CourtListener 10593799•People v. Dorey CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/28/25 P. v. Dorey CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082268
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN373721)
LEIGHTON BROMILUY DOREY, IV,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
K. Michael Kirkman (Ret.), Carlos O. Armour, Judges. Affirmed with
modification.
Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Leighton Bromiluy Dorey IV (Dorey) killed his elderly father, Leighton
Dorey III (Leighton III), when he was alone at home. A jury convicted him of
first degree murder with the torture special circumstance. Dorey raises four
issues on appeal. He contends the evidence he intended to cause his father
extreme and prolonged pain was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and
special circumstance finding. He contends the trial court failed to provide
him with an adequate opportunity to “fully air his grievances” at a Marsden1
hearing. He asks us to conduct an independent review of crime laboratory
records for Brady2 material or other discoverable evidence. Finally, he
contends the minute order and abstract of judgment incorrectly reflect the
imposition of a $10,000 parole revocation fine. Apart from directing a minor
change to the abstract of judgment, we affirm the judgment in all respects.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2017, the San Diego County District Attorney charged Dorey
with the first degree murder of Leighton III. (Pen. Code,3 § 187, subd. (a).)
The operative information alleged the special circumstance that the murder
was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)
Dorey pled not guilty.
Wilfrid Rumble was assigned to represent Dorey by the San Diego
Office of the Public Defender. The District Attorney initially sought the
1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
2 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
death penalty, but Rumble persuaded her to seek a maximum sentence of life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
In March 2019, Dorey changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGI). He withdrew the NGI plea two months later.
The case was tried to a jury starting in August 2019. The first jury to
hear the case was unable to render a unanimous verdict.
In December 2019, Dorey asked the trial court to relieve Rumble and
appoint substitute counsel to represent him at his second trial. After
conducting a Marsden hearing, the court denied his motion. In February
2020, the court granted Dorey’s motion to represent himself pursuant to
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. He represented himself at his
second trial.
In June 2022, the second jury found appellant guilty of first degree
murder and found true the torture special circumstance allegation. In May
2023, the court denied probation and sentenced appellant to LWOP.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
Strained Family Dynamics
In 2017, Leighton III and his wife, Kimberly D., lived in Rancho Santa
Fe. They were in their seventies and retired. Kimberly was Dorey’s
stepmother and had known him since he was 18 years old. She believed she
and Leighton III had a good relationship with Dorey until 2012.
In 2012, Dorey was 35 or 36 years old. He was using drugs and
struggling to find jobs and a place to live. According to Kimberly,
Leighton III tried to be supportive, but their relationship now had “good
times” and “bad times.”
3
In 2013, Dorey moved to France and his relationship with Kimberly
and Leighton III became one of “e-mails and phone calls.” It also became
more and more strained. The phone calls started out nice but would turn
caustic. Dorey complained about Kimberly, his father, the government, and
his employers. The constant complaining would eventually cause Leighton
III to hang up. Dorey also regularly complained—on the phone and in more
than 100 email messages—that he needed money, which Leighton III
declined to provide.
Kimberly eventually became frightened by the thought that Dorey
might return from France and come to their house. In emails, Dorey began
referring to Kimberly as “Lady Warbucks,” a reference to her work in the
military defense industry before she retired. He falsely accused Leighton III
and Kimberly of trying to poison him before he left for France. In a 2016
email, he asked Leighton III, “Why don’t you go murder your wife and take
all her money[?] Fuck you.”
Later that year, in December 2016, Dorey wrote messages to his
biological mother and a friend insinuating he had been physically abused by
Leighton III as a child and suggesting he was entitled to reciprocate. To his
mother, he wrote, “Mom, if I were to give dad one good knock on the head
that’s about equal in force to the combined effect of all the spankings he gave
me, do you think I have a right to do so as the inherit[or] of the fascist failure
factory?”
In another email to his mother, he wrote, “If you think parents have
the right to impose violence upon their children in order to teach morality,
then when their children are grown up and they find their parents, or some of
their parents, are feeble and old war criminals, don’t the children then have
the right and perhaps the duty in protection of the planet to reciprocate their
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parents’ violence and terminate the crime spree of their parents’ fraud and
fascism? If dad wants to teach me that getting away with war crimes is more
important than promoting liberty and justice, don’t you think he should be
the first to suffer from his bad teachings?”
To his friend, he wrote, “I think parenting is only morally dubious if the
parent presumes the right [to] impose violence upon their children with
disregard to their children’s well-being. In this case, perhaps the children
should be responsible for their parents’ death.”
In January or February 2017, Dorey called Leighton III and said he
would be returning to San Diego. He asked him if he would pick him up from
the airport and rent him a car. Leighton III said he would pick him up, but
would not agree to rent him a car.
A few months later, in April 2017, Dorey sent an email to Leighton III
asking, “Would you like me to operate under the principal that if I hurt you I
will only be helping you?” He also wrote, “There’s no such thing as a real
victim in any crime, no matter how heinous the crime because the victim was
there causing the crime. Would you like me to operate under the principle
that if you are victimized by a violent crime of fascist aggression that the
crime is actually your fault?” That same month, Leighton III upgraded the
security system at the house because he was concerned about some of the
“frightening things” Dorey had said in email messages.
II.
The Homicide
On May 26, 2017, Dorey surprised Leighton III and Kimberly at their
home around lunchtime. He had flown back from France a few days earlier,
and he was driving a black Jeep that his mother had given him. Leighton III
5
was thrilled to see his son. They spent time outside in the yard catching up.
Kimberly joined them after 20 minutes.
Dorey said he was in town for only a couple of days and would be
headed to Los Angeles to meet with some other people. Leighton III wanted
to see more of Dorey and said, “Well, we need to get together for lunch or
dinner.”
Dorey did not commit to a lunch or dinner meeting. He said he was
unable to afford a hotel and would be sleeping in the Jeep. Abruptly, he
ended the conversation and said, “he better go.” As Dorey left, Leighton III
yelled, “I love you,” but Dorey did not respond.
Four days later, on May 30, 2017, Kimberly took her dog to a
veterinarian appointment. She called Leighton III at 10:54 a.m. to let him
know she was on her way home. Leighton III told her Dorey was there.
Kimberly arrived home and saw Dorey’s car parked near the third
garage door at an angle. She drove her car into the garage and brought her
purse and the veterinarian paperwork inside. She spent some time getting
the elderly dog out of the car and into the house. When she finally went to
find Dorey and Leighton III, Dorey’s car was no longer in the driveway. She
thought they had gone to lunch and she just missed them.
At 11:15 a.m., Kimberly called Leighton III’s phone to let him know she
would try to meet them for lunch, but he did not answer. She thought this
was strange. She called him several times more while she went to look for
him around the house.
Kimberly found Leighton III’s “mutilated body” in a loft area where she
had her home office. “His body was stretched across an area near the
entrance to the loft.” She was horrified. “His nose had been blown off. [She]
could see . . . the bones. [She] saw teeth missing. . . . [She] couldn’t see his
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eyes there was so much blood on his face. And there was a big cut on his
chin, and his shirt was up a little bit.” She could see he was not breathing.
