel also asserted that the prosecutor
“excessive[ly]” questioned A.R.—who was the last
remaining African American in the venire.

The court concluded the Batson/Wheeler motion was
insufficient and denied it, citing defendants’ failure to make
a prima facie case. The court said “extensive questioning”
of J.W. showed that he was “very forthcoming” with his
concerns, “the reasons he did not want to serve as a juror,”
and his reservations about his ability to be fair and
impartial.

After the court’s ruling, the prosecutor added that
defense counsel had not demonstrated anything aside from
“their impressions of [jurors’] races.” The prosecutor said
J.W. gave “numerous reasons why he would have difficulty
11
sitting and judging fairly this case. Some were specific to him
and his racial background, which he talked about frankly, and he
talked about emotively, although he wasn’t overwhelmed by it.”
The prosecutor said that “the main issue” was J.W.’s work as a
funeral director and grief counselor. After summarizing J.W.’s
statements about the impact of his job and how it made him
sympathetic towards victims, the prosecutor noted how J.W. was
personally offended by one juror’s opinion about racial disparities
in crime rates. The prosecutor said it seemed that, based on
J.W.’s “visible reaction” to that juror, he could be unwilling to
deliberate. The prosecutor also noted that, although J.W. said he
was biased in favor of victims, he also audibly agreed with
another juror who stated a belief that the police tend to “shoot
first and ask questions later.” In summary, there were
“numerous reasons to grant [J.W.’s] request . . . to not sit on the
jury.”

3.

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Sullivan
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that J.W. was excused
because he was African American.

The moving party establishes a prima facie case “by
producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred.” (Johnson v.
California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) There is no requirement to
show a systematic exclusion of multiple jurors based on their
membership in a protected class. (People v. Battle (2021) 11
Cal.5th 749, 773 (Battle).) Instead, the court considers all the
relevant circumstances to determine whether the record supports
an inference that the prosecutor excused one or more prospective
jurors because of race. (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393,
429 (Rhoades).) Ordinarily we review the trial court’s first prong
decision deferentially, for substantial evidence. (Battle, at p.
772.) We will affirm the trial court’s ruling where the record

12
suggests “grounds upon which the prosecutor might
reasonably have challenged the juror[].” (People v. Farnam
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 135.)

Certain types of evidence are especially relevant,
including whether the prosecutor has struck most or all of
the members of an identified group from the venire;
whether the prosecutor has used a disproportionate
number of their strikes against members of the same
group; whether the prosecutor has engaged prospective
jurors from that group in only superficial voir dire; whether
the defendant is a member of the identified group; and
whether the victim is a member of the group to which a
majority of remaining jurors belong. (Rhoades, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 429.) We may also consider nondiscriminatory
reasons for the prosecutor’s challenge that “ ‘ “necessarily
dispel any inference of bias,” ’ ” if those reasons are clearly
established in the record. (Ibid.)

There is little evidence to support an inference of
discrimination. Sullivan cannot show that the prosecutor
peremptorily challenged most or all the African American
prospective jurors or that he used a disproportionate number
against African Americans—because the prosecutor only
exercised one of his seven challenges against an African
American prospective juror. (Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp.
429-430.) There is no dispute among the parties that there were
five African American prospective jurors in the venire—A.D.,
R.A., J.G., J.W., and A.R. The court excused A.D., J.G., and R.A.
for cause or hardship. Challenges for cause are distinct from
peremptory strikes. (See Rhoades, at p. 435.) And Sullivan does
not argue that any of the for-cause challenges were specious. (Cf.
Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 782-783 [in some cases,
“[s]pecious” for-cause challenges might support an inference of
bias].)

13
Furthermore, A.R. was not challenged by any party and
was seated as Juror No. 9. In these circumstances, it is very
difficult, although not impossible, to make a prima facie case.
(Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 776.) Our review shows no
indication that the prosecutor’s voir dire of J.W. was improper or
unusual in any way. (See Battle, supra, at p. 783; People v.
Bryant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 525, 539.)

Sullivan notes that both he and J.W. are African American.
This circumstance is highly relevant and requires careful
scrutiny. (See Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 430; see also
Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) 588 U.S. 284, 297.) But the record
reveals no other case-specific reasons why the prosecutor would
be motivated to exclude a particular class of jurors. (Rhoades, at
p. 430.) The victims in this case were also African American. We
are not inclined to find a prima facie case based solely on the fact
that the defendant and challenged juror share the same racial
identity. (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384-385; cf.
Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.)

Any inference of bias is further weakened because the
record reveals that J.W. had obvious race-neutral characteristics
that a reasonable prosecutor would seek to avoid. (See Rhoades,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 431-435.) J.W.’s unwillingness to serve as
a juror in this case is clearly established by the record. He had a
strong, emotional reaction to the charges, the questionnaire, and
fellow jurors’ statements during voir dire. J.W.’s reaction did not
subside even after the People and defense counsel all carefully
explained to the entire panel why the questionnaire asked about
certain topics and the need to openly discuss complex topics.
Despite those clarifications, J.W. maintained that his role as a
mortician and grief counselor was a “direct” and “personal”
conflict with his duties as a juror and said he was unable to
ignore those concerns. He only readily agreed that he could sit on
a jury if he believed the prosecution had not met its burden and

14
otherwise repeatedly referenced his “peace of mind,” adding
that the trial was “the last thing” he wanted to “have on
[him].” J.W. was subject to challenge for cause based on
these answers. (See People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th
792, 836; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
981.)

To a reasonable prosecutor, these readily-apparent,
nondiscriminatory grounds would provide cause for a
challenge. (Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 431-434;
People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1213 [reluctance to
serve]; People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 803 [rigid
jurors who may be divisive during deliberations]; People v.
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 918 [juror’s experience in
counseling or social services was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis supporting a prosecutor’s
peremptory challenge].)

Having reviewed all the circumstances, we agree
with the People that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Sullivan failed to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. (See People v. Parker,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1212-1213.)

4.

Sullivan insists we cannot review this case at the
prima facie stage. He says our review should start at the
third stage—or alternatively that the trial court necessarily
erred at the first step—because the prosecutor’s reasons for
peremptorily challenging J.W. are purportedly “facially
discriminatory.” According to Sullivan, the prosecutor’s
reasoning was not race-neutral because the prosecutor
justified the strike (in part) by referring to the offense J.W.
took to another prospective juror’s opinion about racial
disparities in crime rates.

15
After the other prospective juror stated his belief and
admitted that he was more fearful of African American men, J.W.
lamented that he often did not feel seen as a human being and
said, “these perceptions . . . about black people . . . [that they’re]
more likely to commit a crime, like, it’s completely absurd.”
Thus, Sullivan claims that one of the prosecutor’s reasons for
striking J.W. was dependent on racial stereotypes (the fact that
J.W. disagreed and took offense to them) and, accordingly, the
trial court erred in finding no prima facie case.

Sullivan’s arguments are unpersuasive. This is a first
prong case because the trial court concluded that Sullivan failed
to establish a prima facie case before the prosecutor stated his
reasons for peremptorily striking J.W. (See People v. Scott,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 386-389, 391-392; People v. Bryant,
supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 536, 539.) Sullivan’s selective
reading of the record does not compel us to conduct a third-stage
analysis. (Cf. People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 386-389,
391-392 [when prosecutor proffers a “facially discriminatory
justification” this circumstance would raise inference of
discrimination and trigger review under next step].) We need not
consider Sullivan’s argument involving comparative juror
analysis. (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 350; People v.
Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 135.)

B. Racial Justice Act

Sullivan asserts, for the first time on appeal, several
violations of the Racial Justice Act (RJA), which became effective
on January 1, 2021, before his sentencing. (§ 745; Stats. 2020, ch.
317, § 3.5.) He contends that the prosecutor’s peremptory
challenge to J.W., statements by other prospective jurors during
voir dire, and the juror questionnaire (prepared by his attorney)
violated the RJA. In addition, he contends that the introduction
of rap videos and lyrics violated the RJA. We conclude that

16
Sullivan forfeited several of his RJA claims and his
remaining contentions lack merit.

1.

The Legislature’s stated intent in enacting the RJA is
“to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice
system.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(i).). To further that
important goal, section 745, subdivision (a), provides that
“[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or
seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a); accord,
People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 809 (Lashon).)

As relevant here, the RJA is violated if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge,
an attorney, a law enforcement officer, an expert witness,
or a juror exhibited racial bias or animus toward the
defendant or “used racially discriminatory language about
the defendant’s race . . . whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745,
subds. (a)(1)-(2).) The prohibition on use of discriminatory
language “does not apply if the person speaking is relating
language used by another that is relevant to the case or if
the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and
unbiased physical description of the suspect.” (§ 745, subd.
(a)(2).) “ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means
language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or
implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited
to, racially charged or racially coded language, language
that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that
references the defendant's physical appearance, culture,
ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular
words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately
in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity,
or national origin is relevant to determining whether
language is discriminatory.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)

17
18
2.

As an initial matter, we reject Sullivan’s RJA
challenge to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike
against J.W. As discussed in connection with the Batson-
Wheeler claim, the prosecutor’s challenge to J.W. neither
“exhibited bias or animus towards” Sullivan nor “used
racially discriminatory language about” Sullivan’s race.
(§ 745, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)

3.

As for Sullivan’s remaining RJA claims based on
statements made during voir dire, he has forfeited them
because he did not raise them below despite having an
opportunity to do so. Further, we are unpersuaded by
Sullivan’s arguments that his counsel’s failure to preserve
the issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

a.

At no time during the trial court proceedings,
whether during voir dire or in a post-trial motion, did
Sullivan preserve a claim based on racially discriminatory
statements contained in the juror questionnaire or made by
prospective jurors during voir dire.

It is true, as Sullivan argues, that the RJA was not
enacted until after his 2019 trial. But his counsel could
have fashioned a different questionnaire, and counsel could
have raised Sullivan’s concerns about discriminatory
statements by prospective jurors during voir dire. (Cf.
People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 572 [holding that
defendant forfeited claim of racial bias during jury selection
by failing to raise the claim at trial].) Notably, the defense
did not use all its peremptory challenges, and each of the
defense’s challenges for cause was successful. Had Sullivan
brought his concerns to the court’s attention during voir
19
dire or exercised his remaining peremptory challenges, he could
have precluded any potential bias from affecting the trial. (Cf.
People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1104 [explaining that
without a forfeiture rule, a defendant might purposefully
“ ‘delay[] the raising of the claim in the hopes of an acquittal,
with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the
claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction’ ”],
quoting Davis v. United States (1973) 411 U.S. 233, 241.)

Nor did Sullivan raise his discrimination concerns in the
trial court once the RJA was enacted. By the time Sullivan was
sentenced on September 17, 2021, the RJA had been in effect for
more than eight months. (§ 745, subd. (j)(1) [providing that
section 745 applies to “all cases in which judgment is not final”];
Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 810, 816.) Yet he did not
file a motion under (or otherwise raise) the RJA. (See Lashon, at
pp. 810-816 [holding that RJA claims may not be raised for the
first time on appeal where the defendant’s trial court judgment
was not final until after the effective date of the RJA]; People v.
Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 113-114 (Singh) [agreeing with
Lashon]; see also People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323,
337 [“Counsel should . . . have raised the issue at the first
opportunity after the [RJA] took effect, appellant’s sentencing
hearing.”].) Further, Sullivan’s RJA claims do not come within
the exception to forfeiture for pure questions of law, as RJA
claims like Sullivan’s necessarily rely on the trial court record.
(See Singh, at p. 116; accord, Lashon, at p. 811.) Accordingly,
Sullivan’s RJA claims based on statements made during voir dire
are forfeited.

b.

Sullivan argues in the alternative that if his RJA claims
based on voir dire are forfeited, then his trial counsel provided
constitutionally deficient representation. (See Strickland v.

20
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-698 (Strickland).) We
disagree.

i.

Sullivan’s principal RJA claim is based on the juror
questionnaire prepared by his own trial counsel for use in
voir dire. The trial court granted defense counsel’s
unopposed request to use a written jury questionnaire,
which she prepared, during jury selection.

The only question that Sullivan appears to challenge
on appeal is question 32, which asked jurors to consider
their agreement with (among others) the sixth statement:
“African-Americans commit more crime than people of other
races or ethnic group[s].” (Italics added.) Sullivan
maintains that inclusion of the italicized statement
“suggested to prospective jurors that the court and
attorneys believed this statement to be true.” He contends
it “likely conditioned some jurors to accept the implied
[stereotype] that African Americans are prone to crime.”

Sullivan’s concern about his attorney’s question cannot be
taken lightly; the statement, if endorsed, would clearly be racially
offensive. (See Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100, 121 (Buck)
[observing that the notion that people with black skin would be
more likely to commit future violence represented a “particularly
noxious strain of racial prejudice”].) But the questionnaire itself
did not endorse the statement. Instead, the questionnaire
instructed, “Please check the box that is closest to your opinion,”
and provided a range of possible responses from “Agree Strongly”
to “Disagree Strongly,” including “No Opinion.” Further, the
question presented eight other unrelated opinion statements in
addition to the challenged one, and jurors did not necessarily
agree with all or even any of them. For example, one juror
selected “Disagree Strongly” for seven of the statements and
“Disagree Somewhat” for the remaining two.
21
On its face, the purpose of the questionnaire in general and
this question specifically was to draw out prospective jurors’
opinions that may be pertinent to their ability to serve
impartially. According to defense counsel, she believed it
necessary to describe certain beliefs—held by some members of
society—to ferret out any of the jurors’ racial biases and ensure
that Sullivan would receive a fair trial. An objective observer
would not view the substance of defense counsel’s question as an
explicit or implicit appeal to racial bias. (§ 745, subds. (a)(2),
(h)(4).) Further, a statement that “relat[es] language used by
another that is relevant to the case” does not violate the RJA
under the circumstances here. (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Nor would
finding a violation in these circumstances—where defense
counsel reasonably asked about jurors’ potential biases for the
purpose of ensuring a fair trial—further the Legislature’s intent
to eliminate racial bias from criminal justice proceedings. (Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 2(i).) As a result, Sullivan’s claim lacks merit
and counsel’s decision not to raise an RJA claim on this basis was
not deficient.

ii.

Sullivan also argues that three prospective jurors (Juror
Badge Nos. 4853331, 4802469, and 4783984) “expressed bias
against African Americans on their questionnaires” by checking
the “[a]gree [s]omewhat” or “[a]gree [s]trongly” boxes in response
to the sixth statement in question 32 (discussed above). He
similarly contends that these same prospective jurors, plus a
fourth (4853308), exhibited racial bias against African Americans
in their responses to counsel’s follow-up questions during voir
dire. Although we are troubled by several of these prospective
jurors’ statements, Sullivan is unable to prevail on his ineffective
assistance claims.

First, Juror No. 4783984 was excused for cause and did not
serve on Sullivan’s jury. Thus, Sullivan cannot show with respect

22
to Juror No. 4783984 that a “juror” used discriminatory
language about his race or exhibited bias or animus
towards him because of his race. (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) For
the same reason, Sullivan cannot show that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to preserve an RJA claim on this basis
in trial court.

With respect to Juror No. 4853308, Sullivan contends
that this juror, an African American who spoke with an
accent, expressed bias against native born African
Americans. Sullivan relies on two statements by this juror.
In one exchange, the juror discussed “the things that my
kids went through as black boys growing up in the
neighborhood [and] the way people would react to them.
When they hear my accent it’s completely different. Oh,
you are not one of them, but I say no, those are my kids so I
am one of them, you know. So if you want to treat me
differently, you got to treat them the same way.” In the
second statement, after relating an incident in which their
son was racially profiled, the juror stated: “when they hear
my accent it’s like, oh, you're a king, you’re different from
them. It's not like that for me.” Neither statement relied
upon by Sullivan indicates that the juror personally made a
discriminatory statement or otherwise exhibited bias
towards African Americans. In both exchanges, the juror
rejected the notion that he should be treated differently
based on his accent. Further, as discussed, the juror’s
relating of statements by others does not amount to an RJA
violation under the circumstances here. (§ 745, subd.
(a)(2).) Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to preserve an
RJA claim on this basis was not deficient.

