CourtListener 10601753•People v. Clark CA5
Testo completo
Filed 6/10/25 P. v. Clark CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F085286
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF171472A)
v.
BRANDON DANIEL CLARK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders and a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County.
Michael G. Bush and John R. Brownlee, Judges.*
Galit Lipa, State Public Defender, Ann Lahyung Kim and Hassan Gorguinpour,
Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Jeffrey D.
Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Judge Bush ruled on the motion for mental health diversion; Judge Brownlee
presided over all other hearings pertinent to this appeal.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Brandon Daniel Clark used an assault rifle to shoot out the glass door
of the hospital where his mother worked and, while searching for her, pointed the rifle in
front of him as he encountered several employees. After a jury convicted him of five
counts of assault with a semiautomatic rifle, shooting at an occupied building, and other
charges, the trial court sentenced him to a total term of 20 years 4 months in prison.
Defendant argues, and the People agree, that the matter should be conditionally reversed
and remanded to permit the trial court to reconsider the appropriateness of mental health
diversion under recent changes to the law. He further challenges his conviction and
argues that (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding testimony as to defendant’s
statements that cartel members intended to harm his mother because such testimony was
relevant to his general intent to commit assault with a semiautomatic rifle and shooting at
an occupied building and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts for two
counts of assault with a semiautomatic rifle. We accept the People’s concession and
conditionally reverse for further mental health diversion proceedings but otherwise affirm
the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2018, a third amended indictment was filed in Kern County
Superior Court, charging defendant with shooting at an occupied building (Pen. Code,
§ 246;1 count one), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts two–
twelve),2 possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count thirteen),
possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count fourteen), possession
of a firearm while under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11550, subd. (e); count fifteen), possession of an assault rifle (§ 30605; count sixteen),
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Counts two through twelve name eight separate victims.
2.
and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count seventeen). The third amended
indictment additionally alleged that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) and an assault weapon (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)) as to counts two through five and
seven through twelve.
The court denied defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion (former
§ 1001.36) without prejudice on May 29, 2019, due to a lack of programs available in the
county and denied the motion on the merits with prejudice on January 16, 2020, after
finding that defendant was a danger to the community. After the court found defendant
competent to stand trial, defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity on February 19 and 21, 2020.
On June 8, 2022, prior to trial, defendant withdrew his insanity plea and the court
granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss counts two, seven, twelve, fifteen, and
seventeen. On June 23, 2022, the jury convicted defendant of counts one, four, five,
eight, nine, ten, thirteen, fourteen, and sixteen3 and found true the enhancements as to
those counts. The jury found defendant not guilty of counts three and eleven and their
lesser included offenses.
The trial court sentenced defendant on November 10, 2022, to a six-year term of
imprisonment, plus six years (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)), and a stayed four-year term
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) as to count four. The court also imposed a consecutive one year
eight-month term as to count one; two-year terms of imprisonment, plus stayed four- and
two-year terms on the gun enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.5(b)), as to
3 Although the third amended indictment charged defendant with shooting at an
occupied building and the jury was so instructed, the verdict erroneously describes the
charge for count one as “Shoot at Inhabited Dwelling (… Hospital),” an error which is
also reflected in the abstract of judgment. We order the trial court to correct the abstract
of judgment to reflect the correct description of count one. Additionally, although
count six was included in the charges read to the jury at the commencement of trial, the
court instructed the jury that count six had been removed from their consideration. The
court record does not otherwise indicate any disposition for count six.
3.
counts five, nine, and ten; and a consecutive eight-month term as to count thirteen, for a
total term of 20 years 4 months in prison. As to counts eight, fourteen, and sixteen, the
court imposed stayed terms of imprisonment of three, two, and two years, respectively.4
Additionally, the court ordered defendant to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)),
$300 restitution and suspended parole revocation restitution fines (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b),
1202.45), $360 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8), and $270 in criminal
conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373).5
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 11, 2022.
FACTS6
I. Prosecution evidence.
A. Defendant arms himself and gets a ride to the hospital
On December 1, 2017, defendant stopped his pickup truck outside Michael
Dawson’s house due to engine trouble. Although he did not know defendant, Dawson
4 We note that the November 10, 2022 sentencing minute order incorrectly reflects
a two-year sentence as to count eight, but, while the court originally pronounced a two-
year prison term (one-third the middle term), it corrected itself shortly thereafter and
changed the term to the lower term of three years. The abstract of judgment incorrectly
reflects that the court imposed the middle term as to count eight.
5 The abstract of judgment provides that the total amount of assessments is $240
(§ 1465.8) and $180 (Gov. Code, § 70373). However, the court imposed these
assessments as to all nine counts of conviction. Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)
requires a $40 assessment “be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense,” and
Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1) requires a $30 assessment also “be
imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense.” Based upon nine counts of
conviction, the correct assessments are $360 pursuant to section 1465.8 and $270
pursuant to Government Code section 70373. Although the court stayed terms of
imprisonment as to three counts pursuant to section 654, these assessments are not
stayed. (See People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368, 370 [holding § 654 does not
apply to fee pursuant to § 1465.8 because that fee is not punishment]; see also People v.
Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 484 [holding § 654 does not apply to fee pursuant
to § 1465.8 or Gov. Code, § 70373 because neither fee is punishment (collecting cases)].)
6 We note that defendant’s statement of facts includes facts of the crime contained
within expert reports that addressed his mental competence to stand trial. However, we
4.
unsuccessfully attempted to help defendant fix the truck. Defendant appeared to be under
the influence, as some of the things he said did not make sense, and desperate for a ride,
explaining that people were after him. Dawson saw an AK-47 rifle in the bed of
defendant’s truck. The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to defense counsel’s
question as to whether defendant had stated why he wanted to go to the hospital based
upon its prior in limine ruling.
Dawson agreed to provide defendant a ride, and defendant asked to be taken to the
hospital and got into the front seat of Dawson’s vehicle. Defendant had a dog with him.
While driving, Dawson noticed that defendant had the AK-47 inside his pants. Dawson
let defendant off at an intersection near the hospital and had to call him back to retrieve
the dog. After picking up a firearm magazine that he had dropped, defendant took the
dog with him.
1. Defendant shoots his way into the hospital (count one)
On December 1, 2017, Jessica Juhasz, a hospital emergency room clerk, received a
call from an employee who requested that security respond to the employee entrance
where a homeless person and a dog were present. Juhasz contacted security. The
employee entrance required a key code to access. Juhasz could view the security feed
from the cameras in her office, including the cameras at the employee entrance. Juhasz
saw the back of an individual crouched down in the corner by the employee entrance and
called security.
One of the security cameras pointed from inside the hallway toward the double-
glass employee exit doors. The video was admitted into evidence. It shows an employee
exiting the doors at approximately 4:40 p.m., and then reentering the hospital. At the
only include evidence presented at trial and do not consider evidence outside the trial
record in addressing the issues raised by defendant’s appeal. As issues raised in this
appeal deal only with the counts charging assault with a firearm and shooting at an
occupied building, we have not described all evidence presented at trial but only the
evidence applicable to those charges.
5.
same time, a security guard passes the returning employee, goes out the exit doors, and
appears to speak to someone who is out of view of the camera. As other employees look
on, a male employee attempts to exit the doors as the security guard steps back inside,
and everyone moves quickly down the hallway and out of the view of the glass doors.
The video shows a man, holding a long weapon with a strap, outside the glass
doors looking at the glass doors. For several minutes, the man alternates between leaning
against the wall, pacing, and pulling on the doors. At one point, the man removes a
handgun from his back waistband and points it with his arm fully extended. At another
point, the man knocks on the doors. While on the phone, a security guard peers around
the corner from inside the hospital and looks at the man.
