CourtListener 10598474•In re E.V. CA1/2
Testo completo
Filed 6/4/25 In re E.V. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.V., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171123
v.
E.V., (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. JV24-00056)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant E.V. appeals a dispositional order adjudging him a juvenile
court ward pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602,
committing him to the county juvenile detention facility (JDF), and placing
him under home supervision after his release from JDF subject to various
probationary terms and conditions. He contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion in committing him to JDF. The People argue, and E.V. in his reply
brief concedes, that this challenge is moot because E.V. has since been
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
1
released from JDF.2 We agree with the parties and conclude E.V.’s challenge
to his commitment to JDF is moot.
E.V. also challenges four of his conditions of probation on various
grounds. We conclude that two of the probation conditions require
modification and one must be stricken. We will modify or strike those
probation conditions and affirm the dispositional order as modified.
BACKGROUND
According to the probation reports, on June 13, 2024, a woman left a
nail salon in Antioch with her daughters, aged four and 10. She was putting
her younger daughter in her car when L.M., the accomplice of then 14-year-
old E.V., pointed a gun at them. L.M. said, “ ‘[G]ive me all your shit bitch’
and ‘I swear to god I’m going to shoot you.’ ” E.V. went through the victim’s
purse and removed her jewelry.
Police officers saw two minors who matched the dispatcher’s
description of the suspects running away from the shopping center. The
minors were later identified as E.V. and L.M. One of the officers ordered E.V.
to stop, but he continued to run away. The officer was able to subdue E.V.
and handcuff him. E.V. had a loaded, unregistered semi-automatic handgun
in the pocket of his sweatshirt.
On June 17, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a petition
under section 602, subdivision (a) alleging E.V. committed three felonies:
second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1), with an enhancement that
he was armed with a firearm while committing the robbery (id., § 12022,
subd. (a)(1)); carrying an unregistered, loaded firearm in public (id., § 25850,
2 We previously granted the People’s motion to augment the record to
include the juvenile court’s post-dispositional orders indicating E.V.’s release
from JDF.
2
subds. (a), (c)(6); count 2); and carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (id., §
25400, subd. (a)(1); count 3).
On June 24, the petition was amended to reduce count 2 to a
misdemeanor and add two counts: felony grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd.
(c); count 4) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1); count
5). E.V. entered a plea of no contest to counts 2, 4, and 5. The Contra Costa
County juvenile court sustained the admitted allegations, granted the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining allegations, and transferred
the case for disposition to Solano County, E.V.’s county of residence.
At the dispositional hearing on July 18, the Solano County juvenile
court adjudged E.V. a ward of the court (§ 602). The court committed E.V. to
JDF for 199 days (i.e., until November 14), and ordered he be placed on 45-
day home supervision with an ankle monitor upon his release from JDF,
subject to various probationary terms and conditions. They included that
E.V. shall “attend school . . . regularly and maintain satisfactory
grades . . . and obey school rules”; “attend counseling” of a type determined by
the probation officer; pay a restitution fine of $100; and “submit to drug and
alcohol testing by any peace officer.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
E.V.’s Challenge to His Commitment to JDF Is Moot
E.V.’s first argument is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
committing him to JDF instead of placing him under home supervision. The
People assert that this claim is moot because E.V. has been released from
JDF and, thus, this court cannot provide E.V. any effective relief. In his reply
brief, E.V. concedes the People’s assertion.
As a general rule, appellate review is limited to an actual controversy.
3
A case that involves “ ‘only abstract or academic questions of law cannot be
maintained. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Moreover, ‘ “[A]n action that originally
was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all
the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in
such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be
dismissed.” ’ ” (People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486; see People
v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380 [“ ‘a case becomes moot when a
court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with
effective relief.’ ”].) For example, where a defendant has completed a
sentence, his or her claims of error as to that sentence are moot “because a
reviewing court’s resolution of the issues could offer no relief regarding the
time he spent in custody . . . .” (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645.)
E.V.’s claim is that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
committed him to JDF as opposed to ordering less restrictive, alternative
placement for him. Since E.V. has been released from JDF, there is no longer
a justiciable controversy. We thus agree with the parties that E.V.’s
challenge to his commitment is moot.
