CourtListener 10595670•Finley v. Gantz CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/30/25 Finley v. Gantz CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ELIZABETH J. FINLEY et al., D082623
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
ERIK GANTZ, 00004914-CU-BC-CTL)
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed.
Dinsmore & Shohl, John H. Stephens and George A Rios III for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall, Rebecca L.
Reed, Alex G. Brizolis and Megan E. Dawson for Defendant and Respondent.
This case is a dispute among homeowners arising from construction on
one lot of improvements affecting views and privacy at a nearby lot.
Elizabeth J. Finley and Cynthia A. Adams contend: (1) that the extension of
a deck on a lot owned by Erik Gantz and the placement of a “yurt-type
structure” atop the deck is in breach of covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(CC&Rs) governing the community in which the two lots are located; (2) that
these structures, and activities associated with them, constitute a nuisance;
and (3) that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise as to each
contention. We disagree with Finley and Adams. Thus we affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
The parties’ properties are situated above a canyon in the Pacific Beach
community of San Diego and comprise part of a tract developed circa the
1960’s called Pacifica Unit No. 5, with Gantz’s property located two lots to the
south of Finley and Adams’s property. Each lot includes a single-family
house and—in its backyard—a pool, patio, and deck with views across the
canyon.
Finley and Adams purchased their lot, and Gantz purchased his lot, in
2015. Opinions regarding the quality of the southerly view from the
Finley/Adams property at that time vary. According to Finley and Adams’s
expert, the view “included Pacific Beach, Mission Bay, Point Loma, and the
distant ocean”; and, according to Finley and Adams, the view was
“expansive.” But in the opinion of Gantz’s expert, it was “marginal.”
In early 2017, a contractor hired by Gantz commenced work on a
project that would result in replacement of Gantz’s old deck with a new deck;
extension of the deck, atop a substructure of pillars or piers, some distance
into the canyon;1 and construction of what Finley and Adams have described
1 Finley and Adams assert that, as a result of the project discussed
above, Gantz’s deck now “extends another twenty feet into the canyon beyond
his pre-existing deck, about tripling its size.” Although they have invited our
attention to copies of architectural diagrams in the record to support this
assertion, the copy quality of those diagrams renders us unable to discern the
numbers or texts set forth in them. Thus the diagrams’ value as evidentiary
support is limited. Be this as it may, Gantz does not appear to dispute that
the new deck extends into the canyon a significant distance beyond the deck
that preceded it.
2
as a yurt-type structure (to which we refer as the gazebo2) atop the extended
deck. On August 21, 2017 (well into the construction process), the city issued
a permit for the deck; and, on April 24, 2018, the city approved a change in
the permit’s scope to include the addition of the gazebo. Then on, July 6,
2018, after the project had been completed, the city issued its final approval.
During 2017 and 2018—at a time when the project was well underway
but not yet completed—Finley, Adams, and other neighbors met with their
city council representative, communicated with city code enforcement,
engaged in community organizing activities (discussed post), and eventually
reached out to Gantz in an effort to stop the project or reduce its scale.3 But
those efforts did not achieve a resolution. Thus, in 2019, Finley and Adams
initiated this lawsuit.
In the operative complaint (the verified first amended complaint),
Finley and Adams asserted two claims—breach of contract and nuisance.
The claims proceeded to a five-day bench trial that included site visits by the
2 The gazebo is oval, made of wood, and includes a pitched roof supported
by posts along its perimeter. Comprising most of the perimeter (between the
posts) is a horizontal rail, rising less than half the height from the deck to the
eaves, interspersed with balusters. Comprising the remainder of the
perimeter are a wall that extends approximately one third to one quarter of
the way around, rising from the deck to the eaves; and, between two of the
posts, a floor-to-eaves opening to permit ingress and egress. The gazebo
includes removeable, weatherproof fabric, floor-to-ceiling walls, with
windows, that can be zipped together to completely enclose the structure,
thereby giving it a yurt-like appearance. It is eleven feet tall at its highest
point, and is nineteen feet wide and thirteen feet deep.
3 Finley and Adams have focused substantial attention on details of the
prelitigation efforts to put a stop to the project; however, we do not dwell on
those details because, for reasons discussed post, they are irrelevant to our
resolution of this appeal.
3
trial judge, accompanied by each party’s counsel, to both the Finley/Adams
property and the Gantz property. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
entered judgment against Finley and Adams, and in favor of Gantz, on both
claims.
Finley and Adams timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Finley and Adams contend the trial court erred in
ruling that Gantz was not liable for breach of contract or nuisance.
A. The Breach of Contract Claim
The breach of contract claim is rooted in the CC&Rs. Hence we must
identify, interpret, and apply the CC&Rs.
1. The Applicable CC&Rs
It may seem odd to say we must identify the CC&Rs; however, this case
presents a somewhat unusual situation in that the parties disagree as to
which of three documents constitutes the set (or sets) of CC&Rs that govern.
These three documents are: a “Declaration of Restrictions” recorded in 1962
(original CC&Rs); an “Amended and Restated Declaration of Restrictions”
recorded on January 16, 2018 (first amended CC&Rs); and a second
(identically named) “Amended and Restated Declaration of Restrictions”
recorded on February 28, 2018 (second amended CC&Rs).
