People v. Samson CA2/7

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Filed 6/17/25 P. v. Samson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B323730

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA472710)
v.

RONALD WESLEY SAMSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Norman J. Shapiro, Judge. Affirmed in
part, remanded in part with instructions.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Ronald Wesley Samson was convicted of the murder of
Kenny Combs. Samson asserted at trial that he killed Combs in
self-defense. Samson argues the trial court misstated several
jury instructions, including those relating to justifiable homicide.
He also argues the court erroneously admitted unduly prejudicial
evidence of Samson’s prior threats and violence against an
eyewitness to the murder. Samson further contends he is
indigent, and the court violated due process by imposing fines
and fees despite his inability to pay.
We directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to
determine whether the reporter’s transcript from Samson’s trial
contained any errors and, if so, to correct them. The trial court
did so. Although the reporter introduced additional errors in the
corrected transcript, we are persuaded under the circumstances
that the trial court did not misstate the jury instructions at
Samson’s trial. We further conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence relating to Samson’s prior
threats and violence. We remand, however, to have the trial
court conduct a hearing on Samson’s ability to pay the fines and
fees it imposed at sentencing.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Information
Samson was charged in 2019 with one count of murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) for the death of Combs.1 The
information further alleged Samson personally used a deadly
weapon (a knife) in the commission of the offense (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).

B. The People’s Evidence
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that, on
October 31, 2018, Samson stabbed Combs during an altercation
in an alley behind Combs’s house. At that time, Samson had
been dating their mutual friend, Rasjay Hardy. Hardy would
stay at Combs’s house from time to time. Hardy was an
eyewitness to Combs’s murder.

1. Hardy’s Police Interview
Officers from the Los Angeles Police Department
interviewed Hardy in the early morning hours of November 1.
Hardy explained to detectives that her relationship with Samson
was “just going kind of south,” so she stayed at Combs’s house on
October 31 for “some space.” That night, Samson showed up at
Combs’s house “yelling” for Hardy to come outside. Combs left
his house to talk to Samson. Hardy overheard Combs and
Samson arguing, and when she stepped outside to break it up,
she saw the two started fighting. Hardy saw Samson “pull[] [a]
knife out.” She stated she did not see where Samson stabbed

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Combs but that she saw Combs’s blood and Combs drop to the
ground.
Despite extensive questioning, Hardy did not provide
detectives with Samson’s name until the very end of her
interview. When asked for Samson’s name, Hardy replied, “I
don’t want to say his name. I’m―I’m already sitting here. . . .
[I]n violation of everything, you know what I’m saying? Like, I
can never go back to the neighborhood or nothing, like, I ain’t
going to my family’s house ever again.” Further into the
interview, Hardy stated that Samson “knows where my family’s
house is,” he had “threatened before to, like, set those houses up,”
and “I don’t want him to set my family’s house up.” She
described that Samson “has friend[s]. That whole [expletive]
hood is behind him. One night he kicked me in my face. . . . He
was kicking me in my face and the whole neighborhood came, we
were fighting on the street. And the whole neighborhood came
and told me that I needed to shut the [expletive] up. . . . [I]f he
goes in, the whole [expletive] neighborhood is behind him.”
Hardy explained to police, “I just don’t want any harm to come to
my family.” Eventually, police convinced Hardy to disclose
Samson’s name.

2. Hardy’s Trial Testimony
Hardy was subpoenaed to testify at Samson’s trial. Before
Hardy testified, Samson sought to exclude her police interview
under Evidence Code section 352. Samson argued Hardy’s
statements about Samson were “character evidence” and “a jury
might improperly infer that the defendant has gang ties.”
Samson admitted Hardy’s prior statements were “surely
relevant” if Hardy was “unwilling[]” to testify, but he asked the

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court to “consider how much of it would come in.” The court
agreed to “tell the jury at the time this evidence is being admitted
for a limited purpose,” i.e., to assess Hardy’s credibility.
On the stand, Hardy denied knowing Samson or Combs and
stated she didn’t “remember” any of the events of the murder or
her subsequent interview with police. Hardy answered “I don’t
remember” to almost all questions, but her testimony included
the following exchange:

Counsel: Miss Hardy, are you scared?
Witness: Yes, ma’am.
Counsel: Are you afraid to be here right now?
Witness: I don’t want to answer that.
Court: I didn’t hear you.
Witness: Your Honor, I don’t want to answer that
question, please.
Court: You have to answer that question. Are
you scared being here[?]
Witness: I don’t want. I don’t understand the
question.
[. . .]
Court: Do you know what being scared means[?]
Witness: Yes.
Court: Are you scared right now?
Witness: No.

