People v. Fox CA2/3

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Testo completo

Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Fox CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B339074

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA115395)
v.

DEVONTE FOX,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of John F. Schuck and John F. Schuck, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Devonte Fox of hit and run driving
resulting in injury to another, and the jury found that the offense
involved an act revealing a high degree of callousness. The trial
court denied Fox’s request for probation and sentenced him to
two years in prison. On appeal, Fox contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by not sentencing him to probation. We find
no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at trial
A. Prosecution evidence
Fox and Kierra Charles were childhood friends. But
around 2020 or 2021, their friendship ended when Fox posted
something on Instagram about a member of Charles’s family.
However, Fox remained friends with Charles’s sister Kamuara
Mitchell and cousin Shana Pittmon.
On the evening of June 27, 2023, Charles was at her
apartment with her two young children when Pittmon called and
asked Charles to meet her in the parking lot. Mitchell, Fox, and
several others were in the parking lot, where they drank liquor.
Charles saw Fox drinking, and Charles thought he was
intoxicated. Fox said, “Hi,” to Charles. Charles responded, “Hi,”
but Fox got mad, called her greeting fake, and cursed at her. Fox
got close to Charles’s face, and they argued. Their argument
turned physical, they pushed each other, and Fox threw her to
the ground.
The police arrived, having received a noise complaint. The
group started to go inside, and the police left. Charles went to
get her wallet, cellphone, and purse, which she had left on her
cousin’s car. However, Fox grabbed the items and ran to his car

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with them. Charles ran after Fox, who got into the driver’s seat
of his car. Charles reached into the car to get her things, Fox
grabbed her shirt, and he reversed the car, causing Charles to fly
across the street. Charles said the car hit “the wall of the next
house across the street or something. We hit something, and we
bounced to the middle of the street, and he dropped me and kept
going.” Charles thought she blacked out for a second. When she
could not get up, she “rolled” towards her apartment, screaming
in pain.
Pittmon said it looked like Charles’s leg was “off.” A family
member wrapped Charles’s leg in a shirt. When an officer
arrived at the scene, people were screaming and asking for help.
The officer applied a tourniquet to Charles’s leg to stop the
bleeding. An ambulance took Charles to a hospital, where her leg
was amputated. Charles was in the hospital for a month and a
half.
On June 29, 2023, which was about one day after the
incident, Fox sold his car to a junkyard.
Charles has not spoken to Fox since their altercation, and
he has never apologized to her.
B. Defense evidence
Felix Smith was with Fox, his cousin, that night. Fox drove
Smith and another cousin to the parking lot. During the
gathering, Smith saw Fox and Charles drinking. He also saw
them arguing, although Smith described Fox as “playful” and
Charles as “serious.” Charles pushed Fox, which just made him
laugh. Smith and Fox got into Fox’s car to leave. Smith wanted
to drive because Fox had been drinking, but Fox insisted on
driving. When Fox was pulling out to leave, Charles was still
arguing with Fox, and she kicked the car. Fox stopped the car.

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Initially, Fox was laughing, apparently thinking that Charles
was “playing.” But Charles hit the windshield with a bottle,
cracking the windshield, and then she hit Fox with the bottle.
Smith described Fox as scared. Smith said that the car was
“already in reverse. So, I guess, like, he tried, to … press the gas
but end[ed] up pressing the brake and we flew backwards.” The
car went over the curb, and Smith could hear Charles screaming.
Charles’s body did not come into the car. People said they were
going to kill Fox and his family. Fox left.
Fox’s cousin Umika Taylor was also at the gathering.
Taylor saw Fox and Charles arguing, with Charles becoming
physical with Fox. When Fox was in his car trying to leave,
Charles threw her robe, said she was “about to F him up,” and hit
him on the head with a bottle. The car was reversing, but
Charles was hitting Fox, who had his arm up. Taylor did not see
Fox grab Charles’s shirt and pull her into the car. When Charles
was injured, Fox got out of the car and tried to help Charles, who
screamed that she did not want to be touched. After the incident,
Charles’s family said “[a]ngry things.” Taylor expressed concern
for Fox’s safety, and he left.
Charles’s cousin Pittmon said everyone was drinking that
night. After the police came the first time in response to the
noise complaint, Fox got into his car to leave. Charles picked up
a bottle and hit Fox in the head with it as he was reversing the
car.
Babak Malek, a forensic scientist who does accident
reconstruction, testified that the maximum speed at which Fox’s
car could have reversed was 30 miles per hour. If somebody
whose upper body is inside a car is being dragged by the car, it
would be difficult for that person to fall out and for the car to run

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over the person’s foot. But if the person were outside the car and
leaning into it while hitting the driver with a bottle, the car,
while in reverse, would first have contact with the person’s left
shoulder, causing a rotational movement and the person to fall.
II. Verdict and sentencing
A jury convicted Fox of hit and run driving resulting in
injury to another. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1); count 3.)
The jury found true the aggravating circumstance that the
offense involved an act revealing a high degree of callousness.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).) The jury found Fox not
guilty of count 1 for mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and deadlocked
on count 2 for assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).
The parties submitted sentencing briefs. In its brief, the
People asked the trial court to impose the upper term of three
years. In his brief, Fox argued that three mitigating
circumstances applied to his case: (1) Charles was either the
aggressor or a willing participant in the incident, (2) Fox had no
prior or significant criminal record, and (3) Fox was employed, a
father and a partner, a community volunteer, and his income was
needed to support his family. He also asked the trial court to
deem the offense a misdemeanor and to sentence him to
probation with a suitable amount of jail time.
At the July 2, 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court
agreed that the second and third factors were mitigating but not
the first. After considering the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, sentencing memoranda, and statements made by
Charles and her family at the hearing, the trial court refused to
reduce the offense to a misdemeanor and denied probation. It
explained, “The evidence at trial established that Mr. Fox saw