The parties agree the original CC&Rs were in effect from a date before
they purchased their lots until a date no earlier than January 16, 2018. But
they disagree as to what if any effect should be given to the amended CC&Rs.
Specifically, Finley and Adams contend the first amended CC&Rs took effect,
and superseded the original CC&Rs, on January 16, 2018, and that the
second amended CC&Rs took effect, and superseded the first amended
4
CC&Rs, on February 28, 2018.4 By contrast, Gantz contends neither of the
amended CC&Rs ever took effect because each failed to comply with
provisions in the original CC&Rs governing the process for making
amendments and, as a consequence, that the original CC&Rs continued in
effect. We need not wade into the parties’ dispute regarding the validity of
the amended CC&Rs because, for reasons discussed post, we conclude that
construction of the deck and gazebo was substantially completed prior to the
dates that Finley and Adams say the amended CC&Rs took effect.5 Thus,
the applicable CC&Rs for our purposes are the original CC&Rs.
2. Interpretation of CC&Rs and Standard of Review
In interpreting the original CC&Rs, we commence with the observation
that the “ ‘ “same rules that apply to interpretation of contracts apply to the
interpretation of CC&R’s.” ’ ” (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern
California Investors, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 809, 818; see also Eisen
v. Tavangarian (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 626, 635 (Eisen); Zabrucky v.
McAdams (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 618, 622 (Zabrucky).) Among these rules
are the rule that “[t]he language of a contract is to govern its
4 The parties agree the two amended CC&Rs are substantively identical
to one another. Finley and Adams attribute the filing of two sets of amended
CC&Rs to “a mix-up.” They say the second amended CC&Rs were recorded
because the first amended CC&Rs “had hand-written notes” on them but that
“the content [of the two sets of amended CC&Rs] was the same.” In keeping
with this explanation, Gantz characterizes the second amended CC&Rs as “a
clean version of” the first amended CC&Rs.
5 It should be understood that our use of the term CC&Rs to refer to the
document recorded on January 16, 2018, and the document recorded on
February 28, 2018, is not to be construed as a validation of either document.
We express no view as to whether either of these two documents ever took
effect because neither is material to our analysis.
5
interpretation . . . if the language is clear and explicit” (Civ. Code, § 1638)
and the rule that the contract is to be construed as a whole so as to give effect
to every part. (Civ. Code, § 1641.) “ ‘Where, as here, the trial court’s
interpretation of . . . CC&R’s does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic
evidence, we independently interpret the meaning of the written
instrument.’ ” (Eisen, at p. 635; accord Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch
Beach Homeowners Assn. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1111.)
In interpreting CC&Rs, we are further guided by the principles that “a
landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property;”
that “ ‘ “the law is reluctant to imply such a right;” ’ ” and that, “[a]though
such a right may be created through adoption of enforceable CC&R’s
[citation], “ ‘[i]t is a general rule that restrictive covenants are construed
strictly against the person seeking to enforce them, and any doubt will be
resolved in favor of the free use of land.’ ” (Eisen, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 635; see also Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) This said,
however, we also are guided by the principle “ ‘that the “ ‘intent of the parties
and the object of the [CC&Rs] should govern, giving the instrument a just
and fair interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (Zabrucky, at p. 622; see also Eisen, at p. 636
[court’s “ ‘duty [is] to interpret the [CC&Rs] “in a way that is both reasonable
and carries out the intended purpose of the contract” ’ ”].)
While interpretation of CC&Rs is de novo, a determination as to
whether CC&Rs as interpreted have been breached is based on the
substantial evidence standard.
“This traditional standard of review is highly
deferential. It has three pillars. First, we accept all
evidence supporting the trial court’s order. Second, we
completely disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all
reasonable inferences to affirm the trial court. . . . Under
6
this standard of review, parties challenging a trial court’s
factfinding bear an ‘ “enormous burden.” ’ [Citation.]
“If substantial evidence supports factual findings,
those findings must not be disturbed on appeal. [Citation.]
“Inferences favorable to appellants may create conflicts in
the evidence, but that is of no consequence. [Citation.]
When a civil appeal challenges findings of fact, the
appellate court’s power begins and ends with a
determination of whether there is any substantial
evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the
trial court findings. [Citation.] We must therefore view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]
“Our job is only to see if substantial evidence exists to
support the verdict in favor of the prevailing party, not to
determine whether substantial evidence might support the
losing party’s version of events.” (Schmidt v. Superior
Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582.)
See also Eisenberg et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs
(The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 8:52, p. 8-26 [“The testimony of a single credible
witness—even if a party to the action—may constitute ‘substantial
evidence.’ ”]; In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614 [“ ‘The
testimony of a witness, even the party himself, may be sufficient.’ ”]; Rupf
v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429, fn. 5 [“ ‘So long as there is “substantial
evidence,” the appellate court must affirm . . . even if the reviewing justices
personally would have ruled differently had they presided over the
proceedings below, and even if other substantial evidence would have
supported a different result. Stated another way, when there is substantial
evidence in support of the trial court’s decision, the reviewing court has no
power to substitute its deductions.’ ”].)
