CourtListener 10593818•People v. George CA4/1
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Filed 5/28/25 P. v. George CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084810
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2201583)
JOE LYNN GEORGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
John M. Monterosso, Judge. Dismissed.
Joe Lynn George, in pro. per.; and Richard L. Fitzer, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joe Lynn George purports to appeal from the trial court’s June 26, 2024
minute order “tak[ing] no action” on his request for recall and modification of
sentence. His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and George filed a supplemental brief. We
have reviewed the issues raised in George’s supplemental brief and, at our
discretion, have independently reviewed the record. (Id. at p. 232.) Doing so,
we conclude the trial court’s order declining to act on his request for
resentencing is not an appealable order and thus we lack jurisdiction to
consider his appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss.
I.
Background
In a second amended felony complaint, George was charged with three
felony counts: felon in possession of a semi-automatic firearm who is
“addicted to the use of any narcotic drug” (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 1); felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2);
and gross negligent discharge of a firearm which could result in injury or
death to a person (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 3). It was alleged, as to count 1,
George was armed with a deadly weapon (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii)) and, as to
count 3, that George personally used a firearm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). It was
further alleged George had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)) and four strike priors (id., subds. (c) & (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)),
including 1997 convictions for assault with intent to rape (§ 220), rape
(§ 261), lewd acts with a minor (§ 288), and a 1998 conviction for assault with
intent to rape (§ 220).
On February 29, 2024, George pled guilty to counts 1 and 3 and
admitted he personally fired the gun within the meaning of section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(8), and that he had suffered the prior serious felony conviction
(sometimes referred to as a “nickel prior”) and one strike conviction in
exchange for an agreed upon sentence of 12 years, four months. The sentence
imposed consisted of six years on count 3 (upper term of three years, doubled
for the strike conviction), a consecutive term of one year, four months (one
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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third the middle term, doubled for the strike conviction) on count 1, plus five
years for the nickel prior.
On June 25, 2024, George filed a pleading entitled “Motion for
Modification of Sentence, Pursuant to Senate Bill No.’s 1393, 1618, 1385 as
Amended by Senate Bill 81, and 620,” in which he asserted the “five-year
prior serious felony conviction enhancement must be set aside.”
(Capitalization omitted.) On June 26, the trial court entered a minute order
stating it had read and considered George’s filing and declined to take any
action on George’s request. George filed a notice of appeal from the court’s
minute order.
II.
Discussion
George’s appellate counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and
requesting this court proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.
At our discretion, we have conducted an independent review of the record and
we have also considered the specific arguments presented by George in his
supplemental brief. As we explain, we lack jurisdiction to consider this
appeal and thus we dismiss.
In his motion for modification of sentence, George argued he was
entitled to “retroactive” application of Senate Bill No. 1393 (Senate Bill 1393)
and the five years imposed for his nickel prior “must be set aside.” Senate
Bill 1393 amended sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b),
effective January 1, 2019, to give courts discretion to strike or dismiss a
nickel prior in the interests of justice. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1–2; see
People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 971 (Garcia).) In an ex parte
minute order, the trial court declined to take any action on George’s request,
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explaining “[section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),] does not apply, . . . nor is
[George] entitled to apply for post sentence relief per [section] 1172.1.”
In his supplemental brief on appeal, George argues the trial court
“without any legal bases to do so, switch[ed]” his motion made under “Senate
Bills Number 1393, 1619, Penal Code 1385 as amended [b]y Senate Bill 81
and 620” to one made under sections 1170, subdivision (d)(1), and 1172.1.
George’s contention reflects a fundamental misunderstanding about the
statutory procedure for recall of a sentence and resentencing.
Section 1172.1 is the statute that authorizes the trial court to recall a
previously imposed sentence and resentence the defendant. It provides: “the
court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or
at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case
law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) When recalling and resentencing
under this statute, the court is required to “apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity
of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Ibid., subd. (a)(2).)
And the court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment in the
interests of justice “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed
after a trial or plea agreement.” (Ibid. & id., subd. (a)(3)(1).) Thus, although
George did not explicitly invoke section 1172.1, the court correctly observed
that to provide a defendant with the benefits of ameliorative sentencing laws
such as Senate Bill 1393, the trial court would proceed under section 1172.1.
However, the trial court correctly observed that George is “not entitled”
to apply for postsentence relief under section 1172.1. Nor can he invoke
section 1172.1 to compel resentencing. The statute expressly provides: “A
defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
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this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this
section, the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c), italics
added.) By its plain terms, “[t]hough the court can act on its own motion,
defendants may not petition under section 1172.1.” (People v. Faustinos
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 695 (Faustinos).) And if the defendant requests
consideration for relief under the statute, the court is not required to respond.
(Ibid., citing § 1172.1, subd. (c).)
Thus, the trial court was within its authority to take no action on
George’s request for recall and resentencing.2 (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) This
conclusion compels dismissal of George’s appeal from the court’s minute order
declining to take no action on his request. Because “[a] defendant is not
entitled to file a section 1172.1 petition nor to receive a ruling if he
nevertheless files one,” it follows that “an appeal from an order acting on his
petition (whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other statement that
the court is not acting) does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”
(Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) We therefore “lack the
authority to rule on the merits of appeals from orders filed in response to a
defendant’s attempt to seek resentencing under section 1172.1. (§ 1237,
2 We note there is another problem with George’s motion for modification
of sentence. The trial court has discretion to initiate recall and resentencing
“within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable
sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by
new statutory authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
The amendments to sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b),
had been in effect for more than five years at the time of his sentencing.
Senate Bill 1393 made these amendments effective January 1, 2019. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1013, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; see Garcia, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at
p. 971.) At sentencing, George did not request the trial court consider its
discretion to strike or dismiss his nickel prior.
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subd. (b).)” (Faustinos, at p. 696.) Because there is no appealable order, we
dismiss the appeal. (Id. at p. 700.)
III.
Disposition
We dismiss the appeal.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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