Courts sometimes have discretion to decide an issue even when it is
moot. (See Sturgell v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
35, 46.) That discretion is generally exercised when the case presents an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when there may be a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or when a material
question remains for the court’s determination. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 282.) Here, E.V. does not ask us to exercise our discretion to reach the
merits of his moot challenge. In fact, he argues that discretionary review is
inappropriate, asserting that “the record on appeal provides insufficient
support to argue this Court should exercise its discretion and address the
4
merits of his claim.” We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to decide
E.V.’s challenge to his commitment to JDF.
Three Conditions of Probation Must Be Modified or Stricken
General Legal Principles
When a juvenile court places a minor on probation, it “ ‘may impose and
require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citations.] ‘ “In fashioning the
conditions of probation, the . . . court should consider the minor’s entire social
history in addition to the circumstances of the crime.” ’ [Citation.] The court
has ‘broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation’ [citation], although
‘every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and
the minor.’ ” (In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293–294 (P.O.).)
“Generally, we review the court’s imposition of a probation condition for an
abuse of discretion. [Citations.] However, we review constitutional
challenges to a probation condition de novo.” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to E.V.’s challenges to his
probation conditions, addressing them in a slightly different order than he
presents them in his opening brief.
Condition No. 1: “Attend School . . . Regularly” and
“Maintain Satisfactory Grades”
One of the probation conditions E.V. challenges, no. 1, requires E.V. to
“attend school . . . regularly and maintain satisfactory grades in the grading
system utilized by [his] school in a manner consistent with identified physical
or medical limitations, and obey school rules.” E.V. argues that the
requirements to “attend school . . . regularly” and “maintain satisfactory
grades” are unconstitutionally vague. Although E.V. did not raise any
5
objection to this condition at his dispositional hearing, the People
acknowledge—and we agree—that we may consider E.V.’s claim because he
is challenging the condition as facially vague, “without reference to the
particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 (Sheena K.).) “In such circumstances, an issue of
law arises that is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (In re Edward B.
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1236–1237.) We thus address the merits of
E.V.’s arguments, beginning with a discussion of the principles on vagueness.
“[J]uvenile courts have ‘broad discretion to fashion conditions of
probation’ to further a minor’s rehabilitation [citation], but ‘[a] probation
condition “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is
required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has
been violated,” if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.’
[Citation.] ‘[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process
concept of “fair warning.” [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of “the
due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing
adequate notice to potential offenders” [citation], protections that are
“embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California
Constitutions.” ’ ” (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 299, quoting Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
We start with the requirement in condition no. 1 that he “attend
school . . . regularly.” E.V. argues the requirement “is vague because it does
not notify him or his mother whether a single unexcused absence from a class
would constitute a probation violation . . . .” Our colleagues in Division One
rejected the same argument by a minor who was also directed to “ ‘attend
school regularly.’ ” (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 730 (D.H.).) The
D.H. court explained that while the “command to attend ‘regularly’ is
6
arguably vague in a vacuum,” viewed in context and alongside the command
that the minor “[o]bey school rules,” the condition was sufficiently precise and
did not require modification. (Ibid.) Here, as in D.H., the requirement that
E.V. “attend school . . . regularly,” when read together with the other
requirement that he “obey school rules,” is sufficiently clear for an average
juvenile of E.V.’s age to understand. Thus, under D.H., the requirement to
attend school regularly is not unconstitutionally vague and requires no
modification.
We turn to E.V.’s other assertion that the requirement that E.V.
“maintain satisfactory grades” is unconstitutionally vague. E.V. relies on In
re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096 (Angel J.), in which the court held that
in order to pass constitutional muster, a probation condition requiring the
minor to maintain “satisfactory grades” required a more specific definition.
(Id. at p. 1102.) Angel J. defined “satisfactory grades” as passing grades in
each graded subject—that is, “not failing, such as a D or above in an A
through F grading system”—and modified the condition of probation
accordingly. (Ibid. & fn. 7.)