Juhasz received a called from Michelle Oxford, the hospital’s chief executive
officer. Oxford had learned from a housekeeping employee that a man with a weapon
(possibly a BB gun) hanging at his side was in the parking lot. After the call, Juhasz
asked her partner to page a “code silver” (a threat caused by someone with a weapon) to
the entire hospital. She then dropped the shields over the glass windows of the reception
desk to obscure the employees there from view.
Juhasz called 911 and advised that a man with a gun was located at the back
employee entrance of the hospital and she could see a security guard at the entrance on
the security camera. She then advised that the man was banging on the doors, had a dog
with him, and had a rifle on his arm. Juhasz advised that the man was preparing to shoot
and, thereafter, that the man shot through the door and entered the hospital. Juhasz
testified that she heard at least three shots fired, but she did not see anyone in the hallway
at that time.
Mark Hollenbaugh was the hospital’s biomedical supervisor and heard murmurs
about someone outside with a gun. He approached the employee entrance from inside the
hospital but remained in the hallway around the corner with several other hospital
employees, including David Christophers. Christophers worked as an engineer in the
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hospital, assisted in maintaining the building, and testified that he had learned of the code
silver and accompanied Hollenbaugh to the employee entrance. Security Guard Landon
Russell called 911. The recording was introduced into evidence. Russell reported that a
man armed with a black pistol, who appeared to be on drugs, attempted to follow him
through the employee entrance and the hospital was in lockdown. Defendant told Russell
that he was waiting for his mother who worked in the documents department.7 Russell
indicated that the hospital did not have a documents department and asked defendant to
leave, but defendant then displayed a gun and threatened Russell by saying, “If I were
you[,] I’d get out of here, unless you wanna go down too.”
Christophers heard someone yelling as they shook or kicked the door.
Hollenbaugh heard defendant bang on the entrance door while yelling that he wanted to
see his mother. They stood in the hallway for several minutes before hearing gunshots.
The security video shows defendant fire at the glass doors and then enter the
hospital through the broken doors, carrying his rifle as he runs down the hallway and out
of the camera’s view.
2. Defendant’s actions inside the hospital
a) Interaction with Hollenbaugh
Hollenbaugh and Christophers instructed other individuals to go to their
predesignated areas and directed those coming toward them in the hallway to go the
opposite direction. Hollenbaugh jogged a short way down the hall, then turned around
and saw defendant with a long rifle. Defendant was holding the rifle “[s]loppily” and
twisting his body as if looking for someone. Hollenbaugh demonstrated the manner in
which defendant held the weapon, which the court described as being at waist level with
defendant’s right hand on the grip, his left hand on the forestock, and swinging his entire
7 Defendant’s mother, Vickie Mocan, was at the hospital working as a clinical
documentation specialist.
7.
body and rifle simultaneously. There were times when defendant held the rifle with only
one hand.
Hollenbaugh asked defendant if he could help. Defendant said that he was looking
for his mother. Hollenbaugh asked her name and for additional information as to where
she worked. Defendant’s speech was incoherent, “sloppy,” and “slurred.” Hollenbaugh
testified that while speaking with defendant, defendant turned toward Hollenbaugh,
which pointed the rifle in Hollenbaugh’s general direction. Hollenbaugh did not feel
threatened but was worried that the rifle could discharge accidentally.
b) Interaction with David Christophers
Defendant walked away from Hollenbaugh, and Hollenbaugh heard defendant
speaking with Christophers. Christophers had walked to the nurse station and saw
defendant standing in the open double doors. Defendant was looking at Christophers and
pointing a rifle at him. Defendant may have been cradling the rifle before pointing it at
Christophers. Defendant was holding the rifle parallel to the ground with his left hand on
the pistol grip and his right hand on the foregrip with his arms extended. He told
Christophers that his mother needed help and stood there for one minute.
While employees left the area, Christophers tried to calm defendant by telling him
that he had not done anything that could not be changed, asked defendant to put the gun
down, and said that Christophers would take care of defendant’s mother. Defendant said
that he did not intend to shoot anyone, but Christophers pointed out that defendant had
already shot the building, so Christophers believed that defendant would shoot.
Defendant was “very incoherent,” spoke fast, and seemed “stressed.”
While Christophers was speaking with defendant, defendant turned and addressed
someone else. Defendant pointed the rifle at the other individual, whom Christophers
later learned was Hollenbaugh, and then defendant turned back and pointed the rifle at
Christophers. Defendant then turned and walked away toward the employee entrance.
8.
c) Interactions with Oxford, Womack, and Cunanan
Registered Nurse Lynn Berkshire testified that she was working with a patient
when she heard the code silver. She gathered people from the front lobby into the day
patient area near the nurse station. Christophers entered the area and directed them to
run. Berkshire saw a man and a dog. The man was holding a large gun at waist level
with his arms parallel to the ground. Berkshire ran toward the administration area and
saw defendant walking around in the administration foyer where Oxford and Chief
Nursing Officer Laura Cunanan had offices. Berkshire then ran in the opposite direction.
Oxford was in her administrative office with Secretary Timesha Womack and
Cunanan when they heard the code silver announced over the intercom system. After
several minutes, Oxford peeked out of a window to view the parking lot and left the
administrative offices because it seemed clear. She saw defendant approaching from
approximately 12 feet away and backed into the administration offices. Defendant was
looking into the day patient area and, when he noticed Oxford, turned his body and the
weapon toward her to face her directly. Defendant made eye contact. Oxford described
that the weapon was on a sling and defendant held it waist high with both hands, his left
hand was close to his waist area and his right hand extended forward. When he turned,
the weapon pointed at her and she was frightened. Defendant was wearing jeans, a big
jacket, and glass was “coming off” him. She concluded he was confused because he was
in a hospital with a weapon and thought he might be looking for something.
Defendant walked toward Oxford while she backed into the administration offices.
Oxford told Womack and Cunanan that defendant was right outside the door. The three
of them went into Cunanan’s office, closed the door, and sat down using their backs to
hold the door closed. Oxford heard the outside door to the administration area open and
close. Cunanan called 911 to advise that defendant was in that area. At one point,
Oxford believed defendant was pacing because she peeked through a window and could
see his head.
9.
Cunanan testified that she went into her office to prepare to go home after hearing
the code silver announced and then heard a noise outside the door. Accompanied by
Oxford and Womack, she walked to the door and opened it. She saw defendant with a
large black gun looking around the hallway. Defendant was approximately 15 or 20 feet
away and looked at them. Cunanan demonstrated that defendant held the rifle parallel to
the ground with his right hand on the rear grip and his left hand on the forestock. When
he turned, defendant looked and pointed the rifle at them.
Cunanan testified that when defendant turned his body, the rifle moved with him
and aligned to where they were standing, but he did not purposefully point it at her.
Defendant appeared confused as he looked around, as if he did not know where he was
going. She had previously testified to the grand jury that defendant seemed disheveled
and not focused. Cunanan screamed and ran with Oxford and Womack back into her
office. The three of them crouched behind her office door, and she heard the waiting
room door open and close and then footsteps right outside her door.
