Estala v. Kerrigan CA4/3

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Filed 6/3/25 Estala v. Kerrigan CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MIRNA MIRELLA ESTALA,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063582

v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2000114)

DAVID KERRIGAN, Individually OPINION
and as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Godofredo Magno, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Law Offices of Ameer A. Shah, Ameer A. Shah and Lisa Jackson
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horton, Oberrecht & Kirkpatrick, Kimberly Suzanne Oberrecht,
and Karen L. Bilotti for Defendant and Respondent.
While walking in front of a residential property in Perris,
California, plaintiff Mirna Mirella Estala was attacked by two large dogs
owned by a squatter who was living on the property. The property was held
in trust by the Erma Kerrigan Trust (the landowner), which had acquired it
in foreclosure. Defendant David Kerrigan was the successor trustee of the
landowner, managed the property in that capacity, and visited it several
times a year. At the time of the attack, the dogs were unrestrained and able
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to exit the property through an open gate and attack plaintiff. Plaintiff sued
Kerrigan in his individual and representative capacities for the injuries she
suffered on theories of negligence and strict liability.
Kerrigan moved for summary judgment on the ground he did not
owe a duty of care to plaintiff because neither he nor the landowner owned
the dogs, the dogs had no prior reported attacks, and Kerrigan did not know
they had dangerous propensities. The trial court granted the motion based on
the public policy exception to a landowner’s general statutory duty of care
that is applicable to landlords who have relinquished exclusive possession
and control over their property to a tenant. This was error. The evidence
showed Kerrigan was not a landlord, but instead maintained full control over
the property, including the ability to access the property to discover any
unsafe conditions and to repair, replace, or give adequate warning of
anything that could be reasonably expected to harm others. Kerrigan’s lack of
actual knowledge the dogs had dangerous propensities was not dispositive on
the issue of duty, and Kerrigan failed to meet his initial burden on summary
judgment. We reverse the judgment as to Kerrigan in his capacity as trustee

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Just after the attack, the dogs’ owner was found deceased on the
property in an advanced stage of decomposition.

2
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of the landowner and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the
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judgment as to Kerrigan in his individual capacity.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 7, 2019, plaintiff was walking in front of the
property when “suddenly and without warning, plaintiff was viciously
attacked and bitten by two large pit bulls that came out of [the property],
causing plaintiff severe personal injuries and damages, including fractures.”
The owner of the dogs, William Hewett, had lost the property in a foreclosure
sale to the landowner and been evicted. After the eviction, Kerrigan chained
and padlocked the gate to the property. Within months, however, Hewett had
dismantled the padlock, removed the chain, and moved back onto the
property. Kerrigan knew Hewett was living on the property in a trailer and,
in the months leading up to the incident, contacted the Riverside County
Sheriff’s Department about removing Hewett; he was told the department
could remove Hewett, but not his trailer and other belongings.

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The issues of breach of duty, causation, and damages are not
before us and are for determination by the trier of fact. (Salinas v. Martin
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 417, fn. 3 (Salinas).) In addition, Kerrigan moved
for summary judgment on the entire complaint and did not move
alternatively for summary adjudication of the strict liability cause of action.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed in its entirety as to Kerrigan in his
capacity as successor trustee of the landowner.

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Estala’s counsel announced at oral argument Estala is not
appealing from the judgment in favor of Kerrigan in his individual capacity.
That was not clear, however, from the notice of appeal or her briefing on
appeal. We therefore address briefly below the court’s ruling as to Kerrigan
in his individual capacity and affirm that portion of the order and resulting
judgment.

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In his capacity as trustee of the landowner, Kerrigan visited the
property multiple times a year to speak with Hewett for the purpose of
instructing Hewett to leave. Kerrigan was aware the dogs were living on the
property and had seen them from time-to-time in person. At the time of the
incident, Kerrigan was in the process of selling the property.
On November 12, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint against various
defendants alleging causes of action for general negligence, strict liability and
liability under the California Food and Agriculture Code, sections 31601–
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31683. The first cause of action for negligence was based on the alleged
“fail[ure] to warn about and control dangerous animals,” resulting in injuries
to plaintiff. The second cause of action for strict liability was alleged
pursuant to Civil Code section 3342 against the owner(s) of the dogs. The
third cause of action was alleged only against the county, and alleged the
dogs were escaping through an open gate at the property and had attacked
neighborhood dogs in the past.
Plaintiff added Kerrigan as a defendant to the complaint
pursuant to a Doe amendment, both as an individual and as trustee of the
landowner. Kerrigan eventually became the sole defendant in the action.5

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Plaintiff initially named as defendants the County of Riverside,
the Riverside County Department of Animal Services (collectively, the
county), the Estate of Erma Kerrigan, the Erma Trust, Colleen Kerrigan, as
Trustee of the Erma Trust, the Estate of William Hewett, Joseph Kelly Cox
and Does 1 to 25.