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Ms. Charles’[s] horrific injury. He heard her screams. He knew
she was injured in the road. He fled the scene. [¶] The jury did
not accept the defense claim that he was threatened at the scene.
The jury was given a necessity instruction. Had they accepted
this claim, they would have found him not guilty. The credible
evidence at trial established that Mr. Fox was aware of Ms.
Charles’[s] horrific injury, and he chose to leave. [¶]
Significantly, the next day he took actions to try to conceal his
connection to the crime. He sold the car that was involved in the
hit-and-run.” The trial court then denied probation and
sentenced Fox to the midterm of two years in prison.
DISCUSSION
Fox contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying probation. As we now explain, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
Probation is the suspension of the imposition or execution
of sentence and the order of conditional or revocable supervised
release into the community. (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (a).)
“Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose
conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public
safety and promotes rehabilitation.” (People v. Carbajal (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “The safety of the public, which shall be
a primary goal through the enforcement of court-ordered
conditions of probation; the nature of the offense; the interests of
justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into
the community, and enforcement of conditions of probation; the
loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant shall be the
primary considerations in the granting of probation.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.7.)

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Whether to grant or to deny probation requires considering
all the facts and circumstances of the case. (People v.
Birmingham (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 180, 185.) Factors to
consider include the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of
the crime as compared to other instances of the same crime; the
victim’s vulnerability; whether the defendant inflicted physical or
emotional injury; the degree of monetary loss to the victim;
whether the defendant was an active or a passive participant;
whether the crime was committed because of an unusual
circumstance, such as great provocation; any prior record of
criminal conduct; the likely effect of imprisonment on the
defendant and his dependents; adverse collateral consequences
on the defendant’s life resulting from the felony conviction;
whether the defendant is remorseful; and the likelihood that if
not imprisoned the defendant will be a danger to others. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.414.) In determining a defendant’s
“suitability for probation, the court may consider factors in
aggravation and mitigation, whether or not the factors have been
stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.414(c).)
A grant or denial of probation is within the trial court’s
sound discretion, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is
shown the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. (People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165,
178–179.) Absent evidence clearly showing that the sentencing
decision was arbitrary or irrational, we presume that the trial
court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. (Id. at
p. 179.) Reversal is not warranted merely because reasonable
minds might disagree. (Ibid.) Only “ ‘ “in a very extreme case” ’ ”

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will we interfere with a trial court’s exercise of discretion in
denying probation. (People v Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766,
773.)
Here, Fox argues that the trial court abused its discretion
because he did not intend to cause injury to Charles, it is unlikely
such an accident will be repeated, he has no prior record, and he
has a family that he supports financially. The trial court,
however, found that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors. The trial court weighed heavily that Fox fled
the scene even though Charles was screaming in pain and that
Fox tried to conceal his involvement in the crime by selling his
car. The trial court was well within its discretion to focus on
these aggravating factors. That is, while a Vehicle Code section
20001 offense is commonly referred to as a “hit and run,” the
offense is “ ‘more accurately described as fleeing the scene of an
injury accident.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1102
(Martinez).) Stated otherwise, the criminal act is the running,
not the hitting. (Ibid.) And the legislative purpose behind the
statute is to prevent the driver involved in an accident from
leaving injured people in distress and danger for want of medical
care and from trying to avoid possible civil or criminal liability.
(Ibid.)
Fox agrees that leaving the scene was “uncalled for” but
asserts that his doing so did not cause or increase Charles’s
injuries. However, Charles was bleeding and her injury was
horrific, with a witness saying it looked like her leg was “off.” A
family member tried to help by wrapping Charles’s leg with a
shirt, and an officer thereafter applied a tourniquet. Therefore,
Charles required immediate aid, which Fox was not present to
provide because he had fled. This is exactly the kind of conduct

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Vehicle Code section 20001 was designed to prevent. (Martinez,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1102.)
The trial court also weighed against Fox his attempt to
conceal his crime by selling his car the day after Charles was
injured. Fox dismisses this as mere consciousness of guilt. (See,
e.g., People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 35 [consciousness of
guilt may be inferred from defendant’s attempts to conceal
evidence].) But the trial court was within its discretion to view it
as an attempt to avoid liability, which is something Vehicle Code
section 20001 was designed to prevent. (Martinez, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1102.)
Moreover, the trial court disagreed that Charles instigated
or participated in the incident. Instead, there was evidence that
when the police first arrived in response to a noise complaint,
everyone, including Charles, began to leave. Fox prevented
Charles from leaving by taking her things and getting into his car
with them. Based on this evidence and the trial court’s finding
that Charles’s conduct was not a mitigating factor, the trial court
was also impliedly finding that Fox was the active participant in
the crime and the provocateur. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.414(a)(6).)
In conclusion, notwithstanding the mitigating factors that
Fox had no prior criminal record and a family that he was
supporting, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding
that the aggravating factors regarding the nature of the crime
and Fox’s conduct outweighed them. We therefore cannot agree
that this is an extreme case warranting reversal of the decision to
deny probation.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

GAAB, J.*

*
Judge of the Fresno County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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