Cunanan called 911. That recording was admitted into evidence. Cunanan
reported that she was in the administration office on the first floor and defendant was
right outside the door, armed with a rifle. She remained on the phone until learning that
defendant had been taken into custody. Cunanan testified that she was very scared
because defendant was right outside their office with a big gun, and she believed that he
was going to shoot.
d) Second interaction with Hollenbaugh
Defendant walked down the hallway back to Hollenbaugh’s location and asked
where his dog had gone. Hollenbaugh suggested that defendant go outside the hospital to
look for his dog and followed as defendant left through the employee entrance. After
defendant walked outside the employee entrance doors, Hollenbaugh stood in the hallway
near the corner and continued to talk to defendant about his dog. Both men called for the
10.
dog. Hollenbaugh told defendant that police had entered the building and urged him to
run. He did that so that defendant would not reenter the building.
Hollenbaugh described that defendant held the rifle in front of him and, when
defendant turned, the rifle turned too. Hollenbaugh was not focused on the rifle and did
not know whether defendant intended to point it at him or whether the rifle’s barrel just
moved when defendant turned his body, but Hollenbaugh agreed that the rifle was
pointed in his direction.
Security camera footage shows defendant, holding the rifle at his side with one
hand, leave through the broken glass doors at the employee entrance approximately three
minutes after entering. It shows Hollenbaugh looking down the hallway speaking with
defendant who had turned to face him. Defendant cradles the rifle as he alternately faces
Hollenbaugh and looks toward the parking lot. Defendant walks away but then turns,
raises the rifle to his shoulder, and points it toward Hollenbaugh who ducks around the
corner in response. Hollenbaugh peeks from the corner, and defendant raises the rifle
again and points it at Hollenbaugh before walking down the walkway. A police officer
comes around the corner and fires at defendant. Defendant first falls to the ground, but
then gets to his feet, is shot by another officer, and then falls to the ground.
After viewing the security video, Hollenbaugh testified that defendant pointed the
rifle down the hallway toward where Hollenbaugh was standing, and Hollenbaugh moved
out of the way.
3. Police officers shoot defendant in the parking lot
Bakersfield Police Officer Felipe Juarez testified that he responded to the
hospital’s employee entrance and was advised that defendant was in the parking lot. He
saw defendant carrying a rifle in the parking lot, about 50 feet away, and shot him two
times. Defendant dropped the rifle after the first shot and fell to the ground after the
second shot. Defendant immediately stood up and ran. At that time, Bakersfield Police
Officer James Montgomery approached the hospital’s parking lot and saw defendant
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running from Officer Juarez while ducking between parked cars. Unaware that Officer
Juarez had shot defendant and defendant had dropped his two firearms, Officer
Montgomery fired four times. Defendant was then arrested.
Cunanan and other hospital staff responded to the parking lot, placed defendant on
a gurney, and transported him into the emergency room. Defendant asked Cunanan
whether anyone intended to kill him when they got inside. She replied, “No, honey.
We’re going to take care of you.”
4. Additional evidence
The walls and ceiling in the employee entrance hallway, as well as a laundry bin,
displayed bullet strikes. Ammunition casings were recovered from the sidewalk, the
ground near the hospital’s employee entrance, a flower bed, and the parking lot. Officers
also recovered a loaded semiautomatic rifle, a second firearm, and several loaded
magazines of ammunition from the hospital’s parking lot. Features of the rifle were
consistent with the statutory definition of an assault weapon.
II. Defense evidence.
Defendant’s mother, Vickie Macon, testified to defendant’s character, which she
described as “soft-hearted and compassionate.” Despite his struggle with alcoholism,
defendant remained caring and loving and a part of his daughter’s life, having served as
her track coach. He also helped his mother with yard work and roofing repairs, was a
hard worker, and had been in line to become a superintendent at his job.
DISCUSSION
I. This matter must be conditionally remanded to permit the trial court to evaluate
defendant’s motion for mental health diversion in light of recent amendments to
section 1001.36.
A. Background
On April 15, 2019, defendant filed a motion for the trial court to determine his
eligibility for mental health diversion pursuant to former section 1001.36 and submitted a
12.
psychological evaluation of defendant’s mental competency prepared by Dr. Gary
Longwith. Dr. Longwith concluded that defendant met the criteria for schizoaffective
disorder, delusional disorder, substance abuse induced psychotic disorder, and
methamphetamine dependence. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice
because the county did not yet have a treatment program.
Defendant refiled his request on September 16, 2019, and once again relied upon
the mental competency evaluation prepared by Dr. Longwith. The prosecution opposed
the motion, relying in part on conclusions of the mental competency evaluators that
defendant was a danger to himself and others.8 The trial court held a hearing on
defendant’s former section 1001.36 motion on January 16, 2020. The trial court
explained, “[A]ssuming he’s eligible,” the issue appears to be “[w]hether or not he’s
suitable,” and “I’m not sure on these charges I would send him to diversion.” The court
then denied defendant’s motion: “Even if he were eligible, I’m going to find he’s not
suitable based on … this set of facts” because “I think he’s a danger.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
In May 2019, when defendant first brought his motion for mental health diversion,
section 1001.36 listed six criteria that a defendant had to meet to be eligible for diversion.
Three of the criteria required that the court be “satisfied” that (1) the defendant suffers
from a recognized mental disorder, (2) the disorder was a “significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense,” and (3) “the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in
8 The mental competency evaluations did not include discussion of any proposed
treatment plan in the community. Dr. Kathe Lundgren concluded that defendant was
competent to stand trial, a danger to himself and others, and diagnosed him as suffering
from a depressive disorder, substance abuse disorder (alcohol, methamphetamine,
opioid), and either amphetamine induced psychotic disorder or delusional parasitosis.
Dr. R. Bruce Walker initially diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia spectrum and other
psychotic disorder, recommended antipsychotic drugs, and concluded that defendant may
become a danger to himself and others due to his delusional symptoms.
13.
the community.” (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B), (F), as amended by
Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1, pp. 6631–6632, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) The remaining criteria
required that (1) a mental health expert provide an opinion that the defendant’s mental
health symptoms would respond to treatment, (2) the defendant give their consent to
diversion and waive their right to a speedy trial, and (3) the defendant agree to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion. (Id., subd. (b)(1)(C)–(E).)
A series of amendments to section 1001.36 became effective after defendant’s
conviction in this case. As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1223) amended section 1001.36, effective January 1, 2023, after the trial
court denied defendant’s motion. (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, pp. 8169–8173.)9 Among
other changes, the 2023 amendments recharacterized the first two requirements—that the
defendant be diagnosed with a recognized mental illness and the mental illness be a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense—as eligibility criteria.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1),(2).) Under the amended statute, “a defendant’s eligibility no
longer turned on findings to the court’s ‘satisfaction.’ ” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) A defendant is now generally eligible for diversion if
the defendant “has been diagnosed” with a recognized mental disorder. Such a diagnosis
creates a presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged crime. Overcoming that presumption requires
clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or
9 Defendant’s argument addresses the retroactivity of Senate Bill 1223’s
amendments to section 1001.36, effective January 2023. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1,
pp. 8169–8173.) The People note that the 2023 version of section 1001.36 was repealed
(Stats. 2023, ch. 687, § 1.1, pp. 6537–6541) and reenacted (Stats. 2023, ch. 687, § 1.2,
pp. 6541–6544). Additional amendments to section 1001.36 are not material here, and
section 1001.36 currently includes the 2023 amendments. (Compare Stats. 2022, ch. 735,
§ 1, pp. 8169–8173 with Stats. 2024, ch. 647, § 1.5, pp. 6297–6300.) We therefore quote
the statute in its current form throughout the remainder of this opinion.
14.
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. (§1001.36,
subd. (b)(1)(2); Sarmiento, at p. 891.)
