CourtListener 10596701•Berry v. Pope Valley Union Elementary School District CA1/3
Berry v. Pope Valley Union Elementary School District CA1/3
CourtListener 10596701Calctapp2 giu 2025
Testo completo
Filed 6/2/25 Berry v. Pope Valley Union Elementary School District CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CHARLES J. BERRY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171352
v.
POPE VALLEY UNION ELEMENTARY (Napa County Super. Ct.
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., No. 19CV000733)
Defendants and Respondents.
Charles J. Berry, representing himself, appeals a trial court order
awarding Pope Valley Union Elementary School District (District) and Napa
County Office of Education (NCOE, collectively defendants) attorney fees and
costs for prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16;
undesignated statutory references are to this code.) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The relevant history is set forth in our prior opinion, which we
incorporate here by reference. (Berry v. Pope Valley Union Elementary
School District (Oct. 10, 2023, A165592) [nonpub. opn.] (Berry).) We briefly
summarize the facts and provide additional details below.
Berry filed a complaint against defendants, alleging claims arising out
of his termination as a substitute teacher. (Berry, supra, A165592.) After
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several demurrers, he filed a third amended complaint alleging malicious
prosecution and undue influence against the District, and defamation,
whistleblower retaliation, due process violations, equal protection violations
under 42 United States Code section 1983, and abuse of process against both
defendants. (Berry, supra, A165592.) Defendants moved to strike the claims
under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.) The trial court struck the complaint
against the District, and all claims against the NCOE except for the
whistleblower claim. (Ibid.) It awarded the District and NCOE $8,507 and
$5,494.50 in attorney fees, respectively. (Ibid.)
Berry appealed the order. We reversed as to his procedural due process
and equal protection claims, vacated the attorney fee award, but otherwise
affirmed. (Berry, supra, A165592.) We directed the trial court to reconsider
the fee award due to the partial reversal. (Ibid.) On remand, the District
sought $10,952 of its $12,242 lodestar for litigating the anti-SLAPP motion.
In support, it submitted declarations executed under penalty of perjury that
noted two attorneys — billing at rates of $235 and $225 per hour,
respectively — spent 52.8 hours prosecuting the motion, approximately 10.4
of which were spent exclusively on the six causes of action that were
ultimately dismissed, and another 36.8 hours on research, preparation, and
other efforts overlapping with those claims. Similarly, the NCOE requested
$6,919 of its total $7,807 in attorney fees incurred litigating the anti-SLAPP
motion. The NCOE’s counsel declared under penalty of perjury that they
spent 41.6 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion, totaling $7,696 in fees. Of those
hours, counsel spent eight exclusively on the three causes of action the court
struck, and 29.4 hours on efforts that overlapped with those causes of action.
They also noted a little more than four hours was spent exclusively on efforts
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related to the causes of action that remain in the complaint. Thus, it reduced
its original request.
In opposition, Berry argued the declarations were untrustworthy —
they constituted inadequate evidence, the attorneys should have submitted
billing records to support their motion for fees, and the declarations were
hearsay. He also urged the trial court to conclude the anti-SLAPP fee-
shifting provision violates the constitutional right to petition, constitutes an
excessive fine, and that the forcible transfer of large sums of money based on
scant evidence is a due process violation.
The trial court rejected Berry’s arguments. It further concluded
defendants’ relative success in achieving their objective on the anti-SLAPP
motion was high. Accordingly, it minimally reduced the District’s requested
fee award to $9,410 — $2,410 for fees exclusively incurred on the successful
claims, and $7,000 in fees incurred on work overlapping with those claims. It
similarly noted only two causes of action against the NCOE remained after
the anti-SLAPP motion, allowing the parties to “more realistically evaluate
liability, damages, and future legal expenses.” It awarded the NCOE $5,980
of its original request, finding that it incurred $1,480 exclusively for claims
that were successful and $4,500 for overlapping work.
DISCUSSION
Defendants who prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion are entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Mann v. Quality
Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 339 (Mann).) Defendants
who partially prevail “must generally be considered a prevailing party unless
the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve
any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann, at p. 340.) Partial
success “reduces but does not eliminate the entitlement to attorney fees.”
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(ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1019–1020.)
Determining whether a party prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion is within
the trial court’s broad discretion. (Ibid.) We review an anti-SLAPP attorney
fee award for an abuse of discretion, but we independently review whether
the court used proper legal standards when making its fee determination.
(Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 619–620.)
I.
Berry contends the trial court incorrectly determined defendants were
partially prevailing parties. We disagree.
