CourtListener 10604436•People v. Altobell CA3
Testo completo
Filed 6/13/25 P. v. Altobell CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100537
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE019895)
v.
MICHAEL VANCE ALTOBELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Michael Vance Altobell pleaded no contest to possession of fentanyl for
sale and possession of a firearm by a felon in exchange for an agreed-upon aggregate
sentence of seven years four months in prison. Before the trial court imposed sentence,
the prosecutor recited an advisement informing defendant of the dangers of controlled
substances generally, and fentanyl specifically, and cautioned that if—in the future—he
manufactured, sold, distributed, or shared a controlled substance and someone died as a
result, he could be charged with murder. Defendant’s only contention on appeal is that
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we should strike the advisement because it was unconstitutional. We will dismiss the
appeal as presenting an unripe, nonjusticiable issue.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was driving a vehicle when he was stopped by law enforcement.
Officers searched the vehicle and found a loaded .25-caliber handgun, approximately 92
grams of fentanyl, a digital scale, and plastic baggies.
A felony complaint deemed an information charged defendant with possession of
fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count one), possession of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count two), possession of
methamphetamine and fentanyl while armed with a loaded, operable firearm (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count three), possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen.
Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count four), and driving a vehicle without a valid driver’s
license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count five). The information alleged that
defendant was personally armed with a firearm in the commission of counts one and two.
(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c).) The information also alleged defendant had two prior
serious felony convictions, and therefore came within the provisions of the Three Strikes
law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
Defendant accepted the prosecution’s plea offer and pleaded no contest to counts
one and four in exchange for an agreed-upon aggregate prison sentence of seven years
four months. He also admitted to one prior strike conviction.
Before the imposition of sentence, defense counsel objected on constitutional
grounds to a “Fentanyl advisement” the prosecutor intended to recite. Defense counsel
argued that the advisement was “not part of the deal,” and was “something being stated
by the People to lighten their constitutional burden in any potential future prosecutions.”
Defendant also filed a written motion to strike the advisement, which he characterized as
an invalid term of the plea bargain.
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The trial court permitted the prosecutor to recite the advisement. Before the trial
court imposed sentence, the prosecutor advised defendant: “You are hereby advised that
manufacturing, selling, distributing, or sharing controlled substances in any form is
extremely dangerous to human life. You can kill the people who use these controlled
substances or who are exposed to these controlled substances. [¶] This is especially true
of controlled substances that contain synthetic opiates including fentanyl. Counterfeit
pills can now be made to look exactly like legitimate pharmaceutical pills. Fentanyl is
often found in counterfeit pills or mixed with other controlled substances such as
methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA, marijuana, and heroin. [¶] If you manufacture,
sell, distribute, or share a controlled substance and someone dies as a result of using or
being exposed to that controlled substance, you can be charged with murder.”
Defendant was not prompted to respond in any way to this advisement, and he did
not volunteer any response. Defense counsel again objected after the prosecutor’s
recitation, emphasizing that the advisement was non-statutory and was not part of the
negotiated agreement. The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion to strike the
advisement.
The trial court then sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of seven
years four months, consisting of the middle term of three years on count one, doubled
based on defendant’s prior strike conviction, and a consecutive term of one year four
months, one-third the middle term doubled, on count four.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the advisement recited by the prosecutor was unconstitutional.
He asserts that it violates the separation of powers doctrine because, by redefining the
elements of implied malice in any future murder prosecution, the recital invades the
Legislature’s province to define crimes. He further argues that the advisement gives rise
to a presumption that diminishes the People’s burden of proof in any future murder
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prosecution and thus violates his due process right to a fair trial. Finally, he argues the
advisement infringes on his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The People respond that defendant’s contentions are unripe and moot and thus
nonjusticiable because they “are based on hypothetical facts and a potential future trial
that has yet to occur.” The People further argue that defendant’s contentions fail on the
merits.
We agree with the People that defendant’s arguments raise unripe, nonjusticiable
issues. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.