E.V.’s assertion is well taken. Similar to the condition in Angel J., the
portion of condition no. 1 stating E.V. shall “maintain satisfactory grades”
requires a more specific definition. We therefore modify the phrase
“maintain satisfactory grades in the grading system utilized by the youth’s
school” to state: “maintain passing grades (meaning not failing, such as a D
or above in an A through F grading system) in each graded subject.” (See
Angel J., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1102 & fn. 7.)
Condition No. 4: Attend Counseling of a Type Determined by
the Probation Officer
Probation condition no. 4 requires E.V. “to attend counseling of a type
determined by the probation officer and as directed by the probation officer.”
7
E.V. argues this condition violates the separation of powers doctrine because
it delegates to the probation officer the authority to decide the type of
counseling E.V. must participate in.
The People again acknowledge that while E.V. did not object to
condition No. 4, we may still consider his challenge to that condition, since it
presents a pure question of law. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp.
888–889; People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) Once
again, we agree. We thus turn to the merits of E.V.’s challenge to the
juvenile court’s delegation—and conclude such claim is unavailing.
As noted above, a juvenile court has broad discretion to establish
probation conditions. (P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 293–294.) At the
same time, “[u]nder the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, §
3), judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.” (Smith,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) The “general rule is that a court may
dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving specification of
details to the probation officer. . . . However, the court’s order cannot be
entirely open-ended. It is for the court to determine the nature of the
prohibition placed on a defendant as a condition of probation.” (In re Victor
L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919; accord, In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372 [“The probation officer may recommend probation
terms, but it is the court’s responsibility to tailor the conditions specifically to
each minor.”].)
Here, the juvenile court ordered E.V.’s participation in counseling, but
left the selection of which counseling program to the probation officer.
Contrary to E.V.’s assertion, that delegation was permissible, as it “falls
within the . . . general rule that a court may dictate the basic policy of a
condition of probation, leaving specification of details to the probation
8
officer.” (In re Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.)
People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298 (Penoli), a case cited by the
People, supports our conclusion. In Penoli, the defendant made a similar
challenge to a probation condition that required her to enter a residential
drug treatment program “ ‘as approved by the Probation Officer.’ ” (Penoli,
supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) This court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the condition unlawfully delegated authority to the probation
department to unilaterally select a drug rehabilitation program. (Id. at pp.
307–308.) We reasoned: “any attempt to specify a particular program at or
prior to sentencing would pose serious practical difficulties. The trial court is
poorly equipped to micromanage the selection of a program, both because it
lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and,
more fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on
mercurial questions of timing and availability.” (Id. at p. 308.) We further
observed that the delegation did not place the defendant “completely at the
mercy of the probation department.” (Ibid.) The defendant was permitted to
bring any concerns she had to the court’s attention. The defendant could also
seek judicial intervention by moving to modify the probation order if the
probation officer sought to exercise the delegated authority. (Ibid.)
In this case, it was appropriate and reasonable for the juvenile court to
authorize the probation officer to select a specific counseling program for E.V.
because, as in Penoli, the court may not be as well equipped to micromanage
the selection of such programs. (Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) In
addition, the delegation here does not place E.V. “completely at the mercy of
the probation department.” (Ibid.) If E.V. disagrees with any specific
program identified by the probation officer, he could “seek judicial
intervention” (ibid.) by petitioning “to change, modify, or set aside” the
9
probation condition to ensure that the program is necessary and properly
related to his rehabilitation. (§ 778, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, as in Penoli, we
decline to hold that the delegation of authority to probation to select an
appropriate counseling program for E.V. was erroneous.
E.V.’s arguments do not convince us otherwise. E.V. tries to
distinguish Penoli on the ground that the condition there identified the type
of program the defendant was supposed to attend (residential drug
treatment), whereas the condition here gives the probation officer gave the
probation officer “carte balance [sic]” authority “to order any type of
counseling program.” We are unpersuaded. Although the condition in Penoli
was arguably more specific than the condition here because it required the
defendant’s participation in a “residential drug treatment program,” it
similarly lacked details such as the type of drug treatment and its location
and frequency. Further, E.V.’s claim that the condition gives the probation
department carte blanche authority to order his participation “in any type of
counseling program” is not well taken. We presume that the probation officer
will not make irrational demands that E.V. participate in programs that are
unrelated to his needs. (See People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989,
996 [“ ‘A probation condition should be given “the meaning that would appear
to a reasonable, objective reader,” ’ ” and we do not presume that the
probation officer will issue irrational or capricious directives], citing People v.