Citing Mann, the trial court assessed the extent to which the anti-
SLAPP motion advanced defendants’ litigation posture. (Mann, supra,
139 Cal.App.4th at p. 340.) It noted only two of the original eight claims
remain after the anti-SLAPP motion. Indeed, the motion successfully
eliminated defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
whistleblower retaliation, and undue influence claims arising out of alleged
conduct or statements by students, other employees, defense counsel, or
Berry’s own complaints about defendants’ educational content. (Berry, supra,
A165592.) Those claims have little factual or legal overlap with the
remaining procedural due process and equal protection claims — that
defendants failed to provide meaningful procedures before terminating Berry
as a substitute teacher and they treated him differently based on his age and
gender, respectively. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office
of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212 [requiring notice and opportunity to
be heard to precede any deprivation]; Peters v. Lieuallen (9th Cir. 1984)
746 F.2d 1390, 1393 [plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants acted with
intent to discriminate to prove a violation of federal equal protection clause].)
Eliminating those claims thus “narrowed the scope of the lawsuit” and
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limited discovery of the facts necessary to support the remaining claims.
(Mann, at p. 340.)
The motion further “narrow[ed] the litigation with respect to” damages,
particularly those based on defendants’ statements made in the context of
judicial proceedings, investigations, or other government agencies. (Mann,
supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 340 [noting defendants’ reports to government
entities precluded recovery on trade libel claim]; O’Hara v. Storer
Communications, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1101, 1115 [economic loss in
employment and time lost from work are special damages in defamation
cases]; Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1158
[“Exemplary damages are available in tort actions”].) That Berry may
recover damages on his remaining claims does not demonstrate defendants
failed to prevail on the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants recover fees and
costs “only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation.” (Christian
Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) The achieved
results were not “ ‘so insignificant that [the NCOE and District] did not
achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.’ ” (Lin v. City of
Pleasanton (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1159.)
Berry’s contrary arguments fail to persuade. Nothing requires a
defendant to successfully strike every challenged claim to be considered a
prevailing party. (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 339.) Defendants’
“lack of success on a portion of the motion” is “relevant to the amount of fees
awarded,” not the determination of whether they were prevailing parties.
(Ibid.) And his contention that a defendant must eliminate all factual issues
to be considered a prevailing party fares no better. Rather than citing case
law or identifying factual issues that must be determined in his procedural
due process and equal protection claims, he merely posits questions the court
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must decide — e.g., “[d]id this fact contribute to the stigma necessary for a
name-clearing hearing,” (underscore omitted) “[i]s this fact something that
Berry would proffer in a due process hearing to show his innocence” — before
asserting “every fact is still on the table.” We disregard the arguments given
his failure to discuss the application of relevant legal authority to the facts of
this case. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277
[disregarding conclusory arguments unsupported by legal authority].)
Finally, we reject Berry’s request to order defendants to pay his costs
on appeal, before he pays any attorney fees to defendants as prevailing
parties on the anti-SLAPP motion. As the trial court concluded, the relevant
motion at issue was defendants’ entitlement to fees under the anti-SLAPP
statute, not enforcement of his costs on his prior appeal.
In sum, Berry has not demonstrated any error or abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s determination that defendants are prevailing parties.
II.
Next, Berry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
attorney fee awards. We are unpersuaded.
First, Berry contends defendants improperly submitted declarations of
counsel rather than billing records to support their attorney fee requests.
Despite acknowledging there is no case law requiring parties to submit
billing records, he argues the trial court should have drawn adverse
inferences against defendants because the declarations were weak and less
satisfactory evidence than billing records. (Evid. Code, §§ 412 [if “weaker and
less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within” the party’s power “to
produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should
be viewed with distrust”], 413 [authorizing court to consider a party’s willful
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suppression of evidence when determining inferences to draw from the
evidence against a party].) We disagree.
Anti-SLAPP attorney fee awards must be based on a “ ‘careful
compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each
attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132; Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486.) Courts “ ‘have discretion to award fees based on
declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s
own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.’ ” (Syers Properties III,
Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698.) Declarations of counsel
describing the work they have performed are not less satisfactory evidence
than billing records. Courts “ ‘do not require detailed time records.’ ” (Ibid.)
Indeed, courts should not “ ‘ “ ‘become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of
every detailed facet of the professional representation.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 699.)
Consistent with this authority, defendants supported their fee requests with
declarations that included attestations on the amount of time each attorney
spent on each claim. Consequently, no adverse inference against defendants
was required. Berry’s conclusory invocation of the “ ‘best evidence available’ ”
doctrine and citing cases for establishing lost profits or damages does not
demonstrate otherwise. (See, e.g., Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 958, 964; Ojala v. Bohlin (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 292,
304; Hutcherson v. Alexander (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 126, 135.) The lack of
time records and billing statements did not deprive “the trial court of
substantial evidence to support an award.” (Weber v. Langholz (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587.)
Second, we reject Berry’s suggestion that the attorney fee award is
improper because defendants did not demonstrate they paid their counsel.
