CourtListener 10613055•People v. Nicholson CA3
Testo completo
Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Nicholson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101177
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
2014-0005067, SF127084B)
v.
KYREN NICODEMUS NICHOLSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Kyren Nicodemus Nicholson appeals from the trial court’s order
declining to dismiss an enhancement under Penal Code1 section 1385. Defendant
contends that remand is necessary to ensure that the order comports with our Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, issued subsequent to the
trial court’s decision. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider mitigating
circumstances and failed to present substantial, credible evidence of aggravating factors
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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“to neutralize the ‘great weight’ of the mitigating circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1036.) We
conclude that the trial court was not required to consider mitigating circumstances in light
of the court’s finding that defendant would endanger the public if his sentence were
reduced. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and found true
that he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 15 years to life for second degree murder and 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. Defendant appealed and this court remanded the matter to the trial court to
consider whether to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385, as amended by
Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018;
§ 12022.53, subd. (h)). (People v. Nicholson (Feb. 2, 2021, C083498) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court declined to strike the firearm enhancement. Defendant
appealed, contending, inter alia, the trial court erred in concluding the enhancement could
not result in a sentence of over 20 years. (People v. Nicholson (Jan. 22, 2024, C097850)
[nonpub. opn.].) We agreed with defendant. Because the record did not establish the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion but for this error, we vacated the order and
remanded for resentencing. (Ibid.)
In April 2024, defendant filed a resentencing brief arguing the enhancement
should be dismissed under section 1385 based on two mitigating circumstances
enumerated in the statute: (1) the enhancement resulted in a sentence over 20 years and
(2) defendant’s youth at the time of the offense. Defendant also maintained the presence
of statutory mitigating circumstances created a presumption in favor of dismissal that the
prosecution failed to rebut.
The prosecution opposed, arguing that striking the enhancement would not be in
the interest of justice given the circumstances of the crime: Defendant stood over the
victim who was on the ground begging for his life and fired two shots killing him. The
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prosecution further noted that the issue of whether section 1385, subdivision (c) creates a
rebuttable presumption was currently under review by our Supreme Court.
On April 29, 2024, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing. The court
denied defendant’s request to strike the enhancement, finding that defendant would be a
danger to public safety and also that it was not in the interest of justice to change
defendant’s sentence. The court explained: “It was callous . . . that defendant stood over
a man; first, the co-defendant allegedly shot the victim’s vehicle. [¶] Then the victim
came outside and the defendant stood over the victim while he was lying in the street
begging for his life, and shot him twice and killed him.” The trial court further stated that
it had given great weight to mitigating circumstances but the callousness of defendant’s
actions outweighed that consideration.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the firearm
enhancement because it failed to consider mitigating circumstances and did not present
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors to neutralize the great weight of
the mitigating circumstances. The trial court, however, found that dismissing the
enhancement would endanger public safety. Therefore, the trial court was not required to
consider mitigating circumstances.
We generally review the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement
under section 1385, as well as specifically whether dismissal would endanger public
safety, for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298;
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.) “The abuse of discretion standard
is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the
trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, at
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p. 298; see also People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857 [a trial court’s “risk
finding” that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety “will be upheld
‘if it falls within “the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered” ’ ”].)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides: “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I)
are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.”
Thus, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) “provides that in determining whether to
dismiss an enhancement ‘under this subdivision,’ the court must consider nine listed
mitigating circumstances if proven by the defendant (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(I)), ‘unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety’ (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). That provision means that if the court finds that dismissal of an
enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed
mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385[, subd. ](c)(2).)” (People v. Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296, fn. omitted.)
Defendant relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th 1024. In Walker, the high court rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
the presence of mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)
“creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement that can only be
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.” (Walker, at p. 1034.) On
the other hand, “if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public
safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But
ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This
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means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.)
Here, the trial court made an express finding that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety based on defendant’s “callous” actions in shooting the
victim, who was lying on the ground and pleading for his life. Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) “does not require the trial court to consider any particular factors in
determining whether ‘there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.’ ” (People v. Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) A court may rely on the circumstances of the charged offense
to find a defendant a danger to the public. (See People v. Graham (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 787, 798-799 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
defendant posed “ ‘an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” under §§ 1001.36
and 1170.18, based “on the serious and violent nature of [the] defendant’s charged crime
and [the] defendant’s actions during the commission of those crimes”]; Mendoza, at
p. 298 [determination whether dismissal would endanger public safety under § 1385,
subd. (c)(2) is similar to whether resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety under § 1170.18, subd. (b)]; see also People v. Garcia,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 856.) Accordingly, having made a finding that dismissal of
an enhancement would endanger the public, the trial court was not required to consider
mitigating circumstances. (Mendoza, at p. 296.)
In Gonzalez, the appellate court held that determination a defendant posed a
danger to society under section 1385, subdivision (c) also involves evaluating whether
the defendant would be a danger when released in the future, including after serving a
lengthy sentence that might remain after dismissal of an enhancement. (People v.
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Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) The appellate court held the trial court
erred in interpreting section 1385 as requiring it to decide only whether the defendant
currently posed a danger to the public. (Garcia, at p. 230.) The appellate court rejected
the trial court’s “singular focus on whether the defendant currently poses a danger.” (Id.
at p. 228.) Here the trial court’s statements do not show that it interpreted section 1385 as
limited to defendant’s current dangerousness. Rather, the trial court found defendant
would be a danger to society based on the callousness of the crime. The trial court did
not focus on, or limit, the temporal nature of the risk posed by an offender capable of
such violence and cruelty.
In any event, defendant does not argue that the trial court’s finding of danger to the
public constituted an abuse of discretion. Indeed, defendant essentially ignores the
finding. To be sure, defendant asserts the trial court failed to consider nonstatutory
“mitigating factors” in the probation report that might arguably be relevant to a
determination whether defendant posed a risk to public safety, e.g., that defendant had no
adult criminal history, earned a high school diploma in custody, and scored “ ‘low risk to
reoffend’ ” on the Static Risk and Offenders Needs Guide assessment tool. The probation
report, however, also sets forth defendant’s repeated statements that “he ‘did not do
anything’ ” and “ ‘[he] did not do anything to anyone.’ ” In addition, the report states:
“During his stay in the county jail . . . defendant received numerous write-ups concerning
noncompliance with the housing guidelines as of this writing.” In sum, the probation
report does not establish that defendant had or would become less dangerous to public
safety during incarceration. Defendant offers no other evidence or information indicating
defendant would not endanger public safety if dismissal of an enhancement reduced his
sentence.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
DUARTE, J.
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