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The court sustained the county’s demurrer to the complaint
without leave to amend and separately dismissed the Estate of Erma
Kerrigan, the Erma Trust, the Estate of William Hewett and Joseph Kelly
Cox. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Colleen Kerrigan from the action.

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Kerrigan moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff opposed the motion. The court granted Kerrigan’s motion. As to the
negligence cause of action, the trial court found no triable issue of fact existed
showing Kerrigan had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the
dogs. As to the strict liability claim, the trial court found there was no triable
issue as to the fact that Kerrigan did not own the dogs. The court entered
judgment against plaintiff, and plaintiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly granted if “there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “A
defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot
establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant makes this showing, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2).)
“‘On review of an order granting or denying summary judgment,
we examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect
as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] We review the entire record, ‘considering all
the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to
which objections have been made and sustained.’ [Citation.] Evidence
presented in opposition to summary judgment is liberally construed, with any
doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.”

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(Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 618.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING KERRIGAN, AS TRUSTEE, DID NOT
OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF
“‘To prevail on her action in negligence, [Plaintiff] must show
that [the landowner] owed her a legal duty, that [it] breached the duty, and
that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of her injuries.’” (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) “‘The existence of duty is a
question of law to be decided by the court . . . .’” (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach
& Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 22.)
For purposes of his motion for summary judgment, Kerrigan
assumed as facts plaintiff’s allegations that she was attacked by both dogs
when she was walking outside in front of the property, the dogs had escaped
from the property unrestrained either through an open gate or from a hole in
the fence, and plaintiff had no advance warning. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Kerrigan because he was not the owner of the
dogs and did not have prior knowledge of any dangerous propensity of the
dogs. We conclude this was error and that Kerrigan, as trustee of the
landowner, owed a duty of care to plaintiff.
We start with the statutory proposition that “[e]veryone is
responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property . . . .” (Civ.
Code, § 1714.) Courts “‘have repeatedly declared the existence of a duty by
landowners to maintain property in their possession and control in a
reasonably safe condition.’” (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc.,
supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.) “A landowner ‘“‘has an affirmative duty to

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exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition,
and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain
their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have
discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’”’” (Salinas, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 412; Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 826, 833.)
This duty extends not only to persons who come on to the
property, but also to persons off the property who suffer injuries due to the
landowner’s lack of due care in the management of his property. (Davert v.
Larson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 407, 410.) For example, a landowner may be
held liable for negligently allowing an animal to escape from his property
causing injury. (See Davert v. Larson, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.)
“Although liability might easily be found where the landowner has actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition, ‘[t]he landowner’s lack of knowledge of
the dangerous condition is not a defense. He has an affirmative duty to
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition,
and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain
their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have
discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’” (Swanberg v. O’Mectin
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 325, 330.) Indeed, “courts have imposed a duty to
prevent the harm caused by a third party’s animal when a defendant
possesses the means to control the animal or the relevant property and can
take steps to prevent the harm.” (Cody F. v. Falletti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th
1232, 1236, italics added; Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156 [the
duty “to maintain land in one’s possession in a reasonably safe condition

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exists even where the dangerous condition on the land is caused by an
instrumentality that the landowner does not own or control”].)
With respect to a landowner’s duty, “‘“[t]he crucial element is
control.”’” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.) Salinas is on point.
One of two pit bulls that were loose on the landowner’s property with his
knowledge and consent while the property was under construction attacked a
worker who came onto the property. (Id. at pp. 408–409.) The landowner had
“no knowledge of prior specific incidents of violence or aggressiveness by the
dogs.” (Id. at p. 415.) Because the property was under construction, the
regular appearance of people was expected. (Id. at pp. 415–416.) The
landowner in Salinas did not lease the property to the dog’s owner, but rather
continued to control the premises. (Id. at pp. 408, 409, 416.) But, as the trial
court erroneously did here, the lower court in Salinas applied standards of
duty applicable to landlords who have relinquished control of their property
to a tenant, and it concluded the landowner did not owe a duty of care to the
person attacked by dogs on the property because the landowner lacked
knowledge of the dogs’ dangerous tendencies. (Id. at p. 409.)
Reversing the judgment in favor of the landowner, the Salinas
court held: “This is not a case . . . in which the plaintiff has asserted passive
neglect on the part of a landlord for failure to inspect or take security
measures to protect third parties from a dangerous condition on a tenant’s
property. The present action is distinguishable on many decisive levels. First
and foremost, respondent was not an absentee landlord with limited access to
the property. He did not surrender his possessory interest in the property in
any way; he continued to control the premises at least intermittently while
the construction project proceeded. The dog owners were not respondent’s
tenants who had sole possessory rights associated with the property, but

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rather temporary invitees . . . . And unlike tenants, they were neither vested
with exclusive possession of the property nor were entitled to keep their dogs
there without express permission granted by respondent. Thus, the essential
foundation that underlies the carefully circumscribed duty imposed upon
landlords—the restraint upon the landlord’s right to engage in intrusive
oversight or control of the tenant's use of the property—is absent here.”
(Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.)
The same is true here. Kerrigan was not a landlord, and Hewett,
the dogs’ owner, was not a tenant with the right to exclusive control and
possession of the property.6 Hewett was a squatter and therefore was not in
lawful possession of the property. (See Pen. Code, § 602.5 [squatting is a
misdemeanor].) And the evidence before the trial court showed that at the
time of the attack, (1) Kerrigan was aware the dogs were living with Hewett
on the property, (2) the property was listed for sale and Kerrigan, through his
agent, was inviting potential buyers and/or their agents to enter and exit the
property through the front gate that secured the property, and (3) the
landowner owned and controlled the property from which the dogs escaped.