In response to this line of questioning, and over Samson’s
objection, the prosecutor impeached Hardy with her police
interview. Hardy denied telling police she was afraid for her
family because Samson had threatened to “set up” their house.

5
Hardy also stated she did not remember saying that “the whole
neighborhood” supported Samson when Samson “kicked [her] in
the face” during a fight. The People then played for the jury a
video recording of Hardy’s police interview identifying Samson as
Combs’s killer, including Hardy’s statements about being afraid
of Samson and his influence in the neighborhood. The court did
not give, nor did Samson request, any limiting instruction at the
time the video was played.
Later, Samson requested a limiting instruction (CALJIC
No. 2.09) to address “the potential misuse of what amounts to
character evidence that was admitted to show [Hardy’s] fear.”
The court asked defense counsel to “draw a proposed instruction”
and counsel agreed, but the record reflects no instruction limiting
the use of Hardy’s testimony was given to the jury. Instead, the
trial court delivered CALJIC No. 2.09 and referred to other
evidence in the case.

3. Additional Prosecution Evidence
The People introduced surveillance video of the fight
between Samson and Combs, which showed Samson holding a
knife, Samson making stabbing motions toward Combs as
Samson approached him, and Combs then collapsing to the
ground. The police detective who obtained the surveillance video
admitted it was “hard to say” whether Samson or Combs initiated
the fight.
Combs’s autopsy showed multiple stab wounds, including
defensive wounds on his hands and a fatal thigh wound, which
reached his femoral artery and caused him to bleed to death. The
autopsy also established Combs was under the influence of

6
methamphetamine when he died. Samson’s DNA was found
under Combs’s fingernails.

C. Samson’s Trial Defense
Samson testified he killed Combs out of self-defense.
Samson asserted he and Combs often spent time together at a
bus stop by a liquor store, and he had seen Combs carrying a
“small gun.”
Samson testified that, on the night of the killing, he came
to pick up Hardy from Combs’s house and was gathering
recyclables from the alley. Combs came into the alley and started
“cursing” at Samson with an “unusual,” “angry” demeanor.
Samson argued with Combs in the alley, and Combs threatened
to “pull my gun” and shoot Samson. Samson testified he pulled a
kitchen knife out of his backpack for safety and moved to pick up
his bags of recyclables when Combs hit him “[v]ery, very hard” in
the head.
Samson testified he fell to the ground, losing hold of his
knife. He stated Combs continued to punch him in the face and
ribs “harder and harder” while yelling he was “going to kill”
Samson. Samson found his knife, and believing he “was going to
die,” he “started swinging the knife.”
Samson also testified he never “laid hands on” Hardy,
never threatened to “set the neighborhood houses up,” and had no
gang ties.

D. Samson’s Conviction and Sentence
The jury acquitted Samson of first degree murder but
convicted him of second degree murder. The jury found true the
special allegation that Samson personally used a deadly weapon.

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The trial court sentenced Samson to 16 years to life in
prison. As part of Samson’s sentence, the trial court ordered
Samson to pay $3,588.50 in victim restitution for “primarily
funeral and burial expenses.” The trial court further imposed a
restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4), a court operations assessment
of $40 (§ 1465.8), and a court facilities assessment of $30 (Gov.
Code, § 70373). It imposed and stayed a parole revocation
restitution fine for $300 (§ 1202.45). Defense counsel argued that
Samson “was indigent[,] continues to be[,] and has no ability to
pay,” but the court made no findings on Samson’s indigency and
noted that “an inmate . . . in a similar type situation―who had no
funds, apparently, won a lottery amount out of the blue, and the
restitution was enforced against the lottery winnings.”
Samson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Samson raises three claims of error. First, he contends the
jury received incorrect oral instructions on the doctrine of self-
defense. Next, Samson argues the trial court erred in admitting
unduly prejudicial evidence of Samson’s prior violent conduct.
Third, Samson contends the court violated due process by
imposing a restitution fine without assessing his ability to pay.
We conclude the third argument has merit.