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 383.)
E.V. mentions in passing Smith, which he explains involved “a
probation condition ‘entrusting the decision whether to mandate residential
treatment to the probation officer’ [that] was deemed an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority.” To the extent E.V. suggests Smith supports
invalidating the condition at issue here, we disagree. Smith involved an
10
entirely different context and is therefore inapposite.
Smith concerned a probation condition requiring the defendant “ ‘to
participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including
residential, as directed by the probation officer.’ ” (Smith, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) Our Division Five colleagues held that the condition
improperly delegated to the probation officer the discretion to require the
defendant’s participation in residential treatment as opposed to an outpatient
program. (Id. at p. 903.) In reaching its conclusion, Smith relied on federal
cases holding that a condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such
as one requiring residential treatment, must be imposed by a court, not a
probation officer. (Ibid., citing United States v. Martinez (5th Cir. 2021) 987
F.3d 432, 435, United States v. Matta (2d. Cir. 2015) 777 F.3d 116, 122–123,
United States v. Mike (10th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3d 686, 695–696, and United
States v. Esparza (9th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 1088, 1091.) As one of those cases
explained, “[I]npatient drug treatment programs are sufficiently more
restrictive than outpatient programs that the difference between the two
programs might be said to be the difference between liberty and the loss of
liberty.” (United States v. Matta, supra, 777 F.3d at p. 122.) “ ‘[I]n light of
this difference . . . , granting the probation officer the discretion to decide
whether such conditions will be imposed is tantamount to allowing him to
decide the nature or extent of the defendant’s punishment,’ ” and thus “any
condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such as one requiring the
defendant to participate in residential treatment . . . must be imposed by the
district court and supported by particularized findings that it does not
constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to
accomplish the goals of sentencing.’ ” (Id. at p. 123.)
A condition authorizing probation to select a specific counseling
11
program is very different from a condition authorizing probation to require
participation in residential treatment. A requirement to attend counseling is
obviously much less restrictive and does not raise “significant liberty
interests.” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.) Accordingly, we do not
find the reasoning of Smith or the cited federal cases applicable here.
In sum, we conclude that condition no. 4 was not an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority.
We next address E.V.’s argument under section 729.2, subdivision (b)
(section 729.2(b)). Section 729.2 mandates various conditions when the
juvenile court grants probation, “except in any case in which the court makes
a finding and states on the record its reasons that that condition would be
inappropriate.” Without this finding, and unless the minor is also a
dependent of the court or subject to a pending dependency petition, the court
“shall . . . [¶] [¶] [r]equire the parents or guardian of the minor to participate
with the minor in a counseling or education program, including, but not
limited to, parent education and parenting programs operated by community
colleges, school districts, or other appropriate agencies designated by the
court or the probation department . . . .” (§ 729.2(b).)
E.V. argues that under section 729.2(b), “the Legislature imposed the
duty to determine what type of counseling program would further a minor’s
rehabilitation on the juvenile court, not the probation department.” E.V.
then generally describes the separation of powers doctrine, before going on to
assert, “[a]lthough section 729.2[(b)] expressly allows a court to delegate to
the probation department to ‘designate’ an ‘appropriate agency’ for the type of
counseling the court has required, the condition here delegates even the
authority to decide what counseling the minor needs.”
E.V.’s argument is not entirely clear. But he appears to assert that in
12
addition to violating the separation of powers doctrine, the juvenile court
violated statutory law when it imposed condition no. 4. If that is his
argument, we disagree, as explained below.
