CourtListener 10603619•People v. Edwards CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 6/12/25 P. v. Edwards CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B335150
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA071546)
ANTHONY MONQUALLI
EDWARDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2007, a jury found defendant and appellant Anthony
Edwards (defendant) guilty of robbery, forgery, and burglary; the
trial court found true several associated sentencing
enhancements, including a one-year prior prison term
enhancement (Pen. Code,1 § 667.5, subd. (b)) and three five-year
prior serious felony conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (b)).
More recently, the trial court struck the prior prison term
enhancement pursuant to section 1172.75 and, in holding the full
resentencing that statute requires when doing so, declined to
strike the other aforementioned enhancements it previously
imposed. Defendant asks us to decide this was error for a reason
he did not raise in the trial court, namely, because the trial court
purportedly misunderstood the law when assessing whether to
dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2007, defendant was charged with one count of second
degree robbery against Maria Viteri (Viteri) (count 1), one count
of forgery for forging a check from Viteri’s Washington Mutual
account (count 2), and one count of second degree commercial
burglary for entering a Washington Mutual Bank with the intent
to commit larceny (count 3). The information also included
multiple sentencing allegations, including several prior “strike”
convictions under the Three Strikes law.
After trial, a jury found defendant guilty on all three
charged counts. The trial court found prior conviction sentencing
allegations true, including the aforementioned three prior serious
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
felony conviction allegations and the aforementioned prior prison
term allegation. The trial court imposed an aggregate 66 years to
life prison sentence: two 25 years to life terms (consecutive)
pursuant to the Three Strikes law (the sentence on the burglary
conviction was stayed pursuant to section 654), 15 years for the
prior serious felony conviction enhancements, and one year for
the prior prison term enhancement.
In 2022, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation identified defendant as a person potentially
serving a term for a judgment that included a legally invalid
prison prior under Penal Code section 1172.75.2 The trial court
appointed counsel for defendant.
In October 2023, defendant filed a resentencing
memorandum asking the trial court to strike his section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancement and: strike and recall two of
2
That statute provides, in pertinent part: “(a) Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid. [¶] (b) The
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
and the county correctional administrator of each county shall
identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term
for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a) . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Upon receiving the information
described in subdivision (b), the court shall review the judgment
and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing
enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.”
3
defendant’s 25 years to life sentences, maintain its earlier
determination to stay the 25 years to life sentence on the
burglary conviction, and resentence defendant to a determinate
term of 8 years. Defendant contended the relief beyond striking
the prior prison term enhancement was warranted under
prevailing law governing striking or dismissing enhancements in
furtherance of justice given his current age (61 years old), his
service of 17 years on his existing sentence, and his positive
prison record.
At the October 2023 resentencing hearing, the parties
submitted without additional argument. The trial court ruled
defendant’s prior prison term enhancement was ordered stricken.
The court also acknowledged it had discretion to strike the
section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony conviction
enhancements, but declined to do so because it found “[t]here is
no justification to warrant striking the enhancement[s].”
The trial court declined to strike any of the Three Strikes
law prior conviction allegations, but it ruled defendant’s forgery
conviction would be “treated as a second[ ]strike offense under
the new Three[ ]Strikes law” and result in a consecutive six-year
sentence (three years, doubled). The new aggregate sentence was
therefore 46 years to life in prison: 25 years to life for the robbery
conviction, 6 years for the forgery conviction, and 15 years for the
three prior serious felony conviction enhancements. The court
maintained the section 654 stay of sentence on the burglary
conviction. Defendant did not object to the new sentence imposed
or the trial court’s articulation of its reasons for imposing that
sentence.
4
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends reversal is required because the trial
court did not say it considered whether striking the serious prior
felony conviction enhancements would endanger public safety
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) at the time of defendant’s
possible future release from custody (remarking more generally
instead that there was “no justification to warrant striking the
enhancement[s]”).3 We hold this argument is forfeited because it
was not raised below, either before or after the trial court
announced the sentence that would be imposed.
“‘In general, the forfeiture rule applies in the context of
sentencing as in other areas of criminal law.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856.) “[In] People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331 [ ], [our Supreme Court held that] a defendant
3
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides that in exercising
its discretion to strike or dismiss an enhancement, a court “shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances”
elsewhere enumerated in the statute are present. The statute
further provides that “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) One reviewing court has held that a trial court erred
under this statute when it considered only whether the defendant
“currently posed a danger to the public when assessing if a
dismissal of the firearm enhancement would ‘endanger public
safety’” rather than also considering “the date on which [the
defendant] could be released if the firearm enhancement was
dismissed and the fact that the release would be subject to a
review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 230-231.)
5
forfeits on appeal any ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’
in the absence of objection below. [Citations.]” (People v. Wall
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1075.) That is the case here. There was
no objection or argument below that the trial court must, on the
record, expressly consider defendant’s “future dangerousness,” or
whether striking the prior serious felony conviction
enhancements would unjustifiably endanger public safety at the
time of his eventual release (if any).
It is no response, as defendant argues, that the portion of
his resentencing memorandum arguing his initial sentence was
no longer in the interests of justice (because of his age, the
amount of time he already served, and his behavior while in
custody) was adequate to raise the point he now argues on
appeal. The resentencing memorandum’s discussion would not
have alerted the trial court to any need to articulate whether
dismissing the prior serious felony conviction enhancements
would put public safety at risk if defendant were released from
custody earlier than he would be if the enhancements were
reimposed. Moreover, when it was indisputably clear at the
resentencing hearing that the trial court did not undertake the
express consideration defendant now says was necessary,
defendant still did not object. The absence of any objection or
argument on the specific ground now advanced on appeal results
in forfeiture. (See, e.g., People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393,
416 [a “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection
on the ground he now raises forfeits the claim on appeal”].)
Defendant alternatively argues his attorney was
constitutionally ineffective by failing to raise the forfeited
argument. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a
6
defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation
was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2)
counsel’s representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e.,
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings,
the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see also
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.)
Defendant makes no serious attempt at either of these
demonstrations. Instead, in one clause of one sentence that is
repeated verbatim in defendant’s opening and answering briefs,
defendant levels a mere assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. That is not enough. An argument like defendant’s that
“does not even attempt to explain how counsel’s failure to object
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or how the
failure to object resulted in prejudice” does not suffice, and “[w]e
will not address a claim that defendant has failed to develop.”4
(People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 467; see also
People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 857, fn. 6.)
4
We do observe, however, that a “‘trial court is not required
to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under
section 1385’ [citations], and ‘is presumed to have considered all
of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to
the contrary’ [citation].” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) Defendant identifies nothing that would
undercut this presumption in his case; the court’s “no
justification to warrant striking the enhancement[s]” comment is
consistent with a determination that striking the enhancements
would not be in furtherance of justice because it would
unjustifiably risk public safety.
7
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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