White v. Gabriel CA6

CourtListener 10593048Calctapp27 mag 2025

Testo completo

Filed 5/27/25 White v. Gabriel CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THOMAS WHITE, H051530
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22CV408831)

v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING PETITIONS FOR
ARIANA GABRIEL et al., REHEARING

Defendants and Respondents, NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

JAMES WALL et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants’ petitions for rehearing are denied. The court orders that the opinion
filed April 28, 2025, be modified as follows:
The second and third sentences of the second full paragraph on page 20 of the
opinion shall be deleted and replaced with the following three sentences:

The SSI Slack post was made in a channel containing thousands of students, faculty,
recent graduates, and aerospace professionals, and the Fountain Hopper publication was
available to almost tens of thousands of Stanford community members. Because the
common interest privilege is intended to apply to a narrow range of private interests,
neither publication falls under the common interest privilege. (Brown, supra, 48 Cal.3d
at p. 727.) Both publications were so widely disseminated as to defeat the purpose of the
common interest privilege.

There is no change in the judgment.

___________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

_____________________________ ___________________________
Grover, J. Danner, J.

2
Filed 4/28/25 White v. Gabriel CA6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THOMAS WHITE, H051530
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22CV408831)

v.

ARIANA GABRIEL et al.,

Defendants and Respondents,

JAMES WALL et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Thomas White sued Ariana Gabriel, Julia Thompson, James Wall, and Maya
Harris (together, defendants) for defamation, alleging defendants spread false rape and
sexual assault accusations against him while they all attended Stanford University.
Defendants moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16
(the anti-SLAPP statute).1 The trial court granted Gabriel and Thompson’s motions to
strike in their entirety and Wall and Harris’s joint motion in part. White now appeals the
trial court’s order, and Wall and Harris cross-appeal. For the reasons stated below, we
reverse the trial court’s order on the three anti-SLAPP motions and remand with
directions to deny all three motions to strike the defamation claim in part.

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Relationships
White and defendants are former or current students at Stanford. As
undergraduates, White and Gabriel lived in the same dorm complex and participated in
the Stanford Debate Society. White, Thompson, and Wall were roommates who
participated in a space-themed cover band with Harris. All four students also participated
in the Stanford Space Initiative (SSI), a student-run organization for students pursuing
careers in the aerospace industry. White later became a graduate student at Stanford and
continued to participate in SSI.
According to Gabriel and Wall, White sexually assaulted them while they were
undergraduates at Stanford. Gabriel asserts White sexually assaulted her2 five times and
she recalled the key details months later due to amnesic episodes. Wall claims White
sexually assaulted him3 once, and his memory of the events also emerged over time.
Gabriel and Wall subsequently reached out to Stanford’s Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response & Education Title IX Office (Title IX Office). Wall filed
a formal complaint that he withdrew two months later. Gabriel, however, met with the
Title IX coordinator with Thompson and sent the coordinator and an investigator
information regarding White’s alleged assaults. According to defendants, Gabriel
informed them she was going to file a Title IX report, and all four defendants agreed to
organize information to present to the Title IX Office. The Title IX Office accepted
Gabriel’s formal complaint two months later, and White was notified of the investigation
the same day.4

2
According to the record, Gabriel uses they/them pronouns, but her brief refers to
Gabriel by she/her pronouns. We defer to the pronouns used in Gabriel’s brief.
3
According to defendants, James Wall now identifies as a male but identified as
female at the time of the alleged assault. We use he/his pronouns to refer to Wall.
4
The record does not confirm the status of the Title IX investigation. White states
it was still ongoing at the time of the appeal.
2
B. The Defamation Lawsuit
White filed a defamation lawsuit against defendants, alleging they conspired to
spread false rape and sexual assault accusations against him. He pled defendants made
four defamatory communications to individual Stanford students, two defamatory
statements to and on behalf of a former employer, and two defamatory statements to the
larger Stanford community.5 White also asserted defendants made defamatory
communications to numerous other people and he had to republish the statements to
others to defend his reputation.
Defendants moved to strike all causes of action within White’s complaint. They
argued they reached out to others because they were concerned about their safety and
wanted to provide relevant information to the Title IX Office. White opposed the
motions to strike.
While the anti-SLAPP motions were pending, the trial court granted in part
White’s motion to lift a discovery stay. White was allowed to take limited depositions of
each defendant to address publication, subpoena documents from Stanford relating to
defendants’ sexual assault complaints against White, and obtain communications in
defendants’ possession regarding any sexual assault allegations against White.