A. Samson Does Not Establish the Trial Court Incorrectly
Instructed the Jury
Samson argues, citing the reporter’s transcript, that the
trial court misstated several jury instructions on the law of
homicide, including instructions on provocation, justifiable

8
homicide, and self-defense, and that these errors misled the jury
and compromised his self-defense argument. Samson’s opening
brief identified significant errors in the reporter’s transcript with
CALJIC Nos. 3.31 (intent), 5.10 (justifiable homicide), 5.12 (self-
defense), 5.15 (self-defense), 5.16 (justifiable homicide), 5.54 (self-
defense), 8.00 (homicide), and 8.42 (provocation). Samson
conceded he did not object to any of these instructional errors at
trial, and that the written jury instructions provided to the jury
did not contain any errors.
The People asserted that “[a]ny alleged misstatements―
which may merely be transcription errors―were harmless
because the jury received correct written instructions.” The
People urged affirmance based on the written instructions but
suggested that “[t]o the extent the record needs to be settled or
errors corrected, this Court can order a limited remand for that
purpose.”

1. The Record-correction Hearing
We requested supplemental briefing regarding whether
remand for a record-correction hearing was appropriate under
rule 8.155 of the California Rules of Court and People v. Lucas
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 468-470 (Lucas).2 Samson argued a
hearing to “settl[e] the record . . . is appropriate and advisable.”
Samson’s letter brief also identified additional errors with the

2 Rule 8.155(c) of the California Rules of Court provides:
“(1) On motion of a party, on stipulation, or on its own motion,
the reviewing court may order the correction or certification of
any part of the record. [¶] (2) The reviewing court may order the
superior court to settle disputes about omissions or errors in the
record.”

9
reporter’s transcript, including with CALJIC Nos. 5.17
(manslaughter) and 5.54 (self-defense). This court directed the
superior court to hold a hearing to determine the accuracy of the
reporter’s transcript and, if necessary, to correct the record.
The superior court held the record correction hearing.
Samson was represented by his appellate and trial counsel. The
People were represented by appellate counsel from the Office of
the Attorney General, with the trial deputy district attorney
present.
The court reporter testified she reviewed the challenged
portions of the reporter’s transcript and determined “there were
errors in the transcript.” She stated she “needed to make
corrections to the record to make it match the written jury
instructions” because the transcript “did not match what was
read by [the trial judge].” The superior court asked, “[W]ere
there any omissions by [the trial judge] that you determined, as
compared to the written jury instructions, or was it―it was a
verbatim reading?” The reporter answered, “Yes.” The reporter
further testified she “listened to the recording” of the instructions
as read by the judge and she “also looked at [her] notes.” She
explained that the transcription “doesn’t come out perfectly as I
am writing. I still have to go through and make corrections,
spellings, things like that,” but “it is possible that when I went to
change the file, it didn’t take accurately.” Samson’s counsel
asked, “[D]id the court misread the instructions?” The court
reporter testified, “I said previously the court did not misread the
instructions.”
Based on the court reporter’s testimony, the superior court
found there were transcription errors and ordered the court
reporter to correct the transcript. A copy of the corrected

10
reporter’s transcript was transmitted to this court. We also
invited the parties to brief the impact of the superior court’s
record correction on this appeal, and we address these arguments
below.

2. Samson Does Not Establish Instructional Error
Our review of the corrected reporter’s transcript confirms
the trial court did not err in delivering the jury instructions
Samson challenged as incorrect in his opening brief and
supplemental brief. The corrected transcript reflects CALJIC
Nos. 3.31, 5.10, 5.12, 5.15, 5.16, 5.54, 8.00, and 8.42 as read to the
jury by the trial court judge were consistent with the written jury
instructions included in the clerk’s transcript. Further, as
Samson concedes, the written jury instructions themselves were
correct and contained no errors. We may affirm on this basis
alone under the well-established presumption that jurors are
guided by the written instructions. (See People v. Jurado (2006)
38 Cal.4th 72, 123 [“when the jury has received an instruction in
both spoken and written forms, and the two versions vary, we
assume the jury was guided by the written version”]; accord,
People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 201 (Mills) [“Because the
jury was given the correctly worded instructions in written form .
. . and because on appeal we give precedence to the written
instructions, we find no reversible error.”]; People v. Mungia
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1132 [“when erroneous oral instructions
are supplemented by correct written ones, we assume the jury
followed the written instructions”].)