She dragged their dog to the kitchen and called the paramedics. While
calling, she thought to herself, “My God, . . . [Dorey] was here and his car was
here.”
III.
The Crime Scene and Autopsy
Paramedics arrived at 11:35 a.m. Leighton III had no pulse and was
pronounced dead. Sheriff’s deputies cleared the house. A crime scene
technician and two criminalists documented, collected, and preserved
evidence. One day later, a pathologist performed an autopsy.
At the time of his death, Leighton III was 71 years old, 69 inches tall,
and weighed 158 pounds.4 His body was found face up on the floor of the
lower loft area with his legs lying in the door space to an adjacent bathroom.
His right shoe was on, but his left shoe was off. A belt with the buckle
missing was lying next to his left leg. The buckle was by his foot, just inside
the bathroom.
There were bloodstains all over the room. There were teeth and teeth
fragments scattered on the floor. In the bathroom, consistent with an
attacker cleaning up after an attack, there were bloodstains diluted with
water on the shower handle, showerhead handle, shower floor, countertop,
and faucet handle.
Leighton III’s whole face was covered with blood and there was a large
pool of blood under his head. According to a forensic pathologist who
4 Dorey was 39 years old, 6 feet tall, and weighed slightly less than 180
pounds.
7
witnessed the autopsy, “blunt force injuries” to Leighton III’s head were
caused by at least 10 or 11 impacts that all occurred before he died.
On the right side of his frontal forehead, a two-and-one-fourth inch
laceration was deep enough to reach the bone. There was another laceration
on the left side of his forehead as well as an area of contusion and abrasion.
The cartilage of his nose was fractured and separated from the bone of his
nose. The bone that “forms the cheekbones and the top of the mouth” (the
maxilla) was also fractured and nine teeth were missing from the upper
jawbone.5 Seven of the nine missing teeth (or fragments of them) were found
in locations throughout the loft. Of the seven teeth that remained in the
jawbone, all but one were loose or broken.
There were scrapes and bruises on both of Leighton III’s cheeks and
under his chin. His tongue and ear were bruised. There were bruises on the
front of his nose and around his nose and left eye. Both sides of his face, both
ears, and his upper lip were scraped and bruised as well. His lower lip was
torn all the way through to the inside of his mouth. A one and a half-inch
laceration on the bottom of his chin went all the way to the jawbone.
According to the pathologist, numerous internal injuries to Leighton
III’s brain were also caused by blunt force impacts that occurred before he
died. The autopsy revealed subarachnoid bleeding and bruising in multiple
areas. There was a subdural hemorrhage on the right side of his brain
toward the back. There were small hemorrhages in the white matter in the
center of his brain. There was a hemorrhage in his brain stem. Swelling on
the bottom part of Leighton III’s brain had caused “uncal notching,” which
5 According to his dentist, Leighton III had good dental health and did
not have any loose teeth as of his last check-up in December 2016.
8
means that “part of the brain went through a hole in the bone,” creating a
“notch.” These injuries were sufficient to kill Leighton III by rendering him
unconscious and unable to protect his airway and breathe.
In addition to the injuries caused by blunt force impact, the pathologist
believed that injuries to Leighton III’s neck and eyes were caused by
strangulation sufficient in force and duration to asphyxiate him. These
injuries also all occurred before he died. A long linear mark was visible on
the outside of his neck. His eyelids and the surface of his eyes both contained
petechial hemorrhages, which are caused by strangulation. His hyoid bone
and his Adam’s apple (laryngeal cartilage) were fractured.
Leighton III also had six broken ribs. His cervical spine was fractured
and bleeding in two places. His thoracic spine was fractured and bleeding at
the fifth and eleventh vertebrae. He sustained five blunt force injuries to his
back, deep under his skin. The large muscle in his neck, between the ear and
collarbone (clavicle), was torn and bleeding. These blunt force injuries to his
torso were not independently fatal. But, according to the pathologist, they
also all occurred before Leighton III died. The fractures would have been
painful.
The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy agreed with the
pathologist that it was not possible for Leighton III to have died before the
blunt force impact injuries were inflicted; the injuries occurred when he was
alive. All the injuries had a significant amount of bleeding (hemorrhaging)
associated with them. Bleeding happens only when a person is alive and has
a heartbeat that pushes blood through the arteries and veins. For this
reason, postmortem injuries do not resemble antemortum injuries; they are
pale and colorless. Leighton III did not have any “clear-cut, obvious
postmortem injuries,” including the injuries to his brain.
9
Consistent with the pathologist and medical examiner, an expert in
crime scene reconstruction and blood stain pattern analysis opined that the
blood spatter and other crime scene evidence showed Leighton III’s injuries
occurred before he died. In his opinion, all of the bloodstains in the room,
with one exception, were created by wounds that occurred while Leighton III
was alive and his heart was still beating. Only the large pool of blood on the
floor near Leighton III”s head could have collected there after his death.
In the expert’s opinion, based on the blood spatter evidence, the injuries
took place in several different locations in the loft area. In the hallway
leading to the loft area, where one of Leighton III’s hearing aids was found,
there were bloodstains on the carpet and on the baseboard. In the loft itself,
there were large bloodstains on the floor, the surrounding walls, the
bathroom door jamb, a table, and a bookshelf. The stains appeared to have
been made during separate confrontations around the room. In addition, a
separate “bleeding wound,” most likely to the head, was created by the stairs.
There were bloodstains on the first three stair steps to the loft, on the vertical
portion of the fourth step, and on the handrail. There were also stains on the
wall next to the stairs, the highest of which was about three feet from the
floor.6
Leighton III, in addition, had defensive injuries that were consistent
with holding his hands in front of his face, while still alive, to try to protect it.
The back of his right hand was bruised and there were “small[ ] scrapes and
bruises on the backs of the fingers.” His right forearm and the back of his left
hand were bruised and scraped. The skin on his left forearm was torn.
6 According to the expert, the stains were inconsistent with the body
being dropped down the stairs headfirst.
10
Notably, the bloodstain evidence was inconsistent with Leighton III
ever standing up and walking around after he started bleeding. The small
bloodstain on the bottom of one of his shoes was inconsistent with walking
through the large amount of blood on the floor. The tops of his shoes and
their outer soles did not have enough blood on them to be consistent with
blood falling downward from his wounds while he was standing. The
bloodstains on the wall in the loft area were also inconsistent with him
standing while he was bleeding. They were no higher than two-and-a-half
feet, and they had all hit the wall either in a downward direction or a 90-
degree angle. Instead, in the crime scene expert’s view, the blood on the wall
and on the front of Leighton III’s body, on places like his thigh, was
consistent with him being on his knees while he was attacked and trying to
flee.
By contrast, at some point, the attacker was standing and not wearing
shoes while walking around the room. There were naked “bloody foot
impressions” on the stone floor near Leighton III’s body and at other locations
in the loft area. The impressions were caused by “a foot that [did] not have a
sock or shoe on it that . . . stepped into a blood source and subsequently
stepped in another area.”