5
The four alleged defamatory communications involving Stanford students
include: (1) a conversation between Wall, Harris, and two other students named Glikbarg
and S.V., (2) a text message from Wall to Glikbarg, (3) a recorded call between White,
defendants, and Gabriel’s friend, and (4) a text message, drafted by defendants, sent by
Harris to eight Stanford students. Later in this opinion we refer to these as the “Four
Communications to Individual Stanford Students.”
The two alleged defamatory communications involving a former employer
include: (1) a conversation between Gabriel and her former internship employers at
Zipline, and (2) a text message from Gabriel to Glikbarg on behalf of Zipline. We refer
to these as the “Two Zipline Communications.”
The two alleged defamatory communications involving the larger Stanford
community include: (1) a post on Stanford’s SSI Slack channel, and (2) an article written
and published by defendants in the Fountain Hopper, an independent Stanford
publication read by Stanford students. We refer to these as “Two Defamatory
Communications to the Larger Stanford Community.”
3
The trial court granted Gabriel and Thompson’s separate motions to strike in full,
striking the defamation claim based on the two communications involving Gabriel’s
former employer. It granted Wall and Harris’s joint motion to strike in part, striking the
claim as to three of the four alleged communications to individual Stanford students and
one of the two alleged communications to the larger Stanford community. The court
denied Wall and Harris’s motion to strike the defamation claim as to one allegation based
on a conversation between individual Stanford students and one allegation based on a
Slack post made to the larger Stanford community.
White timely appealed the trial court’s order, and Wall and Harris timely cross-
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
White does not analyze the alleged defamatory communications individually.
Instead, he argues none of the statements are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute
because they concern sexual assault between private parties and do not raise public issues
contributing to existing public debate.6 He also argues the statements are not protected
because they were made prior to the Title IX Office’s official acceptance of Gabriel’s
formal complaint and were not made by a pre-litigation investigator. White contends he
has made a sufficient showing of each element of defamation, including the
inapplicability of any privilege. He maintains the trial court failed to consider all the
evidence and draw inferences in his favor and should have denied the motions in their
entirety.
Defendants argue White failed to engage in the claim-by-claim analysis required
to successfully defend against an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. They assert all the
alleged defamatory statements were connected to the Title IX investigation, were made in