As another initial matter, while E.V. focuses on section 729.2(b), the
probation department cited another provision—section 727, subdivision (c)
(section 727(c))—in recommending condition no. 4. As did the juvenile court
when it imposed the condition at the dispositional hearing. Section 727(c)
permits ordering a juvenile court ward to participate in a counseling or
education program, but uses slightly different language than section 729.2(b):
“If a minor has been adjudged a ward of the court . . . , and the court finds
that notice has been given . . . , and if the court orders that a parent or
guardian shall retain custody of that minor either subject to or without the
supervision of the probation officer, the parent or guardian may be required
to participate with that minor in a counseling or education program,
including, but not limited to, parent education and parenting programs
operated by community colleges, school districts, or other appropriate
agencies designated by the court.” (§ 727(c), italics added.) Unlike section
729.2(b), section 727(c) uses permissive language—the word “may”—in
describing the authority to require the minor’s and parent’s participation in
counseling. Also, it expressly permits the court to designate an “appropriate
agenc[y]” for the counseling program; it does not also confer such authority on
the probation department.
In his opening brief’s discussion of the relevant proceedings below, E.V.
mentions the juvenile court relied on section 727(c) in imposing condition no.
4. However, he does not address that provision at any other point in his
brief, let alone explain how it relates to section 729.2(b). Thus, to the extent
E.V. relies on section 729.2(b), he fails to demonstrate why that provision, as
13
opposed to section 727(c), applies. However, because the People also rely on
729.2(b) as a further basis to uphold condition no. 4, we assume without
deciding that section 729.2(b) governs.
Turning to E.V.’s argument under 729.2(b), we disagree that it should
be interpreted as “impos[ing] the duty to determine what type of counseling
program would further a minor’s rehabilitation on the juvenile court, not the
probation department.” It is true that the provision does not expressly
authorize a juvenile court to delegate to probation the decision to select a
specific counseling program for a ward. But it does not expressly prohibit
such delegation either. In interpreting section 729.2, we find guidance from
the Judicial Council, which has approved form JV-624. (Judicial Council
Forms, form JV-624 (rev. Jan. 1, 2012) (Terms and Conditions).) That form
cites among other provisions section 729.2 and sets out terms and conditions
for juvenile probation. One of the terms and conditions states, “The parent or
legal guardian must participate in a program of counseling or education as
directed by the probation officer.” (Ibid., italics added.) Also, item 11 states,
“The child must [¶] . . . [¶] [p]articipate in individual, group, or family
counseling, as directed by the probation officer . . . . ” (Ibid., italics added.)
The use of the phrase “as directed by the probation officer,” which modifies
“counseling,” suggests that the Judicial Council has interpreted section 729.2
to permit the juvenile court to authorize the probation department to direct
the specific counseling program that the minor and his or her parents or
guardian must attend.
The Judicial Council’s interpretation of the statute, as reflected in form
JV-624, while not binding, is highly persuasive and entitled to great weight.
(See In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1063; see also Sara M.
v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1011.) We thus defer to the Judicial
14
Council’s interpretation of section 729.2. Applying that interpretation here,
we reject E.V.’s assertion that the juvenile court violated that section by
authorizing the probation department to select a counseling program for E.V.
That said, we do find the juvenile court failed to comply with section
729.2(b) to the extent it “str[uck] the portion [of condition no. 4] that requires
the parents are ordered to attend.” As recited above, section 729.2 generally
requires that the court order “the parents or guardian of the minor to
participate with the minor in a counseling or education program . . . .”
(§ 729.2(b).) Under the statute, the court was required to order E.V.’s
parents, not just E.V., to participate in counseling.3 Accordingly, we will
modify condition no. 4 to require E.V.’s parents to participate in counseling
with E.V.
Condition No. 9: Pay a Restitution Fine
Probation condition no. 9 requires E.V. to pay a $100 restitution fine
pursuant to section 730.6. At the time of his dispositional hearing, section
730.6, subdivision (a)(2)(A) directed the juvenile court to impose a restitution
fine on juvenile offenders. (Stats. 2015, ch. 131, § 1.) Under subdivision
(b)(1) of section 730.6, the minimum restitution fine for a minor found
responsible for a felony was $100. (Ibid.)
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1186) amended section 730.6 to provide in pertinent
part: “The court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine
3 The court was also required to do so under section 727, subdivision
(d)(2), which states: “If counseling or other treatment services are ordered for
the minor, the parent, guardian, or foster parent shall be ordered to
participate in those services, unless participation by the parent, guardian, or
foster parent is deemed by the court to be inappropriate or potentially
detrimental to the minor.”
15
against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.” (§ 730.6,
subd. (a)(2); Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.)