Sullivan next argues that Juror No. 4853331’s
response—that he “[a]gree[d] [s]omewhat” with the
statement that African Americans commit more crime than

23
other groups—violated the RJA. Sullivan rightly asserts that the
juror’s endorsement of the statement, which attributes a
pernicious stereotype to a group of people based on race, is
racially offensive. (See Buck, supra, 580 U.S. at p. 121.) Despite
the juror’s endorsement of a racial stereotype, however,
Sullivan’s counsel affirmatively agreed with the prosecution to
include the individual on the jury. Indeed, the record indicates
that this juror held views favorable to the defense. The juror
indicated that when they had previously served on a jury, the
defendant was “over prosecuted” and the case “should never
ha[ve] come to trial”; that “most of the people” who live in
housing projects “are just struggling to survive”; that they
“[d]isagree[d] [s]trongly” with the statement that if the
government brings a defendant to trial, the defendant is probably
guilty; and that they “[d]isagree[d] [s]omewhat” that compassion
for the victim is important to their verdict in this case.
Accordingly, defense counsel’s decision to agree to seat this
individual on the jury was not objectively unreasonable. (See,
e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170, 196 (Cullen)
[explaining that in determining whether an attorney’s
performance was deficient under the objective inquiry called for
in Strickland’s first step, “[t]he Court of Appeals was required not
simply to ‘give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,’ . . . but to
affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons Pinholster’s
counsel may have had for proceeding as they did’ ”].)

As Sullivan asserts, Juror No. 4802469 made very
troubling statements concerning African Americans. The juror
indicated that he “[a]gree[d] [s]omewhat” with the stereotype
that African Americans commit more crimes than others. He
stated that he “suppose[d]” that his belief made him “more fearful
of African Americans.” And, when asked whether he crosses the
street to avoid an African American, the juror responded: “I
imagine I do to some extent but probably not any more than a lot

24
of other people.” Notwithstanding the juror’s statements,
Sullivan’s counsel affirmatively agreed to seat him on the jury.

Sullivan’s counsel could have reasonably believed
that countervailing factors justified allowing Juror No.
4802469 to serve. The juror selected “[d]isagree [s]trongly”
in connection with the statements that if the government
brings a defendant to trial, the defendant is probably
guilty; an innocent person is unlikely to be charged or tried
for a serious crime; and compassion for the victim is
important to his verdict. During voir dire, the juror
asserted that his agreement that African Americans
commit more crimes than others would not impact his
deliberation and judgment of Sullivan. He agreed that
some people arrested by police are not guilty, and he
affirmed that if he served on the jury, he would “look to the
facts, look to the [court’s] guidance.” And the juror had
experience as a juror, having served on five or six trials
including cases involving murder, child molestation, and
robbery; when he served as the jury foreperson in the child
molestation case, a mistrial was declared due to lack of
unanimity. In addition, he had been a member of the
American Civil Liberties Union, an organization that works
on criminal justice and other social justice issues, for 40
years. Sullivan’s counsel had an opportunity to question
this juror and was able to observe his demeanor throughout
voir dire. Accordingly, Sullivan is unable to demonstrate
that his counsel’s decision to seat this juror was objectively
unreasonable. (Cullen, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 196.)

It is true that even after the RJA was enacted,
Sullivan’s trial counsel did not bring an RJA motion in trial
court. Because defense counsel had affirmatively agreed to
seat Juror Nos. 4853331 and 4802469 on the jury, however,
an RJA challenge on that basis would have lacked merit.

25
(Cf. People v. Holmes, McClain & Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719,
821-822 [“ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by
its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim
on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that
error.’ ”]; People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 96-97 [holding
that defendant had waived any challenge to procedure whereby
by prospective jurors could be dismissed solely based on their
written questionnaires, where “trial counsel explicitly endorsed
the procedure defendant now challenges on appeal,” and trial
counsel’s decision was reasonable]; People v. Morris (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 402, 413-414 [rejecting a defendant’s Wheeler
challenge where the “[d]efendant did not suffer a cognizable
injury because he was tried by a jury of his own choosing.”].) As a
result, defense counsel’s failure to bring an RJA motion on these
grounds was not deficient.

4.

Sullivan also contends that the admission of rap lyrics at
trial violated the RJA. As he concedes, however, his counsel
forfeited this issue by failing to make an RJA objection before
sentencing. Further, his failure to brief this issue adequately in
his opening brief has forfeited the argument on appeal.

As our Supreme Court recently observed in People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 (Hin), the admission of rap lyrics into
evidence can invoke racist stereotypes and “inject[] racial bias
into jury decisionmaking.” (Hin, at p. 477.) The two-sentence
argument in Sullivan’s opening brief, however, fails to identify
any specific portion of the record in support of Sullivan’s
contention that the RJA was violated here. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)-(C).) Accordingly, the argument is
forfeited.

26
C. Admission of Gang Evidence & Rap Videos/Lyrics

Sullivan maintains that his substantive gang conviction,
gang enhancements, and other convictions must be reversed for
several reasons based on the erroneous admission of gang
evidence, rap videos, and rap lyrics. We disagree.

1.

Prior to trial, Sullivan moved in limine for an
Evidence Code section 402 hearing to set parameters
around the prosecution’s proffered gang evidence and to
exclude any case-specific hearsay pursuant to Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) as applied by
our Supreme Court in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
665 (Sanchez). Sergeant Manning, the prosecution’s gang
expert, testified for eight days at the evidentiary hearing.
Hunter subsequently filed written objections to portions of
Manning’s proposed testimony, including testimony
concerning Big Block predicate crimes. Neither defendant
moved to bifurcate the substantive gang charges or gang
enhancements from the other charges.

At the conclusion of the hearings, the prosecutor
stated he would limit the predicate or pattern offenses to
those of which Manning had personal knowledge, and that
older offenses were offered to “bridge the gap” between the
instant offense and a federal indictment of older Big Block
members from the year 2001.

At trial, Manning testified that he had been assigned
to the Bayview District for 25 years and had worked on the
gang task force (in the Bayview) for 12 years. During that
time, he investigated various gang-related crimes in the
area. According to Manning, at least nine different gangs,
including Big Block and Westmobb, were active in
Bayview/Hunters Point in 2013. Each gang has its own

27
“home turf,” where its members predominately work and
ostensibly feel safe.

Manning testified that Big Block has existed since before
2000. Its primary activities are narcotics sales, home and auto
burglaries, robberies, possessing firearms, and shootings.
Various Big Block members engaged in a continuous pattern of
criminal activity between 2005 and 2013. As of 2013, he opined,
Big Block had about 30 to 60 active members.

Various officers said they saw Sullivan, Hunter, and Q.H.
hanging out with each other and/or other known Big Block
members on multiple occasions. These included instances where
police, for example, searched Sullivan’s room and found the case
for an assault weapon, police stopped a car Sullivan was a
passenger in and found a handgun under the driver’s seat, and
police found a gun and a gun magazine (from a different gun) in a
vacant apartment occupied by Sullivan and another known Big
Block member. The prosecution presented similar evidence
regarding Hunter.

The prosecution also introduced evidence from social
media, rap lyrics, and rap videos to establish Sullivan’s gang
membership. This included evidence from various Big Block
members’ social media accounts, including Sullivan and Hunter.
One image showed Sullivan using his hands to “[throw] a 7” (for
the 700-block of Kirkwood) while simulating shooting with his
other hand. The jury was shown several Big Block rap videos,
including some that either depicted Sullivan and Hunter or
referred to them.

Manning opined that the shooting in this case was done
during broad daylight to send a “strong message” to Westmobb
that challenging or taunting Big Block members (either online or
in person) could be fatal.

28
The jury found Sullivan guilty of, among other
things, actively participating in a criminal street gang (§
186.22, subd. (a)) (count 12) and found true multiple gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). At sentencing,
however, the trial court struck count 12 and all the gang
enhancements “in all instances” in the interests of justice.

2.

Evidence Relating to Sullivan’s Gang Participation
Conviction & Gang Enhancements

We first address Sullivan’s challenges to his gang
participation conviction and gang enhancements.

a.

Sullivan relies in part on Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), known as the STEP
Forward Act of 2021, which became effective on January 1,
2022, while his appeal was pending. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §
1.) AB 333 “amended . . . section 186.22 by imposing new
substantive requirements relating to gang enhancements
and the criminal offense of gang participation. (Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 4.) [AB 333] also added section 1109, which
provides that, if requested by the defense, a trial court
must try a gang enhancement charge separately from the
underlying offense. (§ 1109, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 5.) The statute likewise provides that gang-participation
offenses must be tried separately from all other counts that
do not require gang evidence as an element of the crime. (§
1109, subd. (b); Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.).” (People v.
Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Burgos), fn. omitted.)

b.
To begin, we reject Sullivan’s argument that his gang
participation and gang enhancement convictions must be
reversed based on section 1109’s new provisions concerning
29
bifurcation of trials of gang participation offenses and gang
enhancement charges. In Burgos, our Supreme Court held that
section 1109 does not apply retroactively to nonfinal cases like
Sullivan’s. (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 24.) Burgos
explained that the exception to prospective application of statutes
first recognized in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 applies to
statutory amendments that narrow the scope of criminal liability
or mitigate the punishment for a criminal offense. (Burgos, at pp.
12-15.) Burgos reasoned that “[b]ecause the procedures
established by section 1109 do not alter the criminality of
defendant’s conduct or the severity of punishment,” the Estrada
exception does not apply to section 1109. (Burgos, at p. 21.)

c.

As for Sullivan’s remaining arguments for reversal of his
gang participation and gang enhancement convictions, we
conclude that portion of his appeal is moot because the trial court
has already granted him the relief he requests.

“As a general rule, we do not issue advisory opinions
indicating ‘ “what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.” ’ ” (People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084, quoting
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33
Cal.3d 158, 171; see also People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739,
746.) We have discretion to consider a moot issue that involves a
question of serious public concern that would otherwise elude
resolution, however. (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646
(DeLeon).)

Sullivan does not explain how his remaining challenges to
his gang-related conviction and enhancements are properly
before us given the trial court’s decision to strike count 12, the
substantive gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and all the gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Even assuming
(without deciding) that they are properly before us, none of the
issues identified by Sullivan have escaped appellate review or are
30
likely to do so as the above-cited cases reflect. (See DeLeon,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Accordingly, we disregard Sullivan's
challenges to the gang evidence to the extent they relate to
his gang participation conviction and enhancements. We
therefore turn to Sullivan’s arguments that the unlawful
admission of gang evidence prejudiced his trial for murder,
attempted murder, and other remaining offenses.

3.

Evidence of Other Guns, Other Murders, and Gang
Members Attending the Trial

Sullivan argues that his remaining convictions must be
reversed because the trial court erred in admitting highly
prejudicial evidence of guns not used in the instant crime and
other gang-related murders, and of the presence of gang members
at the trial. He contends that the admission of this evidence “so
overwhelmed the trial” that it not only constituted an abuse of
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 but also amounted to
a due process violation. Because his counsel neither requested
bifurcation nor objected on these grounds at trial, however,
Sullivan has forfeited these arguments. Further, Sullivan is
unable to show on this record that his counsel’s failure to do so
constituted ineffective assistance.

a.

Before the trial, Sullivan’s motion in limine unsuccessfully
sought to exclude all gang evidence from the trial. The trial court
told the prosecutor, “I’m certainly going to let you present gang-
related evidence and evidence relating to each of the defendants
and their alleged participation in the gangs to make a case.”
Although the trial court was inclined to rule that the
prosecution’s gang-related exhibits were admissible, the court
made clear that the exhibits would “still all be subject to
exclusion under [section] 352. . . . In other words, just because

31
something’s admissible doesn’t mean necessarily it all comes in if,
you know, we get into a point of cumulativeness on an issue or
something like that.”

Sullivan’s argument on appeal is that even though “some
gang evidence was admissible to explain the rivalry . . . between
Westmobb and Big Block[,] . . . the evidence of other firearms,
other murders, and gang members in the courtroom had little or
no relevance” or “[wa]s cumulative.” But as to the evidence of
other guns and other murders, Sullivan’s brief acknowledges that
the reason this evidence was admitted was “[b]ecause the gang
charges were not bifurcated,” and his counsel never moved for
bifurcation.

Further, Sullivan does not maintain that, at trial, he ever
objected to the evidence he now challenges on the grounds it was
cumulative or that its undue prejudicial effect outweighed any
probative value. Because Evidence Code section 353, subdivision
(a), requires that “the specific ground of the objection” be “timely”
and “clear[ly]” made, we may not reverse his convictions based on
Sullivan’s newly raised arguments. (See People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 433-435; see also People v. Holloway (2004) 33
Cal.4th 96, 133 [“A tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling, made
without fully knowing what the trial evidence would show, will
not preserve the issue for appeal if the appellant could have, but
did not, renew the objection or offer of proof and press for a final
ruling in the changed context of the trial evidence itself.”]).

b.

Sullivan argues in the alternative that even if his counsel
forfeited the issue by failure to object, the failure constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. As our Supreme Court has
observed, ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed
on direct appeal because the appellate record seldom reveals trial
counsel’s reasoning for an action or omission. (See People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal. 5th 181, 198 (Mickel).)
32
We are unpersuaded by Sullivan’s contention that, because
counsel objected to all gang evidence at the outset, there could
have been no reasonable explanation for failing to move for
bifurcation or failing to object to admission of particular gang
evidence at trial. As the jury was instructed and trial counsel
acknowledged during closing arguments, the gang evidence was
relevant not only to the gang participation and enhancement
charges, but also to the question of motive. Trial counsel may
have reasoned that because the evidence relevant to the gang-
related charges was so interwoven with the evidence relevant to
the remaining substantive charges that any attempt to bifurcate
would have been unsuccessful at keeping the gang evidence out.

Moreover, trial counsel made use of the evidence. She
asserted during closing argument that the jury was “bombarded
with all of this gang testimony” not only because it was relevant
to the prosecution’s case on the gang participation and
enhancement charges but also because “[i]t’s to give you a real
picture. You should have a full picture of everyone involved. [¶]
You can’t evaluate the evidence unless you have a full picture.”
Trial counsel affirmatively relied on the “full picture” of
interactions between the gang members, including the ongoing
feud between Big Block and Westmobb and specific incidents of
violence between the two gangs. For example, she argued that
two other Big Block members, Anthony Brown and Michael
Higginbotham, were more likely suspects than Sullivan because
Westmobb members tried to shoot them the day after Rice was
killed. Sullivan’s counsel also pointed to an incident in which
armed Westmobb members came to Hunter’s house—but not
Sullivan’s—to try to exact retribution just hours after Rice was
killed. She pointed to graffiti that suggested Westmobb planned
to kill Hunter. She highlighted other Big Block or Westmobb
members who had been “murdered” or “killed” since Rice’s death.
Trial counsel argued that no one came to Sullivan’s house or tried
to threaten or kill him after Rice was shot because Westmobb

33
members who witnessed the shooting knew that Sullivan was not
Rice’s killer. For the jury to understand these exculpatory
arguments, Sullivan’s counsel told the jury, “you have to know,
from my point of view,” who the “player[s]” in Westmobb were,
and their relationships with one another, as well as who the main
players in Big Block were.

Because Sullivan has failed to show affirmative evidence
that his trial counsel could have had “no rational tactical
purpose” for declining to move for bifurcation or make further
objections to the gang evidence, he is unable to establish that his
counsel’s performance in this regard was constitutionally
deficient. (See Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.)

4.

Challenge to Admission of Case-Specific Hearsay

Sullivan next contends that his convictions must be
reversed because “much of the gang evidence was case-specific
hearsay” admitted in violation of his rights under the federal
Constitution’s Confrontation Clause. (See Crawford, supra, 541
U.S. 36; Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665.) In his abbreviated
briefing on this issue, the only evidence that he specifically
identifies as hearsay is testimony by Manning that “certain gang
members were ‘murdered’ and others were in prison facing
charges of murder or other violent crimes.” However, Sullivan
does not reference any specific out-of-court statements or provide
any analysis or authority for the proposition that the fact a
person is facing criminal charges or has died is an out-of-court
statement amounting to hearsay. He has therefore forfeited the
issue. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)

34
5.