6
White includes two attachments to his reply brief, but there is no showing any of
the documents attached to White’s brief are part of the appellate record. We accordingly
do not consider them in this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d).)
4
public forums and in furtherance of their right to petition or free speech, and were related
to public issues. Defendants also argue White did not properly plead a prima facie case
of defamation, including libel as to the written statements, and all the factual allegations
are protected by the litigation privilege, common interest privilege, or the fair and true
report privilege. Defendants maintain White is barred from amending his complaint, and
the trial court properly considered the evidence and struck White’s meritless allegations.
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
Section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, “provide[s] a
procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights” under the First Amendment. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1048, 1055-1056.) The anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a special motion to strike claims
“arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection
with a public issue . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Such motions to strike serve to prevent and deter lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, seeking to screen out
meritless claims early, before the defendant’s resources are drained. (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 312 (Flatley).) The anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly.
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
We review the trial court’s order on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 325.) A court must “consider the pleadings, and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
We evaluate a trial court’s denial of a motion to strike under section 425.16 in two
steps. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) First, we resolve
the threshold inquiry whether the moving defendant made a prima facie showing “that the
5
challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged. [Citations.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “A defendant satisfies the first step of the analysis by
demonstrating that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls
within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]’
[citation], and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that conduct [citation].” (Rand
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620 (Rand).) The categories
protect any written or oral statement or writing made: (1) “before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,” (2) “in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,” and (3) “in a place
open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest,” or (4)
“any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
If we determine the defendant has made the showing at the first step, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate “a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) At this second “ ‘summary-judgment-like’ ” step, the
plaintiff must demonstrate its claim has minimal merit. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 384-385 (Baral).) The plaintiff “ ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if
verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.
[Citations.]’ ” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Such
evidence includes evidence uncovered in discovery, which must be limited to the issues
raised in the motion to strike. (See § 425.16, subd. (g); Slauson Partnership v. Ochoa
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1021.) “The court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a
6
favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law. [Citation.]” (Baral, at pp. 384-385.) Defendant bears the burden of proof on any
affirmative defense. (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769 (Laker).) If the plaintiff fails to show its claim has minimal
merit, “then the trial court should deem the cause of action a SLAPP and should strike it.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 760.)
B. Scope of Review
White pled one count of defamation involving eight communications. He argues
the trial court erred by failing to consider additional defamatory statements uncovered in
discovery that would render his defamation claim actionable. “ ‘It is not our role to
engage in what would amount to a redrafting of [a] complaint in order to read that
document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been specifically
alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have essentially drafted could
survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.’ [Citation.]” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v.
ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883, italics omitted (Medical Marijuana).)
We will not consider defamatory statements not properly alleged in the complaint. (See
id. at pp. 883, 893-894.)
We address the eight alleged communications individually. (See Baral, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 396.) White argues defendants’ motions should have been denied in their
entirety because some of the claims based on challenged activities support the defamation
cause of action. White is not correct. Where a cause of action is based on multiple
claims arising out of a variety of factual allegations, as here, we analyze each claim for
relief and strike the claims falling under the anti-SLAPP statute and allow other claims
within the same cause of action to go forward. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1010-1011.) Defendants, as the moving parties, have properly identified
and addressed the factual allegations individually. (Ibid.; Young v. Midland Funding
7
LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 99-100.) Evaluating each allegation separately, we
conclude all eight communications are protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute but
only two communications involving the larger Stanford community support a finding of
minimal merit.
C. Step One
1. Speech in Connection with a Public Issue or Matter of Public Interest
The parties dispute whether the alleged acts are protected under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4) (the public interest provision). The public interest provision defines
protected activity to include “any . . . conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with
a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16(e)(4)). This subdivision serves as
“a catchall provision.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 139
(FilmOn).) Under the provision, no public forum is required, and even private conduct is
protected if the communications concern issues of public interest. (Hailstone v. Martinez
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736.) We determine all eight alleged communications are
protected under this provision.
The Supreme Court evaluated the public interest provision in FilmOn. (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 139.) FilmOn.com Inc. sued an online tracking company called
DoubleVerify for allegedly disparaging FilmOn’s web-based network in confidential
