CourtListener 10613054•People v. Pecot CA3
Testo completo
Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Pecot CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C100290
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22FE014097)
DAWAN HAMEED PECOT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Dawan Hameed Pecot shot and killed Sean Bernal while committing
a robbery at Capitol Casino in Sacramento. A jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder and robbery. With respect to the murder, the jury found a special circumstance
allegation to be true. With respect to both counts, the jury also found that defendant
personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant
to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years to life.
1
On appeal, defendant claims that the conditions of his confinement during trial
violated his constitutional rights by adversely impairing his ability to assist in his defense
and to appear in a dignified manner before the jury. As we will explain, the contention is
forfeited because defendant did not raise the constitutional issues in the trial court.
Anticipating this conclusion, defendant also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issues. Because defendant has not carried his appellate burden
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Bernal worked the graveyard shift as a security officer at Capitol Casino. At about
6 a.m. on August 22, 2022, defendant entered the casino wearing black pants, a black
hooded sweatshirt, black gloves, a black ski mask, and red tennis shoes. He walked
to the casino’s cashier cage and forced his way inside. Bernal immediately confronted
him with his taser drawn and ordered him out of the cage. Defendant was armed with a
.40-caliber semi-automatic handgun, but did not draw his weapon. Instead, he complied
with Bernal’s commands without saying a word. Bernal escorted defendant out of the
casino at taser-point, saying: “Keep walking or I shoot your ass.” Bernal walked
defendant through the main parking lot. When they got to Basler Street, adjacent to the
parking lot, defendant drew his gun and quickly turned around. Bernal yelled “gun” and
ran toward a cross-street. Defendant took a couple of steps toward Bernal and then ran
back through the parking lot toward the casino.
R.C., the casino’s floor supervisor, had seen Bernal escorting defendant outside
and followed them to the parking lot. When defendant pulled the gun and started to run
back toward the casino, R.C. ran inside and went into the cage, locking the door behind
him. Moments later, R.C. heard someone punching a code into the cage’s electronic door
lock. Thinking the person might be an employee trying to get to safety, R.C. opened the
door. Defendant pushed his way into the cage. R.C. told him not to shoot and ran out of
the cage.
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Bernal, who also doubled back to the casino, followed defendant into the cage as
R.C. ran out. Bernal fired his taser, hitting defendant in the upper abdomen with only one
electrode dart. Defendant fired his handgun, hitting Bernal in the neck. Defendant took
about $38,000 from the cage and fled to a white Lexus parked on Basler Street. R.C.
was outside the casino when defendant emerged. When defendant got to the Lexus,
he opened the trunk, climbed inside, and closed the lid, then as sirens approached,
defendant emerged from the trunk, fired a round in R.C.’s direction, and continued down
Basler Street on foot, heading toward the American River levee.
Police arrived within minutes and apprehended defendant along the levee. He
was wearing the same clothing described by witnesses to the robbery. He threw down
his gun when officers made contact with him. And he had one taser dart sticking out
of his hooded sweatshirt, along with a corresponding puncture wound to his abdomen.
When police made contact with defendant, R.C. returned to the casino to check on
Bernal. R.C. found Bernal lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to his neck.
Bernal did not survive the shooting.
A forensic analysis of an expended shell casing found inside the casino’s cashier
cage and another such casing found on Basler Street revealed that those casings were
fired by the gun that was in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest. The money
stolen from the casino and black gloves were found in the trunk of the Lexus. The Lexus
was registered to defendant’s girlfriend; he had her permission to drive the car.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the conditions of his confinement during trial violated his
constitutional rights by adversely impairing his ability to assist in his defense and to
appear in a dignified manner before the jury. He also asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise these issues in the trial court.
3
A
Defendant’s trial began on November 13, 2023, with motions in limine and jury
selection. The evidentiary portion of the trial spanned the next two days, November 14
and 15. On November 16, the parties met in the afternoon to discuss jury instructions.
The next day of trial, November 27, occurred after the Thanksgiving break and involved
jury instructions, closing arguments, and the jury’s verdict.
On the morning of November 15, the second and final day of evidence, defense
counsel raised the issue of defendant’s confinement, referring to it as “rather chaotic.”
Defense counsel noted: “He indicates he was kept into a holding cell until 12:30 this
morning. Yesterday he told me that he was, I believe, taken down to the branch [referring
to Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center in Elk Grove] and then brought back here
[referring to the Sacramento Main Jail] at 1:30 in the morning.” The trial court received
clarification from defendant that he was initially housed in Elk Grove, where he slept
Monday night, after day one of the trial. The next morning, he was woken up at 1:30
a.m. and brought to the main jail before day two of the trial. After a full day of evidence,
defendant was returned to the main jail and held in a holding cell until 12:30 a.m., at
which point he was moved to a regular cell. Defendant said he was not fed dinner that
night “because they already served dinner” by the time he was housed. Defense counsel
also noted that defendant had not been permitted to shower at the main jail and was
“nodding off” during the first day of evidence. Citing defendant’s constitutional right to
participate in his defense, defense counsel asked the trial court whether there was “any
way that we can stabilize his situation so he can at least be given the opportunity to get a
decent night sleep and a shower.”