Challenges to Admission of Rap Lyrics

Sullivan challenges the admission of several videos, most of
which show Big Block members performing raps, as well as rap
lyrics recovered from his cell phone. Sullivan asserts that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the videos and lyrics
and the error prejudiced his trial. We conclude that the
admission of five rap videos and lyrics from Sullivan’s phone was
harmless error under Evidence Code section 352.

a.

Before assessing the parties’ contentions, we briefly
describe the videos and lyrics challenged by Sullivan.

“Sick Crew ft. NBA” (Exhibit 242). The video opens with a
purported news clip discussing the rivalry between Big Block and
Westmobb, stating that “[t]he death toll surges as the gang
warfare heats up. [¶] Big Block, the larger of the two groups and
with superior firepower, is winning.” According to Sergeant
Manning, the song is about the “crimes committed by Big Block
that led up to the [2000] federal indictment” against the gang.
The lyrics discuss drug sales, the federal indictment against Big
Block, and firearm charges. The lyrics include “[f][*]ck the boys
in blue,” referring to the police, as well as a reference to “sharp
b[*]tches.” The video was filmed in Big Block territory, and
several Big Block members are seen rapping, dancing, or
congregating in this video, including Sullivan, although he does
not rap in it. Firearms and ammunition are visible in the video.

“Money on Yo Head -- Lil Blood” (Exhibit 242). The video,
which was shot in Big Block’s gang territory, starts with two men
discussing a kidnapping, and it shows a person tied up in a trunk
as well as a blindfolded woman and child who huddle together

35
while a rapper points two guns at them. The video includes the
repeated refrain:

“My gang is shootin’ shots all day we call it trippin’
Money on ya head, your sister will come up missin’
Money on ya head, your daughter will come up missin’
Snatch that b[*]tch up in broad day we caught him slippin’”
The song refers to “stabbing,” “choppin,” “shots,” “guns,” a
“trigger finger . . . itchin’” and “blow[ing] out your brain.”
Sullivan appears in the video along with other Big Block
members. While Sullivan appears in the center of the camera
shot, a rapper says “ ‘Lee [is] trying to catch a body.’ ” Manning
testified that this lyric indicated that Sullivan was “trying to kill
somebody.”

“Off Safety - Taliban Shady” (Exhibit 242). This video, in
which Sullivan does not appear, features rapping by Rashad
Preston, a Big Block member whose rap name is “Taliban Shady.”
Individuals are seen pointing handguns at the camera, and some
of the young men depicted in the video simulate shooting with
their hands. Groups of young men are rapping, dancing,
standing around, smoking, and throwing hand signs, and
flashing cash. The lyrics discuss keeping the narrator’s gun with
the safety off—ready to fire, warn people not to “f[*]ck around
and make the hit list,” and threaten to kill people and put them
on a memorial t-shirt. Several of the young men in the video are
Big Block members. In one scene, the words “Free Smoove” are
visible as graffiti; the words refer to releasing co-defendant
Hunter.

“Why You Hatin - Taliban Shady” (Exhibit 242). The video
opens with a young man saying “free D-Smoov” and “free Lee,”
referring to Hunter and Sullivan, neither of whom appear in the
video. In the video, Taliban Shady raps, smokes, flashes cash,
and repeatedly simulates shooting a gun with his hands. The

36
lyrics discuss sliding through a block spraying bullets; a Glock
that could “throw a ni[**]a [and] put him back to sleep”; and
flipping cars, burning, and charred flesh.

Untitled Video (Exhibit 250). Unlike the foregoing videos,
which appear to be professionally produced, this informal video
appears to have been shot with a cell phone camera. Several
young men, one of whom is Sullivan, hang out on the street, in
Big Block territory, and take turns improvising raps, laughing,
and dancing. As Manning testified, the video “[l]ooks like it[]
[was filmed] just when they’re hanging out, [and] they made a
freestyle . . . rap video.” No weapons are visible, but the raps
reference guns and violence: “AK’s . . . spittin’ like camels” and
“clearing blocks”; “[y]oung ni[**]as pullin’ trigger”; and “spraying
hella rounds” and “put[ting] you in the ground.” Sullivan’s rap
includes references to “getting[] bitches,” “shootin,’” “holsters,”
putting people on “homicide posters,” and “jump[ing] out with the
chop” (assault rifle). In addition, Sullivan raps: “Imma go off the
top of the dome” and “[h]it his ass with the chrome,” which
Manning testified meant Sullivan was going to “shoot off the top
of someone’s head” and hit someone with a gun or bullet.
Laughter can be heard throughout the video, including while
Sullivan is rapping.

“Public Announcement 3” (Exhibit 240). This informal video
depicts Rice, the murder victim, walking around near his home,
showing where he can be found, and inviting rival gang members
to come after him. Rice posted the video to his Facebook account
in March 2012.

Lyrics from Sullivan’s Phone (Exhibit 251). The lyrics
recovered from Sullivan’s phone contain references to gangs and
“[B]ig [B]lock” specifically; AK-47s, Glocks, and other firearms
and ammunition; and murder, violence, and other criminal
activities. For example, the very first lines in Exhibit 251 are
“Gang affiated might get me indicted/ [¶] . . . Selln dope shoot

37
guns dat get me excited.” The lyrics continue: “Ride for my
ni[**]azYea I’m my brother’s keeper/ [¶] . . . Walkin ya hood
snatchn ni[**]a like d reaper / [¶] . . . Rockin wid dat swweeper /
[¶] Dat ak 47.” These lyrics referred to getting indicted for being
gang affiliated, shooting people, and using a “street sweeper” or
assault rifle to kill people.

Other lyrics include: “if its beef me n yungis creep Murder
u /mm I use to run wid murder crew.” The jury heard testimony
that these lines meant “if ‘[i]t’s a beef, me and my youngins
creep” and will “kill you” and that the narrator was affiliated
with the “ ‘M and M’ ”: “ ‘money and murder’ ” or “ ‘murder crew,’
” a clique within Big Block. Additional lyrics referred to “
‘thuggin’ ” or being a criminal, clutching a gun, using a “ ‘big
chop[] ’ ” or assault weapon, and being a “ ‘solder (sic) of Harbor
Road,’ ” or a soldier in a gang war.4 In addition, the lyrics
included: “ ‘Fuk [doing] a drive by [shooting], tip toe when I’m
clappin,’ ” meaning “sneak up while I’m shooting.”

In another set of lines that Manning testified was “very
important,” the lyrics read: “45 WID 30 ON EXTENDO
JUMPING OUT D RENTAL@/ . . . [¶] that’s way a Ni[**]a get
murdah in dese streets quick.” Manning testified that these lines
referred to “ ‘jumping out’ ” of a rental car with a .45-caliber gun
outfitted with a 30-round magazine.

b.

As an initial matter, we must address the People’s
argument that Sullivan forfeited his objections to some of the rap
videos due to failure to object at trial.

At trial, Sullivan objected to four of the six videos he
challenges on appeal, and he objected to the admission of the rap
lyrics found on his phone. As the People acknowledge, Sullivan

4Because it is in Big Block territory, “Harbor Road” refers
to Big Block.
38
objected on Evidence Code section 352 grounds to the four videos
contained in Exhibit 242: “Sick Crew ft. NBA,” “Money on Yo
Head -- Lil Blood,” “Off Safety - Taliban Shady,” and “Why You
Hatin - Taliban Shady.” Sullivan also objected on Evidence Code
section 352 grounds to the rap lyrics from his phone (Exhibit
251).

Sullivan did not, however, object to Rice’s “Public
Announcement 3” video in Exhibit 240, or to the untitled video in
Exhibit 250. His failure to object forfeits his challenge on appeal
unless an objection would have been futile. (See People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1190 [“We typically excuse failures to
raise futile objections.”].)

Although we agree with the People that Sullivan forfeited
his objection to the “Public Announcement 3” video, we conclude
that he did not forfeit his challenge to the video in Exhibit 250
because an objection likely would have been futile. (See People v.
Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 286-287 [concluding that evidentiary
objections were futile where the trial court had already rejected
an Evidence Code section 352 objection to the testimony and the
record suggested the trial court would have overruled further
objections]; see also, e.g., People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285,
332-333; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 494.) “Public
Announcement 3” was the first of the videos introduced by the
prosecution, and there was no basis for concluding at that point
that an objection would have been ineffective. By the time the
prosecution sought to introduce Exhibit 250, however, the trial
court had already admitted four other rap videos over Sullivan’s
Evidence Code section 352 objection.

We will therefore consider Sullivan’s challenge to the five
rap videos in Exhibits 242 and 250 and to the rap lyrics in
Exhibit 251.

39
c.

Sullivan relies in part on Assembly Bill No. 2799 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 2799), which added section 352.2 to the
Evidence Code and took effect on January 1, 2023, while his
appeal was pending. (Stats. 2022, ch. 973, § 2.) The statute
provides that when a party seeks to introduce a form of creative
expression such as rap lyrics into evidence, the court, in addition
to performing an Evidence Code section 352 analysis, must
consider that: “(1) the probative value of such expression for its
literal truth or as a truthful narrative is minimal unless that
expression is created near in time to the charged crime or crimes,
bears a sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime or
crimes, or includes factual detail not otherwise publicly available;
and (2) undue prejudice includes, but is not limited to, the
possibility that the trier of fact will, in violation of [Evidence
Code] Section 1101, treat the expression as evidence of the
defendant's propensity for violence or general criminal
disposition as well as the possibility that the evidence will
explicitly or implicitly inject racial bias into the proceedings.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.2, subd. (a).)

“In enacting the provision, the Legislature made the
following findings and declarations, showing that a particular
concern was the possible unfair prejudice stemming from the
admission of rap lyrics: [¶] ‘(a) Existing precedent allows artists’
creative expression to be admitted as evidence in criminal
proceedings without a sufficiently robust inquiry into whether
such evidence introduces bias or prejudice into the proceedings.
In particular, a substantial body of research shows a significant
risk of unfair prejudice when rap lyrics are introduced into
evidence. [Citations.] [¶] (b) It is the intent of this Legislature to
provide a framework by which courts can ensure that . . . an
accused person's creative expression will not be used to introduce
stereotypes or activate bias against the defendant, nor as

40
character or propensity evidence; and to recognize that the
use of rap lyrics and other creative expression as
circumstantial evidence of motive or intent is not a
sufficient justification to overcome substantial evidence
that the introduction of rap lyrics creates a substantial risk
of unfair prejudice.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 578, 591–592, review granted July 12, 2023,
S280073 (Ramos).)

There is a split in authority over the retroactive
application of Evidence Code section 352.2 to nonfinal
convictions. Our Supreme Court is currently considering
the issue. (People v. Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445,
448 [Evid. Code, § 352.2 is retroactive], review granted May
17, 2023, S279081 (Venable); Ramos, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 596 [Evid. Code, § 352.2 is not retroactive]; People v.
Slaton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 363, 376 [same], review
granted Nov. 15, 2023, S282047 (Slaton); see also People v.
Bankston, S044739 [automatic appeal raising the
retroactivity of Evid. Code, § 352.2].) We need not resolve
this disagreement, however, in light of our analysis of
Sullivan’s Evidence Code section 352 challenge, to which
we now turn. (See Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 471.)

d.

Sullivan contends that the trial court abused its
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting
the rap videos and lyrics because their probative value was
outweighed by their prejudicial effect, particularly given
that the prosecution presented abundant alternative
evidence that he was affiliated with Big Block and
therefore had a motive to kill Rice. At oral argument, the
People conceded that at least some of the rap evidence
should not have been admitted. We agree that the court

41
erred by admitting the videos and lyrics, but we conclude the
error was harmless.

i.

Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” “The ‘prejudice’ which section 352 seeks
to avoid is that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional
bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th
256, 275, original italics.)

Our Supreme Court recently cautioned that rap lyrics have
“ ‘minimal probative value’ ” as evidence of their literal truth.
(Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 477, quoting People v. Coneal (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 951, 953 (Coneal).) Like other musical lyrics, rap
lyrics are a form of “ ‘ “figurative expression[]” ’ ” and “ ‘ “are not
intended to be and should not be read literally on their face.” ’ ”
(Hin, at p. 477, quoting In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620,
636; see also People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 23
(Melendez).) The probative value of lyrics as a statement of fact
may be increased with corroboration from other evidence or when
the lyrics are written close in time to the crime at issue or bear a
“sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime.” (Coneal, at p.
969; see also Melendez, at p. 23 [affirming exclusion of
handwritten rap lyrics found in co-defendant’s jail cell appearing
to take responsibility for the charged crime, where no foundation
was laid indicating the co-defendant had authored the lyrics and,
although the lyrics bore some similarity to the crime, “[n]o reason
appears to assume they relate actual events”].) But absent a
meaningful basis for concluding that particular lyrics bear a
relationship to real-life events, rap lyrics—like those from any

42
other musical genre—may be purely fictional. (Coneal, at pp.
968-969; see also Hin, at p. 478.)

Apart from its minimal probative value, gang-related
rap music may be especially prejudicial due to its “ ‘violent,
inflammatory lyrics.’ ” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 477,
quoting Coneal, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 954.) The use of
rap lyrics in a criminal prosecution relies on racist
stereotypes concerning Black men and other people of color.
(Hin, at p. 477.) It also invites the possibility that the jury’s
decisionmaking may be infected by racial bias. (Ibid.)

Sullivan relies on Coneal, which was decided a couple
months after the verdict in this case. Coneal held that the
admission of the rap videos at issue in that case was an
abuse of discretion because the videos were cumulative of
other evidence of the defendant’s gang membership and
related issues. (Coneal, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 966-
968.) For the purpose of establishing the defendant’s gang
membership, the prosecution introduced numerous
screenshots depicting still images from each of the rap
videos challenged by the defendant. (Id. at p. 966.) The
prosecution presented the screenshots, social media
images, and other photographs showing the defendant
associating with other gang members, making gang hand
signs, or wearing gang-associated clothing. (Ibid.) There
was also evidence that a police detective contacted the
defendant while he was at a known gang hangout, and
another witness testified that the defendant was a gang
member and that he was throwing gang signs in two
photographs. (Ibid.) Coneal held that in light of this
substantial evidence of the defendant’s gang membership,
“the additional probative value of the videos themselves
was minimal.” (Ibid.)

43
The prosecution in Coneal contended that the videos were
important to demonstrate the rivalry between the defendant’s
gang and another gang. (Coneal, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p.
967.) But Coneal concluded that the videos were cumulative in
light of testimony from two expert witnesses about the rivalry
between the gangs as well as evidence of other shootings in which
members of one gang were shooting at members of the other.
(Ibid.) Because there was a substantial amount of other evidence
serving the same purposes for which the prosecution introduced
the rap videos, Coneal held that the additional probative value of
the videos was minimal. (Id. at pp. 967-968.)

Here, as in Coneal, the probative value of the rap videos
and lyrics was minimal. Notably, the People concede that no
foundation was laid for the videos or lyrics, nor do they argue
that they were created or written close in time to the charged
crimes. Indeed, the subject of the “Sick Crew ft. NBA” video was
the events that led up to the indictment of Big Block, which
occurred in 2001, when Sullivan was no more than 10 years old.
The two “Taliban Shady” videos, which call for Hunter and
Sullivan to be released from prison, were made after the two were
taken into custody.

Although they had some limited relevance to the gang
charges and potential motive, the videos and lyrics were
cumulative of other evidence on those questions. The prosecution
presented evidence of at least seven separate occasions between
2010 and 2013 in which police encountered Sullivan in the
company of other Big Block members on gang territory, in some
instances with firearms or drugs. Two of the instances in which
police documented that Sullivan was in the company of known
Big Block members occurred within three weeks before Rice’s
killing.