reports to DoubleVerify’s paying clients. (Id. at p. 140.) FilmOn alleged the reports
falsely indicated its network engaged in copyright infringement and featured adult
conduct, resulting in the loss of advertisements on FilmOn’s network. (Id. at pp. 141-
142.) The Supreme Court established the inquiry under the public interest provision
requires a two-step analysis. “First, we ask what ‘public issue or [] issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the
content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional relationship exists
between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest. It is
8
at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (Id. at pp. 149-150.) The Court determined
DoubleVerify’s reports implicated the public issues of copyright infringement and
children’s exposure to sexually explicit media content. (Id. at pp. 140, 152-154.)
However, the reports were not protected under the public interest provision because they
were too remotely connected to those public issues under the second step of the analysis,
as the reports were generated for profit, were exchanged confidentially to paying clients,
and were not intended to enter the public sphere. (Id. at pp. 140, 152-154.)
We commence our review by examining the content of the eight alleged acts. The
first step of the public interest provision “is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or
conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a
public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1238, 1253 (Geiser).) “[T]he focus of our inquiry must be on ‘the specific nature
of the speech,’ rather than on any ‘generalities that might be abstracted from it.’
[Citation.]” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152.) The challenged statements in this case
directly or implicitly concern White’s purported sexual assaults and violence. Sexual
violence is a matter of concern to the larger public. (See Terry v. Davis Community
Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1547 (Terry) [involving alleged child sex abuse].)
The concern here was pressing because White was a Stanford graduate student and a
member of SSI at the time of the alleged statements. His alleged sexual violence could
affect large numbers of students beyond defendants. (FilmOn, at p. 145; see Grenier v.
Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 482-483 (Grenier) [in child sex abuse case by
church pastor, “public interest” is broadly construed to include private conduct impacting
a broad segment of society or a large community].) Therefore, the eight statements
implicate public issues.
Having identified the matters of public interest in the speech, we turn to the pith of
the parties’ arguments—the second step of the FilmOn test. This step requires “ ‘some
degree of closeness’ ” between the statements and the public interest. (FilmOn, supra,
9
7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of
widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the
public debate.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) When assessing whether a statement contributes to
the public debate, “[w]e are not concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or
the degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular direction; rather, we
examine whether a defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—participated
in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest. [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 151.) In conducting this examination, we consider “context—including
audience, speaker, and purpose.” (Id. at p. 152.)
All eight statements by defendants contributed to the public discussion of sexual
violence and safety on Stanford’s campus. Defendants, believing White had a history of
sexual violence and access to weapons, reached out to Stanford and Zipline community
members with the expectation the shared information would protect others and further the
Title IX investigation. (See Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 375 [tenant’s
private warning to a buyer’s agent that a convicted sex offender lived nearby was directly
related to public issue because it served to alert prospective buyers of the potential risk to
children]; Grenier, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 483 [defendants’ statements alleging
child sex abuse were connected to a public issue because they attempted to warn people
from attending the church with plaintiff as the pastor and generally raised issue of child
molestation and abuse].) These statements contributed to the existing community
discussion concerning Stanford’s deficient response to sexual violence on campus.
(Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1550-1551 [statements accusing church’s youth
group leaders of inappropriate sexual contact with a minor contributed to the ongoing
public debate about how the church could keep sexual predators out of leadership
positions].) Although defendants’ statements implicated a private figure and some of the
alleged communications were made to individuals, “no single element is dispositive”
under the second step of the analysis. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 153.) All the
10
communications sought to draw public attention to White’s alleged sexual violence for
safety and investigatory purposes. (See Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1255 [sidewalk
demonstration furthered the public discussion of the implicated public issues because
demonstration served to draw attention to the alleged unfairness of foreclosure and
eviction practices].) We hold all of defendants’ statements underlying White’s
defamation claim have the requisite degree of closeness required for protection under the
second step of the public interest provision. (FilmOn, at p. 150; Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 620.)
As the eight communications qualify as protected speech under the public interest
provision, we need not determine whether the acts are protected under other subdivisions
of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.)
D. Step Two
Finding all the alleged defamatory statements are protected under step one of the
anti-SLAPP statute, we turn to step two to determine whether White has demonstrated his
defamation claim has minimal merit. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385.) To
prove defamation, a plaintiff must show (1) a publication is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4)
unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or cause special damages. (Taus v.
Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 (Taus).) In addition, a private person must
demonstrate the defendant “failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity
[citation]” of the alleged defamatory statement. (Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent
Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 470 (Hecimovich).)
A defamation claim is not actionable without a showing of falsity because truth is
a complete defense to defamation. (See Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256,
293 (Hawran).) “ ‘[I]t is not the literal truth or falsity of each word or detail used in a
statement which determines whether or not it is defamatory; rather, the determinative
question is whether the ‘gist or sting’ of the statement is true or false, benign or