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a. Substantial evidence supports the superior
court’s order correcting the reporter’s transcript
Samson argues the court reporter’s testimony was not
credible or reliable, and therefore substantial evidence does not
support the correction of the transcript. (See People v. Mitchell
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 353, 371 (Mitchell) [“The settlement of a
transcript as to corrections and augmentations is primarily a
question of fact to be resolved by the trial court.”]; see also
People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681
[appellate court reviews trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence].)
The court reporter’s testimony identifying the errors as
transcription errors, based on her review of her notes and the
audio recording for each erroneous instruction, is substantial
evidence supporting the record-correction order. (See Mitchell,
supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 371 [affirming record correction where the
court reporters from trial were present at the hearing, “[t]he trial
judge requested that the reporters check their notes as to each
requested correction and augmentation, and the rulings of the
trial court were in accordance with the matters shown by the
court reporters’ notes”]; accord, Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 469
[same, where the court reporter was “confident” of transcription
errors and explained that reporter’s transcription notes
frequently contain errors “which usually but not always are
corrected when the reporter proofreads the computer
transcription”].) Although Samson contends the court reporter
gave “ambiguous” answers when asked whether the trial court
misstated the instructions, the court reporter testified at the
hearing in response to questions from Samson’s counsel that “the
court did not misread the instructions.” (See In re Caden C.

12
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [on substantial evidence review of
factual findings, appellate court should not reweigh the evidence
or resolve evidentiary conflicts]; accord, People v. Mumin (2023)
15 Cal.5th 176, 202.)

b. Any purported errors in the corrected transcript
do not establish the jury was incorrectly
instructed
In his second supplemental brief, Samson argued the
transcript contains additional errors requiring reversal. First,
Samson argues the corrected transcript still contains the
previously identified error with CALJIC No. 5.17 because the
court reporter was evidently unable to “make corrections.” But
Samson’s argument ignores the superior court’s finding,
supported by substantial evidence, that this misstatement was a
transcription error and that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury as to CALJIC No. 5.17. (We address Samson’s argument
the court reporter improperly referred to written jury
instructions further below.)
Next, Samson contends the corrected transcript contains a
new material error in the court’s recitation of CALJIC No. 5.55
on self-defense. While the original reporter’s transcript correctly
quoted CALJIC No. 5.55 (“The right of self defense is not
available to a person who seeks a quarrel with an intent to create
a real or apparent necessity to exercise self defense”), the
corrected transcript states, “The right of self defense is only
available” to such a person. (Italics added.)
Under these circumstances, where the original reporter’s
transcript did not contain the error and the written instructions
in the record on appeal correctly recite CALJIC No. 5.55, we

13
determine the clerk’s transcript and the original reporter’s
transcript have “greater credence” than the corrected reporter’s
transcript. (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [when
the record is in conflict, the court should determine “which [part],
because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to
greater credence . . . depend[ing] upon the circumstances of each
particular case”]; accord, People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935,
945, fn. 7 [assuming “a transcription error” caused discrepancy in
record where “[t]he reporter’s transcript ungrammatically
render[ed] the phrase ‘knowing the same facts to do an act rashly’
as ‘knowing the same facts to do and act rashly,’” but clerk’s
transcript did not contain error].) We therefore conclude the trial
court did not misstate CALJIC No. 5.55 when it charged the jury.

c. Correction of the record did not violate due
process
Samson also contends the corrected transcript violates his
right to a “reliably accurate” appellate record guaranteed by due
process. (See People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 595 (Elliott)
[due process and equal protection principles entitle criminal
defendant “to an appellate record that is ‘sufficient to permit
adequate and effective appellate review’”].) According to Samson,
the court reporter improperly corrected the reporter’s transcript
by referencing the written instructions “without actually
consulting her notes or the [audio] recording.” Samson infers this
because the corrected transcript retains the error with CALJIC
No. 5.17 and contains a new annotation stating: “I didn’t have
CALJIC 5.17 to make corrections to the following sentence.”
Samson also argues the court reporter corrected CALJIC No. 3.31