The prosecution presented seven stills from the rap videos,
four of which included Sullivan. In addition, the record contained

44
a photograph of Sullivan by himself, throwing hand signs,
as well as several social media images depicting Sullivan
throwing hand signs along with Big Block members. The
record also included numerous photos of Big Block
members other than Sullivan associating with each other
and/or throwing hand signs.

Police witnesses, including Sergeant Manning, the
gang expert, testified that Sullivan is a member of Big
Block, a criminal street gang. Manning also testified that
the photographs of Sullivan associating with other Big
Block members and throwing gang signs supported the
conclusion that he was a gang member because in
“throwing those Big Block hand signs, they are letting
anyone else who sees those images . . . know . . . what gang
they are, and they are doing that directly to show their
affiliation to that gang.”

The prosecution also presented evidence of the gang
rivalry between Big Block and Westmobb and its violent
history, including testimony from Manning. Several hours
after Rice was killed, police encountered Terrell Blay,
another Westmobb member, aiming an assault rifle at
Hunter and Q.H.’s residence, and the next day, multiple
shots were fired at a car with two Big Block members,
Matthew Higginbotham and Anthony Brown, inside.

We reject the People’s argument that the rap videos
were not cumulative because they corroborated the
defendants’ gang membership, the federal indictment of Big
Block, the Big Block-Westmobb rivalry, and relatedly,
Sullivan’s motive to kill Rice. As discussed above, there
was abundant other evidence—including testimony,
photographs, and video stills—establishing Sullivan’s
membership in Big Block, the membership of numerous
other Big Block members, and the rivalry with Westmobb.

45
Notably, still images from the videos introduced by the
prosecution were probative of Sullivan’s association with
other Big Block members, but the actual lyrics and music in the
videos—painting a picture of rampant violence, cruelty, and
misogyny—had little probative value on that question. (See Hin,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 479 [holding that rap lyrics were
cumulative as evidence of the defendant’s gang membership
where the prosecution introduced expert testimony about the
defendant’s gang membership as well as numerous photographs
of the defendant making gang signs, wearing gang colors, and
associating with other gang members].) In addition, the federal
indictment itself was part of the record and was the subject of
testimony by Manning, so the purported news clip included in the
beginning of the “Sick Crew ft. NBA” video added little of value.
We conclude the probative value of the rap videos and lyrics was
minimal in light of the other, less inflammatory evidence.

As in Coneal, moreover, the potential prejudice of the rap
videos and lyrics was high. “The lyrics casually describe graphic,
widespread violence,” cruelty, and misogyny. (Coneal, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 970; see also Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 480.)
The videos refer to gun violence, murder, mayhem, burning cars
and flesh, drugs, and kidnapping of women and children. They
describe women in offensive terms, threaten to shoot or otherwise
harm the listener, and reflect antagonism toward the police.
Notably, in one of the videos, a rapper states, “ ‘Lee trying to
catch a body’ ”—suggesting that Sullivan was trying to murder
someone. The lyrics from Sullivan’s phone were similarly
inflammatory and, in particular, discussed using rental cars and
extended magazines in shootings, which the prosecution’s gang
expert suggested was a “direct reference to this incident.” As the
People conceded at oral argument, there is no foundation for
taking these lyrics literally, as required by Hin. (Hin, at p. 478.).
They also conceded that the videos showed bad conduct and a
propensity for violence by gangs.

46
The videos and lyrics thus “pose[d] a significant
danger that the jury will use it as evidence of appellant’s
violent character and criminal propensity in violation
of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a).” (Coneal,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 971; see also Hin, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 476-477.) In addition, the videos and lyrics
posed a “risk of injecting racial bias into the jury’s
decisionmaking.” (Hin, at p. 480.) For these reasons, the
potential prejudicial impact of the videos and lyrics
substantially outweighed their probative value. The court
should have excluded them under Evidence Code section
352.

ii.

We next consider whether the erroneous admission of
the rap videos and lyrics was harmless. Like the courts in
Hin and Coneal, we conclude the error was harmless.

We apply the state law test for harmless error
because there were multiple permissible inferences that
could be drawn from the evidence, making it a statutory
rather than constitutional issue. (See Coneal, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 972.) The question is “ ‘whether it is
reasonably probable the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant absent the error.’ ” (People v.
Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 686; see also Hin, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 482-483; Coneal, at p. 972.)

To apply this test, we must consider a counterfactual
question: what would the jury have done had the court not
admitted the rap videos and lyrics? (See People v. Hendrix (2022)
13 Cal.5th 933, 948 (Hendrix).) To hold an error was prejudicial,
the court need not conclude that the error “ ‘ “more likely than
not” ’ ” affected the result. (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.) Instead, an error is prejudicial if there
was a “ ‘ “reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility,” ’ ”
47
that the error affected the verdict. (Ibid., original italics; see also
Hendrix, at pp. 949-950 [same].) In determining whether the
error was prejudicial, our focus is on “what the ‘jury is likely to
have done,’ ” and we may neither reinterpret nor reweigh the
evidence. (Hendrix, at p. 948.)

Here, there is no reasonable chance that the rap evidence
made a difference. Because the FBI surveillance video shows the
second shooter, the jury would have faced an obvious, focused
question regardless of whether the rap evidence came in: Is
Sullivan the same short, skinny man in a dark jacket, cap, white
t-shirt, and sneakers who is seen, in the video, stepping out of
Renesha’s rental car and shooting Rice? The jury had two
months to observe Sullivan in trial. His appearance had not
changed since the shooting. On at least three occasions during
the trial, defense counsel asked Sullivan to stand up for the jury,
and counsel encouraged “[e]verybody [to] take a look at him.”
Three police officers who knew Sullivan pointed out things in the
video that they believed demonstrated it was him. As the
prosecutor told the jury, the video was the “star witness.”

In addition to their own eyes, moreover, the jury had
copious evidence that placed Sullivan in the video and in the
rental car—his phone in the car’s center console, his fingerprints
on the interior door handle, the glove with his DNA and gunshot
residue found in the jacket pocket, the dark jacket itself, which
Renesha thought could be Sullivan’s. Renesha, Sullivan’s
girlfriend, said she lent Sullivan (along with the first shooter,
Q.H., and Hunter) the car just before the shooting, when Sullivan
was wearing a dark baseball cap and jacket, and she picked him
up immediately afterwards, when he was wearing just the white
t-shirt. In the car, Renesha heard Sullivan brag about killing
Rice (known as “Dutch”) when he said, “ ‘I blow Dutch when I
smoke.’ ” Sullivan also matched B.K.’s description of the second

48
shooter, given just days after the shooting, as a 5 foot, 7 inch tall
African American man with light skin and a thin build.

To be sure, the defense contested most of this evidence and
attacked Renesha’s credibility. The defense also presented their
own evidence and arguments that it is not Sullivan in the
surveillance video. But the jury was confronted with a wealth of
evidence tying Sullivan to the crime. Renesha’s testimony
placing Sullivan in the car just minutes before the shooting was
corroborated not only by the surveillance video, but also by the
physical/forensic evidence, B.K.’s spot-on description of the
second shooter, and even Sullivan’s distinctive sneakers, as
depicted on the video. We see no basis for thinking that, had the
rap evidence been excluded, the jury would have drawn different
conclusions on whether Renesha was lying or on its views on the
physical/forensic evidence and surveillance video corroborating
her testimony. Indeed, an uncanny sequence of coincidences and
bad luck would be required to explain away the evidence
incriminating Sullivan, especially the timing, the presence of
Sullivan’s DNA on the gloves with the gunshot residue, and the
second shooter’s height, build, and choice of footwear. The nature
and strength of the evidence connecting Sullivan to the crime
persuades us that the jury would have convicted him absent the
rap evidence.

Notably, none of the jury’s 18 notes to the court during
deliberations concerned the rap videos or lyrics. (Cf. People v.
Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 384 [explaining that the jury’s
questions about a video provided “indicia” that the showing of the
video was prejudicial].) Three jury questions addressed factual
issues specific to Sullivan. The jury asked a question about
Renesha’s testimony concerning Sullivan and requested the
transcript of an interview Sullivan gave to the police. The jury
also asked whether Manning had identified Sullivan as the
second shooter from the surveillance video at any point prior to

49
his 2019 trial testimony.5 These questions further indicate the
jury was properly focused on the identity evidence.

Sullivan argues, essentially, that this is a close case on
identity—closer than Hin and Coneal—and therefore the case
poses an unreasonable risk that rap videos and lyrics portrayed
Sullivan as a violent person who would commit this kind of crime.
He points to parts of the prosecutor’s closing arguments in which
the prosecutor invoked an overall culture of gang violence. For
example, the prosecutor argued, “These defendants . . . were
raised their entire lives in this area with this gang violence. . .
They were raised in it. It’s part of their identity, and they
promoted it over and over and over again.” He also referred to
the rap lyric about Sullivan “trying to catch a body.” “Both
[Sullivan’s] public persona and then his private musings [in the
lyrics on his phone] give us the same idea, the same
understanding, the same focus on gang violence, violence in
general.” We agree that, as in Coneal and Hin, the prosecutor
came “ ‘dangerously close to advocating the use of the videos as
evidence of appellant’s violent character.’ ” (Hin, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 478, quoting Coneal, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p.
971.)

We note, however, that the prosecutor referred to rap
videos or lyrics in relatively few instances in his lengthy closing
and rebuttal arguments, and he generally did so in the context of
arguing that the rival gangs’ videos help explain the motive for
the shooting or that Hunter and Sullivan were “active members”
in a criminal gang, “not just guys in the background of music

5 During closing arguments, Sullivan’s counsel argued that
the first time Manning ever said he could tell that the second
shooter in the video was Sullivan was during his testimony at the
2019 trial. In his testimony, Manning said he was on vacation
when the shooting occurred, and that when he reviewed the video
“at some later point” after he returned, he recognized the second
shooter as Sullivan.
50
videos.” He did not play the videos during closing argument.
Instead, the prosecutor focused more on the surveillance video
(the “star witness”), Renesha’s credibility, the other witness’
testimony, and the physical/forensic evidence. Moreover, when
arguing that the videos and lyrics were prejudicial, Sullivan does
not seriously grapple with the fact that, even if they had been
excluded, there would remain a lot of evidence that Sullivan was
an active member of a violent criminal gang that killed rival gang
members. Had the rap evidence been excluded, we believe the
probability of a different outcome for Sullivan was at most an “ ‘ “
‘abstract possibility’ ” ’ ” rather than a reasonable likelihood.
(Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 949-950).

Finally, the fact that the jury acquitted Hunter strongly
supports this conclusion. The prosecution argued that Hunter
drove the rental car. But the surveillance video did not capture
the car’s driver, there was no forensic evidence tying Hunter to
the rental car, and two eyewitnesses thought the driver was a
woman. The prosecution was forced to rely heavily on Renesha’s
testimony implicating Hunter. Unlike with Sullivan, the
prosecution had no evidence, aside from Hunter’s phone, to
corroborate Renesha’s account or to place Hunter in the car at the
time of the shooting—no video, no fingerprints, no gunshot
residue, no clothing, no DNA evidence. Hunter’s acquittal,
together with Sullivan’s conviction, reinforces our view that the
jury based its verdicts on the strength of the identity evidence
and would not have reached a different verdict, as to Sullivan, if
the rap evidence had been excluded.6

6 We do not mean to suggest that the erroneous admission
of rap evidence, in violation of Evidence Code section 352, is
unlikely to constitute prejudicial error as a general matter.
Whether it does will depend on the nature of the evidence in a
particular case. Indeed, in a case in which the prosecution’s case
was comparatively weaker, like Hunter’s, the argument for
51
Our task is not to reweigh the evidence but to determine
what the jury would have done absent the rap evidence.
(Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 948.) We are unpersuaded that
the erroneous admission of the rap videos and lyrics prejudiced
the jury’s verdict.

D. Lay Opinion Testimony

Sullivan further argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing several police officers to give their lay
opinion identifying Sullivan as the second shooter shown in the
surveillance video of the shooting. (See People v. Leon (2015) 61
Cal.4th 569, 600 (Leon) [standard of review].) We disagree.

1.

Sullivan moved in limine to preclude any police officer from
identifying him based on surveillance footage of the shooting. He
argued that law enforcement identification testimony was
unnecessary, unduly prejudicial, and invaded the jury’s province.
The court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Outside
the presence of the jury, two San Francisco Police Department
officers, Eduard Ochoa and Dave Johnson, testified about
watching video of the shooting and their familiarity with
Sullivan. Both stated they could identify Sullivan as the man
shown in the video who exits the Escape during the shooting.

At the hearing, Ochoa testified that, in the four to five
years preceding Sullivan’s arrest in this case, he had arrested
Sullivan twice, spoken to him approximately 25 times, and had
seen him “well over 500 times” while either on patrol or on social
media. Ochoa testified he recognized Sullivan based on the hair,
body type, shoes, and walking gait of the man shown in the video.
Johnson estimated he had seen Sullivan over 100 times and
“interacted” with him approximately 50 times (including during

prejudicial error from inflammatory rap videos and similar
propensity evidence would be much stronger.
52
execution of a search warrant and two arrests) before June
24, 2013. When Johnson viewed the video, he recognized
Sullivan based on the second shooter’s face, specifically
their nose and lips.

The prosecutor argued the officers’ testimony was
helpful to the jury (and therefore admissible) because the
surveillance footage itself was not clear. The court agreed
and denied Sullivan’s motion in limine but stated the
officers’ testimony could be sanitized to exclude references
to prior arrests or search warrants.

Both Ochoa and Johnson testified similarly before the
jury—that they recognized Sullivan as the man who was
shown on the surveillance video exiting the rear passenger
side of the Escape. Ochoa said he recognized Sullivan from
“the [body type], the walk, the stance, as well as the
height.” Johnson testified that he recognized the man in
the black sweatshirt’s nose and lips, as well as his
mannerisms, as being Sullivan’s.

The prosecution’s gang expert, Sergeant Manning,
testified on direct exam that, in his role on the gang task
force, he was responsible for monitoring FBI surveillance
video from the scene of the shooting. However, on June 24,
2013, Manning had not been watching the footage live
because he was on vacation. Manning also testified that he
knew Sullivan—with whom he had “dozens of
conversations and contacts” since 2008.

When Manning’s direct testimony resumed, after
defense witnesses Befford and Jones were called out of
order, Manning testified, over defense counsel’s objection,
that he viewed the surveillance video footage when he
returned from vacation and had no doubt that Sullivan was
the man who exited the Ford Escape during the shooting.
The court allowed Manning’s testimony.
53
2.

Sullivan is wrong that the officers’ identification testimony
should have been excluded because his appearance had not
changed since the shooting and the officers were in no better
position than the jury to make an identification from the video.

“A lay witness may offer opinion testimony if it is rationally
based on the witness’s perception and helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.)
‘[T]he identity of a person is a proper subject of nonexpert
opinion.’ ” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601.) Our supreme
court and courts of appeal have upheld the admission of similar
testimony identifying a suspect in surveillance video footage or
photographs by officers who were not direct witnesses to the
crime. (See Leon, at p. 601; People v. Mixon (1982) 129
Cal.App.3d 118, 130-131; People v. Perry (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d
608, 613.) In short, it is proper for an officer to provide a lay
identification opinion from surveillance photos or video if (1) the
witness testifies based on personal knowledge of the defendant’s
appearance; and (2) the testimony aids the trier of fact in
determining the identity issue because the photo or video is not
clear or because the defendant has changed his appearance before
trial. (Leon, at pp. 600-601; Mixon, at pp. 128-132; Perry, at p.
613.)

Ochoa, Johnson, and Manning all had personal knowledge
of Sullivan’s appearance from their interactions before the video
was captured. The officers’ testimony also aided the jury because
the images captured by the surveillance video were undisputedly
not clear. (Mixon, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 131.) True,
Sullivan’s appearance had not changed since the time of the
shooting. But this went to the weight, not the admissibility, of
the officers’ testimony. (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601.) The
same goes for the fact that 15 to 20 other officers were unable to
make an identification from the video.