E.V. argues that he is entitled to the benefit of the amendment to
section 730.6 under the rule established by In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, 744 (Estrada). The Estrada rule states: “ ‘[W]here the amendatory
statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, . . . the
amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is
imposed’ in all cases in which judgment was not yet final when the
amendment took effect. [Citation.] Cases in which judgment is not yet final
include those in which a conviction has been entered and sentence imposed
but an appeal is pending when the amendment becomes effective.
[Citations.] The Estrada rule has been applied to juvenile delinquency
judgments. [Citation.]” (In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891.) E.V.
therefore asserts we should vacate his restitution fine. The People concede
the point.
We accept the People’s concession. We therefore strike the $100
restitution fine.
Condition No. 11: Submit to Alcohol Testing
Lastly, E.V. argues that probation condition no. 11 requiring him to
submit to alcohol testing is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15
Cal.3d 481 (Lent), superseded on another ground as stated in People v.
Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–291.
Preliminarily, the People argue E.V. forfeited his claim by not objecting
to the condition below. E.V. acknowledges he did not object below, but asks
us to exercise our discretion to consider the claim on its merits.
Alternatively, if the claim is forfeited, he asserts his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object. We exercise our discretion to
16
excuse any forfeiture and reach the merits of E.V.’s claim to forestall any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [an appellate court has authority to reach a claim not
cognizable on appeal]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146
[reviewing court may exercise discretion to consider claims not cognizable on
appeal to forestall ineffective assistance of counsel arguments].)
Turning to the merits, E.V. asks us to strike the alcohol testing
condition as unreasonable under Lent. In Lent, our Supreme Court stated
the criteria for assessing the validity of a probation condition: “A condition of
probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not
in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality[.]’ [Citations.] Conversely, a condition of
probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is
valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant
was convicted or to future criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
“The Lent test ‘is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a
reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).)
“Adult and juvenile probation conditions are reviewed under the Lent
criteria. [Citation.] A condition that would be improper for an adult is
permissible for a juvenile only if it is tailored specifically to meet the needs of
the juvenile. [Citation.] In determining reasonableness, courts look to the
juvenile’s offenses and social history.” (In re Edward B., supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 1233.)
“In applying Lent, we review the imposition of a probation condition for
an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘That is, a reviewing court will disturb the
17
trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if,
under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is
wholly unreasonable.’ ” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) E.V. cannot
show an abuse of discretion.
Applying the Lent test here, the People do not dispute E.V.’s argument
that the alcohol testing condition has no relationship to the crimes E.V.
admitted to, thereby meeting the first Lent prong. We agree.
As for the second Lent prong—that the condition relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal—E.V. fails to address it altogether in his briefs.
We construe E.V.’s failure to address the second Lent prong as an implied
concession that the prong is not satisfied. (See Westside Center Associates v.
Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [appellant “effectively
concedes” issue by failing to address it in brief]; Glendale Redevelopment
Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424 [appellants “impliedly
concede” an issue by failing to address it]; see also People v. Bouzas (1991) 53
Cal.3d 467, 480 [argument was conceded by the People, who “ignored [the]
point in their brief and at oral argument”].)
In any event, and notwithstanding that concession, we would still
conclude that the condition fails the second Lent prong. In re Kacy S. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 704 (Kacy S.) is directly on point. There, the juvenile court
imposed on two minors as a condition of probation conditions that each
“ ‘submit to urine testing to determine the presence of alcohol and illegal
drugs.’ ” (Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 707–708.) Although there
was no indication in the minors’ offense or social histories of substance abuse,
the appellate court concluded that the testing condition was authorized by
18
section 729.3.4 (Id. at pp. 708–709.) It additionally determined that the
condition was permissible under Lent. (Id. at pp. 709–710.) With respect to
the second Lent prong, Kacy S. explained that the urine testing condition
related to conduct which was itself criminal because it was “designed to
detect the presence of substances whose use by minors is unlawful.” (Id. at p.
710, citing Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22 [prohibiting alcohol consumption by a
minor].) Like Kacy S., we conclude the testing condition here directly relates
to conduct which is itself criminal—the unlawful use or alcohol by a minor.