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by reference to the pattern instruction, not the instruction
contained in the clerk’s transcript.
Even assuming Samson is correct about the court reporter’s
method of correction (which we need not decide), Samson does not
explain how these circumstances prevent meaningful appellate
review. (See Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 595 [defendant has
the burden of showing appellate record is inadequate for
meaningful review].) Here, we can review Samson’s claims of
instructional error because the court reporter testified that, when
charging the jury, the trial judge read the written jury
instructions correctly, and the written jury instructions are
included in the record for our review. (See Mills, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 201 [“‘To the extent a discrepancy exists between
the written and oral versions of jury instructions, the written
instructions provided to the jury will control.’”]; People v. Davis
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542 [“It is generally presumed that the
jury was guided by the written instructions.”].) And Samson does
not argue the written instructions contain any errors.
Accordingly, we reject Samson’s due process argument.

B. Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting
Hardy’s Police Interview
Samson next argues the trial court abused its discretion
under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the entirety of
Hardy’s interview with police, including her statements that
Samson had threatened her family’s home and kicked her in the
face, and that the “neighborhood” was behind Samson.

15
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court “discretion
[to] exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create
substantial danger of undue prejudice.” The trial court has
“broad discretion to evaluate whether the probative value of
evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice.”
(People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719,
811 (Holmes); accord, People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197,
270 (Williams).) “‘Where, as here, a discretionary power is
statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion
“must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.”’” (Williams, at pp. 270-271.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding Hardy’s
Statements Were More Probative Than Unduly
Prejudicial
Samson argues Hardy’s statements were more prejudicial
than probative because they were “highly inflammatory evidence
that portrayed Samson as a ‘bad’ man who had a propensity for
violence” and “insinuated he had gang ties.” He also argues
Hardy’s statement that Samson had assaulted her was
prejudicial “evidence of an uncharged offense.” For the reasons
below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
determining the probative value of Hardy’s statements to the
police outweighed the risk of undue prejudice to Samson.
“‘“The ‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352
applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional

16
bias against defendant as an individual and which has very little
effect on the issues. In applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not
synonymous with ‘damaging.’”’” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 270; accord, People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320.)
“‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative . . . if,
broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the
proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.”’” (People v. Tran
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.) Because evidence of uncharged
crimes “may be viewed as ‘inherently prejudicial’ [citation],
‘“uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial
probative value.”’” (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 331;
accord, People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1331.)

a. Hardy’s police interview had high probative
value
Samson argues Hardy’s police interview had “minimal”
probative value. He claims Hardy’s statements that Samson
threatened and assaulted her were not probative but cumulative,
considering other evidence that Hardy was afraid to identify
Samson as the killer or to testify at trial.
Hardy’s statements about Samson’s prior violence, threats,
and influence in the neighborhood were substantially probative
regarding her credibility as the sole eyewitness to the murder.
(See Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 773 [“‘Evidence that a
witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is
relevant to the credibility of that witness.’”]; Williams, supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 271 [rejecting defendant’s Evidence Code
section 352 argument because evidence was “probative in that it
would allow the jury to accurately assess the credibility of the
prosecution’s central witness”].) This evidence explained why

17
Hardy was reluctant to identify Samson as the killer to police,
and why she refused to testify to this effect at trial. (See
People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 722-723 [no abuse of
discretion under section 352 by admitting evidence that witness
feared defendant as “an explanation for why [the witness] did not
immediately name [defendant]” as the perpetrator and why
witness had “fear of testifying”]; People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th
339, 360 [evidence that defendant broke witness’s leg was
“probative in that it would explain to the jury why [witness] was
afraid to testify against [defendant], allowing the jury to
accurately assess [her] credibility and the inconsistencies in her
testimony”].)
Samson argues Hardy testified at trial that she was
“scared” and that the rest of her police interview showed she was
afraid of implicating Samson. Therefore, he contends, the trial
court should have redacted Hardy’s statements about Samson’s
threats and violence against her. The trial court was not
required to redact Hardy’s description of threats and violence
from Samson. Although Hardy’s reluctance at trial and in the
police interview may have demonstrated Hardy was afraid, it did
not explain the underlying basis for her fear, which was that
Samson had threatened her and her family. (See People v.
Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 704-705 (Chavez) [rejecting
argument under Evidence Code section 352 that “the court
should have ‘sanitized’ [witness’s] testimony by limiting the
details of the nature or extent of [defendant’s] threat,” which was
“highly relevant to [witness’s] state of mind and credibility”];
accord, People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 417 [court did not abuse its discretion under section 352 by
admitting witness’s prior statement “that witnesses might be