The crime scene expert could not say, based on the crime scene
evidence alone, whether the attacker had ever been wearing shoes during the
attack. He could say, however, that if the attacker was wearing shoes at the
beginning of the attack, the earlier they were removed, the less blood he
would expect to find on them.
Finally, according to the crime scene expert, it was obvious Leighton
III’s body had been moved to the location where it was ultimately found.
Consistent with being wounded elsewhere in the loft and then dragged on the
11
floor, he was found with his shirt and sweater pulled up and his pants
slightly pulled down, and with one of his hearing aids, his phone, and one of
the bloody footprints underneath his body.
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy concluded the cause
of death was “strangulation and blunt force injuries of the head, neck, and
torso.” It was the combination of injuries that resulted in death. Nothing
about the injuries indicated whether the strangulation or blunt force head
trauma occurred first.
IV.
Dorey’s Arrest and Injuries
Members of a fugitive task force team tracked Dorey’s phone to the
Palm Springs/Idyllwild area. They located his car in Idyllwild at 8:00 p.m. on
the same day Leighton III was killed. They arrested Dorey the next morning
at 7:15 a.m. when he returned to his car.
Dorey’s right hand was swollen and bandaged. He had been treated
the day before at a hospital for a fractured “finger metacarpal,” which is a
small bone located between the knuckle and wrist. This kind of fracture is
commonly known as a “boxer’s fracture,” because it is usually “sustained by
somebody hitting a solid object.”
Dorey had scratches and small injuries to his arms, legs, ankles, right
thumb, and the right side of his hip, and scratches to his lower back. He had
an injury to the right side of his neck, but no redness or other markings.
There were no injuries to the back or top of his head.
Leighton III’s DNA was found on fingernail swabs of Dorey’s right hand
and the interior pocket of a pair of shorts found in a suitcase in Dorey’s car;
in bloodstains found on the driver’s seat, the steering wheel, and the steering
wheel adjustment lever; as well as in a single bloodstain each on the heel of
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the left shoe and the tongue of the right shoe Dorey was wearing when he
was arrested.
V.
Dorey’s Trial Testimony
Dorey testified at trial that he had a difficult relationship with
Leighton III when he was growing up. According to Dorey, he “could be
nurturing, he could be supportive, but he could also be tremendously violent,
with unexpected explosive bursts of anger, and brutal.” While Dorey was
growing up, he hit him with a wooden spoon, an “industrial-sized cooking
ladle,” a belt, his hands, and “branches from the yard.” He beat him severely
on several occasions. He liked to give him “humiliation spankings” in front of
dinner guests. He also forced Dorey to work on renovations to the old
“country estate” where they lived. In Dorey’s view, the work he was required
to perform was inappropriate “child labor.”
Leighton III changed in 1991 or 1992 after he was diagnosed with colon
cancer and survived. He studied holistic medicine and became “more
accepting, more peaceful, more tolerant.” Dorey’s relationship with him
improved and he chose to live with him when his parents divorced. They had
“three close years” during Dorey’s last three years of high school. But the
relationship grew distant after Leighton III married Kimberly, and more
distant when Dorey began to use drugs and to grow marijuana, and further
distant when he later moved to France.
In 2013, Dorey believed Leighton III and Kimberly tried to poison him
by slipping something into his water bottle one night when he was visiting.
After the incident, Leighton III “completely cut [Dorey] off,” “no birthday
gifts, no Christmas presents, no financial support of any kind.”
13
Nevertheless, in 2015, Dorey contacted Leighton III after he lost his job
and the United States Internal Revenue Service and California Franchise
Tax Board began collecting back taxes that he owed. When they reconnected,
Leighton III dismissed Dorey’s questions about the “poisoning incident,”
saying, “I don’t want to hear your paranoia.” He also declined Dorey’s
requests for financial support and said he would not inherit anything from
him.
In 2017, Dorey decided to return to the United States. He was
unemployed, “behind on bills,” and his auto insurance had expired. His car
was not starting well, and his mother offered him $15,000 toward a new car if
he returned.
Dorey flew to San Diego on May 19, 2017. He visited some friends from
high school and picked up the Jeep his mother had purchased for him. After
meeting with a prospective investor for a business idea, he decided he
“wanted to reconnect” with his father. Leighton III had been a “really nice,
decent guy” during Dorey’s high school years. Dorey wanted “to get over this
fear that he had tried to poison [him].” He wanted to believe the evidence
that he was poisoned was “just a coincidence.” So he dropped by on May 26
and visited with Leighton III and Kimbery for 30 to 45 minutes.
According to Dorey, on the morning of May 30, he received an email
message from Leighton III suggesting they get together again. Dorey decided
to drop by unannounced because he was still concerned about the poisoning
incident. He arrived sometime between 10:40 and 10:50 a.m. Kimberly
called and spoke with Leighton III shortly after he arrived.
Dorey tried to talk about the poisoning incident with his father, but
Leighton III did not want to discuss it. Leighton III suggested they look at
some changes to the house instead. As they walked toward the loft area,
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Leighton III pointed to a portrait on the wall. Using a family nickname for
Dorey, he said, “That’s the L.B. that I prefer to remember.”
Dorey noticed his left shoe was untied and he kneeled down to tie it. As
he did so, he heard “rustling” behind him. The next thing he knew, Leighton
III “whipped his belt over [his] head,” and screamed, “Now you’re dead,” in an
“authoritarian, angry, vindictive, . . . aggressive, . . . murderous tone of voice,”
and started choking Dorey with the belt.
Dorey grabbed at the belt, “pushed him back a little bit,” “swung a right
back fist,” and “caught him on the right side of his head.” Leighton III
“stumbled backwards” into the hallway area. Dorey tried to run past him,
but Leighton III tripped him, pushed him down to the floor, and began
“pounding [him] with hammer fists on the back of the head.” Dorey was
“seeing stars” and thought he was going to die.
Dorey hit Leighton III with a “right cross” that broke Dorey’s hand.
Leighton III fell down and Dorey decided to put him in a “sleeper hold” to
subdue him. But Leighton III “instantaneously” went limp.” When Dorey
released him from the sleeper hold, he was not breathing and had no pulse.
According to Dorey, he then made a “really stupid decision.” He
decided to make it look like Leighton III hung himself “from one of the
railings on the steps or one of the rails from the railing.” He dragged
Leighton III’s body back to the steps in the loft area and did a “weight test”
with his belt to see if he could “hoist him up to [the] railing.” Dorey was able
to use the belt to pull Leighton III’s torso off the ground, but the belt broke
and Leighton III’s head went “slamming down into the ground.”
Dorey knew Kimberly was on her way home and he had to rush. He
thought, “well, he’s here at the bottom of the steps. Maybe I can make it look
like he fell down the stairs.” He pulled Leighton III’s torso up by the back of
15
his shirt collar and dropped his head onto to the bottom step, but he “did not
hear his neck snap.” Without a broken neck, Dorey did not think it would be
a “convincing fall down the stairs.” So Dorey continued to try and snap
Leighton III’s neck by dropping it on the stairs several times. He “saw a
tooth go flying,” but never heard Leighton III’s neck snap.