The trial court stated that it had previously ordered defendant to be housed at the
main jail during trial, but given that the evidentiary portion of the trial would likely be
finished that day, followed by the Thanksgiving break, the trial court did not “see any
need to have [defendant] housed downtown for the next week and a half.” Defense
4
counsel then asked the trial court to order defendant returned to the Elk Grove facility.
Defendant confirmed that was his preference. The trial court stated that would be the
order. Regarding the rest of the day, the trial court asked defendant whether he was
following the proceedings. Defendant said he was. The trial court asked defense counsel
whether he had any concern about proceeding with the trial. Defense counsel answered:
“No, not this morning, but if a concern develops as we go through our long day, I’m
going to voice it.” Defense counsel also asked that defendant be fed over the lunch hour.
The trial court stated that providing defendant with lunch “would be standard” and asked
defendant whether he was given lunch the previous day. Defendant confirmed that he
was fed lunch, but repeated that he missed dinner.
The trial court then stated: “All right. So correct me if I’m missing something,
but it seems we’re covered through the day. He is okay to participate today. I mean,
we’re talking, you’re tracking what we’re discussing, and after today’s proceeding,
assuming we’re on schedule, he’ll be transferred back to [the Elk Grove facility] for the
next almost week and a half, and then we’d have one day of arguments and instructions
and then deliberations.” Defense counsel responded: “Yes. Thank you, your Honor.
I feel I made my record.” The trial court asked defense counsel: “Then unless there’s
some change in [defendant’s] condition throughout the day today, at this point I’m
assuming everything has been taken care of?” Defense counsel answered: “I will submit
on that issue.” The trial court asked whether it was “missing something.” Defense
counsel responded: “No, I don’t feel that you are. And, as I said, if something develops
I’ll bring it up, but right now we’re okay to proceed.” Defense counsel did not raise the
issue again for the remainder of the day.
The next day, the parties met in the afternoon to go over jury instructions. At the
start of the instruction conference, the trial court noted that defendant declined to attend
and asked defense counsel to comment. Defense counsel informed the trial court that
defendant was not returned to Elk Grove as the trial court had ordered, adding: “This
5
is the fourth day that he has not had access to a shower.” Defense counsel also raised
an issue involving defendant’s contact lenses, suggesting that defendant had not been able
to take them out since he was transported to the main jail because his eyecare materials
were at the Elk Grove facility, causing defense counsel to become “concerned for
permanent damage to his vision.”
The trial court said it understood the situation and had issued two orders for
defendant to be returned to Elk Grove. It then stated: “I will do it again, and we’ll check
tomorrow. We will not be meeting on this case tomorrow, but this department will be in
session on other matters, and we’ll check tomorrow and we’ll check Monday.” The trial
court noted defendant declined to attend the instruction conference because he had not
showered and the trial court declined to order his appearance when his presence was not
necessary. The trial court said it would continue checking and issuing orders until
defendant was transferred.
The record is silent as to when defendant was transferred back to the Elk Grove
facility, but by the next court date, November 27, the trial court confirmed with defendant
that the transfer had occurred.
B
Defendant’s constitutional claims are forfeited because he did not make
“a motion for mistrial or other motion in which he asked the trial court to consider
and rule on the contention” he now raises on appeal, i.e., that “adverse conditions of
confinement . . . deprived him of [constitutional] rights.” (People v. Jenkins (2000)
22 Cal.4th 900, 999-1000 (Jenkins); see also People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 270
[constitutional issues forfeited for failure to raise them before the trial court].)
Anticipating this conclusion, defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to request a mistrial on this basis.
“The standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled.
‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether
6
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. [Citations.] A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s
actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant
thus bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.
[Citations.] If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act
in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation. [Citation.] Otherwise, the claim is more
appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gray
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 206-207 (Gray).)
On the question of deficient performance, reasonable trial counsel could have
concluded that a motion for mistrial based on defendant’s conditions of confinement
would have been properly denied by the trial court. Such a conclusion finds support in
Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, in which the California Supreme Court rejected
constitutional challenges that are similar to those raised in this appeal.
In Jenkins, the defendant claimed that “numerous adverse conditions” of his
confinement violated his “right to due process of law, to assist in his own defense,
to the effective assistance of counsel, to be present both physically and mentally at all
proceedings against him, and ‘not to be compelled to stand trial except when able to
meaningfully assist his counsel.’ ” (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 999.) The challenged
adverse conditions included, among other things, disruptive searches of his cell, being
kept in solitary confinement for disciplinary infractions, receiving unappealing food,
transportation schedules that deprived him of adequate sleep, and being shackled while
waiting to appear in court. (Ibid.) Rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was
7
deprived of the right to assist in his own defense, the court explained: “Even taking
defendant’s various complaints at face value, he was not deprived of all means of
preparing his defense, but merely suffered circumstances he found disagreeable and
disruptive.” (Id. at p. 1001.) The court also noted that “due process of law prohibits the
trial of an incompetent defendant,” but the defendant did not attempt to establish
incompetence under the state or federal Constitutions. (Id. at pp. 1001-1002.) Finally,
while recognizing that certain conditions of confinement have been held, at least in the
context of civil rights actions brought by pretrial detainees, to “so impair the defendant’s
ability to communicate with counsel or otherwise participate in the defense that a due
process violation or an infringement of the right to effective assistance of counsel
results,” the court explained that “the circumstances described by defendant had no
prejudicial effect on his ability to assist in his defense or on counsel’s ability to defend
him.” (Id. at pp. 1002 & 1003.)