7
We note further that a finder of fact’s view of premises in dispute itself
qualifies as “independent and substantial evidence” (Vaughn v. De Kreek
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 671, 678 (Vaughn)) and that, even though such
“evidence . . . from its very nature is not incorporated in the written record,”
we nonetheless “are required to presume that [it] supports the . . . judgment.”
(Anderson v. State (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 140, 145 (Anderson) “Evidence
obtained by the trier of fact viewing the premises has been held sufficient to
support a judgment.” (Ibid.)
Finally, it should be understood that in reviewing the proceedings
below we do not confine our analysis to the rationale the trial court has
supplied for its decision. To the contrary, “[w]e review the judgment, not the
reasoning of the court below.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 761, 769; see also Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568 [“There is perhaps no rule of review more
firmly established than the principle that a ruling or decision correct in law
will not be disturbed on appeal merely because it was given for the wrong
reason. If correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment
will be sustained regardless of the considerations that moved the lower court
to its conclusion.”]; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 246 [holding in
connection with application of substantial evidence standard that “ ‘ “[w]e
uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, ‘regardless of the
correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion.’
[Citation.] ‘It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject
of review.’ ” ’ ”]; Ramirez v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 218,
223 [“ ‘ “If the decision of the lower court is right, the judgment or order will
be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court
reached its conclusion.” ’ ”].)
8
With these principles in mind, we now turn our attention to the CC&Rs
at issue in this case.
3. Analysis
In their arguments directed at the original CC&Rs, Finley and Adams
focus primarily on four specific paragraphs of those CC&Rs and on what they
contend are enforceable view protections that may be inferred from those
CC&Rs and from other circumstances. The four referenced paragraphs, each
of which Finley and Adams say Gantz breached, read as follows:
“1. No lot shall be used except for single-family
residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered,
placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one
single-family dwelling not to exceed one story in height,
above said lot’s frontage street, or when the specific
approval of the Architectural Control Committee has been
obtained, one single-family dwelling, two stories in height,
above said lot’s frontage street.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“3. No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on
upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which
may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“5. No structure of a temporary character, trailer,
basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding
shall be used or stored on any lot at any time as a
residence, either temporarily or permanently.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“10. No building shall be erected, placed, or altered
(including but not limited to the addition of patio covers,
fences over forty-two (42) inches in height, shelter covers,
carports, pumphouses, or any other type of structure) on
any lot until the construction plans and specifications and a
9
plan showing the location of the structure have been
approved by the Architectural Control Committee as to
quality of workmanship and materials, harmony of external
design with existing structures, location, or as to any other
consideration within the discretion of the Architectural
Control Committee.”
We shall now address each of these paragraphs, albeit in an order that
deviates from the sequence in which they appear in the original CC&Rs. So
doing, we begin with paragraph 5.
a. Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5 lists eight things (a structure of a temporary character, a
trailer, a basement, a tent, a shack, a garage, a barn, and what it refers to as
any other outbuilding), and says that none of these things may ever be “used
or stored” on the property “as a residence” (italics added). The trial court
found that neither the deck nor the gazebo had been used as a residence, and
the record includes substantial evidence to support this finding. Such
evidence includes this testimony of Gantz:
“Q. Is this gazebo plumbed?
“A. It is not.
“Q. So there’s no running water in there?
“A. No, there’s not.
“Q. And no one’s ever lived in there, have they?
“A. No. No. Never.
“Q. Never?
“A. No one’s ever slept in it. I mean it’s basically an
outdoor living room that we just hang out when we’re
outside. That’s it.”
10
On the basis of this substantial evidence, we conclude the trial court
did not err in concluding that construction of the deck and gazebo did not
breach paragraph 5.6
b. Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10 says that “[n]o building shall be erected, placed, or
altered” absent certain approvals from the Architectural Control Committee.
The parties agree that the architectural control committee disbanded many
years prior to 2015 (when they each acquired their respective properties);
that it did not exist when construction activities on the Gantz property
commenced in early 2017; and that it still did not exist at the start of
6 Finley and Adams contend “the intent of paragraph 5 is to prohibit
structures that can be converted to a residence.” But this interpretation
clashes with the plain meaning of paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 does not say:
no outbuilding that could be converted into a residence shall be used or
stored on the property. Instead it says: “[n]o . . . outbuilding shall be used or
stored . . . as a residence.”
Finley and Adams also draw a distinction among the eight different
categories of things listed in paragraph 5. To illustrate this distinction they
say: “It would not be a reasonable interpretation of the paragraph to prohibit
garages or basements though those structures could be converted to a
residence. On the other hand, it would not be reasonable either to allow
trailers, shacks or barns as long as they are not being used as a residence.”
But paragraph 5 makes no such distinction.
11
November 2017.7 However, the trial court found that “[t]he deck
construction . . . was substantially completed in October 2017,” that “[t]he
gazebo was installed as of October 28, 2017” and, consequently, that, “[a]t the
time [Gantz] commenced construction of the deck/gazebo and at the time of
7 Each party offers contradictory accounts as to when (and, in the case of
Gantz, even whether) the architectural control committee was reconstituted.