Next, according to Dorey, he decided to try to make it look like Leighton
III fell down the stairs “by literally throwing him down the steps.” He
“turned him over” and “dragged him up the steps from under his arms to the
midway landing area, and . . . tried to lift him up as high as [he] could at that
point and then push him forward.” But Leighton III’s body “just fell
downwards for the most part. His knees slumped and he fell forwards and
basically slid down the steps.”
Dorey started crying because he realized he “was making a terrible
bloody mess.” He took his shoes, socks, and pants off. While barefoot, he
“repositioned” Leighton III to make his position “seem more natural.” He was
just about to take a shower when he heard Kimberly’s car in the driveway.
He left because he was afraid she might have a gun.
In Dorey’s view, he acted in self-defense and was guilty only of the
“vandalism” of his father’s body after he died.
DISCUSSION
I.
Sufficient Evidence Supports Dorey’s Conviction for First Degree Murder with
the Torture Special Circumstance
Dorey contends his conviction must be reversed because the evidence
was insufficient to support the torture-murder theory of first degree murder
and the torture murder special circumstance. He contends the intent
element of murder by torture may not be inferred solely from the condition of
16
the victim’s body, and the only evidence in the record that Dorey had
torturous intent was the condition of Leighton III’s corpse. We disagree. The
condition of Leighton III’s body was not the only evidence Dorey intended to
inflict extreme and prolonged pain. The existence of this additional evidence
distinguishes the instant case from Dorey’s cited case authorities. (See, e.g.,
People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351; People v. Tubby (1949) 34 Cal.2d 72;
People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, disapproved on different grounds in
People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110; People v. Walkey (1986) 177
Cal.App.3d 268.) As we explain, the totality of the evidence of first degree
murder and the torture special circumstance was solid and compelling.
A. Standard of Review
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In so doing, a reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence. The same standard of review applies to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting special circumstance findings.” (People v. Powell (2018)
5 Cal.5th 921, 944 (Powell) [cleaned up].)
Significant here, Dorey did not move for acquittal on the first degree
murder charge or the torture special circumstance allegation at the close of
the prosecution’s case in chief. (§ 1118.1.) Our review of the evidence
therefore includes all evidence in the trial record, including not only the
prosecution’s case in chief, but also the defense case and the prosecution’s
rebuttal case.
17
Also significant, the jury was instructed on two theories of first degree
murder: (1) premeditated, deliberate murder, and (2) murder by means of
torture. The general rule, under this circumstance, is we must affirm the
first degree murder conviction if there is substantial evidence to support
either theory. (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 (Guiton).)
Dorey contends an exception to the general rule applies. He contends
reversal is required if he demonstrates insufficient evidence to support the
torture-murder theory only, i.e., he does not need to address the sufficiency of
the evidence of premeditated and deliberate murder. He is incorrect.
It is true, in cases where more than one theory for conviction is
presented to the jury, “the record may sometimes affirmatively indicate that
the general rule should not be followed” and reversal will be required despite
a valid basis in the record to support at least one factually adequate theory
for conviction. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) “We may, for example,
hypothesize a case in which the district attorney stressed only the invalid
ground in the jury argument, and the jury asked the court questions during
deliberations directed solely to the invalid ground.” (Ibid.) In such cases, a
review of the entire record might affirmatively demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the jury found the defendant guilty solely on an unsupported
theory. (Id. at pp. 1129–1130, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.) In such situations, however, “instruction on an unsupported theory is
prejudicial only if that theory became the sole basis of the verdict of guilt; if
the jury based its verdict on the valid ground, or on both the valid and the
invalid ground, there would be no prejudice, for there would be a valid basis
for the verdict.” (Id. at p. 1130, italics added.)
Here, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate a reasonable
probability that jurors convicted Dorey based solely on the torture-murder
18
theory. The prosecutor addressed both theories in detail during closing
argument. The jury did not ask questions related to the torture-murder
theory. And, contrary to Dorey’s contention, the jury’s true finding on the
torture special circumstance is no indication it relied solely on the torture-
murder theory to convict Dorey of first degree murder. The elements are not
coextensive. The torture special circumstance under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(18), differs from torture murder under section 189. The
torture special circumstance does not require premeditated and deliberated
torturous intent. (People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546.) Nor does it
require an intent to inflict prolonged pain. (People v. Davenport (1985) 41
Cal.3d 247, 261, 269.) We must therefore affirm the jury’s verdict if our
review of the record demonstrates substantial evidence to support either
theory. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)
As we explain, both theories—torture murder and premeditated and
deliberate murder— were supported by substantial evidence.
B. Substantial Evidence of Torture Murder and Torture Special
Circumstance
“All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture . . . is murder
of the first degree.” (§ 189.) “ ‘Murder by torture requires (1) an act or acts
causing death that involve a high degree of probability of death, (2) a causal
relationship between the torturous act and death, (3) a willful, deliberate,
and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on a person for
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic
purpose, and (4) commission of the act or acts with such intent.’ ” (Powell,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 944.) “The elements of a torture-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) are similar but not identical.” (Ibid.) To
prove the special circumstance of torture, “the prosecution must show th[e]
19
defendant intended to kill and had a torturous intent, i.e., an intent to cause
extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or
another sadistic purpose.” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 237;
§ 206.)
Here, Dorey does not dispute the evidence was sufficient under the
substantial evidence standard to demonstrate he intended to kill Leighton III
nor that his acts created a high probability that he would die. He claims the
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate he intended to cause extreme and
prolonged pain. Specifically, he claims the condition of Leighton III’s body
was the only evidence in the record that he harbored torturous intent, and
that the severity of his injuries alone was an insufficient basis to infer the
required “intent to inflict cruel suffering.”
It is true our Supreme Court has “cautioned against giving undue
weight to the severity of [a] victim’s wounds,” when assessing the sufficiency
of evidence to support torturous intent. (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d
1210, 1239.) “[H]orrible wounds may be as consistent with a killing in the
heat of passion, in an ‘explosion of violence,’ as with the intent to inflict cruel
suffering.” (Ibid.) But here, the condition of Leighton III’s body after the
attack was far from the only evidence that Dorey intended to cause extreme
pain or suffering.
“An intent to cause extreme pain or suffering may be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and the condition of
the victim’s body.” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 65–66 [cleaned up].)
Here, the circumstances preceding the killing provided overwhelming support
for a reasonable jury to conclude Dorey intended to cause extreme pain and
suffering for the purpose of revenge. Dorey had been angry at his father for
many years about his alleged child abuse and unwillingness to provide
20
financial support. A month and a half before the killing, he sent an email
message asking him, “Would you like me to operate under the principal that
if I hurt you I will only be helping you?”