If the defendant meets the two enumerated eligibility requirements, “the court
must consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).) A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four criteria are met, which
include the opinion of a qualified mental health expert that the defendant’s symptoms
would respond to mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)) and the defendant will
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18,10
“if treated in the community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)). Section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(4) was also amended to include consideration of the defendant’s treatment
plan, in addition to the defendant’s violence and criminal history, current offense, and
other factors the court deems appropriate.
Even where defendants make a prima facie showing that they meet all the express
statutory requirements, the court has the discretion to deny diversion but do so
“ ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law,” ’ ” which includes a
strong legislative preference for such treatment of mental health disorders. (Sarmiento v.
Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892–893.) If “the court chooses to exercise
this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect
consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would
not meet those goals.” (Id. at p. 893.)
A trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an incorrect legal
standard. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
10 As used in sections 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) and 1170.18, subdivision (b),
“ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” means an unreasonable risk that the
defendant will commit a new violent felony as listed in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), that is, sexually violent offenses, sex acts against minors,
homicide, and other serious felonies punishable by life imprisonment or death.
(§ 1170.18, subd. (c).)
15.
C. Analysis
Defendant argues, and the People concede, that the amendments to
section 1001.36 apply retroactively to defendant’s case. We accept that concession.
(See People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113.)
The People assert that remand is required because the trial court failed to consider
community treatment in assessing whether defendant posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. We additionally note the trial court relied upon an expert
evaluation concerning defendant’s mental competency to stand trial that failed to address
any community treatment plan relevant to defendant’s disorder and failed to address any
danger to public safety posed by defendant’s diversion in light of community treatment.
We agree that we must remand this matter in light of amendments to section 1001.36.
Defendant is entitled to the court’s informed discretion on his motion for mental
health diversion. (See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [addressing
court’s sentencing discretion].) A court unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers
“ ‘can no more exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose [decision] is or may
have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ ”
(Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the proper remedy is to remand “unless the record
‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it
had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid.) We decline to conclude on this
record that the trial court would have clearly reach the same conclusions about eligibility
or suitability under the new law. (See, e.g., ibid.)
We conditionally remand the matter for the trial court to reevaluate defendant’s
motion for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36, as amended by
Statutes 2022, chapter 735, section 1, pages 8169–8173. We express no view concerning
the proper resolution of defendant’s motion, whether defendant satisfies the eligibility or
suitability factors, nor how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand.
16.
II. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of defendant’s belief in the need
to rescue his mother from danger.
A. Background
1. Motion in limine hearing
The prosecutor filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence as to defendant’s
mental state pursuant to section 28.11 Defense counsel noted that, according to the grand
jury testimony, many witnesses described defendant as having an “altered state,”
demonstrated by his handling of the rifle, his balance, and how he was walking. Defense
counsel objected to “taking out” such testimony because it would change the context of
what had occurred. Both the court and prosecutor agreed that the witnesses’ observations
of defendant would be admissible, although any opinion regarding whether defendant
was under the influence of drugs would not. Defense counsel agreed that “it [was] a fair
way to approach it” and percipient witnesses could testify as to what they observed, but
“it technically would not be correct to allow them to opine as to [defendant’s] mental
state.” With that understanding, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion.
Defense counsel revisited the issue later in the hearing and represented that while
present at the hospital, defendant said that he was trying to protect his mother because a
Mexican cartel was trying to assault her. She argued that this information, referring to
defendant’s statements, should be admitted to dispel any impression that defendant was
there to hurt individuals working at the hospital, even though it would not negate the
general intent element of assault with a firearm. She argued that failure to permit the
evidence would “improperly characterize[] his conduct in the potential mind of a juror as
malicious.”
11 Section 28 provides that evidence of a mental disorder shall not be admitted to
show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, purpose, knowledge, and
intent (id., subd. (a)) and prevents any defense of diminished capacity or responsibility
(id., subd. (b)).
17.
The court ruled that defense counsel could not present evidence that defendant was
present at the hospital to protect his mother from the cartel because it was not relevant to
prove defendant’s general intent to commit the crime and would possibly confuse the jury
regarding mental aspects not relevant to the charges.
2. Evidence Code section 402 hearing
As an offer of proof, defense counsel summarized the evidence that she desired to
elicit from Vickie Macon, defendant’s mother. Macon would testify that the day of the
incident, as she was going to work, an officer arrived at her home to ascertain whether
she was safe. Defendant had apparently contacted them to check on her safety. While
the officer was still there, defendant called and advised her that he was having issues with
a drug cartel and its members intended to hurt her. Macon assured defendant that she was
not afraid and did not have any issues with the cartel. Macon would testify that
defendant went to the hospital to protect her and not to harm her. Additionally, defendant
was moving to a different location, but his U-Haul was filled with rocks rather than his
belongings.
The prosecutor objected to the evidence as irrelevant because the charged crimes
were general intent crimes and defendant’s mental state was not relevant. He also
objected to Macon testifying as to her belief concerning defendant’s mental state.
Additionally, the prosecutor argued that evidence as to defendant’s mental state would be
unduly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
Defense counsel argued that the evidence was admissible as to defendant’s motive,
even though the offenses were general intent crimes and relevant as to defendant’s
general intent.
The court found that the circumstances surrounding the welfare check were not
relevant, as the crimes involved only general intent, and evidence that defendant had
filled his U-Haul with rocks and had a substance abuse problem would prove only that he
had mental issues. The court similarly concluded that testimony as to defendant’s motive
18.
to protect his mother was only relevant to defendant’s mental state. The trial court
permitted testimony as to defendant’s character but precluded testimony from defendant’s
mother that defendant acted as he did to protect her.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“Subject to certain limitations inapplicable to the present discussion, all relevant
evidence is admissible.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 633, citing Evid.
Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).) Relevant evidence is defined as
evidence “ ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.’ ” (People v. Williams, at p. 633,
quoting Evid. Code, § 210.) Evidence is relevant if it tends “ ‘ “logically, naturally, and
by reasonable inference” ’ ” to establish material facts. (People v. Williams, at p. 633.)
C. Relevancy Analysis—Assault with a Semiautomatic Firearm
1. Applicable law
Section 240 defines “assault” as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Section 245, subdivision (b)
prohibits individuals from assaulting another person with a semiautomatic firearm.
Assault requires “the general intent to willfully commit an act the direct, natural
and probable consequences of which if successfully completed would be the injury to
another.” (People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899.) “The pivotal question is whether
the defendant intended to commit an act likely to result in such physical force, not
whether he or she intended a specific harm.” (People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th
206, 218 (Colantuono).) However, our Supreme Court later clarified that because assault
does not punish merely reckless conduct, it necessarily incorporates the language of
probability, i.e., direct, natural and probable consequences that should be distinguished
from an objective mental state akin to negligence. (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th
779, 787–788 (Williams), citing Colantuono, at p. 219.)
19.
“[A] defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a
reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result
from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should
have known. He, however, need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might
occur.” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 788.) “For example, a defendant who honestly
believes that his act was not likely to result in a battery is still guilty of assault if a
reasonable person, viewing the facts known to defendant, would find that the act would
directly, naturally and probably result in a battery.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) “Accordingly,
we hold that assault does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a subjective
awareness of the risk that an injury might occur. Rather, assault only requires an
intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by
its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against
another.” (Id. at p. 790.)
“Unless excluded by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (d); Evid. Code, § 351.) ‘ “Relevant evidence” means evidence,
including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 210.) Relevant evidence includes not
only evidence of the ultimate facts in dispute but also evidence of intermediate facts, that
is, facts from which the ultimate fact may reasonably be inferred. [Citations.] ‘An
inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.’ ” (People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 18–19 (Rodriguez).)
A trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion and will be upheld unless the trial court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
(Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9–10.) We may uphold its ruling on any ground if
20.
correct in result. (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901 [when deciding challenge
to admission or exclusion of evidence, appellate court examines the result, not the trial
court’s rationale].)
As explained below, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings.
2. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that he believed
his mother, who was working in the hospital, was in danger from drug cartel members.12
While defense counsel described generally that defendant had expressed this belief to
someone while in the hospital, as the People argue, the offer of proof did not indicate
whether defendant made these statements before he was arrested. Statements made by a
defendant postarrest are hearsay and are not admissible if offered by a defendant.
(Compare Evid. Code, § 1241 [a statement is not inadmissible hearsay if it is offered to
explain, qualify, or make understandable conduct of the declarant and was made while
the declarant was engaged in that conduct] with Evid. Code, § 1220 [statements of a party
when offered against the party not inadmissible hearsay].) There was no offer of proof
indicating that defendant had made such statements to individuals during his crimes and
before being arrested. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred.
Defendant offered his mother’s testimony as to his statements to her earlier that
day when explaining, after law enforcement responded to her residence, that cartel
members intended to harm her. Statements of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind,
emotion, or physical sensation are not inadmissible hearsay if offered to prove the
12 In making his arguments, defendant has relied upon facts set forth in an expert
report that was not proffered to the court during either of the two hearings in which these
issues were raised. We will not address the exclusion of specific evidence that was not
actually proffered to the trial court when making its decision. (Cf. Evid. Code, § 354;
People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778; see People v. Schmies (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 38, 53 [offer of proof must set forth actual evidence to be produced to
support claim of erroneous exclusion of evidence].)
21.
declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at any other time when it is an
issue in the action. (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).)
Defendant argues that his motive is relevant to whether he committed assault with
a firearm, even though the crime only requires proof of general intent to commit the act,
and the trial court erred in excluding his earlier statements to his mother. He also argues
that his subjective intent to rescue his mother from cartel members who intended to harm
her would tend to prove that he did not intend to discharge the assault rifle at the other
individuals whom he encountered in the hospital and, therefore, such evidence was
relevant to whether defendant intended to apply force to his victims.
While we agree that defendant’s motive can be relevant as to whether he intended
to commit the assaultive act, we ultimately conclude that the evidence of defendant’s
desire to protect his mother had little probative value in proving that he did not intend to
shoot the loaded assault rifle, which he held “at the ready” as the barrel was facing the
victims.
In an assault case, “ ‘[t]he pivotal question is whether the defendant intended to
commit an act likely to result in such physical force, not whether he or she intended a
specific harm.’ ” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 785.) “As a result, a specific intent to
injure is not an element of assault because the assaultive act, by its nature, subsumes such
an intent.” (Id. at p. 786.) “[T]he nature of the defendant’s present willful conduct alone
suffices to establish the necessary mental state [for assault] without inquiry as to an intent
to cause further consequences.” (Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 217.) While
testimony that a defendant did not intend to harm someone is not relevant because “intent
to injure” is not an element of assault, evidence that defendant did not intend to shoot at
the victim would be admissible evidence that defendant “did not commit a violent-injury-
producing act necessary to establish an assault.” (Id. at p. 217, fn. 8.)
“As [our Supreme Court] explained more than a century ago, ‘Holding up a fist in
a menacing manner, drawing a sword, or bayonet, presenting a gun at a person who is
22.
within its range, have been held to constitute an assault. So, any other similar act,
accompanied by such circumstances as denote an intention existing at the time, coupled
with a present ability of using actual violence against the person of another, will be
considered an assault.’ ” (Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 219, quoting People v.
McMakin (1857) 8 Cal. 547, 548 (McMakin).) However, “[t]his conclusion does not
preclude a defendant charged with assault from presenting evidence that he or she did not
intend to injure or do violence to the victim.”13 (Colantuono, at pp. 218–219, fn. 10,
citing McMakin, at p. 549.) But “if the jury determines from the facts that the defendant
willfully committed a violent act, i.e., engaged in conduct that would by its nature likely
and directly result in a ‘violent injury,’ it can reasonably find from the totality of
circumstances that all elements of the offense are satisfied, including the requisite mental
state.” (Colantuono, at p. 219, fn. 10, quoting McMakin, at pp. 548–549.)
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining evidence of defendant’s
delusion was irrelevant to the elements of assault with a firearm because it failed to
consider evidence of the “surrounding circumstances,” including defendant’s motive,
which provide circumstantial evidence as to whether defendant committed the acts
forming the basis for the assault. In support of this argument, defendant relies upon
People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197 (Cruz-Partida).
Cruz-Partida argued on appeal that the evidence failed to show that he did an act
that would naturally and probably result in the application of force, nor was he aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that his actions would have had
such an effect because he fired one shot at the ground and away from the victims. (Cruz-
Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) After reviewing our Supreme Court’s decision
in Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th 779, the court stated, “Cruz-Partida’s assertions to the
13 While McMakin addressed a defendant’s intent to injure or do violence, our
Supreme Court later clarified that McMakin is authority for the proposition that general
intent is sufficient for assault. (People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1171, fn. 6.)
23.
contrary notwithstanding, pointing a loaded gun at another individual and/or firing that
gun in the vicinity of others has been found, under appropriate circumstances, to be
sufficient to justify a charge of assault.” (Cruz-Partida, at pp. 207–208.)
In support, Cruz-Partida examined “the oldest case touching on this issue,”
McMakin, supra, 8 Cal. 547. (Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 208.) McMakin
threatened to shoot the victim, who was horseback riding on land both men claimed to
own, and drew a revolver, “which he held in a perpendicular line with the body of [the
victim], but with the instrument so pointed that the ball would strike the ground before it
reached [the victim], had the pistol been discharged,” and the victim turned his horse and
rode off. (McMakin, at p. 547.) Noting that the ability to commit the offense was clear,
the court stated, “As to what shall constitute evidence of such intention, is the question
arising in this case.” (Id. at p. 548.) “Holding up a fist in a menacing manner, drawing a
sword or bayonet, presenting a gun at a person who is within its range, have been held to
constitute an assault. So any other similar act, accompanied by such circumstances as
denote an intention existing at the time, coupled with a present ability of using actual
violence against the person of another, will be considered an assault.” (Ibid.)
In discussing the evidence of intent necessary for an assault, our Supreme Court
stated that “presenting a gun at a person who is within its range … accompanied by such
circumstances as denote an intention existing at the time, coupled with a present ability of
using actual violence against the person of another, will be considered an assault.”
(McMakin, supra, 8 Cal. at p. 548.) The McMakin court noted, “The drawing of a
weapon is generally evidence of an intention to use it.” (Id. at p. 549.) In that case, the
evidence was sufficient, even though the gun was not pointed directly at the victim,
because there was no evidence rebutting the intention to use it and McMakin threatened
to shoot the victim if he did not leave. (Id. at p. 548.)
24.
Cruz-Partida reviewed several other cases14 and “discern[ed] … the general rule
that displaying a gun and/or firing it in the general direction of others is sufficient to
provide the mens rea for an assault charge where there is animus between the defendant
and the targeted party and/or the surrounding circumstances are fraught. Thus,
understanding the context is important.” (Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 210.)
The court also noted, “We can also envision a scenario where a gun is displayed in a rude
or angry manner, but other circumstances show that the armed individual has no intent to
actually discharge it.” (Id. at p. 211, fn. 14.) The court concluded that “Cruz-Partida’s
dangerous conduct in displaying and/or firing the gun, along with the bad blood between
him and [the victims] and the other surrounding circumstances provide substantial
evidence of the mens rea for assault, even though there is no evidence Cruz-Partida
actually aimed at either [victim].” (Ibid.) A reasonable person, knowing what Cruz-
Partida knew at the time, would find that the act of pointing the loaded gun in the general
vicinity of the victims during the continuing dispute would directly, naturally, and
probably result in some type of physical force being applied to one of the two brothers.