Given our conclusion that the testing condition fails the second Lent
prong, we deem the alcohol testing condition valid under Lent. (See Ricardo
P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1118 [“ ‘all three prongs [of the Lent test] must be
satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ”].) It is
thus unnecessary for us to consider E.V.’s arguments regarding the third
prong.
But even if we were to consider those arguments, we would still
conclude that the alcohol testing condition is valid. According to E.V., the
alcohol testing condition meets the third prong because the condition is not
“reasonably related to preventing his future criminality.” We disagree.
Again, Kacy S. is on point. There, the court observed that, in enacting section
729.3, the Legislature expressly declared that alcohol and drug abuse are
among “ ‘[t]he precursors of serious criminality by juveniles.’ ” (Kacy S.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 708–709, fn. 2; see Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 1,
4 Section 729.3 states: “If a minor is found to be a person described in
Section 601 or 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the physical
custody of his or her parent or guardian, the court, as a condition of
probation, may require the minor to submit to urine testing upon the request
of a peace officer or probation officer for the purpose of determining the
presence of alcohol or drugs.”
19
subd. (a)(2); see also id., § 1, subd. (a)(1) [“The problem of juvenile
delinquency should be addressed at its inception rather than after it has
progressed to serious criminality.”].) Thus, the testing condition was
reasonably related to future criminality, thereby failing the third prong of the
Lent formulation. (Kacy S., at p. 710.) For the reasons set forth in Kacy S.,
we conclude that the alcohol testing condition is reasonably related to
deterring E.V.’s future criminality. Indeed, as the People assert, “given
[E.V.’s] admission of prior substance abuse—marijuana—the condition was
more warranted than in . . . Kacy S. . . , where the minor[s’] history did not
reflect any use of illicit substances.” Accordingly, the alcohol testing
condition also fails at the third prong of the Lent test.
E.V. acknowledges Kacy S.’s holding, but argues the case was decided
25 years ago and should be revisited in light of Ricardo P. In the first place,
E.V. makes no attempt to explain Ricardo P., much less demonstrate how it
undermines Kacy S. E.V.’s failure to support his claim with cogent legal
argument allows us to deem his claim forfeited. (In re S.C. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“When a point is asserted without argument and
authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and
requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence, conclusory
claims of error will fail.”].)
E.V.’s claim is also unavailing. We do not see anything in Ricardo P.
that undermines the analysis in Kacy S. In Ricardo P., the high court held
that a warrantless electronic search condition imposed on a minor was not
reasonably related to future criminality where the record contained “no
indication that [the minor] had used or will use electronic devices in
connection with drugs or any illegal activity.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 1116.) As the court explained, “Lent’s requirement that a probation
20
condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a
degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation
condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Id. at p.
1122.) Since the sweeping electronics search condition imposed “a very heavy
burden on privacy with a very limited justification,” it was not “ ‘ “reasonably
related to future criminality” ’ ” and was therefore invalid under Lent. (Id. at
p. 1124.)
To the extent E.V. suggests that the electronics search condition in
Ricardo P. is similar to the alcohol testing condition here, we disagree.
Unlike an electronics search condition that intrudes upon a range of
otherwise lawful activity, the drug and alcohol testing condition here relates
solely to discovering unlawful behavior by the minor, as explained above. In
addition, the burdens imposed by the testing condition are proportional to
achieving the legitimate goal of preventing future criminality by monitoring
E.V.’s drug or alcohol use and establishing the means for early intervention
to aid in his rehabilitation. (See Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122
[“ ‘conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so
strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime’ [citation] so long as they are
‘reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality.’ ”].)
In sum, the alcohol testing condition is valid under Lent.
DISPOSITION
The phrase “maintain satisfactory grades in the grading system
utilized by the youth’s school” in probation condition no. 1 is modified to read:
“maintain passing grades (meaning not failing, such as a D or above in an A
through F grading system) in each graded subject.”
Probation condition no. 4 is modified to require the participation of
E.V.’s parents in counseling with E.V.
21
Probation condition no. 9 imposing the $100 restitution fine is stricken.
As modified, the dispositional order is affirmed.
22
RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A171123N)
23
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