Thus, for example, in one passage of their briefs, Finley and Adams say “the
three-member ACC, including plaintiff Finley, was selected” “on November
17, 2017.” In another passage, they say “the new ACC was elected in
December 2017.” And in yet a third passage, they say “the new ACC was in
place” “as of mid-January 2018.” In similar fashion, Gantz, in one passage of
his briefs, concedes the committee was “newly constituted” at some point
during the November 2017 through February 2018 timeframe and, in another
passage, says “[t]he earliest the ACC was reconstituted was on January 16,
2018.” Yet, in other passages, he refers to the committee as having been
“purportedly reconstituted” (italics added) and “not validly reconstituted” at
all. We express no view as to when, or if, the architectural control committee
was validly reconstituted.
12
their completion,[8] there was no architectural control committee in
existence.”
Thus, in the trial court’s words, it would have been “impossible for
[Gantz] to perform (i.e., submit to and receive approval from an architectural
8 We presume the court’s reference to “the time of [the deck and gazebo’s]
completion” is intended to refer to those structures’ substantial completion
during the October 2017 timeframe, as it is undisputed that some additional
construction work on the structures occurred between substantial completion
and final city approval. Finley and Adams contend this additional
construction work qualified as alterations to the residence on the Gantz
property and thus ran afoul of the restriction in paragraph 10 requiring that
“[n]o building shall be erected, placed, or altered . . . until the construction
plans and specifications and a plan showing the location of the structure have
been approved by the Architectural Control Committee” (italics added). But
this line of reasoning strikes us as problematic in several ways. First,
neither party offers a practical suggestion (or any suggestion) as to what
manner of improvement—application of a coat of varnish? installation of an
electrical outlet? addition of window blinds?—should qualify as an alteration.
Second, even if we were to recognize in a newly reconstituted architectural
control committee some authority over the remaining finishing touches that
were to be added to the deck and gazebo, it is evident that such authority
would not bring Finley and Adams the relief they seek—which is liberation
from what they have described as the “looming presence” of the gazebo and
extended deck. Third, the general rule (discussed ante) that restrictive
covenants are to be construed strictly against the person seeking to enforce
them, with any doubt being resolved in favor of the free use of land, weighs
conclusively against a construction that would effectively tell a homeowner
that, until the final shingle has been placed on the roof of his new
outbuilding, he is at risk of a committee springing to life that could require
demolition of the entire structure.
13
control committee that did not exist).”9 (See Eisen, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 641 [holding, in situation in which architectural control committee had
ceased to exist, that “the absence of an entity with the authority to review
and approve building plans nullifies that requirement as a precondition to
proceeding with renovations and remodeling”]; Mineral Park Land Co. v.
Howard (1916) 172 Cal. 289, 292 [“It is . . . well settled that where
performance depends upon the existence of a given thing, and such existence
was assumed as the basis of the agreement, performance is excused to the
extent that the thing ceases to exist or turns out to be nonexistent.”]; Civ.
Code § 1596 [“The object of a contract must be . . . possible . . . by the time the
contract is to be performed.”].)
The record includes substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that the construction/installation of the deck/gazebo was
substantially complete before the earliest of the months—November 2017
(see ante)—in which Finley and Adams have suggested the architectural
9 In an e-mail dated November 15, 2017, Judy Nugent, a neighbor who
testified in support of Finley and Adams framed the matter this way: “Per
our 1962 CCR’s, [Gantz] was required to submit a building permit request to
the ACC prior to applying, however, since we had no committee, we are going
to have difficulty pursuing this case legally. We need to get this committee in
force ASAP to stand a chance to deal with this structure.” In a subsequent e-
mail, another neighbor, David Bricken, wrote: “[Gantz’s] attorney definitely
has a leg to stand on with the point she made about the ACC attempting to
retro-actively enforce the ‘revised’ [CC&R]s that were recently passed, and
which weren’t in place at the time of construction of the structure on the
deck.”
14
control committee was reconstituted.10 Such evidence includes testimony of
Finley that, “[i]n October 2017, most of the deck structure and surface were
completed,” and “the deck and the structure it sits atop was there at the
property in October of 2017.” It also includes this testimony of Adams:
“Q. Do you recall when it was that the yurt was actually
placed on the deck?
“A. I do.
“Q. When is that?
“A. It was, I believe, October 27th or 28th in ‘17. . . . The
kit for the framing went up in one day. They spent
many weeks finishing it after that, but it went up in
one day.”