A few months before that, in email messages to his mother, he openly
mused about hurting Leighton III and making him suffer in retaliation for
the alleged child abuse. He specifically considered knocking Leighton III on
the head with extreme force “equal in force to the combined effect of all the
spankings” that he had allegedly received from him when he was a child.
Notably, this was consistent with the 10 to 11 blunt force injuries Leighton
III eventually received to his head before he died.
The nature of the killing, too, provided ample support for concluding
Dorey harbored premeditated, deliberated, and calculated torturous intent.
According to Kimberly, Leighton III would remove one of his hearing aids
when he spoke on the phone, and one of them was found on the floor in the
hallway leading to the loft area. From this, reasonable jurors could infer
Dorey first attacked Leighton III in the hallway right after he finished
speaking with Kimberly. Then, knowing Kimberly would not be home for 15
to 20 minutes, he seized the opportunity he had been thinking about for
months—as evidenced by his email messages about hurting his father and
making him suffer—and deliberately commenced an excruciatingly painful
beating, one timed to last until Kimberly’s estimated return.
From the crime scene evidence, jurors could readily infer the beating
Dorey administered was cruel and cold-blooded, not a killing in the heat of
passion. According to the crime scene expert, jurors could infer from the lack
of blood on Dorey’s shoes that he purposely paused to remove them early on
during the attack to keep them from getting bloody. They could infer the
attack occurred in several locations throughout the room and included a
21
period of time when Leighton III was on his knees with his teeth falling out
trying to crawl away.
In addition, the condition of Leighton III’s body overwhelmingly
supported the inference that the pain Dorey intended to inflict was extreme.
Leighton III suffered blunt force injuries all over his upper body that were
inflicted with enough force to cause extensive bleeding and break more than a
dozen bones. Jurors could infer Dorey deliberately bashed Leighton III’s face
on the stairs or punched it with enough force to knock out, loosen, or break
all of his teeth except one. Leighton III’s body was covered with gratuitous,
nonfatal wounds, including wounds to the particularly sensitive area of the
face. Those wounds went through to the bone in some cases and left his face
covered in blood. (See Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 948 [holding that the
“defendant’s infliction of gratuitous injuries in addition to [a] fatal beating
provided substantial evidence of an intent to inflict pain and suffering for
[its] own sake”].) The injuries all occurred while Leighton III was still alive.
Expert testimony was not needed for jurors to be certain beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dorey knew the injuries would have been unfathomably painful.7
Finally, although not a focus in his opening brief, Dorey argues at
length in his reply brief that “a [20] minute attack . . . is not prolonged.” We
are not persuaded. As discussed extensively, Leighton III’s injuries show an
extended beating above and beyond what was needed to cause death.
Leighton III was alternately strangled and punched, and also perhaps kicked,
all over his head, neck and upper body. The beating took place in several
7 The “defendant’s intent to inflict pain and suffering . . . is at the heart
of torture murder. It need not be demonstrated that the victim was actually
conscious and suffered pain at the time otherwise painful injuries were
inflicted.” (Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 945 [cleaned up], italics omitted.)
22
locations about the loft area with the evidence suggesting Dorey pursued
Leighton III while he was injured. Large numbers of Leighton III’s injuries
were nonfatal and inflicted in the particularly sensitive area of the face. It
was for the jury to decide whether the beating was “prolonged.” We do not
consider 15 to 20 minutes of the kind of agonizing pain inflicted here to be
insufficient as a matter of law. We accordingly decline to second guess the
reasonableness of a jury verdict on this point.
The torture-murder theory for first degree murder and the torture
special circumstance finding were supported by substantial evidence.
C. Substantial Evidence of Premeditated and Deliberate Murder
“ ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as
the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or
rash impulse.’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.) “The true
test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.
Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 580
[cleaned up].)
Here, based on our review of the evidence, the premeditation and
deliberation theory was also sufficiently supported by the evidence. Five
months before the homicide, Dorey specifically considered whether killing his
father would be justified in retaliation for his alleged child abuse. He wrote
to a friend, “if [a] parent presumes the right [to] impose violence upon their
children with disregard to their children’s well-being,” then “perhaps the
children should be responsible for their parents’ death.” As noted, the
evidence showed Dorey knew that Kimberly would not be home from the
veterinarian’s office for 15 to 20 minutes after her call, and this provided
Dorey with the opportunity to retaliate against his father, which is something
he had been contemplating for months. Jurors could infer from the lack of
23
blood on Dorey’s shoes that he purposely paused to remove them early on
during the attack to keep them from getting bloody. And no one would expect
anyone to survive the injuries Dorey inflicted upon Leighton III.
Dorey also strangled Leighton III during the attack. Strangulation is
uniquely probative of premeditation and deliberation. It “requires an
offender to apply constant force to the neck of the victim [and] affords ample
time for the offender to consider the nature of his deadly act.” (People v.
Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1020 [ligature strangulation]; People v.
Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 11–12 [manual strangulation].) The
premeditation and deliberation theory for first degree murder was thus
supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the evidence of a premediated
and deliberate killing was overwhelming.
Dorey’s conviction for first degree murder with the torture special
circumstance is affirmed.
II.
The Trial Court Conducted a Proper Marsden Hearing
Dorey contends the trial court violated his right to due process and
effective assistance of counsel. He claims the trial court did not allow him to
“fully express his grievances” at a hearing to consider his request for his
court-appointed trial counsel to be relieved pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2
Cal.3d 118. According to Dorey, the court “did not permit [him] to
substantively and comprehensively articulate the causes of his dissatisfaction
with counsel and how they affected his defense except in one instance.” As a
result, he claims, “[t]he court did not conduct an inquiry sufficient to
ascertain whether trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.” We are
not persuaded. The record does not support Dorey’s contentions. Our review
is for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500.)
24
A. Additional Background
A few months after the first trial ended in mistrial, Dorey asked the
trial court to relieve Rumble and appoint new counsel. He had a seven-page
list of concerns and issues with Rumble’s representation over the preceding
two and a half years. The court cleared the courtroom and conducted a
Marsden hearing with Dorey, Rumble, and court staff present. The court
spent approximately an hour addressing Dorey’s complaints.8
Dorey began with a series of concerns about the time it took to bring
the case to trial before the first jury. He complained that Rumble had missed
19 appointments with him “in a period of less than a year from September
2018 to August 2019.” He complained that Rumble had not been “proactive”
about setting a meeting to discuss whether the prosecution would seek the
death penalty and instead “wait[ed] for the District Attorney’s Office to get in
touch with him.” He complained that Rumble repeatedly said the meeting
would take place and the District Attorney’s office would have a decision on
whether it would continue to seek the death penalty by certain dates, but he
had not been correct about the timing of the meeting or decision.
Dorey complained that Rumble also repeatedly said he would be ready
for trial by certain dates, but then would not be ready, resulting in the start
of trial delayed by almost a year. In particular, he claimed that trial was
continued because Rumble failed to complete a set of “action requests” on
time. The action requests were “items” Dorey believed “needed to be done to
get us prepared for trial.” They mostly involved potential questions for
witness interviews and a review of Dorey’s “e-mail history.” According to
8 The judge who addressed Dorey’s complaints was not the same judge
who presided over the first trial.