“ ‘California courts will decide only justiciable controversies. [Citations.] The
concept of justiciability is a tenet of common law jurisprudence and embodies “[t]he
principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual
controversy . . . .” [Citations.] Justiciability . . . “involves the intertwined criteria of
ripeness and standing.” ’ ” (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of
Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722.) “The ripeness requirement . . . prevents courts
from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] . . . [T]he ripeness doctrine is
primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in
the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient
definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy. . . .
[¶] . . . . ‘The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. [Citation.] It must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.’ ” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission (1982)
33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.) “Unripe cases are ‘[t]hose in which parties seek a judicial
declaration on a question of law, though no actual dispute or controversy ever existed
between them requiring the declaration for its determination.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City
Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573.)
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The constitutional challenges defendant makes to the prosecutor’s advisement are
based on its potential use against him in hypothetical future criminal proceedings. There
are no pending criminal proceedings against him in which the People could rely on the
advisement as evidence. As such, there is before us no actual controversy concerning the
advisement. In other words, there is no “actual set of facts” that would serve to frame the
constitutional issues defendant raises “with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to
make a decree finally disposing of the controversy.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v.
California Coastal Commission, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 170.) Any dispute involving the
People’s use of the advisement in a criminal proceeding against defendant, as of now, is
not “ ‘definite and concrete,’ ” nor is it currently “ ‘a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’ ”
(Id. at p. 171.) Any decision opining on the propriety of the advisement and its potential
use in future criminal proceedings against defendant would, therefore, be purely advisory.
Defendant in his reply brief argues that the issues are justiciable because the
“advisement was imposed as part of [his] sentencing and constitutes a concrete injury that
is ripe for review.” Defendant is incorrect. Here we must explicate what the advisement
is and what it is not. The advisement was a statement recited by the prosecutor before the
trial court imposed sentence. Contrary to defendant’s framing of the advisement, it was
not a “sentencing condition.” The trial court did not impose it or recite it. (See generally
People v. Bongani El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967 [trial court’s “oral imposition of
sentence constitutes the judgment in an action”].) The advisement was neither “imposed
as part of [his] sentencing” nor “constitutes a concrete injury that is ripe for review.”
Thus, defendant’s reliance on cases in which courts have adjudicated the constitutionality
of probation or parole conditions is misplaced. Nor was the advisement a plea term. As
defendant underscores, it was not something to which he agreed.
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Defendant further asserts that “the advisement’s potential use in future
prosecutions creates an ongoing controversy that is neither speculative nor moot.” We
cannot agree. The advisement, if anything, may present an issue based on its “potential
use in future prosecutions.” This is by definition not an actual, ongoing, ripe, definite,
and concrete controversy involving an actual set of facts. (See Pacific Legal
Foundation v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 170-171.) Rather,
defendant’s arguments are based on hypothetical facts involving a future prosecution for
acts defendant has not committed. (See id. at p. 171.) Defendant refers to a “real,
entirely nonspeculative and concrete harm,” but that harm, as he acknowledges, can only
arise in a future prosecution which may never happen based on acts defendant has not
committed and may never commit. This harm is speculative, hypothetical, and therefore
unripe.
Defendant relies on Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia
(1923) 262 U.S. 553, for the proposition that an individual need not “await the
consummation of threatened injury” to seek judicial relief. (Id. at p. 593.) However, in
the sentence that follows the language quoted by defendant, the United States Supreme
Court elaborated: “If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.” (Ibid., italics
added.) Here, the injury claimed by defendant is by no means “certainly impending.”
(Ibid.) Defendant may never commit acts that might subject him to prosecution. Even if
he does, he could escape prosecution. Assuming he is prosecuted, the prosecutor may
elect against attempting to use the advisement in the prosecution. Even if that theoretical
prosecutor, in that theoretical prosecution, does offer evidence concerning the
advisement, the trial court could exclude it. And, in litigating its admissibility, defendant
would be able to raise in opposition to its admission every argument he attempts to raise
here as to the advisement’s constitutionality.
Defendant’s appeal raises nonjusticiable issues that are unripe for our review.
Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Hull, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
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