Here, defendant similarly argues that the conditions of his confinement violated
his constitutional rights to due process, to effective assistance of counsel, and to equal
protection. The constitutional challenges themselves are forfeited for failure to raise
them below. But reasonable counsel, having read Jenkins, could have concluded that a
motion for mistral based on the conditions of defendant’s confinement would not have
been successful. Taking the complaints of defendant and defense counsel at face value,
defendant was transported from Elk Grove to Sacramento very early in the morning
before the first day of evidence. At some point during the day, defense counsel said
defendant was “nodding off,” but counsel did not elaborate on the extent to which
defendant may have missed portions of the evidence. The trial court did not indicate that
it witnessed any inability of defendant to follow the proceedings. After that day of trial,
defendant was not moved from the holding cell into a regular cell until very late and
missed dinner. He was also unable to shower while at the main jail.
8
Although a trial court properly defers to a great extent on the judgment of jail
authorities regarding the conditions of a pretrial detainee’s confinement (Jenkins, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 1006, fn. 22), we are troubled by the claimed circumstances.
Nevertheless, as in Jenkins, the record on appeal “does not indicate that the conditions of
defendant’s confinement so interfered with his ability to communicate with counsel or
assist in the defense as to constitute a violation of defendant’s rights to due process or the
effective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at pp. 1002-1003.) Indeed, defense counsel assured
the trial court that defendant was okay to proceed after raising the conditions at the start
of the second day of evidence.
Defendant also raises an equal protection challenge, not raised in Jenkins, but he
has not persuaded this court that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to raise
the equal protection challenge in the trial court. Defendant cites People v. Taylor (1982)
31 Cal.3d 488, in which the California Supreme Court held that “the refusal to allow [the]
defendant to wear civilian clothing at trial constituted a violation of due process and
equal protection.” (Id. at p. 493.) After discussing the due process violation, the court
went on to explain that requiring a defendant to go to trial in jail clothing “ ‘operates
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. Persons who can secure
release are not subjected to this condition. To impose the condition on one category of
defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” (Id. at p. 495.)
Defendant does not assert that he was tried in jail clothing. Instead, he argues that
the lack of sufficient sleep and a shower violated his right to due process and equal
protection, relying on two federal district court decisions, Dillard v. Pitchess (C.D.Cal.
1975) 399 F.Supp. 1225 and Rutherford v. Pitchess (C.D.Cal. 1978) 457 F.Supp. 104.
Those decisions arose out of civil rights actions brought on behalf of pretrial detainees in
Los Angeles County. In Dillard, after describing a typical day of trial for such a detainee,
the court stated: “For a man to be subjected to such a procedure for just one day, while
9
he is undergoing the emotional strain inherent in attending his own trial or other court
proceeding, would likely bring him to a condition approaching physical and nervous
exhaustion by early afternoon. To require it of him on successive days is intolerable, for
his ability to be of assistance to his attorney or otherwise conduct himself to his best
advantage must necessarily be affected. Certainly, due process of law requires that a
defendant not be denied the opportunity for a reasonable night’s sleep before each day of
his trial.” (Dillard, at p. 1237; see also Rutherford, at pp. 114-115.) The court in Dillard
also found the conditions of confinement experienced by the detainees violated their right
to “equal protection of the laws in contrast to defendants in criminal cases that remain at
liberty pending trial because they can afford to post bail.” (Dillard, at p. 1235.)
In Jenkins, however, the California Supreme Court cited the Dillard case, and
other similar civil rights actions, but nevertheless concluded the conditions challenged in
Jenkins “had no prejudicial effect on [the defendant’s] ability to assist in his defense or on
counsel’s ability to defend him.” (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1003.) Defense
counsel in this case could have reasonably concluded, based on Jenkins, that raising an
equal protection challenge in a motion for mistrial would have been rejected by the trial
court. This is because, even if an equal protection violation occurred, “[a] motion for
mistrial should be granted ‘ “only when a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have
been irreparably damaged.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1086,
1094.) The record on appeal does not demonstrate that the conditions of defendant’s
confinement irreparably harmed his chances of receiving a fair trial. We therefore decline
to conclude that defense counsel acted unreasonably in failing to challenge those
conditions in a motion for mistrial.
In addition, defendant has not established resulting prejudice. The evidence
adduced against defendant in this case was overwhelming. Defendant has not shown
that he “suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient
10
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 207.)
His assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for this reason as well.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
DUARTE, J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
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