25
Dorey, Rumble “said they would be done by . . . the January trial date. They
weren’t. Then he said they would be done by the March trial date in 2019,
and they weren’t. Then he said they would be done by the May trial date in
2019, and I came to find out in April of 2019 that he hadn’t even started on
the list yet.”
The trial court addressed each issue raised by Dorey in turn, asking
Rumble for a response when needed.
Rumble represented that he met with Dorey at least 50 times over the
course of the representation and “spent an incredible amount of time with
[him], preparing for the trial.” He explained that the September 2018 trial
date was “continued to afford [Rumble] the opportunity to meet with the
District Attorney” to try and convince her to refrain from seeking the death
penalty. In accordance with office “protocol,” it took a “lot of work” and he
spent “a great deal of time” preparing for the meeting. There were also
“logistical problems in setting up meetings with the District Attorney’s Office
in terms of her availability and . . . [the] availability of the Primary Public
Defender’s Chief Trial Deputy.” But, he explained, “there were a lot of
moving parts in setting up the meeting.”
Ultimately, Rumble’s efforts were successful. In November 2018, the
District Attorney notified him that the prosecution would be seeking LWOP
instead of the death penalty. As a consequence, Rumble explained, the
January 2019 trial date was continued to allow him time to prepare because
LWOP cases and death penalty cases “require different strategies and
different work.” Trial was continued again when Dorey decided, in addition
to his not guilty plea, to enter a plea of NGI in the alternative, and then a few
26
months later, to withdraw the NGI plea.9 Rumble explained the changes to
Dorey’s plea “necessitated additional work [and] additional strategies in
terms of whether [there] would be two trials or one trial.”
As for the action requests, Rumble explained that Dorey made “13
specific requests and . . . various subsections within those requests.”
Although Rumble was not “able to get every item,” and not everything was
“completed in the time that we would like,” he “did investigate the case very
zealously.” Rumble estimated he had submitted a total of 20 investigation
requests to the trial court, and his lead investigator had spent 324 hours on
the case. Finally, as for Dorey’s email history, Rumble explained that after
trial concluded Dorey asked for copies of the emails that had been used by
both sides. Rumble’s office assigned an intern to redact them. It was a “big
project,” but he expected the emails to be delivered by the end of the month
and planned to get every single one to Dorey.
Rumble said he sympathized with Dorey’s “frustration with the amount
of time it ultimately took to try the case in front of a jury.” However, in his
view, he spent an incredible amount of time preparing. In August alone, he
personally spent 300 hours making final preparations for trial and handling
the first four days of trial.
Based on this initial set of complaints, the trial court found no reason
to relieve Rumble as counsel of record. The court explained that, even if
Rumble missed a substantial number of appointments, he met with Dorey 50
9 Rumble recalled that, when Dorey decided to change his plea, a March
2019 trial date and a May 2019 trial date were both continued. He appears
to be mistaken. The minutes show the May 2019 trial date was continued
because of the change of plea, but the March 2019 trial date was not. The
March trial date was continued upon request by the People.
27
times, which was “a lot,” and “hardly constitutes a reason to have him
relieved as counsel of record.” With regard to Rumble’s action requests, the
court explained that it takes time to ensure that an investigation is
conducted thoroughly. And when special circumstances are alleged, “it
requires more than . . . the usual case preparation.” Moreover, the court
informed Dorey, the selection of questions for witness interviews is a matter
within trial counsel’s purview.
The trial court found no undue delay in the time it took to obtain an
agreement from the District Attorney to not seek the death penalty. The
court explained “sometimes [target] dates get pushed back.” The court
explained, “[t]here’s a great deal of mitigating information that an attorney
must procure in advance of any trial in hopes of convincing the prosecutor
that the death penalty in that particular case is not appropriate.” “[I]t is
vital that every mitigating factor be presented in your favor before the
District Attorney makes a decision. . . . [Y]ou do not want them to make a
decision until they have everything to the positive, every mitigating factor.”
“There is so very much for an attorney to consider [in] regards [to] preparing
. . . their mitigation package for the District Attorney’s office, and you don’t
want to forget something. You don’t want to leave anything out. And I would
suggest that, as a result, the process, indeed, does take a while and perhaps
longer than [counsel] would have hoped.” “In addition, the District Attorney’s
office, likewise, once they receive the information from the defense, [it] takes
a period of time to analyze it, to make a determination about how they would
like to proceed. So this timeframe is, indeed, a very uncertain one, and all
that any attorney can do on either side of the table is to make their best
educated guess about when the decision might be made.”
28
The trial court also found the time to proceed to trial to have been
reasonable. The court stated, “[i]t doesn’t seem at all unusual to me that it
took a couple of years for this matter to proceed to trial, given everything
involved and the issues involved, which include . . . the entering of a not-
guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea, withdrawal of it, and ultimately the
litigation of the trial. [¶] These are complex matters for everybody involved.
And when you throw into the equation that the District Attorney’s office has
alleged special circumstances, that makes the task of the defense attorney an
onerous one, a difficult one.”
After addressing this first set of complaints, the trial court told Dorey,
“We can go through step by step each little thing, if you will, that you take
exception with. But . . . I’m going to make the broad point that things take
time.” To the extent Dorey was concerned about delay, the court pointed out
that if a new attorney was assigned to the case the attorney would not be
ready to represent him at a retrial for another year or so. The court said it
wanted Dorey to focus on issues “above and beyond” the time it took to
proceed to the first trial. The court said, “I’m here to answer those questions
to the extent I possibly can, and I’m happy to. . . . [¶] But I do want to focus
on any real issues that would suggest [defense counsel] should be excused.
[¶] Let’s move on from matters that perhaps pre-dated the trial in this
matter, wherein the jury could not make a decision, to . . . focus on where we
are headed.”
Dorey responded by stating his “big concern” was Rumble’s ability to
get things done in time for trial. The trial court responded by informing
Dorey that delays to permit further investigation are generally ongoing
throughout high stakes cases such as his. The court represented, based on its
experience, that Rumble was an excellent attorney, “at the top of the heap.”
29
The court noted that Rumble and the prosecution had both represented they
could be ready on the date currently set for the retrial.
The court then explained that complaints about the time it took
Rumble to proceed to the first trial, as well as the way it was handled, were
unlikely to provide grounds to relieve him as counsel given that he
successfully negotiated a commitment from the District Attorney to not seek
the death penalty and prevented the prosecution from obtaining a guilty
verdict. In layperson’s terms, the court explained, “So if the frustration is, 90
percent, [‘]everything’s taking so much time[’], I would suggest this to you, for
good purpose; because as things stand here right now, two things have
occurred during the course of this litigation that benefit you: Number one, no
death penalty. Your attorney did that. . . . Number two, [the case]
proceeded to trial [and] you were not convicted. Both to your benefit. . . .
[¶] So to the extent that . . . your primary issue relates to the time that it’s
taken, the decisions to be made to litigate the matter, understand that to this
point, some good things have happened.”