18
killed” and that “‘there’s more people out there . . . that’s [sic]
putting more pressure down’” because they explained witnesses’
fear of testifying]; cf. People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 135
(Valdez) [“‘An explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is
likewise relevant to the jury’s assessment of his or her
credibility.’”].)

b. The interview was not unduly prejudicial
compared to its probative value
As stated, the probative value of Hardy’s statements was
substantial because they shed light on Hardy’s credibility and her
eyewitness identification of Samson as the murderer. (See
People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1087-1088 [no abuse of
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting death
threat from member of defendant’s gang toward witness because
relevant to witness’s credibility and “inconsistent accounts of
events”]; Chavez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 704-705 [same,
where defendant’s death threat against witness “was distinctly
relevant to show [witness’s] state of mind and credibility”].) The
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the probative
value of the evidence that Hardy feared testifying because of
Samson’s prior violence was more probative than the prejudicial
effect of her testimony about Samson’s prior violence.
And while the evidence that Samson had kicked Hardy in
the face and threatened her family was serious and prejudicial, it
was not more inflammatory than the evidence that Samson had
killed Combs with a knife. (See People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1,
32 (Case) [no abuse of discretion where admission of prior
assaults was unlikely to inflame jury because “the evidence of
defendant’s uncharged acts of violence was far less inflammatory

19
than the evidence of the charged [murder] offenses”]; People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 215, fn. 19 [same, in admitting
evidence of defendant’s prior fight in murder case to show
witness’s fear of defendant].) For this reason, the risk that the
jury might have convicted Samson of murder based on
speculation that he was in a gang, or because he had assaulted
Hardy in the past, was not so unduly prejudicial as to require
exclusion of Hardy’s statements. (See Case, at p. 32 [“there is
little chance that any juror would be moved to convict defendant
for a robbery and murders he did not commit in order to punish
him for his relatively minor acts of violence against [others]”];
People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 408 [same, where
uncharged acts were “no more inflammatory” than charged
offenses].)

3. The Absence of a Limiting Instruction Did Not Violate
Samson’s Constitutional Rights
Samson contends that, even if the trial court properly
admitted Hardy’s statements, the trial court was required to give
a limiting instruction, and its failure to do so was federal
constitutional error. He further argues his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to propose a limiting instruction.
Under the circumstances here, the trial court was not
required to give a limiting instruction. Evidence Code
section 355 provides, “When evidence is admissible . . . for one
purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, the court
upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.” The California Supreme Court has
“consistently held that where, as here, a defendant fails to
request an instruction, a trial court ‘generally [has] no duty to

20
instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence.’” (Valdez, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 139.)
The record reflects that, at the jury instruction conference,
Samson’s counsel requested a limiting instruction regarding
Hardy’s police interview, and the court stated it would give one
and directed Samson’s counsel to propose one. The instruction
the court delivered did not include any language about Hardy’s
testimony. The court had no sua sponte duty to give a limiting
instruction where counsel did not press the issue. (See Case,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 33, fn. 4 [“failure to remind the court to give
[a limiting] instruction precludes [defendant] from arguing on
appeal that the court erred”]; see also People v. Freeman (1994)
8 Cal.4th 450, 495 (Freeman) [where “court apparently offered” a
limiting instruction but defendant did not request one, “court
ha[d] no sua sponte duty” to give the instruction]; accord,
People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051; People v.
Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813 [“‘“If [a] point is not pressed
and is forgotten, [a defendant] may be deemed to have waived or
abandoned it, just as if he had failed to make the objection in the
first place.”’”].)
Samson argues his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
propose a limiting instruction without “a plausible, tactical
reason” for doing so. “To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, [a defendant] must show that [his] counsel’s performance
was deficient and that []he suffered prejudice from the deficient
performance. [Citation.] On direct appeal, if the record ‘“sheds
no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged,”’ we must reject the claim ‘“unless counsel was asked
for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.”’” (People v. Caro