10 The parties focus substantial attention on equitable issues relating to
the sequence of events and passage of time. Thus, for example, Gantz argues
(and, in finding laches, the trial court agreed) that he was prejudiced as a
result of Finley and Adams having delayed, until after the deck was
substantially complete, before surfacing their concerns to him. For their
part, Finley and Adams argue that—notwithstanding the fact that the city
issued permits for the project and approved the construction after the project
had been completed—Gantz should be penalized because construction began
months before the permits issued. Citing Civil Code section 3517 (“[n]o one
can take advantage of his own wrong”), they argue Gantz “would not have
been anywhere near substantial completion of the deck, and the yurt would
not have existed when the new ACC became effective, had he not done
construction without permits.” Insofar as the affirmative defense of laches is
concerned, we need not address the matter because (as discussed post) we
conclude Finley and Adams have not established a breach of contract or
nuisance. As for application of section 3517, we note that determinations
under this maxim are a matter of judicial discretion (In re Brandie W. (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 110, 113), and we are not of the view that the trial court
abused its discretion in according little if any weight to the construction of
the deck and gazebo having been commenced prematurely.
15
In addition, the evidence includes a photograph (exhibit 102) dated
October 28, 2017, that reveals what could be described as a substantially
completed deck and gazebo and about which Finley testified as follows:
“Q. Was this the state of the deck and gazebo as far as you
understood as of this date, October 28, 2017?
“A. Yes.
“Q. At this time, October 28, 2017, there was no
architectural control committee for Pacifica Unit
Number 5, was there?
“A. Not to my knowledge.
“Q. In fact, the first time you’re aware that an ACC has
existed in the neighborhood is January 2018; isn’t that
right?
“A. January ’18 is when the reconstituted ACC occurred.”
On the basis of this substantial evidence, we conclude that construction
of neither the deck nor the gazebo breached paragraph 10.
c. Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 requires an analysis that is somewhat more complicated
than our analyses of paragraphs 5 and 10. It says “[n]o building shall be
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one
single-family dwelling” (italics added). Finley and Adams argue the gazebo
should be classified as a “building” within the meaning of this passage. But
we conclude otherwise. Our conclusion in this regard is informed primarily
by a comparison of paragraphs 1, 5, and 10.
Paragraph 5 makes clear that it is permissible for a property owner to
use or store on his property any of eight categories of things other than or in
addition to the single-family dwelling contemplated in paragraph 1.
Pursuant to paragraph 5, these eight categories of things include: a
16
“structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage,
barn or other outbuilding,” as long as it is not serving as a residence. In
other words, such items (to the extent not used as residences) are allowable,
notwithstanding the requirement in paragraph 1 that the only kind of
“building” allowable is “one single-family dwelling.” Consequently, the term
“building” must be construed narrowly so as to exclude from its meaning each
of those eight things.
Turning to paragraph 10, it makes clear that (subject to the approval of
an architectural control committee) a property owner may “alter[]” a
“building” by adding any of six types of structures to it. Pursuant to
paragraph 10, these six types of structures include: “patio covers, fences over
forty-two (42) inches in height, shelter covers, carports, pumphouses, or any
other type of structure.” Inasmuch as each of these types of structures is an
item the introduction of which paragraph 10 classifies as an alteration to a
building, it cannot itself be a building.
A deck is not any of the eight categories of things listed in paragraph 5,
nor of course is it a building. Instead, it is an “other type of structure” within
the meaning of paragraph 10. That is, a deck is a structure with which a
building may be “altered” within the meaning of that paragraph.
Unlike a deck, a gazebo (or a yurt or “yurt-like structure”) is not so
easily classified. Depending on its design and composition, it could
reasonably be classified as a “shack . . . or other outbuilding” (paragraph 5) or
as a “patio cover[], . . . shelter cover[], . . . or any other type of structure”
(paragraph 10). And it could be classified (in addition or instead) as
something other than any of the eight categories of things or six types of
structures set forth in paragraphs 5 and 10. Indeed, depending on its design
and composition, it could even be classified as a building.
17
However, returning to paragraph 1 and reviewing the evidence in the
record, we conclude that classifying the gazebo in this case as a building
would clash with the meaning of that paragraph’s second sentence: “No
building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot
other than one single-family dwelling not to exceed one story in height, above
said lot’s frontage street, or when the specific approval of the architectural
control committee has been obtained, one single-family dwelling, two stories
in height, above said lot’s frontage street.” Certainly, it is reasonable to
construe this sentence as proscribing the presence on the property of a
commercial office building. That would violate the single-family-residence
use restriction. So too would it be reasonable to construe the sentence as
proscribing the presence, or alteration, of a multi-family dwelling or of a
dwelling exceeding two stories in height, as that would violate the use or
height restriction. But proscribing the presence or alteration of an
outbuilding (paragraph 5), or the alteration of a dwelling through the
addition of “any other type of structure” (paragraph 10), would place
paragraph 1 in direct conflict with paragraphs 5 and 10. For in such a
scenario, no outbuilding or other structure on the property, apart from a
single-family dwelling, (e.g., no outbuilding allowable under paragraph 5 and
no structure allowable under paragraph 10) could ever be altered.