The trial court asked appellant if he had any other points to make.
Dorey responded, “Quite a few.” The court replied, “Well, we are not going to
address quite a few, no. Because heretofore, the only issue really addressed
relate[d] to frustration that things take time. I’ve told you why they take
time. I have many, many, matters on my calendar, and we cannot spend the
day together. I need you to focus on — I ask you [to] focus on issues that you
think are real issues that should prompt me to have counsel relieved.”
Dorey said he had “one last issue on timing.” He told the trial court he
provided Rumble with a new list of action requests. Next to each item on the
list he left a blank space where he expected Rumble “to sign a promised
completion date and to initial.” The court explained it was unreasonable to
30
ask Rumble to make such assurances “when counsel is reliant upon the
actions of others.”
Dorey next brought up a series of complaints about how Rumble
handled the case prior to and during the first jury trial. He complained that
Rumble wasted a “very considerable amount of time working on a huge
motion to exclude evidence,” which was found to be without merit. Rumble
explained he filed a motion to exclude evidence of cell phone records obtained
under exigent circumstances because he did not have any evidence that the
correct protocol was followed, and it was only after the motion was filed that
he was able to determine that protocol had in fact been followed.
Dorey asserted that Rumble lost an email in which his father admitted
assaulting his mother and giving her a black eye. Rumble denied losing an
email and explained that Dorey was mistaken. There was an email that
referred to the incident, but there was no email in which Dorey’s father
actually admitted to giving a black eye to Dorey’s mother.
Dorey next complained that Rumble purportedly said he did not think
attorneys at the District Attorney’s office worked hard. At trial, however, the
prosecutor had a PowerPoint presentation prepared for the opening and
spent about two weeks putting on about 10 witnesses. By contrast the
defense spent about two-and-a-half days putting on only three witnesses.
The trial court explained that it was not reasonable to compare the
prosecution case with the defense case in this manner, and that the
prosecutor’s case is usually longer because it has the burden of proving its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dorey complained that Rumble skipped over important questions from
the script they prepared for his direct examination. He said the questions
were important because they related to his father’s prior violence against
31
him. Rumble admitted he forgot to ask one question. He explained he was in
a “good groove” with Dorey and “did not end up asking it.”
Dorey claimed Rumble did not provide him with all of the emails
produced by the prosecution during discovery. He asserted the prosecutor
asked him questions on cross-examination about emails he had not seen,
placing him “in a very compromised situation where [he] actually answered a
question completely wrong.” Rumble represented he had arranged for an
intern to go over the hundreds and hundreds of pages of emails with
appellant, and she had made a spreadsheet of those emails.
Dorey complained that Rumble did not make objections to prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument even though the prosecutor “very overtly
[and] completely fabricated lies and fictitious arguments out of thin air.” The
court asked Rumble if the prosecutor made arguments that were not
substantiated by the evidence. Rumble said he thought the prosecutor’s
points were arguable and noted that he did raise some objections during her
closing. The court explained that if an argument is “within the realm of the
evidence,” a court is going to allow the argument, and experienced counsel
has to make a tactical decision whether to make an objection or respond in
the defense closing.
At this point in the proceedings, the court stated that it had spent
about an hour, maybe less, addressing Dorey’s concerns, and that it had “not
heard anything to this point that would suggest that there’s any basis upon
which to relieve [defense counsel].” The court said that it would allow Dorey
to say a final word. Dorey responded that he still had three pages left, and
asked to read them. The court asked him to summarize them.
Dorey complained that Rumble told him to not to look the jury in the
eyes during the testimony, because it would make him appear anti-social,
32
untrustworthy, and unbelievable. The court replied that attorneys have
different “strategies and perspectives” about jurors. The court explained that
some attorneys are concerned that looking at jurors in their eyes can be
perceived as intimidation.
After addressing this issue, the trial court told Dorey he was making
“minor points.” The court said it was unrealistic for Dorey to expect
everything in a criminal case to take place exactly when he wanted and every
strategy and motion to be successful and executed perfectly.
Dorey then asked, “please give me the time” and complained that the
defense had planned to present three character witnesses who had come in
from Northern California, Washington, and Pennsylvania, but Rumble, in an
“arbitrary, out-of-the-blue judgment call,” decided to not have them testify.
Rumble explained that the witnesses were ready to testify, but the trial court
judge made a ruling that restricted the scope of their expected admissible
testimony. Rumble represented that he and Dorey discussed whether to call
the witnesses and Dorey agreed they would not call them.
Dorey next complained about how Rumble handled closing argument.
Dorey said he gave Rumble three pages of arguments that responded to the
prosecution’s argument, but Rumble “put the pages aside and ignored them.”
Rumble responded that he and Dorey met several times about closing
argument, and even met the night before, to incorporate appellant’s ideas
into his draft. After the prosecutor rested, Dorey gave Rumble additional
comments to incorporate into the closing argument, which he did. After they
took a lunch break, Dorey told Rumble he had additional arguments, but
Rumble said he would not be able to incorporate them because at that point
he had to get up in front of the jury. The court explained to Dorey that, in its
33
view, there has to be a “particular flow” and “particular energy” to the closing
argument and attorneys cannot just “throw[ ] things out there.”
Finally, Dorey said he was concerned that Rumble had a “jaded view on
the justice system” that was “almost defeatist and fatalistic.” The court
responded that there is nothing wrong with an attorney expressing some
harsh realities and not sugar-coating things.
Dorey then said, “I get the sense that your mind is made up, [and] that
before we started this hearing, you were going to make very thorough and
comprehensive excuses for anything that I complained about.” He accused
the trial court of having “an idea that you were going to justify Mr. Rumble’s
work.”
The trial court responded that it did not know beforehand what Dorey’s
concerns would be and had planned “to endeavor to address [Dorey’s]
questions as effectively [and] completely as [it] could.” The court said the
concerns expressed by Dorey were minor ones and, even taking them in their
totality, did not provide a basis to conclude Rumble should be relieved as
counsel. The court stated, “we are not going to go on and on for hours and
hours about each small point to be made about the representation in the
case. . . . [¶] . . . [W]e could take days, I suppose, talking about this strategy
or that. That is not a base, though, to relieve counsel. And you haven’t given
me anything to this point to suggest that [your counsel has] done anything
wrong, . . . that he hasn’t adequately defended your interests to this point.”
The trial court then brought the hearing to a close: “So we must at
some point bring the hearing to a conclusion. I’ve given you an opportunity
to make a big point, but instead, you have made several mini minor points.
And I know they are important to you. I don’t belittle any of that. [¶] [But] I
must . . . have the record be made clear that I don’t believe that these points
34
that have been made are a basis to relieve counsel, which is the purpose of
this hearing. And I reiterate: I know [trial counsel] will ensure that he gives
you his ear, spends additional time in preparation for the trial of this matter.
[¶] I’m going to bring the hearing to a conclusion and deny the motion to
relieve counsel, seal the hearing until further order of the court.”