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Section 425.16 provides a “prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike
shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” (Id.,
subd. (c).) This includes recovery of fees attorneys have accrued on a
defendant’s behalf. (Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 283.)
Defendants “need not have paid the fees in order to receive an award.” (Id. at
pp. 285, 283 [construing § 425.16, subd. (c) “to permit recovery of attorney
fees that are accrued by outside counsel representing a party on a partial pro
bono basis, where counsel has not waived the right to seek recovery of the
attorney fees from third parties, such as insurers, but only from the client”].)
The declarations established defendants incurred attorney fees. The verified
statements of the attorneys’ time “ ‘are entitled to credence,’ ” and Berry fails
to identify anything demonstrating they were clearly erroneous. (City of
Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785.)
Relatedly, Berry contends the declarations are insufficient to support
the attorney fee awards because they contain hearsay. For instance, he
argues one declaration submitted in support of the NCOE’s attorney fee
request improperly represented the time records of an associate no longer
employed by the firm, the declaration lacks dates of purported billings, and it
falsely claims personal knowledge of counsel’s work. Other declarations, he
argues, are improperly based upon “ ‘information and belief,’ ” are being used
despite the lack of any representations the billing records are lost or too
voluminous, and are improperly based on attorney recollections. But
determining whether the declarations contained inadmissible hearsay is
unnecessary because, “for the purpose of fixing attorney’s fees,” the trial court
“is not bound by technical rules of evidence, since it is not trying an issue in
the case and is merely seeking information upon which to base its order.”
(Frank v. Frank (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 135, 138.)
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Moreover, declarations from a single attorney, reviewing billing records
and attesting to the work of others, may support fee requests. (See, e.g.,
Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 63–64; Margolin v.
Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1007.) To the extent
Berry challenges factual assertions in the declarations, including challenges
to hourly rates, the court “presided over the entire matter and was well able
to evaluate whether the time expended by counsel in this case, given its
complexity and other factors, was reasonable.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v.
Rankin, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 700, 702.) We also do not address
Berry’s additional argument that defendants must demonstrate their fees by
clear and convincing evidence, an argument that he makes for the first time
on appeal. (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489.)
The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by relying on the
declarations.1
III.
Finally, we reject Berry’s constitutional challenges to section 425.16’s
fee-shifting provision. First, there is no merit to his argument that the trial
court erred by granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion because they failed to
demonstrate he intended to chill their free speech — according to Berry, a
required anti-SLAPP element — and consequently, defendants are not
entitled to fees. Berry should have challenged the order on those grounds in
the prior appeal. (Payne v. Rader (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576; Berry,
supra, A165592.) Allowing him to raise this issue now would improperly give
him two appeals from the same order. (Rader, at p. 1576.)
1 Berry challenges defendants’ entitlement to attorney fees and use of
the declarations; he does not address the amount awarded. Neither do we.
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Second, section 425.16’s fee-shifting provision is not an indirect
restraint on Berry’s constitutional right to petitions. It is intended to
discourage “strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the
litigation costs on the party seeking to ‘chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) It “subjects
to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot ‘state[]
and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
29 Cal.4th 82, 93.) The statute does not hinder the “constitutional right to
petition the court to redress legitimate grievances.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the
provision is content neutral, “primarily designed to promote and encourage
protected conduct” — applying “to all unmeritorious lawsuits premised on
acts taken in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional rights of petition
or free speech, regardless of the point of view espoused by the plaintiff.”
(Schroeder v. Irvine City Council (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 174, 196, 197.)
Berry’s reliance on section 425.17 — excepting certain causes of action
arising from commercial speech or actions brought solely in the public
interest — to demonstrate otherwise is misplaced. Those exceptions merely
regulate or restrict a defendant’s “ ‘ability as a litigant to seek dismissal of
certain lawsuits at a particular stage of the litigation,’ ” they do not regulate
or restrict speech. (Physicians Com. for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods,
Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.)
Next, we reject Berry’s argument that the trial court violated his due
process rights by awarding attorney fees established by declarations.
Governments must provide persons with due process, such as notice and
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, before depriving them of
any property or liberty interest. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I,
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§ 7, subd. (a); Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of
Education, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 212.) Berry has not demonstrated any
violation of these constitutional provisions. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [appellate argument
forfeited when featuring “conclusory arguments”].)
Finally, the anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision is not an excessive fine
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment — “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) The
excessive fines clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments,
whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’ ” (Austin v.
United States (1993) 509 U.S. 602, 609–610,italics omitted.) That protection
has no application here. The anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision simply
requires “the party that creates the costs to bear them.” (Equilon Enterprises
v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 62.) It does not punish parties
or make them liable for filing a complaint. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting defendants’ motion for attorney fees is affirmed.
Defendants are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278 (a).)
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A171352; Berry v. Pope Valley Union Elem. School Dist. et al.
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