54
We acknowledge that lay opinion identification from
law enforcement officers carries an inherent risk of
prejudice—by presenting a defendant as the subject of prior
police scrutiny. (People v. Larkins (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
1059, 1067; Mixon, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at pp. 129, 132-
133; but see Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 600-601
[upholding admission of officer’s identification testimony
without any expression of concern regarding prejudice].)
However, that does not mean that prejudice outweighed the
probative value of Ochoa’s and Johnson’s identification
testimony—especially where identity was the key disputed
issue.

This was a gang case, where Ochoa, Johnson, and
several other officers testified extensively regarding crimes
committed by other Big Block members, Sullivan’s and
Hunter’s police contacts and possession of firearms, and
congregation with each other and other Big Block members.
Accordingly, no additional adverse inference was likely to
be drawn from Ochoa’s or Johnson’s foundational testimony
regarding their contacts with Sullivan.

Manning’s identification testimony may present a
closer question. As Sullivan points out, Manning testified
in a dual capacity. He was deemed an expert on criminal
street gangs—and provided expert opinion testimony in
that role—and provided lay opinion as a percipient witness.
Thus, there was some danger that the jury would be
confused as to the nature of Manning’s testimony or give
his identification unwarranted authority. (See People v.
Rouston (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 997, 1011 [“[w]hen an
expert testifies to conclusions that a lay jury can draw, it
suggests ‘ “ ‘that the judge and jury may shift responsibility
for decision to the witnesses’ ” ’ ”]; id. at p. 1015; United
States v. Reyes Vera (9th Cir. 2014) 770 F.3d 1232, 1241-

55
1243 [noting problematic nature of dual capacity testimony].)
However, Sullivan did not raise an Evidence Code section 352
objection to Manning’s identification testimony.

Moreover, Sullivan’s vague and conclusory arguments are
insufficient to meet his burden to show prejudice. (See People v.
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) The trial court
instructed the jury, “you heard testimony from witnesses about
the identity of people depicted in photos and videos admitted into
evidence. Some of these witnesses were police officers. Although
some of them testified as experts on other subjects, they were not
testifying as experts when they gave their opinions about the
identity of people depicted in photos and videos. Police officers
should not be presumed to have any greater or lesser ability than
any other witnesses to identify persons depicted in photos or
videos.” (Italics added.) And the jury had the opportunity to
examine the video evidence itself to make an independent
determination on identity. (See Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601
[“because the surveillance video was played for the jury, jurors
could make up their own minds about whether the person shown
was defendant”].) The jury was also instructed on evaluation of
lay and expert opinion and told that they were free to disregard
any opinion if they found it “unbelievable, unreasonable, or
unsupported by the evidence.” (CALCRIM Nos. 332-333.) We
presume the jury followed these instructions. (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 83.)

3.

Sullivan also contends that the trial court “allowed
inadmissible hearsay testimony” and vouching by Sergeant
Cagney regarding Ochoa’s and Johnson’s identifications. He also
argues Sergeant Cagney impermissibly implied that no other
officer identified someone other than Sullivan as the second
shooter.

56
In particular, Sergeant Cagney testified, without
objection, that he was told by another officer that Ochoa
and Johnson (who he had not previously known) were
“really the go-to authorities” about the current “players”
and “personalities” in Bayview/Hunters Point. Sullivan
maintains that this was hearsay and improper vouching.

On cross-examination, Cagney said he showed the
surveillance footage to 15 to 20 other officers. None of
those officers “gave [him] a definitive [identification that]
they were willing . . . to testify to . . . in court.” On redirect,
the prosecutor asked Cagney, “[d]id anyone else ever
identify that second shooter as anyone other than
[Sullivan]?” Cagney responded, “No.” The prosecutor
followed up, “did anyone ever tell you that is not [Sullivan
on the video]?” Cagney responded, “No. No police officer
has ever told me that.” Sullivan claims the latter inquiries
elicited hearsay or were irrelevant.

Sullivan acknowledges that he failed to raise any
such objections to these portions of Cagney’s testimony in
the trial court. Accordingly, he forfeited the issues he
raises on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v.
Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) We disagree with
Sullivan that defense counsel’s omission amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Here, contrary to Sullivan’s assertion, we cannot
conclude that the record “affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose” for failing to object or that
“there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) First, “[b]ecause the decision
whether to object is inherently tactical, the failure to object
to evidence will seldom establish incompetence.” (People v.
Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 490-491.) The Attorney
General argues that Cagney’s “go-to authorities” statement

57
would have been admissible (over objection) not for the truth of
the matter asserted but to explain why Cagney asked the two
officers to watch the video. Thus, trial counsel could have
reasonably concluded that he would be unable to exclude the
statement altogether and decided not to object so as not to draw
further attention to the statement.

Sullivan also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object when Sergeant Cagney testified that none of the
other officers he spoke to identified someone else or otherwise
ruled Sullivan out as the second shooter. Sullivan maintains that
the officers’ silence was either improper vouching or an adoptive
admission of Ochoa’s and Johnson’s identifications. His
ineffective assistance claim lacks merit because even if we
assume (without deciding) that counsel’s failure to object to
Cagney’s testimony was constitutionally deficient in either
instance, Sullivan’s wholly conclusory prejudice argument
nonetheless fails to persuade us that, but for the error, there is
any reasonable probability of a different outcome despite the
admissibility of Ochoa’s, Johnson’s, and Manning’s identification
testimony. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Sullivan fails
to carry his burden on appeal. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p.
1009.)

4.

Finally, Sullivan argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to elicit clear testimony from Sergeant Manning that
he had not reported being able to identify Sullivan as the second
shooter at any time before trial.

There is no dispute that Sergeant Manning never wrote a
report documenting his identification of Sullivan. But even if we
assume (without deciding) that counsel’s failure to elicit clearer
testimony to that effect was constitutionally deficient, Sullivan’s
wholly conclusory prejudice argument nonetheless fails to
persuade us that, but for the error, there is a reasonable
58
probability of a different outcome (given the other
admissible officer identifications and the trial court’s
instructions). (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
Sullivan again fails to carry his burden of establishing a
meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
appeal.

E. Social Media Communications

Sullivan argues that the trial court violated his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process,
confrontation, and a fair trial by allowing a prosecution
witness (Renesha) to testify and by refusing to otherwise
impose sanctions for social media providers’ refusal to
produce Renesha’s private social media communications.
The argument is forfeited and Sullivan does not meet his
burden to show counsel was prejudicially ineffective.

1.

Before trial, in 2014, Sullivan served subpoenas
duces tecum (§ 1326, subd. (b)) on social media providers
Facebook, Inc., Instagram, LLC, and Twitter, Inc.
(collectively, providers), seeking both public and private
communications from Renesha’s accounts. To authenticate
the requested records, Sullivan’s subpoenas also sought the
identity of each provider’s custodian of records. Providers,
none of whom are parties to the criminal case, moved to
quash the subpoenas on the ground that the federal Stored
Communications Act (Act; 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) barred
them from disclosing the communications without user
consent.

In 2018, our Supreme Court addressed the conflict in
its opinion in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hunter)
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245 (Hunter I). The Hunter I court
concluded that the Act’s lawful consent exception (18

59
U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3)) allowed providers to disclose communications
configured by a user to be public. (Hunter I, at p. 1274.) Hunter I
also concluded the subpoenas were unenforceable before trial
under the Act “with respect to communications addressed to
specific persons, and other communications that were and have
remained configured by the registered user to be restricted.”
(Hunter I, at pp. 1250, 1261, 1276.) Because production of public
social media content might obviate the need for additional
(private) communications, and because the trial court had not
developed an adequate record on alternative ways to obtain such
communications, the Hunter I court declined to address the
defendants’ arguments that they would be denied their
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial if providers
were not compelled to produce the private communications. The
matter was remanded to the trial court. (Id. at pp. 1250-1251,
1275-1276.)

On remand, in 2019, the providers produced the responsive
public posts to the trial court for in camera review. The trial
court construed defendants’ subpoenas as trial subpoenas, denied
the providers’ motions to quash, and ordered the providers to
produce responsive private communications to the court for in
camera review (the May 1 production order). Approximately two
weeks after the May 1 hearing, the court said it had reviewed the
public tranche in camera, made minor redactions, and (as agreed
between the parties) turned over a copy of the tranche to the
prosecution for copying and distribution.

Following the May 1 production order, providers petitioned
this court for a writ of mandate. (Facebook, Inc. v. Superior
Court (Hunter) (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 109, 117 (Hunter II), review
granted Jun. 10, 2020, S260846, and review dismissed, Oct. 21,
2020, in light of Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone)
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 354, fns. 11, 12 (Touchstone).) We initially
stayed the production order pending consideration of the petition.

60
After reviewing additional briefing, we dissolved the stay
and issued an order to show cause why the relief requested
in the petition should not be granted. (Hunter II, at p. 117.)
Providers nonetheless stated they would not produce
private communications, as ordered by the trial court,
because they believed compliance would violate the Act.
(Ibid.)

While the writ was pending in this court and with the
stay of the production order lifted, Sullivan’s trial
proceeded. During jury selection, Sullivan urged the court
to hold providers in contempt. Anticipating that the
contempt citation would prove ineffective, Sullivan also
asked the court for sanctions ranging from dismissal of the
entire case to dismissal of the gang allegations, exclusion of
Renesha’s testimony, and postponing her testimony. The
prosecutor agreed that contempt proceedings were called
for but otherwise objected to the requested sanctions,
arguing that they were “premature and inappropriate”
unless the defense could show that the prosecution was
somehow responsible. The trial court stated that its focus
was on commencing contempt proceedings against the
providers and that prejudice to Sullivan could likely be
cured by recalling Renesha. The court denied without
prejudice Sullivan’s request for sanctions.

Sullivan renewed his sanctions request after the trial
court held the providers in contempt. Sullivan argued that
it was reasonable to believe that Renesha’s private
communications would be exculpatory because her public
posts demonstrated her potential bias. The prosecutor
continued to argue that sanctions were not warranted
unless Sullivan’s counsel could show that the People were
responsible for any prejudice caused by the providers’
refusal to produce the private content.

61
The trial court believed the undisclosed social media
content was “potentially relevant” to the defense and that the
providers were “very much in the wrong” for not producing the
private content for in camera review. But the court did not
believe remedial sanctions were necessary at that point and
denied the sanctions requests without prejudice. The court said
it wanted to wait to see “whether [Renesha] shows up for trial,
what she testifies . . . and . . .what additional evidence is
available” for cross-examination.

The issue of sanctions did not surface again until after
trial, in Sullivan’s new trial motion. In the interim—after the
jury convicted Sullivan but before he filed his motion for new
trial—we decided in Hunter II, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 109 that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to
quash and compelling the providers to produce Renesha’s private
communications without adequately considering the relevant
good cause factors. (Id. at pp. 117-118, 121-122.)

We stated that the subpoena should have been quashed
because there was nothing in the record that demonstrated
Sullivan still needed Renesha’s private communications following
the production of her public content or that Sullivan was unable
to obtain such private communications through alternate means.
(Hunter II, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 112, 119-122.) We did
not decide whether the Act violated Sullivan’s constitutional
rights because, had the trial court properly considered all the
good cause factors, any constitutional conflict might have been
avoided. (Id. at pp. 117-118, 121.) We ordered the trial court to
vacate its May 1 production order and to grant the providers’
motion to quash Sullivan’s subpoenas. (Id. at p. 122.) Our
Supreme Court, in Touchstone, supra, 10 Cal.5th 329, similarly
did not reach the constitutional issues. It approved and adopted
our approach. (Id. at p. 354 & fn. 12; id. at pp. 338-339, 356-357,
359.)

62
Notwithstanding the Touchstone and Hunter II
decisions, Sullivan referred to the trial court’s now
invalidated May 1 ruling, in seeking a new trial, and
argued that the trial court should have fashioned some sort
of remedy after providers refused to produce Renesha’s
private content.

The People opposed the motion for new trial, arguing
that Sullivan’s claims regarding his subpoenas were “moot”
because, in Hunter II, we had vacated the trial court’s May
1 production order and instructed the trial court to grant
the motion to quash. (Hunter II, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 122.) The prosecutor also argued that any error was
harmless because Sullivan had not made an offer of proof
regarding the substance of Renesha’s private
communications. The trial court denied Sullivan’s new
trial motion, stating (with respect to the social media
related arguments) that “no error” was shown.

2.

We agree with the Attorney General that Sullivan
forfeited review of this issue by failing to renew his request
for remedial measures after the trial court denied his
motion without prejudice but before the motion for new
trial. (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170 [“[a]s
a general matter, when a trial court denies a motion
without prejudice the matter is forfeited if not renewed”].)

3.

We also reject Sullivan’s alternative argument—that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the
sanction request to remedy the providers’ purported
discovery misconduct.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
failure to make a motion must demonstrate not only the
63
absence of a tactical reason for the omission, but also that the
motion would have been meritorious. (People v. Mattson (1990)
50 Cal.3d 826, 876.)

Sullivan cannot meet this burden. The record on appeal is
silent and does not directly disclose why Sullivan’s trial counsel
did not renew his request for sanctions at the time Renesha was
granted immunity. And Sullivan makes no attempt to persuade
us that, had his sanctions request been reasserted, it had merit
at that juncture.

Our independent research shows there is authority
permitting sanctions for third-party discovery abuses in criminal
cases. (See Hunter I, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1291, fn. 47; Kling v.
Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1078 [“a third party’s
refusal to produce documents requested by the defense can
potentially result in sanctions being applied against the People”],
disapproved on other grounds by Touchstone, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 345 & fn. 6; Department of Corrections v. Superior Court (1988)
199 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1093; Dell M. v. Superior Court (1977) 70
Cal.App.3d 782, 785-787 [Pitchess discovery].) However,
“sanctions should be tailored to [remedy discovery abuse and not
to punish the offending party], should not put the moving party
in a better position than he would otherwise have been had he
obtained the requested discovery, and should be proportionate to
the offending party’s misconduct.” (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223; cf. § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court may
prohibit the testimony of a witness . . . only if all other sanctions
have been exhausted. The court shall not dismiss a charge . . .
unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United
States.].)

There is no basis for imposing sanctions against the
prosecution in the circumstances before us. First, Sullivan’s
apparent assumption that the providers engaged in discovery
misconduct is weak to unsupported. After all, the trial court’s

64
May 1 production order was ultimately invalidated because
Sullivan failed to establish good cause for obtaining the private
social media communications from the providers. (Hunter
II, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 117-118, 121-122.)

Second, most of the remedies Sullivan initially
sought—dismissal of all charges, dismissal of the gang
allegations, or prohibiting Renesha’s testimony—would
have put him in a far better position than he would
otherwise have faced had he obtained additional
communications showing Renesha’s bias. And the People
would have been gravely punished despite having no
constitutional obligation to seek out, obtain from third
parties, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to
the defense. (See People v. Baugh (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
739, 747, 751 [rejecting argument that prosecution has
constitutional duty to assist defense in obtaining possible
impeachment evidence from victim or third party].)

Sullivan’s theory was that Renesha falsely implicated
him in the shooting to avoid her own culpability and
because she was in a jealous rage after discovering
Sullivan’s girlfriend. As Sullivan acknowledges, his trial
counsel extensively cross-examined Renesha with
numerous public social media posts in which she appeared
to threaten others with violence and guns. Renesha
authenticated these posts and acknowledged that she
threatened Sullivan’s girlfriend in August 2013. In these
circumstances, it was not irrational for defense counsel to
forego renewing Sullivan’s request for remedial sanctions.
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a motion that
counsel “reasonably determine[d] would be futile.” (People
v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387.)

Sullivan cannot show that the trial court would have
granted his request to exclude Renesha’s testimony (or

65
dismiss all or some charges) had it been renewed. Thus, Sullivan
has not met his burden to demonstrate that defense counsel
rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance.

F. Anonymous Tip

Sullivan contends that his constitutional rights to due
process and confrontation were violated when the trial court
admitted the contents of an anonymous tip, which identified him
as a suspect. We disagree.

1.