For all of these reasons, to construe the original CC&Rs as a whole so
as to give effect to every part, we conclude the term “building” must be
construed narrowly. Applying a narrow construction of the term building,
accepting the trial court’s finding (see ante) that neither the deck nor the
gazebo had been used as a residence, and finding substantial evidence in the
record that the gazebo—which as noted above is unplumbed—is ill-suited for
use as a dwelling or residence, we further conclude that the gazebo does not
18
qualify as a “building” within the meaning of the CC&Rs. Instead it is either
an “outbuilding”11 or an “other structure.”12 (See People v. Smith (1994)
21 Cal.App.4th 942, 951 [defining “outbuilding” as “[a] small building
appurtenant to a main building, and generally separated from it; e.g.,
outhouse; storage shed” and as “[s]omething used in connection with a main
building,” quoting Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. (1979) p. 993, col. 1.)].)
d. Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3 differs from paragraphs 1, 5, and 10 in that it addresses
activities rather than buildings, structures, or things. It says “[n]o noxious or
offensive activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done
thereon which may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood.” Inasmuch as paragraph 3’s invocation of the term nuisance
implicates our analysis of Finley and Adams’s separate claim for nuisance,
we defer an examination of paragraph 3 to our discussion below under the
heading “Nuisance.”
e. Implied View Protections
As noted above, Finley and Adams’s breach of contract argument
focuses not only on paragraphs 1, 3, 5, and 10 of the original CC&Rs, but also
on view protections they contend should be inferred (i) from height, setback,
landscape, fencing, and architectural control restrictions set forth in the
original CC&Rs and (ii) from the manner in which the developer of Pacifica
Unit No. 5 oriented the development’s lots, and the houses it built on those
lots, when it developed the tract circa the 1960s. In support of this
11 Finley and Adams concede the gazebo is an outbuilding.
12 Of course it is conceivable that someone might one day begin using the
gazebo, either as is or in some altered form, as a residence. But, in that
event, the gazebo would fall out of compliance with paragraphs 1 and 5 of the
original CC&Rs.
19
argument, they rely principally on Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 618.13
But Zabrucky is not particularly helpful to Finley and Adams’s cause.
Zabrucky involved a coastal development in which the owners of one
coastal residential property objected to the plans of adjoining residential
property owners to add an addition to their home. (Zabrucky, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 620.) At issue was whether the addition would violate the
community’s CC&Rs. (Id., at p. 619.) In discussing the CC&Rs, the court of
appeal made the unremarkable observation that a beautiful ocean view is
valuable. (See id. at pp. 623–624.)
Using this observation as a springboard, Finley and Adams contend the
restrictions imposed by the CC&Rs at issue in Zabrucky are similar to those
imposed by the CC&Rs at issue in this case. Focusing in particular on what
they refer to as “the paragraph limiting landscaping” in the Zabrucky
CC&Rs, they point out that the court of appeal in Zabrucky “found it highly
unlikely that the framers of the paragraph intended to limit its protections to
fences, hedges and landscaping, and not structures that ‘might significantly
destroy views and value of homes.’ Zabrucky, at p. 624.” Then they imply
that it is for this reason that that court interpreted “the paragraph limiting
landscaping” in such a manner as to protect views generally, rather than just
“limit[ing] its protections to fences, hedges and landscaping.”
But the implied representation that “the paragraph [in the Zabrucky
CC&Rs] limiting landscaping” referred only to landscaping is misleading. As
revealed in a side-by-side comparison, “the paragraph limiting landscaping”
in the Zabrucky case (paragraph 11) differs substantially from the paragraph
13 Finley and Adams also rely on King v. Kugler (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d
651; however, in that case the defendants admitted that the purpose of the
CC&Rs provision in issue was “to preserve . . . views.” (Id., at p. 653.)
20
limiting landscaping in the present case, in that the former by its express
terms imposes an expansive prohibition against the introduction of view
obstructions whereas the prohibition imposed by the latter is exceedingly
narrow.
Zabrucky v. McAdams Finley v. Gantz
Paragraph 11 Paragraph 7
“No fences or hedges exceeding “No trees or shrubs shall be
three feet in height shall be allowed to grow in such a manner
erected or permitted to remain as to impair view of neighboring
between the street and the properties.”
front set-back line nor shall any
tree, shrub or other
landscaping be planted or any
structures erected that may at
present or in the future obstruct
the view from any other lot . . .”
(Zabrucky, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 622 (italics
added).)
As can be seen, unlike paragraph 7 from the Pacifica Unit 5 CC&Rs,
paragraph 11 from the Zabrucky CC&Rs by its express terms applied,
expansively, to any structure that might ever obstruct a view from any lot.
Commenting on paragraph 11 and the CC&Rs of which it was a part,
the Zabrucky court observed that those CC&Rs “and especially . . . paragraph
11 . . . form [the] only bulwark against rampant expansions of existing
residences that would obstruct views and depreciate land values throughout
the entire . . . neighborhood.” (Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 624,
italics added.) Simply stated, that bulwark is absent—not implicit—in the
original CC&Rs in the present case.
Certainly, the CC&Rs at issue in the present case include restrictions
(e.g., requirements governing height, setback, landscape, fencing, and
21
architectural-control matters) that protect views. But—constrained by the
rule that “restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the person
seeking to enforce them” and that “ ‘any doubt [is to] be resolved in favor of
the free use of land’ ” (see ante, discussing Eisen, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 635 and Zabrucky, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 622)—we will not infer
from these targeted restrictions (or from the manner in which houses and lots
were oriented by the developer) a more generalized proscription against
improvements that could obstruct some views.