(Id. at p. 211.)
14 Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pages 208–210, quoting People v.
Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 507–508 (pointing a gun at the victim “ ‘under
threatening circumstances’ ” was sufficient to establish the mental state for assault),
Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 782, 790 (Williams’s firing of a “ ‘warning shot’ ”
toward the victim’s truck with knowledge the victim “ ‘was in the near vicinity’ ”
sufficiently demonstrated “ ‘that his act by its nature would directly, naturally and
probably result in a battery’ ”) and People v. Laya (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 7, 12, 16
(“ ‘[t]he mere pointing of a gun at a victim constitutes an assault with a deadly weapon,
whether or not it is fired at all’ ”) and citing People v. Raviart (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
258, 261–262, 264–267 (Raviart) (upholding two convictions of assault with a firearm on
a police officer under Williams where the defendant pointed a loaded gun at one officer
as he rounded the corner of a building while another officer crouched nearby around the
corner; pointing the gun at one officer was sufficient to effect an assault upon both
officers who were pursuing him).
25.
Therefore, we agree that evidence of the circumstances of the assault are generally
relevant to the issue of whether defendant committed an act with a firearm that would
result in the application of force to a person and whether he intended the application of
force. In this case, the trial court excluded the evidence of defendant’s belief that his
mother was being targeted by cartel members as irrelevant to whether defendant had the
general intent to discharge the firearm without addressing use of the evidence for these
other purposes.15 Nonetheless, we conclude that the trial court did not err because the
proffered evidence lacked probative value to prove defendant did not intend to discharge
his firearm when he pointed it at the hospital employees.
Defendant argues that his mother would testify that he had told her earlier in the
day that cartel members intended to harm her. Admission of this evidence, therefore,
would allow the jury to infer that he went to the hospital to protect her from the cartel
members. From these facts, the jury could infer that he only intended to discharge his
firearm at cartel members and, therefore, did not point the firearm at the hospital
employees with the intent to discharge it at them.
“Relevant evidence includes not only evidence of the ultimate facts in dispute but
also evidence of intermediate facts, that is, facts from which the ultimate fact may
reasonably be inferred. [Citations.] ‘An inference is a deduction of fact that may
logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 18–19.) Defendant’s
motive for entering the hospital with a firearm is characterized as an intermediate fact
from which defendant wanted the jury to infer that by acting in conformity with that
15 Defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate his general intent
to commit the charged crimes. (People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 448,
superseded by statute as stated in People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133;
People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 455–459.) Similarly, defendant’s diminished
capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes. (People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d
709, 718–719.)
26.
belief, defendant would have no reason to harm the hospital employees and, therefore,
defendant did not point and intend to discharge his firearm at them, which are facts of
consequence to a determination of the action. (See People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959,
987, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069,
fn. 13.)
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that this evidence, “ ‘in the light of logic, reason,
experience, or common sense, has, by reasonable inference, a tendency to prove or
disprove’ ” defendant’s general intent as to hospital employees. (See People v. Hill,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 988, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) If the jury believed that defendant was attempting to
protect his mother, logic, reason, experience, or common sense would not have resulted
in the reasonable inference that defendant would have limited his assaultive actions to
cartel members. Defendant may not have been able to distinguish between cartel
members and hospital employees. Alternatively, defendant may have intended to use
force against the hospital employees if they interfered with his objective or he believed
they would prevent him from finding his mother.
“The court must exclude irrelevant proffered evidence which [tends to] prove or
disprove a disputed fact only if the trier of fact must draw speculative or conjectural
inferences from it.” (People v. Parrison (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 529, 539, citing
1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 21.3, p. 502 [proffered evidence is
not relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to determination of the
action only by resort to inferences or deductions from that evidence that are speculative
or conjectural in nature].) The evidence of defendant’s belief he needed to protect his
mother would prove defendant’s lack of general intent only by the conjectural and
speculative inference that defendant did not intend to use force against the hospital
employees in his efforts to protect his mother.
27.
The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant, and it
had no duty to admit evidence which provides only speculative inferences regarding
disputed issues in the case. (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [inference that
defendant was triggered by violent movies about Vietnam playing on victim’s television
too speculative to permit evidence as to the movies].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence
because it was not relevant to defendant’s general intent or whether he pointed his firearm
at the victims with the intent to discharge it.
D. Relevancy Analysis—Shooting at an Occupied Building
1. Applicable law
Section 246 provides in pertinent part: “Any person who shall maliciously and
willfully discharge a firearm at an … occupied building … is guilty of a felony .…”
Section 246 is a general intent crime, and “[t]he elements of this offense are (1) acting
willfully and maliciously, and (2) shooting at an inhabited house.” (People v. Ramirez
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 985 & fn. 6.) The word “maliciously” imports “a wish to vex,
annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by
proof or presumption of law.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4).) The word “willfully” implies “simply
a purpose or willingness to commit the act” and does not require an intent to violate the
law, injure another, or acquire an advantage. (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
2. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence
that he discharged his firearm at an occupied building out of fear for his mother because
such evidence was relevant to whether he acted with malice, that is, without justification
or excuse or mitigating circumstance. We reject defendant’s argument that evidence of
defendant’s motive was a mitigating circumstance that would defeat the jury’s finding
that defendant acted maliciously.
28.
Defendant relies upon our Supreme Court’s decision in In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1020, which analyzed the statutory definition of malice16 in rejecting V.V.’s argument that
the malice element of arson required an intent to cause a fire, some other harm, or an
“evil result.” (In re V.V., at p. 1028.) “ ‘ “[M]alice … in its legal sense it means a
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting People
v. Ah Toon (1886) 68 Cal. 362, 362.) The court explained the two types of malice:
(1) malice in fact—defined as a “ ‘wish to vex, annoy, or injure’ ” and consisting of
actual ill will or intent to injure; and (2) malice in law—defined as the “intent to do a
wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” (In re V.V., at p. 1028,
quoting § 7, subd. (b)(4).) The court then explained that malice in law “may be
‘presumed’ or ‘implied’ from the intentional doing of the act without justification or
excuse or mitigating circumstance.” (In re V.V., at p. 1028, citing Davis v. Hearst (1911)
160 Cal. 143, 149 (Davis) [a civil action to recover damages for libelous matters
published in a newspaper].)
This definition of malice also appears in Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969)
page 769 (Perkins), relied upon by defendant.17 Ultimately, however, In re V.V. held, “In
determining whether the second type of malice (‘intent to do a wrongful act’) is
established for arson, malice will be presumed or implied from the deliberate and
intentional ignition or act of setting a fire without legal justification, excuse, or claim of
right,” but did not use the term “mitigating circumstances.” (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th
at p. 1028.)
16 The arson statute (§ 450) includes its own definition of “maliciously,” which is
nearly identical to section 7, except it also includes “defraud.” (Compare § 450, subd. (e)
with § 7, subd. (b)(4).)
17 (See also Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) Other Particular States
of Mind, § 4, pp. 858–859.)
29.