Sergeant Cagney testified on direct examination that,
several days after the shooting, he received the following
anonymous tip: “ ‘You better arrest Lee Sullivan. . . . He shot
that boy.’ ” Cagney reported he received the tip initially from a
San Francisco Police Department Lieutenant who, in turn, had
received the tip from someone in the “Police Service Aid.”7 Both
defendants objected that Cagney’s testimony therefore
constituted multiple levels of hearsay. They did not object on any
other ground.

After the prosecutor explained the tip was offered only for
the nonhearsay purpose of explaining the subsequent
investigation, which had been attacked by the defense, the trial
court overruled the defense objection. The court instructed the
jurors that the tip was “not being offered for the truth, but for
what [Cagney] was told, just for its effect on him, his state of
mind, how he went forward in his investigation, why he did the
things that he did.” Cagney then testified that the tip led him to

7 Cagney later testified, in response to a juror question, that
the police department publishes “an anonymous phone number”
where you can call and leave anonymous information, which an
officer records.
66
instruct another officer to show Renesha a photo lineup
containing a photo of Sullivan.

At the close of evidence, the trial court further instructed
the jury: “During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that
purpose and for no other.”

2.

Sullivan asserts on appeal that his confrontation rights
were violated by admission of the tip because he was unable to
cross-examine the anonymous informant and officers who passed
the tip to Cagney. However, Sullivan acknowledges that he
failed to object on constitutional, relevance, or undue prejudice
(Evid. Code, § 352) grounds. Thus, as an initial matter, we
conclude that only the hearsay objection was preserved for
appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Demetrulias
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 19-21.)

We also summarily reject Sullivan’s ineffective assistance
claim based on counsel’s failure to press a confrontation clause
objection. As Sullivan acknowledges, even if his trial counsel had
lodged a confrontation clause objection, the question would still
come down to whether Cagney’s testimony was admissible for
nonhearsay purposes. (See People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th
424, 432.)8

And Sullivan’s contrary arguments notwithstanding,
Cagney’s testimony regarding the anonymous tip was

8 Sullivan also suggests (in conclusory fashion) that defense
counsel should have objected that admission of the tip’s content
violated Evidence Code section 352 because its prejudice
outweighed its probative value. We need not address this point
because Sullivan forfeited it by failing to articulate a reasoned
argument supported by meaningful analysis and citations to
authority. (See People v. Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350,
1364, fn. 6.)
67
admitted only for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining how his
investigation proceeded—specifically why Sullivan’s photos were
included in the lineup shown to Renesha. (See Evid. Code, §
1200; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 774-776 (Ervine).)
Even if Sergeant Cagney treated the anonymous tip as true, as
Sullivan claims, that does not render the information
inadmissible for that limited purpose. (See People v. Bell (2019) 7
Cal.5th 70, 100 [out of court statement to detective admissible to
show its effect and explain why, having believed the statement
true, the detective did not pursue forensic testing].) Moreover,
the court properly and timely instructed the jury that the
statement was not being admitted as proof that Sullivan was the
second shooter but, instead, to explain Cagney’s subsequent
investigative action, and that it could not be considered for other
purposes. We presume that the jury faithfully followed the
court’s limiting instruction. (Ervine, at p. 776.)

Sullivan points out correctly that limiting instructions have
been deemed insufficient to protect defendants in other contexts
(See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665; Bruton v. United States
(1968) 391 U.S. 123). Neither applies here. Cagney was not
testifying as an expert (Sanchez), and nothing in the record
suggests the anonymous tip came from Sullivan’s nontestifying
codefendant, Hunter (Bruton). Sullivan offers no rationale for
extending either the Sanchez or Bruton exceptions to this case.

Finally, we reject Sullivan’s suggestion that the
prosecutor’s isolated reference to the anonymous tip in his closing
argument undermined the court’s limiting instruction. (See
Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 776.) Sullivan never objected to
this in the trial court, so any prosecutorial misconduct argument
is forfeited. (§ 1259.) Moreover, as Sullivan acknowledges, the
prosecutor’s reference to the anonymous tip came only in the
context of explaining Cagney’s questioning of Renesha. It was
not argued as evidence on the identity issue.

68
G. Kill Zone Instruction

Sullivan argues that we must reverse his attempted
murder conviction because the trial court’s kill zone
instruction misstated the law under People v. Canizales
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 (Canizales). After independently
reviewing the question (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1206), we conclude any error was harmless.

1.

Attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill.
(People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 191 (Mumin).)
While an intent to kill one person does not transfer to an
intent to kill surviving victims, a person can be liable for
attempted murder of surviving victims under a theory of
concurrent intent, also known as the kill zone doctrine.
(People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076.) “[A]
kill zone is an area which a defendant intentionally creates
in order to kill all those within it to ensure the primary
target’s death.” (Mumin, at p. 193.)

Our Supreme Court, in Canizales, held that the kill
zone theory may properly be applied only when a jury
concludes: (1) the circumstances of the defendant’s attack
on a primary target, including the type and extent of force
the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable
inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of
fatal harm around the primary target—that is, an area in
which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to
ensure the primary target’s death; and (2) the alleged non-
primary victim was located within that zone of harm.
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) “Taken together,
such evidence will support a finding that the defendant
harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the
primary target and everyone within the zone of fatal
harm.” (Ibid.)
69
Canizales also provides examples of circumstances the jury
should consider: “the type of weapon used, the number of shots
fired (where a firearm is used), the distance between the
defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the
alleged victims to the primary target.” (Canizales, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 607.) The determination “does not turn on the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the defendant’s chosen method
of attack.” (Id. at p. 611.) However, “[e]vidence that a defendant
who intends to kill a primary target acted with only conscious
disregard of the risk of serious injury or death for those around a
primary target does not satisfy the kill zone theory.” (Id. at p.
607; accord, Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 206.)

2.

Our Supreme Court filed its opinion in Canizales, supra, 7
Cal.5th 591 about one month before opening statements in this
case. The jury was nevertheless instructed, without objection, on
the kill zone theory with a version of CALCRIM No. 600 that had
not been modified to include reference to the Canizales factors.9
Specifically, the jury was instructed that the prosecution had to
satisfy two elements to prove Sullivan guilty of attempted
murder: “Number One: The defendant took at least one direct
but ineffective step towards killing another person; [¶] And Two:
The defendant intended to kill a person.” (Italics added.)

The jury was further instructed: “A person may intend to
kill a specific victim or victims, and at the same time, intend to
kill everyone in a particular zone of harm, or kill zone. In order
to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of [B.K.] . . . ,
the People must prove the defendant not only intended to kill
[Rice], but also either intended to kill [B.K.] or attempted to kill
everyone within the kill zone. If you have a reasonable doubt

9 The model instruction has since been revised to account
for the Canizales factors and clarifications. (See CALCRIM No.
600, as modified September 24, 2019.)
70
whether the defendant intended to kill [Rice], or intended
to kill [Rice] by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you
must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder
of [B.K.].” (Italics added.)

The prosecutor argued in closing that Sullivan,
Hunter, and Hunter’s brother “drove to West Point and
Middle Point Road because they were there to kill their
gang rival, [Rice], and they were willing to kill anyone who
got in their way.”

Addressing the attempted murder count specifically,
the prosecutor argued as follows:

“This one’s a little more confusing, but the basic idea
is because [Sullivan, Hunter, and Hunter’s brother]
intended, and clearly the target was [Rice], because they’re
willing to shoot through a person [B.K.] sitting on his lap,
it’s very clear that we satisfied the kill zone theory here.
As long as . . . they intended to kill [Rice] and anyone in
that area - - the area is pretty limited from where the shots
were fired from - - the defendants are equally guilty of
attempted murder.”

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3.

Sullivan argues that his attempted murder conviction
should be reversed because the trial court’s kill zone instruction
did not include Canizales’s refinements.

Without discussing their facts or reasoning, Sullivan relies
on several cases where courts of appeal have reversed for
prejudicial kill zone instructional error, after Canizales, and asks
us to reach the same result. (See In re Sambrano (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 724, 735-736, disapproved on other grounds by
Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 209, fn. 11; In re Lisea (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1056-1057; People v. Dominguez (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 163, 185-188; People v. Booker (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
482, 500-503; In re Rayford (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 754, 781-784,
disapproved on other grounds by Mumin, at p. 203; People v.
Mariscal (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 129, 139.)10

We agree that the instruction given in this case was
inadequate because it does not require the jury to find, as is
required for application of the kill zone theory, that the
defendant intended to kill everyone in the area around the
primary target as a means of killing that primary target.
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607; see Mumin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 209-210; In re Sambrano, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 732.) In fact, the instruction does not define a kill zone in
terms of a primary target at all and, accordingly, there was a
reasonable likelihood the jury understood the kill zone
instruction in a legally impermissible manner. The instruction
given here also fails to enumerate the circumstances the jury
should consider in assessing a defendant’s intent to create a zone
of fatal harm and the scope of that zone. (Canizales, supra, at pp.
607, 613.) However, we conclude the People have met their

10Both Rayford and Sambrano were recently disapproved
(in part/on other grounds) by our Supreme Court in Mumin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pages 194-197 and 209, fn. 11.
72
burden to show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See Mumin, at p. 207 [standard of review].)

Sullivan argues unpersuasively that the kill zone
instruction was prejudicial because “[t]here was no evidence” that
he intended to kill B.K., and that the evidence showed B.K.’s
injuries were either an unintended or consciously
disregarded consequence of the attack on Rice. Here, two
shooters fired from about 10 to 15 feet away as B.K. sat in
Rice’s lap in a bus shelter, which was open to the street but
enclosed on the other three sides. At the crime scene,
police recovered 23 bullet casings from the semiautomatic
gun fired by the second shooter. Both Rice and B.K. were
shot multiple times. B.K. suffered gunshot wounds to her
forehead, shoulder, and hand. It was undisputed that the
shooters intended to kill Rice. And Sullivan’s defense to all
charges (including the attempted murder of B.K.) was an
identity defense.

On this record, the only reasonable inference is that
the shooters intended to kill Rice by killing everyone found
with a zone of deadly harm that they created around him
and that the person sitting in his lap was inside that zone.
(See Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 191-192; Canizales,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) The instructional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The cases cited by
Sullivan are factually distinguishable with respect to
prejudice.

H. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Sullivan argues the prosecutor committed two
instances of misconduct during closing argument: (1) by
misleadingly suggesting that Hunter’s counsel had the
ability to call two key witnesses but chose not to and (2) by
casting aspersions on Sullivan’s counsel and appealing to
the jury’s passions. After reviewing the issue de novo
73
(People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860), we reject his
arguments.

1.

“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must
be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor's
misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair
nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either
the court or the jury.’ ” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.
1202.) We review the prosecutor’s remarks “in the context of the
argument as a whole” (id. at p. 1203) to determine whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or
misapplied them. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.)

“Error with respect to prosecutorial misconduct is
evaluated under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
[(Chapman)] . . . to the extent federal constitutional rights are
implicated and People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . . . if only
state law issues were involved.” (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 540, 564.)

2.

The first instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
stemmed from testimony Hunter elicited from Sergeant Cagney
on cross-examination.

Specifically, Cagney testified that three people (G.H., E.F,
and R.B.) told police that a woman was driving the car involved
in the shooting. On redirect, Cagney testified that E.F. and R.B.
identified Hunter and his younger brother as the shooters.

74
In closing argument, Hunter challenged Renesha’s
credibility and told jurors to compare her testimony that
Hunter was driving with the statements by G.H., E.F., and
R.B. that a woman was driving the car at the time of the
shooting.

In rebuttal, the prosecutor noted that Hunter’s
counsel referred to statements by G.H., E.F., and R.B. but
that the jurors had not heard directly from E.F. or R.B.
The prosecutor argued that the “main reason why”
Hunter’s counsel had not called either witness was because
they had identified Hunter as the second shooter. When
the prosecutor added, “[o]f course, [Hunter’s counsel] didn’t
bother to call them,” Hunter requested a sidebar.

Sullivan also asked that “he be addressed on
prosecutorial misconduct,” but the court overruled the
objection. Nonetheless, the trial court instructed the jury
that the People bore the burden of proof, and that the
defense was not obligated to present any evidence, much
less call any witnesses.

Hunter moved for a mistrial under Griffin v.
California (1965) 380 U.S. 609. He argued the prosecutor’s
arguments regarding E.F. and R.B.’s absence as witnesses
constituted misconduct because they misleadingly implied
that Hunter had the ability to call E.F. or R.B. but chose
not to do so. Hunter stated he had previously sought E.F.’s
and R.B.’s contact information from the prosecution four
times between 2013 and 2019 to no avail. The prosecution
eventually gave Hunter their contact information.
Investigators working with Hunter’s counsel attempted to
locate E.F. and R.B. (using their last known addresses) but
were not successful. Hunter argued that the trial court’s
admonition did not cure the prejudice because the court
declined to instruct the jury regarding his counsel’s efforts

75
to subpoena E.F. Sullivan joined in the motion, which the trial
court denied.

3.

Sullivan maintains that the prosecutor’s “false or
misleading argument stating that defense counsel did not bother”
calling certain witnesses violated his federal due process rights.
(Italics added.) The unrefuted record shows that the prosecutor’s
complained-of argument was directed at Hunter’s counsel, not
his.

That Sullivan joined in Hunter’s Griffin motion brings us
no closer to understanding how Sullivan has standing to claim
that the prosecutor’s remarks about Hunter’s counsel violated
Sullivan’s due process rights. The prosecutor never told the jury
to disregard R.B. and E.F.’s out-of-court statements implicating
Hunter as the second shooter. Instead, the prosecutor suggested
that it was the nature of these very statements, which exculpated
Sullivan, that led Hunter’s counsel not to call them.

Moreover, Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609 held that the
prosecution may not comment on a defendant’s silence, including
his failure to testify. (Id. at p. 615.) The Griffin rule “does not,
however, extend to bar prosecution comments based upon the
state of the evidence or upon the failure of the defense to
introduce material evidence or to call anticipated witnesses.”
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339) And here, the
trial court admonished the jury that the defense had no
obligation to call witnesses or present evidence.

None of the cases cited by Sullivan suggest that further
admonishment—about defense efforts to subpoena the
witnesses—was required here. (See Miller v. Pate (1967) 386
U.S. 1, 5-6 [prosecution intentionally presented false evidence
against single defendant]; Alcorta v. Texas (1957) 355 U.S. 28, 29-
31 [single defendant’s counsel failed to present exculpatory

76
evidence and prosecutor took advantage of that counsel’s
ineffective assistance by making misleading statements in
closing].) These cases simply are not on point.

4.

Sullivan’s second assertion of misconduct—involving
the prosecutor allegedly casting aspersions on Sullivan’s
counsel and appealing to the jury’s passions—also fails.

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued
there were “lot[s] of suggestions, distractions” regarding
both Rice and Renesha. He also argued the defense made
“multiple suggestions” of police misconduct “without any
kind of follow-up.” The prosecutor cited Sullivan’s cross-
examination of one officer, where the officer was asked if he
had ever pulled Sullivan’s “hair or grabbed his testicles.”

The prosecutor went on: “You have to ask yourself
why that was done. [¶] That was done for a very obvious
purpose, which is to have an emotional impact on you that’s
not tied to the evidence, that’s designed to make you - -
make it emotionally easier for you to dismiss the gravity of
the defendants’ actions, right? It’s to normalize how bad
these characters are so you will feel free to wipe your hands
of this case and how heinous what the defendants did.”
Sullivan objected, arguing the prosecutor was casting
aspersions. The trial court overruled the objection.

The prosecutor continued: “You can’t fall for that.
That’s insulting to every one of the witnesses who came in
here, even the defense witnesses frankly, right? It’s
designed to make you not care about the community that
this crime occurred in, right? It has heavy racial overtones,
right? Defense Counsel’s opening statement actually
claimed I was being racist. They want to degrade the
people involved, from Renesha to [Rice] to [B.K.], so that

77
you can walk away from this and not have to make a decision,
right? It’s designed to make it easier for you to give up, and you
can’t do that.”