B. The Nuisance Claim
As noted above, Finley and Adams contend the extension of the deck
and erection of the gazebo on the Gantz property, and activities associated
with the deck and gazebo, constitute a nuisance.
1. Substantiality, Unreasonableness, and the Standard of
Review
As defined in the Civil Code, a nuisance can be “[a]nything which
is . . . an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property.” (Civ. Code § 3479.) It can be
public, private, or both public and private. (See Civ. Code §§ 3480–3481;
Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1551; Mendez
v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 261–264
(Mendez).)
But not every interference is a nuisance. (People ex rel. Gallo (1997) 14
Cal.4th 1090, 1105 (Gallo) [public nuisance]; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938 (San Diego Gas & Electric) [private
nuisance].) “To qualify . . . , the interference “must be both substantial and
unreasonable.” (Gallo, at p. 1105; see also San Diego Gas & Electric, at
p. 938.)
22
As this court has emphasized, “[t]he requirements of substantial
damage and unreasonableness are not inconsequential.” (Mendez, supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.)
“ ‘ “These requirements stem from the law’s recognition
that:
“Life in organized society and especially in populous
communities involves an unavoidable clash of individual
interests. Practically all human activities unless carried on
in a wilderness interfere to some extent with others or
involve some risk of interference, and these interferences
range from mere trifling annoyances to serious harms. It is
an obvious truth that each individual in a community must
put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience
and interference and must take a certain amount of risk in
order that all may get on together. The very existence of
organized society depends upon the principle of ‘give and
take, live and let live,’ and therefore the law of torts does not
attempt to impose liability or shift the loss in every case in
which one person’s conduct has some detrimental effect on
another. Liability . . . is imposed in those cases in which
the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be
required to bear under the circumstances, at least without
compensation.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting in part San Diego Gas &
Electric, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 937–938 and Rest.2d
Torts, § 822, com. g, p. 112, italics added.)
As to each of the two elements just discussed—substantial damage and
unreasonableness—an objective standard is to be applied. (Mendez, supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.) Inasmuch as there are disputed facts and
inferences to be resolved in determining the presence or absence of
substantial or unreasonable damage, we apply the substantial evidence
standard (see Shoen v. Zacarias (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1119 [private
nuisance]; City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164
[public nuisance]) discussed ante.
23
2. Analysis
Finley and Adams base their nuisance claim on two types of
disruptions that they contend have interfered with enjoyment of their
property: (1) “noise disruptions” and (2) disruptions of a visual nature. As to
the first type of disruption, they say the deck and gazebo “have been used for
loud late-night parties and for flying drones.” Regarding the second type of
disruption, they say the extension of the deck and introduction of the gazebo
(a) have obstructed some of the sightlines from their property and (b) have
introduced new sightlines, from the Gantz property toward their property,
that were not present before.
Insofar as the first type of disruption is concerned, the trial court heard
testimony pertaining to parties and drone flights. But that testimony
included substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that any disruptions
attributable to those activities were neither substantial nor unreasonable.
For example, regarding parties, Gantz testified that he had purchased
the property as a family vacation home, that he and his family live most of
the year in Las Vegas, that their use of the property was “pretty
infrequent,”14 that they had never rented the property out as a short-term
rental, and that no one stayed at the property when he and his family were
not there.
Gantz further testified that, when he and his family were at the
property, “[w]e never played loud music or had ragers.” Instead: “It was
14 Although there is some ambiguity in Gantz’s testimony regarding how
many times per year, and which specific months of the year, he and his
family used the property, Finley and Adams’s repeated references to Gantz as
an “absentee owner” tend to corroborate his testimony that use of the
property was “pretty infrequent.”
24
always families, kids, and adults. We’d have dinner, play some cornhole, and
be in at a reasonable hour.” “[M]ost nights we were out there,” he testified,
“we’d be in bed 8:00, 9:00.” “To [say we were] having wild parties, it’s just
kind of crazy in my mind.” Gantz further testified that he could not recall
anybody having ever complained to him about loud parties. In keeping with
this testimony, Cathleen Nielsen—a next door neighbor of Gantz who Finley
and Adams called as a witness—testified: “[t]he noise didn’t bother me too
much.”
As for drones, the trial court heard testimony that, after the deck had
been completed, each of two vendors—first Gantz’s contractor, and then one
of the contractor’s suppliers—flew a drone to gather photographs for
marketing purposes. The court also heard testimony that Gantz had not
authorized either of the two flights, and had not learned about them until
after they occurred.
On the basis of this substantial evidence, we find no error in the trial
court’s determination that the “noise disruptions” presented did not
constitute a nuisance.
As to the second type of disruption (i.e., visual disruption), the trial
court received evidence, not only from the parties and some of their
neighbors, but also from real estate appraisal experts Kevin Allin (for Finley
and Adams) and Larry Heglar (for Gantz).