21
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488; accord, People v. Sepulveda (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 291, 301.) “Accordingly, ‘except in those rare
instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for
counsel’s actions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
should be raised on habeas corpus, not on direct appeal.’”
(Sepulveda, at p. 301.)
In this case, it is possible that Samson’s counsel “may well
not have desired the court to emphasize the evidence” by way of a
limiting instruction. (Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 495; accord,
People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 394 [“A reasonable
attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a limiting
instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such
instruction would provide.”].) Without additional evidence of
defense counsel’s reasoning or lack thereof, we are unable to
conclude on direct appeal that counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to propose an instruction limiting the use of
Hardy’s testimony.
Samson also contends the admission of Hardy’s statements
without a limiting instruction violated his rights to due process
and a fair jury trial by lessening the prosecution’s burden of
proof. But “[t]he trial court did not err under state law, and
[Samson] does not provide any persuasive reason for us to
conclude that the application of California’s rules of evidence
violated his [federal] constitutional rights.” (People v. Prince
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1238-1239 [admission of evidence
defendant contended was more prejudicial than probative did not
violate Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]; see People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [citing “rule” that “[a]pplication of the
ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly
infringe on a . . . defendant’s constitutional rights”].) In any

22
event, the jury was thoroughly instructed by the court and
admonished in closing arguments on the prosecution’s burden of
proof.

C. Under the Federal and State Constitutions, the Court Erred
By Imposing Fines and Fees Without a Hearing on
Samson’s Ability To Pay
Samson also argues the trial court violated his due process
rights by imposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4, a
stayed parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45,
and assessments under section 1465.8 and Government Code
section 70373 without determining his ability to pay.3 Samson
was homeless at the time of the offense, and defense counsel
stated Samson was indigent at the sentencing hearing.
Samson cites People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas), holding that due process prohibits imposition of certain
fines and fees on an indigent defendant. Dueñas involved a
homeless and indigent criminal defendant and reversed the trial
court’s order of assessments under section 1465.8 and

3 Samson does not challenge the order of $3,588.50 in direct
victim restitution. (See Dueñas, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169
[“Direct victim restitution . . . is not at issue in this case.”]; see
also People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647, 658, fn. 8,
review granted, Mar. 11, 2020, S259755 [noting distinction
between “direct victim restitution that reimburses victims for
economic losses caused by a defendant’s conduct and the
restitution fine imposed to punish the defendant”]; People v.
Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 777 [declining to extend
Dueñas to direct victim restitution].) Accordingly, on remand the
trial court need not assess Samson’s ability to pay the victim
restitution order.

23
Government Code section 70373, and stayed the imposition of a
restitution fine under section 1202.4 “unless and until the People
prove that Dueñas has the present ability to pay it.” (Dueñas, at
pp. 1172-1173.) The California Supreme Court granted review of
this issue in a related case. (See People v. Kopp (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted, Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
The People contend Dueñas was wrongly decided. But until
the California Supreme Court issues further guidance, we apply
Dueñas. (See Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9
[“Absent a compelling reason, the Courts of Appeal are normally
loath to overrule prior decisions . . . from the same division.”];
Opsal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197,
1204 [similar].) We therefore remand for a hearing on Samson’s
ability to pay the fines and fees assessed by the trial court. (See
People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647, 663, review granted,
Mar. 11, 2020, S259755 [remanding pursuant to Dueñas where
the court did not conduct an ability to pay hearing]; Dueñas,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163, 1173 [reversing fines and fees
order where court already determined defendant’s inability to
pay].)

DISPOSITION

The case is remanded with directions to hold a hearing on
Samson’s ability to pay the restitution fine, parole revocation
restitution fine, court operations assessment, and court facilities
assessment. If Samson demonstrates an inability to pay the
restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine, the court is
directed to stay execution of the fines. If Samson demonstrates
inability to pay the court operations and court facilities

24
assessments, the court is directed to strike them. The judgment
is otherwise affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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