The prosecutor argued that Rice and the West Point
community did not “deserve less justice” because of Rice’s gang
membership. He further argued that “[j]ustice is the process
where we hold each other accountable to the same set of rules
regardless of who you are, where you’re from, what color you are,
or the quality of your lifestyle . . . . Justice is the promise that we
make, and you make specifically as jurors, that you’re not just
going to abandon each other, abandon this community.”

Sullivan objected to the prosecutor’s arguments as
appealing to the jury’s passions and prejudices. The court
overruled the objection but told the prosecutor to “move on.”

These alleged aspersions did not constitute misconduct.
The comments were not directed at defense counsel personally.
(See People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305.) Rather, the
prosecutor’s “wipe your hands” remarks—while simultaneously
telling the jurors that it was their job to care about the victims
and be the community’s conscience–were made in the broader
context of the prosecution’s explanation of how the defense
sought to “distract” the jury by focusing on issues that were not
in dispute (e.g., Rice’s gang membership), had limited relevance
(e.g., Renesha’s involvement in other misconduct that occurred
after June 2013), and/or were unsubstantiated (e.g., “multiple
suggestions” of police misconduct “without any kind of follow-
up”). Sullivan’s counsel’s question about pulling Sullivan’s hair
or grabbing his testicles was an example. In short, no reasonable
juror would have construed the remarks as a personal attack on
defense counsel’s integrity instead of a fair comment on the state
of the evidence. (See People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 156
[description of defense evidence as “ ‘total farce’ ” and “ ‘ludicrous’
” was fair comment].)

78
Similarly, the prosecutor’s “abandonment” argument,
when viewed in context, did not imply that the jurors’
family and friends would condemn them unless they voted
for guilt. Nor did the prosecutor suggest the jury should
consider “the ‘potential social ramifications’ of the verdict”
when deciding the case or seek to dehumanize Sullivan.

Read in context, the prosecutor’s insistence that the
jury not “abandon this community” was a permissible
appeal for the jury to take its duty seriously—not an effort
to prejudice the jury against Sullivan. (See People v.
Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 513 [no
misconduct where prosecutor urged jurors to “restor[e] law
and order” because it was an “appeal for the jury to take its
duty seriously, rather than efforts to incite the jury against
defendant”].) No reasonable juror would have construed
the remarks as urging the jurors to put aside their own
judgment and instead consider the potential community
response to a “not guilty” verdict. (See ibid.; People v. Lang
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1041-1042, abrogated on other
grounds by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.)

I. Extrinsic Evidence

Sullivan argues his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to confrontation, an impartial jury, and
due process were violated by the jury’s receipt of extrinsic
evidence during deliberations. We disagree.

1.

Police transferred the contents of Hunter’s cell phone
onto a DVD, which was marked for identification as
People’s Exhibit 23. When the prosecutor moved the court
to admit the entirety of Exhibit 23 into evidence, Hunter’s
counsel said, “I’m objecting to some of the contents that are
there. . . . I think we have to have some discussion about

79
that. But I’m not objecting to the admission of the D.V.D. and
I’m not objecting to the testimony at all, but . . . [¶] . . . [¶] the
specifics that are inside, I’d ask the Court to reserve ruling on
that.” The court reserved its ruling. Sullivan’s counsel’s
commented, “Perhaps we should do that though before it’s
published.”

The prosecution later moved into evidence excerpts from
Hunter’s phone, which were marked as separate exhibits. The
entire DVD itself (People’s Exhibit 23) was never admitted.

During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for “the
contents” of People’s Exhibit 23. The trial court said that, after
discussing the matter with the parties, it would provide the
“entire” DVD to the jurors “with a reminder the attorneys chose
only to show them a small fraction of the images on it.” But, the
court said, “they have asked for the entire thing, so I think it is
appropriate to give it to them since it is in evidence.”

Sullivan’s counsel raised an Evidence Code section 352
objection on behalf of Hunter’s counsel (who was not present) with
respect to “at least 100 images” contained on the DVD that could
constitute character evidence. He raised no objection on behalf of
Sullivan. The court overruled Hunter’s objection and provided
the jury with the entire DVD.

After the jury reached its verdicts, a posttrial defense
investigation revealed that “multiple” unidentified “jurors
reviewed the contents of People’s [Exhibit] 23 extensively,” and
that one unidentified juror—who was purportedly described by
another juror as “a ‘specialist on cell phones’ ”—“spent a
substantial amount of time examining” the DVD and later
“presented the results of his examination” to the jury.

Sullivan moved for a new trial (§ 1181, subds. (2), (3)),
arguing that the error amounted to the jury receiving extrinsic
evidence. Sullivan supported his motion with a declaration from

80
his trial counsel. Counsel stated that she “intended to join
in” Hunter’s objections, after the jury requested the DVD,
but failed to do so. Additionally, she meant to include
additional grounds—specifically, the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments—but failed to do so. She had no tactical or
strategic reason for her omissions.

The People conceded that Exhibit 23 was mistakenly
given to the jury due to “clerical error.” The trial court
denied the new trial motion without an evidentiary
hearing, concluding that Sullivan failed to show a
reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more
favorable outcome but for the purported error.

We independently review the trial court’s denial of a
new trial motion asserting juror misconduct. (People v.
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396 (Gamache).)

2.

It was undisputedly error for the jury to receive an
exhibit not admitted into evidence. And we assume
(without deciding) that Sullivan’s counsel did not forfeit his
current argument even though only Hunter’s counsel raised
a timely objection to the admission of the entirety of
Exhibit 23. Nonetheless, Sullivan cannot prevail because
he has not shown prejudice.

The question is whether the error was sufficiently
prejudicial to require a new trial. (Gamache, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 396.) Sullivan suggests that the incident
amounts to jury misconduct, which would trigger a
presumption of prejudice. (Id., at p. 397.) Sullivan also
insists that prejudice must be presumed from the
“constitutional error,” meaning the error is reviewable
under the Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 standard. The
Attorney General, on the other hand, argues this was

81
“ordinary” error subject to the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818
standard because it resulted from clerical error. The
Attorney General has the better argument.

“Juror misconduct gives rise to a presumption of prejudice
[citation]; the prosecution must rebut the presumption by
demonstrating ‘there is no substantial likelihood that any juror
was improperly influenced to the defendant's detriment.’ ”
(Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 397.) In the absence of
misconduct, however, “the burden remains with the defendant to
demonstrate prejudice under the usual standard for ordinary
trial error.” (Ibid.)

Here, nothing in the record suggests any juror (either
actively or passively) obtained extrinsic evidence from sources
outside the court. (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 398.)
Rather, due to a clerical mistake in the exhibit list that showed
Exhibit 23 as having been admitted, the trial court provided the
jury with an exhibit that had not been admitted. Accordingly, no
presumption of prejudice arises. (Id. at pp. 398-399; People v.
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [“[w]hen . . . a jury innocently
considers evidence it was inadvertently given, there is no
misconduct”].)

“The situation is the same as any in which the court
erroneously admits evidence . . . There has been merely ‘an error
of law . . . such as . . . an incorrect evidentiary ruling.’ ” (People v.
Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 836; accord, Gamache, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 397.)11 Accordingly, Sullivan must demonstrate a

11Relying on a series of older decisions by federal appellate
courts, Sullivan insists that our Supreme Court has gotten it
“wrong” (italics omitted) and its holdings in cases like Gamache
are “[an] unreasonable interpretation of settled precedent.”
Sullivan fails to identify any United States Supreme Court
precedent establishing that a presumption of prejudice attaches
when a jury innocently considers evidence mistakenly provided
82
reasonable probability that, in the absence of the error, he
would have obtained a more favorable result. (People v.
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1213-1214.)

He has not done so. Sullivan does not even address the
contents of the DVD or explain how there is a reasonable
probability he would have received a more favorable result but for
the jury’s inadvertent receipt of the contents of Hunter’s phone.
What we do know is that Cagney, who reviewed the call detail
records for the various phones recovered in this case, did not find
any messages between Sullivan’s and Hunter’s phones
indicating planning, or any communications with Rice. It is
not our role to fashion a prejudice argument on Sullivan’s
behalf. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 411.)

J. Juror Intimidation & Misconduct

Sullivan also raises numerous challenges to the
adequacy of the trial court’s response to alleged juror
intimidation or misconduct. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion. (See People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401,
506 [standard of review].)

1.

A criminal defendant has a fundamental
constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. (See
U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16;
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 149; In re
Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293 (Hamilton).) “An
impartial jury is one in which no member has been

by the court itself. In the absence of any such binding authority,
we must follow our Supreme Court’s decisions. (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456;
People v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1513, 1531 [decisions of the lower federal courts are
not binding on federal questions but merely persuasive].)
83
improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ‘ “capable
and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” ’ ”
(Hamilton, at p. 294.) “When even one juror lacks impartiality,
the defendant has not received a fair trial.” (People v. Cissna
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1111.)

Consistent with this right, section 1089 allows the
trial court to discharge a juror for cause if the juror, “upon . . .
good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform
his or her duty.” The decision of whether or how to investigate
the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v.
Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478.) A hearing is required only
where “ ‘the court possesses information which, if proven to be
true, would constitute “good cause” to doubt a juror’s ability to
perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case.’ ”
(Ibid.) “[A] trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for
discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as
possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the
jury’s deliberations.” (Id. at p. 485.)

Juror misconduct occurs when an overt event directly
violates a juror’s duties and admonitions, such as when a juror
consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with
nonjurors, or conveys improper information to the other jurors.
(Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 294.) Where the event
involves an attempt at juror intimidation, “[a] sitting juror’s
involuntary exposure to events outside the trial evidence, even if
not ‘misconduct’ in the pejorative sense, may require similar
examination for probable prejudice.” (Id. at pp. 294-295.)
Misconduct by a juror, or a nonjuror’s unauthorized
communication with a sitting juror about the matter pending
before the jury (the defendant’s guilt or innocence) raises a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice. (Id. at pp. 295, 305-306.)
But “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact

84
or influence that might theoretically affect their vote,” and
“due process does not require a new trial every time a juror
has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.”
(Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217.)

Thus, “whether an individual verdict must be
overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity ‘ “ ‘is
resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an
objective standard.’ ” ’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p.
296.) “Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the
verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the
particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or
other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates
there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no
substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually
biased against the defendant.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)

2.

A.R.12 was the sole African American juror. He lived with
his wife and two adult sons in Bayview / Hunter’s Point. During
voir dire, he disclosed that he lived “three blocks” from where the
shooting took place and “drove by the incident” but said it would
not affect his ability to be fair and impartial.

On the seventh day of deliberations, the jury sent a
note, written by Juror No. 11 and signed by the foreperson
(Juror No. Six),13 saying that A.R. needed to speak with the
court immediately regarding “[j]uror intimidation issues.”

When questioned individually by the court (in the
presence of the prosecutor and Sullivan’s defense counsel),
A.R. said he slept poorly the night before. He reported that
his wife did not pick him up from court the prior evening as

12As discussed in section A., A.R., Juror Badge No.
4853308, was originally seated as Juror No. Nine.
13 Juror Badge No. 5052031 was seated as Juror No. Six.

85
usual. When he got home, his family would not speak with him.
His wife told him she overheard someone at work talking about
his jury service. A.R. told the court that “the whole
neighborhood” knows him and his wife, adding that the
neighborhood “know[s] that I’m on the trial and we are in at the
deliberation.” Moreover, although he never discussed the case
with his wife, his wife seemed to be aware of what the case was
about based on talk at her work, that it involved a shooting in the
neighborhood, and she was upset by the whole matter.

A.R. also said he thought he saw a black car follow him
home over the weekend and sit outside his house for
approximately five minutes. While he was waiting for the bus to
take him to the courthouse, he thought he saw the same car. He
continued, “the tint was so dark . . . I don’t know who was
driving. And it just went down the hill. It could be a coincidence;
I don’t know.”

A.R. said his wife became upset and scared after she
overheard people in the neighborhood discussing the fact that he
was a juror on this case. A.R. said he had told the other jurors
about his concerns and that his fellow jurors urged him to tell the
court. A.R. said he wanted to ensure his family’s safety.

A.R. told the court that his experiences with the black car,
his wife’s behavior, and hearing that people at his wife’s work
were discussing his role as a juror in the case were all affecting
his ability to serve impartially on the jury. The court asked if the
juror felt his wife was essentially signaling that she wanted him
to vote not guilty for his family’s safety. “She’s not saying it in
those words, but I can get the feeling,” the juror responded. The
court then asked whether the familial pressure was making him
“less inclined” to return a guilty vote “if that was your
inclination?” “I think so,” the juror said.

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The trial court discharged A.R. from the jury,
explaining that it was “clear that . . . [A.R.’s] ability to
perform [his] function as a juror is negatively [a]ffected by
everything [he’s] told us.”

The court moved one of the alternates, Juror No. 13,14
into the ninth seat. The court told the jurors not to
consider the substitution for “any reason, any purpose.”
The court also instructed the jurors that they were to
disregard all prior deliberations, begin deliberations anew,
and “decide this case as if the earlier deliberations had not
taken place.”

Outside the presence of the jury, Sullivan moved for a
mistrial on the ground that the court erroneously refused to
inquire further. The court initially denied the motion for
lack of irreparable prejudice and said it would consider
conducting a further inquiry after the lunch break.

During the afternoon session, the court questioned
the foreperson, Juror No. Six, who signed the note on
behalf of A.R. Juror No. Six said that when he first saw
A.R. that morning, he “didn’t look quite normal, like
something was wrong.” A.R. told him he slept poorly the
night before, that his wife had overheard two people at
work commenting on how her husband (A.R.) was one of
the deliberating jurors, and that he had seen a black car at
or near his home at least twice. Juror No. Six confirmed
that this was said in the presence of the entire jury. Juror
No. Six said they told the former juror that “ ‘none of this
matters,’ ” and that he should prioritize his family’s safety.
Other jurors similarly encouraged A.R. to take care of

14Juror Badge No. 4853331 was Juror No. 13. The jury
reached its verdicts against Sullivan one day after the
substitution.
87
himself and his family. At that point, Juror No. 1215 volunteered
seeing someone on a bicycle wearing a “Halloween” mask.
However, Juror No. Six told the court that he “didn’t really see
any kind of relation” between the two.

The court asked if any of the 11 jurors indicated that A.R.’s
concerns affected their ability to serve as jurors. Juror No. Six
said, “I don’t think so,” adding that the jurors collectively asked if
anyone else felt in danger. No one spoke up, the foreperson said,
and he “didn’t get th[e] sense” that this would affect the other
jurors’ judgment. Juror No. Six added that he did not personally
feel in danger or that his ability to be neutral was affected. Juror
No. Six said, “I honestly think that this really doesn’t change
anything,” before adding that he could not “speak for everyone.”

After an unreported conference with the prosecutor and
Sullivan’s counsel, the court asked Juror No. Six whether A.R.
mentioned any other concerns. Juror No. Six said A.R.
mentioned that he lived in the community where the shooting
occurred and saw “a lot of people in the gallery” that he knew
from the neighborhood. Juror No. Six appeared to refer to voir
dire and said that A.R. expressed some concerns just based on
living in the neighborhood.

Juror No. Six was instructed to continue deliberations and
not discuss with anyone else the issues raised during the hearing.
At this point, Sullivan’s counsel renewed his motion for mistrial,
arguing that A.R.’s comments, as well as those relayed by Juror
No. Six, “creat[ed] a climate of fear and prejudice” in the
deliberation room and inappropriately introduced outside
matters.

The court denied the motion, reasoning there was no
factual support for Sullivan’s claim that A.R.’s concerns affected
the other jurors’ abilities to uphold their oaths and follow the law.

15 Juror Badge No. 4802591 was seated as Juror No. 12.
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The court stated A.R.’s concerns were personal to him and
arose because he lived in the Bayview/Hunters Point
neighborhood, the other jurors apparently recognized as
much, and that there was no other evidence suggesting any
impairment of the other jurors’ impartiality.