Insofar as views are concerned, these two experts agreed that—with or
without the extended deck and gazebo on Gantz’s property—the view from
the Finley/ Adams property was limited. Allin testified that the view was
“not . . . an expansive 180-degree view,” but rather a 40-degree “view
corridor” that “is really restricted on each side.” Heglar testified: that the
views from Finley and Adams’s property were “marginal” to begin with; that
25
“the view directly to the west” was “the main view;” that it did not have any
significant value; that the optimal view (toward the ocean, bay, and
waterfront) was the one to the south, from the southwest-most corner of the
Finley/Adams deck; that the view corridor corresponding to this view was
about 20 degrees (rather than 40 degrees); and that the extent to which the
extension of the deck and introduction of the gazebo on the Gantz property
had impaired the view from the Finley/Adams property was 10 percent.
Heglar further testified that photographs Allin had used to illustrate the
views from the Finley/Adams property had been “zoomed in” and that this
distorted the appearance of those views. Allin conceded the point and
acknowledged that “the effect [of zooming in] would be to make the
[Finley/Adams] view corridor appear larger” than it actually was.
With respect to privacy, the trial court heard testimony from Gantz to
the effect that the extension of the deck and introduction of the gazebo on his
property had had no effect on sight lines toward the Finley/Adams property.
“The sight lines that I have into my neighbors’ yards, . . .
[including] the plaintiffs and the people down below, it is no
different now than it was when I had my original deck. I
could see everything then that I can see now. I’m not
getting any additional vantage point or getting insight into
anything that I didn’t already have from the old deck that
would be any loss of privacy. So it just blows my mind that
these statements [about the extension of the deck and
addition of the gazebo having impaired Finley and Adams’s
privacy] keep being made.”
This testimony was corroborated by Heglar, who testified that views of
the Finley/Adams property from the Gantz property were largely “obfuscated”
by large eucalyptus trees and an approximately 7- or 8-foot-tall wall. “In
looking from the back of the Gantz property into the plaintiffs’ property,”
Heglar testified, “I cannot see much of the patio area at all.”
26
Significantly, the evidence before the trial court with respect to views
and privacy included not only that just described, but also observations the
trial court itself made during its site visit to each property. (See Vaughn,
supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 678 [fact finder’s view of premises qualifies as
“independent and substantial evidence” and reviewing court is “required to
presume . . . [it] supports the . . . judgment”]; Anderson, supra, 61 Cal.App.2d
at p. 145 [fact finder’s view of premises is sufficient to support a judgment].)
On the basis of the substantial evidence described above, we find no
error in the determination, set forth in the trial court’s statement of
27
decision,15 that “the deck/gazebo do not constitute a substantial and
unreasonable interference with [Finley and Adams’s] use and enjoyment of
15 Finley and Adams argue the trial court failed to adequately address
issues that they raised in objections to a proposed statement of decision and,
therefore, that the doctrine of implied findings is inapplicable to this appeal.
We do not agree. It is well settled that:
“ ‘[T]he trial court is not required to respond point by
point to the issues posed in a request for statement of
decision. The court’s statement of decision is sufficient if it
fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate
facts and material issues in the case.’ [Citations.] ‘When
this rule is applied, the term “ultimate fact” generally
refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a
claim.’ [Citation.] ‘Ultimate facts are distinguished from
evidentiary facts and from legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]
Thus, a court is not expected to make findings with regard
to ‘detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as
to individual items of evidence.’ In addition, ‘[e]ven though
a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the
judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless
error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding
in favor of the complaining party which would have the
effect of countervailing or destroying other findings.’ ”
(Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983.)
Here, the statement of decision fairly disclosed the court’s
determination that, to whatever extent the deck or gazebo interfered with
Finley and Adams’s use and enjoyment of their property, that interference
was “not . . . substantial and unreasonable”—as required to establish liability
on a theory of nuisance. Further, as discussed above, the judgment is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
28
their property.”16 (Cf. Mendez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 263. [recognizing
the “unavoidable clash of individual interests” in organized society, observing
that “that each individual in a community must put up with a certain amount
of annoyance, inconvenience and interference,” and noting that “the law of
torts does not attempt to impose liability or shift the loss in every case in
which one person’s conduct has some detrimental effect on another,” italics
omitted]; Eisen, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 635 [“a landowner has no right to
an unobstructed view over adjoining property”].)17
16 Our analysis of Finley and Adams’s nuisance claim dispenses, not only
with that claim, but also with the breach of contract claim to the extent it is
premised on the part of paragraph 3 of the original CC&Rs that proscribes
any activity that “may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood.” Zeroing in on the words “annoyance or” in the above-quoted
phrase, Finley and Adams argued at trial that an annoyance is
distinguishable from, and more easily established than, a nuisance.
According to counsel, an annoyance is anything that is “bothersome.” But, to
interpret paragraph 3 in so expansive a manner would fly in the face of the
“obvious truth that each individual in a community must put up with [some]
amount of annoyance.” (Mendez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.) Hence we
interpret the term “annoyance or nuisance” as synonymous with the term
“nuisance.” (See Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) pp. 1280–1281[noting that,
historically, “nuisance” was “also termed annoyance”].)
17 The parties have made arguments pertaining to damages and
injunctive relief; however, our determination that Finley and Adams have not
established liability renders it unnecessary for us to address those
arguments.
29
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Gantz is entitled to costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
30
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