The terms “justification,” “excuse,” and “mitigation” (or “mitigating
circumstances”) are legal concepts that describe different categories of affirmative
defenses to a crime and those circumstances that reduce the degree of the crime or its
punishment.18 (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed. 2024) Affirmative Defenses,
§ 2, p. 410; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1115 [For purposes of murder,
express “malice” is defined as a deliberate intention to unlawfully take a life, and “ ‘[t]he
adverb “unlawfully” … means simply that there is no justification, excuse, or mitigation
for the killing recognized at law.’ ”]; Jackson v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 521,
525 [malice is presumed without evidence of excuse, justification, or mitigation].) “ ‘The
adverb “unlawfully” in the express malice definition means simply that there is no
justification, excuse, or mitigation for the killing recognized by the law.’ ” (Saille, at
p. 1115, italics added; see also Perkins, supra, at p. 769 [“[i]n brief, malice in the legal
sense imports … the absence of all elements of justification, excuse or recognized
mitigation” (boldface omitted & italics added)].)
Defendant argues, however, that because our Supreme Court in In re V.V. used the
term “mitigating circumstances” in discussing the definition of malice, there must be
mitigating circumstances applicable to the crime of shooting at an occupied building, and
he identifies his motive in protecting his mother as one such circumstance.19 First, we
18 “Justification” refers to a sufficient reason explaining why one acted in a way
that, without the reason, constitutes an offense, including consent, self-defense, defense
of others, defense of property, and necessity. (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1034,
col. 2.) “Excuse” refers to a defense that relieves defendant of blame such as duress,
entrapment, insanity, and involuntary intoxication. (Id. at p. 711, col. 1) “Mitigating
circumstances” are facts that do not justify or excuse an offense but reduce the degree of
culpability or punishment. (Id. at p. 307, col. 1.)
19 The court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 965: “Someone acts
maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with
the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy, or injure someone else.” In a footnote, defendant
argues that the jury instruction failed to correctly define malice because it did not include
the language that he committed the wrongful act without “justification, excuse, or
30.
note that In re V.V. did not ultimately include “mitigating circumstances” in the definition
of malice for purposes of arson after concluding the discussion of malice’s historical
development and legal meaning. (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1028–1029.) Malice
has different meanings depending upon the crime to which it is attached. (Perkins, supra,
at p. 769.)
Second, the term “mitigating circumstance” is used in In re V.V. while reviewing
the historical meaning of malice and attributed to Davis. (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1028 [“the intentional doing of the act without justification or excuse or mitigating
circumstances”], citing Davis, supra, 160 Cal. at p. 158.) Apart from In re V.V. not using
the terms “mitigating circumstance” in the final definition of malice, Davis was a civil
libel case that, in part, concluded that malice in fact was a state of mind arising from ill
will and evidencing an intent to vex, annoy, or injure (as in § 7) and only malice in fact
justified an award of punitive damages. (Davis, at pp. 160–161, 163.) The term
“circumstances in mitigation” in a civil libel case functions to either disprove the
existence of malice in fact or lessen compensatory damages by rebutting evidence of
special damages or bad reputation. (Id. at p. 175.) A defendant most often would not
plead truth as a complete defense but would respond with proof of circumstances which
would mitigate damages. (Id. at p. 188.) More importantly, Davis, in addressing the term
“malice,” specifically noted that the civil law of libel uses different definitions and has
different defenses from the criminal law of libel. (Id. at p. 154.)
We do not conclude that the In re V.V. court’s passing references to “mitigating
circumstance,” without additional elaboration, grafted the legal concept of “mitigating
circumstances” from civil liable law into the section 7 definition of malice. Other than
liable, the term “mitigating circumstances” is also used to describe those substantial
mitigating circumstances.” However, CALCRIM No. 965 correctly defines malice in
accordance with section 7, subdivision (b)(4), which requires proof that defendant
committed the wrongful act intentionally.
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circumstances in mitigation that will reduce a killing that would otherwise be murder to
voluntary manslaughter, such as an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, or
provocation. (Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) § 1, p. 75; see § 190.3 [in
determining whether to impose the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole,
“the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances referred to in this section”].) This concept is not applicable to
section 7, subdivision (b)(4)’s definition of malice. Defendant even acknowledges that
“[n]o case has set forth what factors mitigate a defendant’s culpability for firing at an
occupied building.”
Defendant argues that failure to recognize “mitigating circumstances” as part of
the definition of “malice” in section 246 reduces it to surplusage. Previously, however,
our Supreme Court explained the malice requirement in arson ensures that the act is
“ ‘done with a design to do an intentional wrongful act … without any legal justification,
excuse or claim of right,’ ” and the “willful and malice requirement ensures that” it is “a
deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an accidental or unintentional …
act.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 88.) It has this meaning regardless of
whether malice’s definition includes any mitigating circumstances and is not included in
arson’s definition of malice. Additionally, since we do not agree that the concept of
“mitigating circumstances” is applicable to section 7’s definition of malice, defendant’s
argument necessarily fails.
Defendant argues that section 246 punishes those who fire at an occupied building
with a “person-endangering-by-shooting state of mind,” but this not a correct statement
of the intent required for section 246. In People v. Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th 980, our
Supreme Court held that section 246 is a general intent crime such that an individual need
not intend to endanger any person when shooting. (Ramirez, at p. 985 & fn. 6.)
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We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered
evidence because it was not relevant to defendant’s general intent or whether he
discharged his automatic firearm at a hospital occupied by other individuals.
E. Evidence Code section 352 analysis
1. Applicable law and standard of review
In excluding the evidence, the trial court held, “I believe [considering what or why
defendant shot up the hospital] would also confuse and possibly have the jury get bogged
down in mental aspects that are not relevant to these charges.” The trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant. (People v. Williams, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 634.) Even if the evidence is relevant, the trial court has the discretion to
exclude it under Evidence Code section 352, which provides: “The court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” A trial
court’s discretionary evidentiary ruling under this statute “ ‘ “must not be disturbed on
appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams, at pp. 634–635.)
2. Analysis
We agree with the People that the trial court correctly recognized that because both
assault with a semiautomatic firearm and shooting at an occupied building are general
intent crimes, evidence of defendant’s delusion would confuse the jury as to use of the
evidence in light of the elements of the offenses. To be guilty of assault, a defendant
“need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might occur.” (Williams, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 788.) “[A] defendant who honestly believes that [their] act was not likely
to result in a battery is still guilty of assault if a reasonable person, viewing the facts
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known to [the] defendant, would find that the act would directly, naturally and probably
result in a battery.” (Ibid. at fn. 3.)
We previously concluded that the testimony of defendant’s mother, that he
believed his actions were necessary to protect her, had little or no probative value to
prove defendant did not intend to discharge his firearm at the individuals he encountered
in the hospital. Given that such evidence would have little relevance to defendant’s
general intent to commit the crime, the trial court correctly recognized the likelihood that
the jury would use defendant’s mental state and need to protect his mother to conclude
that defendant did not intend to hurt anyone, as opposed to whether he intended an act
that would result in the use of force. Furthermore, the jury could have confused
defendant’s intent to protect his mother and intent to commit acts likely to result in a
battery on other individuals.
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to exclude this testimony.
III. Defendant’s convictions of assault with a semiautomatic weapon as charged in
counts nine and ten are supported by sufficient evidence.
Defendant argues that his convictions for assaulting Cunanan and Oxford (counts
nine & ten) are not supported by substantial evidence that he willfully carried out an act
with a firearm that would directly and probably result in the application of force as to
Oxford and Cunanan. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine the
entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial credible evidence from which a reasonable trier
of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) We do not redetermine the weight of the evidence or the
credibility of witnesses. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60; see People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [“Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the
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testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”].) We must accept logical
inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence even if we would
have concluded otherwise. (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241, overruled on
other grounds as stated in People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834.) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is
not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding.” (Albillar, at p. 60.) If more than one inference may reasonably be
drawn from the evidence, we accept the inference supporting the judgment. (People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
The reviewing court need not address “assertions of conflicts in the evidence” or
“alternative theories regarding the inferences that should have been drawn from the
evidence.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162.) “A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; accord, People v. Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 87.)