Later the same day, Juror No. Six submitted another
note, which stated A.R. also told the other jurors he saw a
“guy going through his backyard” at some point that was
unclear and appeared to cite that as one of his safety
concerns. The court thanked Juror No. Six, instructed him
not to discuss the matter further with the other jurors, and
to continue with deliberations.

Sullivan again moved for mistrial. Referring to
Sergeant Manning’s testimony about “creeping” (where
someone goes to a rival’s neighborhood to intimidate them),
Sullivan’s counsel argued that it sounded like A.R. had
experienced the same or similar behavior. Defense counsel
reiterated that these factors collectively created a
“poisonous atmosphere in the jury room” such that the jury,
“while they may be glad that they’re white . . . or Asian and
don’t live in this neighborhood, it underlines the idea that a
black person . . . is not safe with certain people on the
streets.”

The prosecutor again argued that those might be
reasons why A.R. felt unsafe but that it was “pretty clear”
from Juror No. Six’s statements that those concerns were
not shared by the rest of the jurors. The prosecutor also
argued that A.R. appeared to be more focused on marital
harmony than general safety concerns. Finally, the
prosecutor argued that Juror No. Six’s comments did not
lay the “factual predicates” for a mistrial.

Sullivan’s counsel argued that A.R. was “quite clear”
that he feared for his family’s safety, that he shared those
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concerns with the rest of the jurors, and that this obligated the
court to poll all the jurors. The trial court said it limited the
inquiry out of concerns that the jurors’ “independent
deliberation” would otherwise have been affected. The court
found a larger investigation was not warranted because Juror No.
Six had suggested the other jurors were unaffected by A.R.’s
comments, and denied the motion for mistrial.

Following his conviction, Sullivan argued that he was
entitled to a new trial (§ 1181, subd. (2)) because the other jurors
discussed A.R.’s removal despite the court’s explicit instructions
not to. The motion was supported by a declaration from Juror
No. 13—the alternate who replaced A.R.— who said the other
jurors told him A.R. was excused “because he lived in the
Bayview neighborhood where the events took place and had
received death threats.” After hearing argument, the court
denied the motion, saying it found no substantial likelihood that
one or more jurors were biased against Sullivan given the court’s
instructions not to consider A.R.’s substitution for any purpose,
as well as the nature of A.R.’s disclosures, the surrounding
circumstances, and the entirety of the record.

3.

Sullivan argues conditionally that “[i]f [A.R.] was excused
solely based upon marital discord,” then “the juror was
improperly excused, and the trial court abused its discretion in
treating [this] inquiry . . . differently from its inquiry of other
jurors.”

Section 1089 allows the trial court to discharge a juror if
the juror, “upon . . . good cause shown to the court is found to be
unable to perform his . . . duty.” Because Sullivan did not object
to the court’s discharge of A.R., he forfeited this argument on
appeal. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 986-987 &
fn. 16, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Yeoman (2003)
31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)
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Even if his claim was not forfeited, we have no
trouble concluding that A.R.’s inability to perform his
duties as a juror appears in the record as a demonstrable
reality. (See People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038,
1052 [heightened standard of review applies].) And a
juror’s demonstrated inability to render a fair and unbiased
verdict constitutes good cause for removal. (See People v.
Hecker (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1244-1245.)
Furthermore, unwillingness or inability to deliberate—
resulting from both trial-related and non-trial-related
stress—constitutes good cause. (See People v. Fudge (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1075, 1099–1100 [anxiety about new job]; People
v. Warren (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 324, 326–327 [juror was so
intimidated by other jurors she was likely to vote with
majority and against her own conscience].)

The trial court relied on A.R.’s own testimony that he
was unlikely to be able to deliberate impartially—he was
now more likely to reflexively acquit—due to both marital
strain and fear for his family’s safety, which was
corroborated by Juror No. Six’s testimony. This establishes
a demonstrable reality that A.R. was no longer able to
perform his duty as a juror.

4.

Sullivan primarily contends that the trial court
improperly limited its inquiry regarding the remaining
jurors’ impartiality—despite these jurors having learned of
the events involving A.R. and his resulting fear—because it
did not question any jurors others than A.R. and Juror No.
Six. We disagree.

In assessing whether the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to question jurors other than A.R. and
Juror No. Six, we are mindful that “ ‘not every incident
involving a juror’s conduct requires or warrants further
91
investigation.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941-
942.) And a juror’s fear, standing alone, does not establish bias
or a valid basis for discharge. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58
Cal.4th 40, 56; see People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 581-
582 [all 12 jurors’ concerns regarding gang retaliation after
verdict did not require evidentiary hearing because no indication
fear affected jury’s deliberations].) The proper inquiry is not
whether A.R.’s disclosures to the other jurors created fear or
safety concerns in the other jurors’ minds, but whether the
objective circumstances give rise to a substantial likelihood that
one or more jurors was actually biased against Sullivan. (See
Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 296, 304-306 [objective
circumstances of juror’s report—that she saw defendant’s sister
parked in an alley behind her home—did not give rise to
substantial likelihood that encounter resulted in actual bias
against defendant].)

The trial court’s decision to limit its inquiry was reasonable
under the circumstances because the entirety of the record did
not show a substantial likelihood that any of the remaining
jurors were actually biased against Sullivan. The only incidents
of direct communication involved A.R., his wife, and her
coworkers. And even the communications between A.R. and his
wife—or the acts of the unknown persons driving the black car or
spotted in A.R.’s backyard—do not constitute direct threats or
concern Sullivan’s guilt or innocence. (See Hamilton, supra, 20
Cal.4th at pp. 305-306 [“ ‘when the alleged misconduct involves
an unauthorized communication with or by a juror, the
presumption [of prejudice] does not arise unless there is a showing
that the content of the communication was about the matter
pending before the jury, i.e., the guilt or innocence of the
defendant’ ”], italics added.) Nor is there anything in the record
to suggest that any of the possibly intimidating acts A.R.
reported were done by people supporting Sullivan (rather than

92
people wholly unrelated to the trial, or people supporting
Westmobb).

Here, the court questioned A.R. extensively and then
summoned the foreperson, Juror No. Six. The court asked
Juror No. Six if he or any other juror felt unsafe or
otherwise felt their ability to continue deliberating was
compromised by A.R.’s disclosures. Juror No. Six denied
any such impact. He added that the other jurors had an
opportunity to speak up if they felt they were affected by
A.R.’s disclosures but had not done so. Believing the
foreperson’s responses, which included representations of
the other jurors’ views, the court reasonably concluded that
no further inquiry was necessary because there was no
suggestion of any effect on the other jurors’ willingness or
ability to deliberate impartially.

Other jurors could have submitted a note if they
believed their abilities to deliberate impartially were
affected by A.R.’s disclosures. No one did. On this record,
the trial court could reasonably infer from interviewing
Juror No. Six and A.R., as well as the silence from the other
jurors, that the other jurors believed A.R.’s concerns were
personal to him and that those concerns did not affect their
ability to continue deliberating impartially. (See People v.
Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 56.) Further inquiry
ran the risk of calling undue attention to security concerns
and possibly spreading those fears while intruding on the
jurors’ private deliberations. (See People v. Navarette
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 500; People v. Cleveland, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 485.)

The record does show that Juror No. 12 had
expressed, during the presentation of the evidence, that she
felt intimidated by the presence of gang members in the
audience and, during discussion of A.R.’s situation during

93
deliberations, brought up having seen someone wearing a
“Halloween” mask. The court did not question Juror No. 12
about her feelings of intimidation either during the presentation
of evidence or during deliberations. Sullivan asked the trial court
to inquire of all jurors after A.R.’s experience came to light. But
he did not argue that the Halloween mask comment constituted
an independent basis to investigate Juror No. 12 for bias. Thus,
we agree with the People that Sullivan’s failure to raise the issue
below forfeited the issue on appeal. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46
Cal.4th 731, 808, fn. 22.) In any event, we conclude that Juror
No. 12 expressed at most ambiguous safety concerns, which are
insufficient to mandate further investigation for bias. (People v.
Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 56; Hamilton, supra, 20
Cal.4th at pp. 304, 306.)

Sullivan relies on People v. Hem (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 218,
which he claims is “indistinguishable.” We disagree. In Hem, the
defendant came forward with evidence that a third of the jurors
violated their oaths by improperly discussing the case in a
courtroom hallway (outside the presence of the entire jury), one
or more had expressed worry about “ ‘letting [defendant] out so
he could kill someone else’s kid,’ ” and that one or more had been
improperly considering punishment. (Id. at pp. 221-222, 226,
229.) This evidence “demanded an inquiry—albeit a careful one,
respecting the jurors’ deliberative processes.” (Id. at p. 227.)
“[W]hat was unknown was the extent of the misconduct.
Exploring that question would not have been a ‘fishing
expedition,’ but would have been a necessary step to preserve
defendant’s right to a fair jury trial.” (Ibid, italics omitted.)
Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to conduct any inquiry
constituted an abuse of discretion and the undisputed juror
misconduct triggered a presumption of prejudice, which could not
be rebutted. (Id. at pp. 226-231.)

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Here, in contrast, the trial court did conduct an
inquiry—it extensively questioned A.R. and the jury’s
foreperson. Although it became clear that A.R. was no
longer able to deliberate impartially, the trial court’s
inquiry revealed that the jurors’ deliberations were
otherwise unaffected. Thus, Sullivan’s reliance on Hem is
misplaced.

Sullivan’s reliance on United States v. Angulo (9th
Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 843, is also misplaced. In that case, a
juror received an anonymous phone call at home in which
the caller said, “ ‘I know where you live.’ ” (Id. at p. 846.)
The threatened juror told her fellow jurors about the call
and asked if they received a similar call. None had. The
juror also told the trial court about the call, how it made
her feel threatened, and that she had shared her concerns
with the other jurors. (Ibid.) The trial court discharged the
juror without conducting any further inquiry with (or
giving instruction to) the remaining jurors. (Id. at p. 847.)
The reviewing court remanded with instructions to hold an
evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 848.)

Angulo is distinguishable for the same reasons as
Hem—the trial court here did investigate and it instructed
the remaining jury members to not discuss or consider the
substitution for any reason.

Although it might have been better practice for the
trial court to conduct a more exhaustive inquiry, a court
does not necessarily abuse its discretion by declining to
question every juror when possible juror intimidation is
brought to the court’s attention. Neither Remmer v. United
States (1954) 347 U.S. 227, nor any other California
authority we know of, stands for that proposition. Remmer,
supra, 347 U.S. 227 stands only for the proposition that, in
an instance of potential juror tampering, “[t]he trial court

95
should not decide and take final action ex parte . . . , but should
determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror,
and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all
interested parties permitted to participate.” (Id. at pp. 229-230,
italics omitted.)

Here, the trial court conducted such an inquiry.

5.

Sullivan argues that the trial court was obligated to
instruct sua sponte that the jury should not discuss the substance
of A.R.’s disclosures and “not to let it affect their deliberations.”
Sullivan forfeited the claim by failing to request such an
instruction and by failing to request clarification of the
CALCRIM No. 3575 instruction that the court did give. (See
People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012; People v.
Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 80.) In any event, we reject the
claim on the merits, since the court did instruct the jury not to
consider the substitution for “any reason, any purpose” and that
“[e]ach [juror] must disregard the earlier deliberation[s] and
decide this case as if the earlier deliberations had not taken
place.”

6.

Sullivan also maintains that, if the evidence was
insufficient to warrant a broader inquiry immediately after the
court discharged A.R., then Juror No. 13’s declaration (filed with
Sullivan’s motion for a new trial) necessitated an evidentiary
hearing before the court could deny that motion.

“Courts evaluate a motion for a new trial based on jury
misconduct in three steps: (1) determine what evidence is
admissible; (2) if there is admissible evidence, decide if it
establishes misconduct; and (3) if there is misconduct, determine
whether it was prejudicial.” (People v. Flores (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 100, 107.) A trial court exercises broad discretion at
96
each step, and its rulings will not be disturbed absent a
clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1250, 1260.) “We accept the trial court’s credibility
determinations and findings on questions of historical fact
if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] Whether
prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a mixed
question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s
independent determination.” (People v. Nesler (1997) 16
Cal.4th 561, 582; accord, People v. Leonard (2007) 40
Cal.4th 1370, 1425.)

A trial court has discretion to decide whether an
evidentiary hearing is needed to determine the truth of jury
misconduct allegations. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th
491, 604.) “Defendant is not . . . entitled to an evidentiary
hearing as a matter of right. . . . ‘The hearing should not be
used as a “fishing expedition” to search for possible
misconduct, but should be held only when the defense has
come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong
possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred. Even
upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally
be unnecessary unless the parties’ evidence presents a
material conflict that can only be resolved at such a
hearing.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)

Juror No. 13 stated in their declaration: “During
deliberations I heard from other jurors that the juror I replaced,
[A.R.], was excused because he lived in the Bayview
neighborhood where the events took place and had received death
threats.” We assume that Juror No. 13’s post-trial declaration
demonstrates some (limited) misconduct occurred—because,
contrary to the trial court’s instruction, the jury discussed A.R.’s
substitution (as well as the underlying circumstances) after he
was excused—and that this gave rise to a presumption of
prejudice. (See People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 578.)

97
Nonetheless, we agree with the People that the trial court
reasonably denied Sullivan’s motion for new trial without holding
an evidentiary hearing. A hearing was not required to resolve
any disputed issues of fact. Juror No. 13’s declaration suggests
that the discussion of A.R.’s substitution was limited and makes
clear that “deliberations were recommenced” and that the new
jury of 12 “went through the evidence from the beginning.”
Considering Juror No. 13’s declaration, the jury’s acquittal of
Hunter, and the record of the trial court’s initial investigation,
Sullivan fails to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of juror
bias.

K. Cumulative Error

Contrary to Sullivan’s assertion, we conclude the prejudice
resulting from the errors found or assumed is so minimal—
whether considered alone or cumulatively—that there is no
reasonable possibility that the errors affected the outcome of the
proceedings.

L. Resentencing

Sullivan argues (and the Attorney General concedes) that
he is entitled to have his sentence vacated and to have the matter
remanded to the trial court for a full resentencing. We agree.

As we recently explained in People v. Flores (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, the determinate sentencing laws underwent
several significant changes effective January 1, 2022. (Id. at pp.
1038-1039; see Sen. Bill No. 567 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (SB 567),
Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; Assem. Bill No. 124 (2020-2021 Reg.
Sess.) (AB 124), Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.3.) As is relevant here,
the new legislation amended section 1170, including changes
affecting a trial court’s discretion to impose an upper term
sentence. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now provides that an
upper term may be imposed only “when there are circumstances
in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of

98
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”

Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B), also now establishes a
presumption that the court “shall order imposition of the lower
term” if the defendant’s “ ‘youth’ ”—meaning they were under 26
years old at the time of the offense (see § 1016.7, subd. (b))—was
“a contributing factor” in his or her commission of a crime “unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; see also Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 3(c); People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
922, 927.)

The People correctly concede that the ameliorative
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), apply retroactively
to Sullivan’s case because it was not yet final as of January 1,
2022. (People v. Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) The
People also concede that because Sullivan was 21 years old at the
time of the commitment offense, and because the trial court
imposed the upper term on counts five and nine without the
requisite stipulation or jury finding, remand for resentencing
under the amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b), is
appropriate.

Sullivan also insists that the sentencing court should be
given an opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike or impose
lesser firearm enhancements under both sections 12022.5 and
12022.53, subdivision (h), as amended by Senate Bill No. 620,
and section 654 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.). (See § 654 as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1,
eff. January 1, 2022.) The People concede Sullivan’s entitlement

99
to a full resentencing hearing where he can raise these additional
issues.

Accordingly, Sullivan’s sentence must be vacated and the
case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the
trial court may revisit all its sentencing choices in light of the
new legislation. (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-
425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior
sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”]; accord,
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

DISPOSITION

Sullivan’s sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to
the superior court for resentencing. At the new sentencing
hearing, the court is directed to resentence Sullivan consistent
with current applicable sentencing laws. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

People v. Sullivan (A163607)

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