B. No Error
When a defendant seeks substitution of counsel pursuant to Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, “the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the
basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate
performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that
the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable
conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (People v. Smith
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) Based on our review of the record, we conclude
the trial court here fully complied with its obligation to allow Dorey an
opportunity to be heard and explain his reasons for seeking substitute
counsel.
As an initial matter, we first address what Dorey does not contend. He
does not contend the record before the trial court established his counsel was
failing to provide adequate representation. Nor does he contend the record
established an irreconcilable conflict with his counsel.10 He contends the
10 Indeed, to the contrary, Dorey asserted he did not “begrudge . . .
Rumble at all for his good, hard work on [his] case,” and “wish[ed] to
maintain positive rapport with him.” He also thanked Rumble on the record
for obtaining an agreement from the District Attorney to seek life without
parole and not the death penalty. He said, “[o]ne thing I did want to say
about the death penalty was thank you very much for getting that cleared
35
court failed to conduct a proper Marsden hearing because it purportedly “did
not conduct an inquiry sufficient to ascertain whether trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance.” (Italics added.) We find no error.
The trial court here gave Dorey a full opportunity to air his complaints.
His concerns consisted of (1) complaints about purported missed deadlines
and the time it took to bring the case to trial before the first jury,
(2) allegations of evidence mismanagement involving lost and missing emails,
and (3) disagreements with trial counsel over case strategy and trial tactics.
Starting with the first set of complaints—those that relate to alleged
delay and other timing concerns—the record does not support Dorey’s claim
that the trial court only “allowed [Dorey] to air some grievances up to a
point.” The court responded in detail to all five of Dorey’s complaints about
the time it took to proceed to the first trial, plus his “big concern” about
Rumble’s ability in general to get things done in a timely manner. After
hearing from Rumble and drawing on its own experience, the court
reasonably concluded that two and half years to prepare for the first trial was
justified given the special circumstance allegation, the successful negotiation
over the death penalty, and Dorey’s plea changes. The court reasonably
informed Dorey that additional complaints about the time it took to proceed
to the first trial would not change its mind, but then went on to entertain
what Dorey stated was “one last issue on timing” anyway.
The record also shows the trial court addressed both of Dorey’s
complaints about alleged evidence mismanagement. Dorey claimed Rumble
(1) lost an important email, and (2) failed to show him a set of emails that
were used to impeach him at trial. The court inquired of Rumble about both
up . . . . I sleep a lot better at night knowing that’s not on the table any[ ]
more.”
36
complaints. Rumble denied he lost the email and said he had a paralegal
review the emails and confirm that Dorey was mistaken about it being lost.
He also denied Dorey was impeached with emails Dorey did not review.
Rumble represented that, while Rumble himself was unable personally to
review all of the emails, his office hired a law school intern to facilitate
Dorey’s review of them and that review was documented on a spreadsheet.
After making this inquiry, the court “was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s
explanation[s]’ ” and to conclude that Dorey’s complaints were unfounded.
(People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.)
Finally, the record shows the trial court conducted an individualized
inquiry in response to each of Dorey’s concerns about case tactics and
strategies. As discussed, those concerns were (1) Rumble brought a motion to
suppress that was correctly denied, (2) he was wrong about the prosecutor’s
work ethic, (3) he refrained from making some potentially meritorious
objections during closing argument, (4) he advised Dorey to refrain from
looking at jurors in the eyes, (5) he chose to skip a single prepared question
during Dorey’s direct examination, (6) he did not call all of the character
witnesses that were available to testify, (7) although Rumble incorporated
most of the points that Dorey suggested into the defense closing argument, he
did not incorporate a set of questions Dorey suggested to him after a lunch
break, minutes before the proceedings recommenced, (8) the prosecution’s
case was longer than the defense case, and (9) overall, Rumble had a jaded
view of the justice system.
The trial court either questioned Rumble or drew on its own experience,
as appropriate, to respond to each concern. After approximately an hour, the
court initially said it would allow Dorey a “final word,” but then allowed
Dorey to continue when he said he had three pages of concerns left and asked
37
“please give me the time.” After numerous additional questions, when the
court finally ruled on the motion, Dorey said nothing about still having more
points to cover. The court then reasonably concluded that this final set of
points raised by Dorey consisted of minor concerns that amounted to a
disagreement about strategy. “Disagreement concerning tactics, by itself, is
insufficient to compel discharge of counsel.” (People v. Smith, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 606.) The record thus does not support Dorey’s claim the trial
court did not consider his entire list of grievances.
The record also contains no support for Dorey’s vague and high-level
claim that the trial court “should have inquired further into the specifics of
[his] concerns.” The nature of Dorey’s concerns was not such that further
inquiry had potential to reveal that Rumble was not providing adequate
representation. Dorey does not explain what more the trial court needed to
ask or know about his straightforward claim of undue delay, his complaints
about lost and missing emails that the court explained were not lost or
missing, or his exceedingly minor disagreements with a highly effective trial
strategy. Indeed, the upshot of virtually all of Dorey’s complaints was that
Rumble purportedly took too long and made minor mistakes in the process of
obtaining outstandingly favorable results: an agreement by the District
Attorney not to seek the death penalty and a hung jury in a gruesome
homicide case. Dorey does not explain how a more in-depth exploration of
any particular issue—or all of them even—could potentially have led to a
finding of inadequate representation by Rumble in the face of this
remarkable success.
The trial court gave Dorey ample opportunity to be heard on his motion
to relieve counsel.
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III.
No Discovery Error
Dorey asks us to conduct an independent, in camera review of sealed
records that were produced to the trial court by the San Diego County
Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The trial
court reviewed the records and determined they contained no material that
had to be provided to the defense. The People agree an independent review is
appropriate. Appellate courts “ ‘routinely independently examine[ ] the
sealed records of . . . in camera hearings to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion’ ” in many contexts. (See, e.g., People v. Myles (2012) 53
Cal.4th 1181, 1209 [motion to disclose confidential police personnel records];
People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 955, 975–976 [motion to disclose sealed
portion of search warrant].) We agree review is appropriate here.
We have reviewed the documents in camera, and we affirm the trial
court’s ruling. Our independent review has not identified any information
that should have been disclosed to the defense. (§ 1050; Brady, supra, 373
U.S. 783.)
IV.
The Parole Revocation Fine Must Be Stricken
Dorey was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. There is
no possibility of him ever being on parole. Nevertheless, the minute order
and abstract of judgment indicate the trial court imposed and suspended a
$10,000 parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45.
Section 1202.45, subdivision (a), provides: “In every case where a
person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of
parole, the court shall, at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation
39
restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision
(b) of Section 1202.4.” (Italics added.) This additional restitution fine “shall
be suspended unless the person’s parole is revoked.” (Id., subd. (c).) We
agree with Dorey and the People that the fine is unauthorized and must be
stricken. (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1183.) “When
there is no parole eligibility, the fine is clearly not applicable.” (People v.
Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the parole revocation fine. With this
modification in place, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct the abstract of judgment and send a copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation and all parties.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
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