6
In Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, the court
held a landlord who has given exclusive possession of the property to a tenant
can only be liable for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog if the landlord had
actual knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensity, which can be satisfied either
by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence the landlord must have
known about the dog’s dangerousness. This actual knowledge rule has been
followed in other cases. (See e.g., Lundy v. California Realty (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 813; Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128.) But even
landlords who have signed a lease with a tenant cannot totally abrogate their
responsibilities. (Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771,
781.) They must, for example, “inspect the premises to make the premises
reasonably safe from dangerous conditions” at those times they have access to
and control over the property. (Ibid.; see Uccello v. Laudenslayer, supra, 44
Cal.App.3d at p. 512.)

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Under these facts, there is no public policy reason like that
applicable to landlords to deviate from the general statutory duty imposed on
landowners by Civil Code section 1714. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1
Cal.5th 1132, 1143.) We measure public policy “by balancing these major
considerations: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Wylie v.
Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 416, citing Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69
Cal.2d 108, 112–113 (Rowland).)
“‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are
ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the
other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’” (Salinas,
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) “[A] danger does not have to ‘previously
manifest’ to be foreseeable. ‘“‘[T]he mere fact that a particular kind of an
accident has not happened before does not . . . show that such accident is one
which might not reasonably have been anticipated.’ [Citation.] Thus, the
fortuitous absence of prior injury does not justify relieving [a] defendant from
responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its acts.”’” (Staats v.
Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838–839.)
The issue here is whether the presence of two large pit bulls
roaming unrestrained on the property at a time when the property was
occupied by a squatter and in the process of being sold created a general risk
of foreseeable injury—the possibility the dogs would attack a passerby. We

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conclude the answer is yes. It was foreseeable the gate might be left open
while the property was being shown to potential buyers, or by Hewett, and
the dogs would escape and harm someone. (See Salinas, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [foreseeability is a crucial factor in determining the
existence and scope of the landowner’s duty].) The evidence before the court
also showed Kerrigan’s real estate agent had asked Hewett to remove the
dogs from the property while it was being shown to agents of potential
buyers, and Kerrigan was aware of that request and thought it was a good
idea.
Next, Kerrigan did not even attempt to argue it would have been
a burden on him to exercise due care regarding the dogs, including securing
the gate, posting a warning, or ensuring the dogs were controlled or removed;
nor could he. As was the case in Salinas, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 404, “the
extent of the burden imposed on [Kerrigan] to exercise due care was
minimal. . . . [U]nlike a residential landlord respondent was not required to
encroach upon his tenant’s possession and enjoyment of the property to
inspect the premises and undertake efforts to remove the dangerous
condition.” (Id. at p. 416.) Finally, “considering the final Rowland factor, we
observe that normally insurance is available for homeowners to cover the risk
that eventuated here.” (Salinas at p. 416.)
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Kerrigan failed to meet
his burden on summary judgment of showing he did not owe a duty of care to
plaintiff.7 (See Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467

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Because Kerrigan failed to meet his initial burden on summary
judgment, the burden never shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact.
Therefore, the court’s rulings on Kerrigan’s objections to the evidence
submitted by plaintiff are not at issue and we need not address them.

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[defendant has initial burden on summary judgment to demonstrate no duty
of care is owed].) As a matter of law, he did. Kerrigan had a duty on behalf of
the landowner to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably
safe condition, including the duty to use reasonable care to discover any
unsafe conditions and to repair, replace, or give adequate warning of
anything that could be reasonably expected to harm others. (See CACI No.
1001.) The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to
Kerrigan in his capacity as trustee of the landowner.
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED TO
KERRIGAN IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
The undisputed evidence before the trial court on summary
judgment was that Kerrigan did not own the dogs or the property from which
they escaped. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of
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Kerrigan in his individual capacity.

8
Plaintiff’s cause of action for strict liability was based on Civil
Code section 3342, which provides that “[t]he owner of any dog is liable for
the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public
place . . . regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s
knowledge of such viciousness.” (Id., subd. (a).)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded as to plaintiff’s
complaint against David Kerrigan in his capacity as successor trustee to the
Erma Kerrigan Trust. The judgment in favor of David Kerrigan in his
individual capacity is affirmed. Appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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