For this offense, the People must prove that (1) “defendant did an act with a
deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to a person”; (2) “[d]efendant did the act willfully”; (3) “[w]hen defendant acted, he
was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature
would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone”; and
(4) “[w]hen defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force likely to produce
great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon.” (People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
101, 121.)
“ ‘[T]he test for assault is whether a reasonable person, viewing the facts known to
[the defendant], would find that the act in question would directly, naturally, and probably
result in physical force being applied to another, i.e., a battery.’ [Citation.] No specific
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intent to cause injury is required. [Citation.] Rather, the focus is on the ‘offensive or
dangerous character of the defendant’s conduct.’ [Citations.] [A defendant’s] assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding, pointing a loaded gun at another individual and/or firing
that gun in the vicinity of others has been found, under appropriate circumstances, to be
sufficient to justify a charge of assault.” (Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 207–208, second bracketed insertion in original.)
B. Analysis
As discussed above, there is well-established precedent that a defendant commits
assault by pointing a gun at a person. “[P]resenting a gun at a person … [has] been held
to constitute an assault.” (McMakin, supra, 8 Cal. at p. 548.) “The mere pointing of a
gun at a victim constitutes an assault with a deadly weapon, whether or not it is fired at
all.” (People v. Laya, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d at p. 16.) “[I]t is not necessary to actually
point the gun directly at the other person to commit the crime.” (Raviart, supra,
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) Where a gun is pointed in the general direction of a victim, a
conviction may be sustained where the gun “was in a position to be used instantly.”
(People v. Thompson (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 780, 782.) “The drawing of a weapon is
generally evidence of an intention to use it,” unless “rebutted when the act is
accompanied with a declaration, or circumstances, showing no intention to use it.”
(McMakin, at p. 549; see People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 269 [“To point a
loaded gun in a threatening manner at another … constitutes an assault, because one who
does so has the present ability to inflict a violent injury on the other and the act by its
nature will probably and directly result in such injury.”].)
Cunanan and Oxford both testified that they saw defendant in the hallway holding
the firearm in front of him, parallel to the ground, at waist level and with one hand on the
stock and one hand on the grip. The jury could infer from this description that
defendant’s grip on the firearm enabled him to be ready to fire if necessary. When he
turned to face them, the firearm was directed at them, and defendant made eye contact
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with Oxford who was standing with Cunanan. The women retreated back into their office
and heard defendant pacing outside the door behind which they were barricaded. Both
women testified that based on the encounter, they believed that defendant intended to
shoot them.
Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that defendant
“willfully took an action” when he pointed the firearm because Cunanan testified that
defendant was looking around the hallway and did not seem to know where he was going.
Defendant argues that this is evidence that he may not have been specifically turning to
target them for violence. However, Cunanan testified that defendant was looking around
before he saw her, then turned to her and Oxford and made eye contact with Oxford. The
court in Cruz-Partida found that, although Cruz-Partida never aimed the gun directly at
either victim, the evidence clearly established that Cruz-Partida pointed the gun in their
general vicinity. (Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 211, fn. 13.) We also note
that defendant followed them as they hid behind an office door, supporting Cunanan’s
and Oxford’s beliefs that defendant intended to shoot them.
Other evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that defendant intended to discharge
the weapon based upon defendant’s actions with other victims. For example, Russell
reported to 911 that defendant had pointed a pistol at him when Russell asked defendant
to leave the premises (after defendant advised that he was looking for his mother in the
hospital) and threatened him by saying, “If I were you[,] I’d get out of here, unless you
wanna go down too.” The jury could have inferred that defendant’s threat to shoot at
Russell indicated his intent with reference to the other victims he encountered.
Significantly, defendant had actually discharged the firearm at least three times and
destroyed the hospital doors. Such violence indicates that defendant was prepared to
discharge his firearm when encountering the other victims.
Most of the witnesses testified that defendant held the weapon with one hand
holding the grip and the other stabilizing the stock. Although the direction of defendant’s
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body determined at whom the firearm pointed, the jury could have inferred defendant’s
intent to discharge the firearm by the fact that he held it ready to fire instantaneously as
opposed to holding it at his side with one arm or hanging from the strap off his shoulder.
Christophers testified that when he asked defendant to lower the weapon, defendant did
not do so and responded that he did not intend to shoot anyone. However, Christophers
told defendant that he did not believe it because defendant had already fired the weapon.
Later, when encountering Hollenbaugh for the second time, the video shows that
defendant pointed the weapon at him, and Hollenbaugh ducked behind the wall in
response. While Hollenbaugh could not remember whether defendant intentionally
pointed the firearm at him, the jury could have concluded that Hollenbaugh would not
have taken cover when defendant pointed the weapon unless defendant’s words or
conduct indicated that he would discharge it. These actions further support the jury’s
findings that defendant intended an act that could have resulted in the application of force
to Oxford and Cunanan when he directed that firearm at them.
Defendant further argues that because the entire encounter was only a few
seconds, based upon the 911 call, there was not enough time for defendant to apply force
to the women. The testimony supports a finding that defendant had enough time to turn
the firearm on the women and follow them to the office door they hid behind. Cunanan
testified that she was on the line with 911 while defendant was outside their door pacing,
and she engaged in conversation with the operator until the operator notified her that
defendant was in custody. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that an assault
requires any particular length of time, but we conclude that such an act can occur quickly,
and often does.
Although defendant claims that there are various inferences that could be drawn
from the evidence to support his defense, the issue is not what evidence or inferences
may support defendant but whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.
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Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdicts as to counts nine and ten.
Defendant held a firearm and directed it to the victims, and therefore, he consequently
had the present ability and intent to apply force. (See People v. Miceli, supra,
104 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) Defendant pointed the firearm in the general direction of
Cunanan and Oxford, and they were in the potential line of fire of the weapon. The gun
did not have to be pointed directly at them. (Raviart, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) It
is sufficient that while pointing the weapon, it “was in a position to be used instantly.”
(People v. Thompson, supra, 93 Cal.App.2d at p. 782.) Defendant had “the present
ability to inflict a violent injury on [them].” (Miceli, at p. 269.) His act “by its nature
will probably and directly result in such injury.” (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s May 29, 2019 and January 16, 2020 orders denying defendant’s
motion for mental health diversion are reversed, and the judgment is conditionally
reversed and remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s motion under section 1001.36,
as amended by Senate Bill 1223 (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, pp. 8169–8173). We express
no view concerning whether defendant will be able to show eligibility on remand or
whether the trial court should exercise its discretion to grant diversion if it finds him
eligible. If the trial court finds that mental health diversion is appropriate in light of the
amendments to section 1001.36, the court shall grant the motion and order diversion. If
defendant successfully completes diversion, the court shall dismiss the criminal charges.
However, if the court determines that mental health diversion is not appropriate, or if the
court orders a program of diversion but defendant fails to complete it successfully, the
court shall reinstate the judgment.
The trial court shall amend the November 10, 2022 sentencing minute order to
reflect the sentence as to count eight was the lower term of three years. The trial court
shall also amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the following: (1) in section 1, the
description of the crime for count one is shooting at an occupied building; (2) in
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section 1, the sentence imposed for count eight is the lower term; and (3) in section 9,
court operations assessments of $360 (§ 1465.8) and criminal conviction assessments of
$270 (Gov. Code, § 70373) were imposed. The trial court shall forward the amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, J.
FAIN, J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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