11
defamatory, in substance.’ [Citation.]” (Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689,
702 (Issa).)
White argues he has presented sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of
defamation, including falsity and negligence, and argues defendants’ statements do not
qualify under any relevant privilege. Defendants argue White has not proven each
element of defamation as to each alleged communication, including negligence, falsity,
and special damages. They maintain the statements are protected under the litigation,
common interest, and fair and true report privileges.
White fails to show the defamation claim based on the four communications to
individual Stanford students and the two communications involving Zipline has minimal
merit. The allegations based on these six communications must be stricken from the
complaint. (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.) The defamation claim based on the
two communications to the larger Stanford community may proceed.
1. Four Communications to Individual Stanford Students
The four alleged defamatory communications to individual Stanford students are
protected by the common interest privilege. This privilege protects a communication
made “without malice, to a person interested therein, . . . by one who is also interested.”
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).) The common interest privilege is “recognized where the
communicator and the recipient have a common interest and the communication is of a
kind reasonably calculated to protect or further that interest.” (Deaile v. General
Telephone Co. of California (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 846 (Deaile).) “The ‘interest’
must be something other than mere general or idle curiosity, such as where the parties to
the communication share a contractual, business or similar relationship or the defendant
is protecting his own pecuniary interest. [Citation.]” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th
at p. 287.) The privilege is limited to only “to a narrow range of private interests” and
does “not [] create any broad news-media privilege.” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co.
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 727 (Brown).) Under the privilege, “defendant generally bears the
12
initial burden of establishing that the statement in question was made on a privileged
occasion, and thereafter the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that the statement was
made with malice. [Citation.]” (Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 721.)
a. Common Interest
Defendants have shown their statements to fellow Stanford students were made in
situations where the communicator and the recipient shared a common interest to protect
the safety of other students. Communications among various members of a school
concerning topics of interest to the school fall within the privilege. (See Hicks v. Richard
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1177-1178 (Hicks); Hecimovich, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 471-472.) In Hicks, the court found a common interest between parents of parochial
schoolchildren and church authorities overseeing the school after a parent on the school’s
advisory board sent the church authorities a letter regarding the principal’s conduct.
(Hicks, at pp. 1177-1178; see also Martin v. Kearney (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 309, 312
[communications by parents of school children regarding teacher made to school officials
fall within the privilege].) In Hecimovich, the court determined a parent teacher
organization’s communications regarding a coach’s ability and qualities were protected
by the common interest privilege because they were made to “interested persons” who
were entitled to it, such as school officials, parent-teacher members responsible for the
boys’ basketball program, the assistant coach, parents of the child player, and league
parents. (Hecimovich, at p. 472.) Similarly here, defendants were Stanford students who
made statements about a current Stanford graduate student to fellow students. These
students were “interested persons” entitled to information regarding their safety as
students at the school.
b. Malice and Excessive Publication
Because the four statements were made on a privileged occasion, the burden shifts
to White to establish a showing of malice. (Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 721.) Malice is
not inferred from the communication. (Civ. Code, § 48.) Instead, “malice has been
13
defined as ‘a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex,
annoy or injure another person.’ [Citation.]” (Brown, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 723.)
“ ‘ “The malice necessary to defeat a qualified privilege is ‘actual malice’ which is
established by a showing that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards
the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in
the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s
rights [citations].” ’ ” (Taus, at p. 721.)
The evidence presented in the trial court is insufficient to establish a prima facie
case of actual malice. White argues defendants acted with malice because their
inherently improbable allegations show they lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the
truth of the publications. However, we do not weigh the evidence at this stage. (See
Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) Instead, we accept White’s evidence as true and also
evaluate defendants’ evidence to determine if it defeats plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law. (Id. at pp. 384-385.) Defendants submitted evidence demonstrating they believed
White committed sexual assaults and had a history of violence, which White simply
denies. We cannot conclude defendants lacked reasonable belief in their allegations on
this record.
White also points to general hostile statements by defendants regarding White.
“ ‘A court may consider a defendant’s anger or hostility toward a plaintiff in determining
the presence of malice only to the extent it impacts the defendant’s actual belief
concerning the truthfulness of the publication. [Citation.] The focus is thus on the
“ ‘defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material published . . . [not] the
defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Hicks, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1178.) The record does not show defendants’ hostility towards White affected their
belief that what they were saying was true.
Nor were the privileged acts excessively published. Excessive publication may
defeat the common interest privilege. (Deaile, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 847.)
14
Excessive publication occurs when a statement is published “to those with no interest in
the business or for any nefarious motives.” (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 426, 442.) As stated above, the four communications were all made to
fellow Stanford students who hold an interest in the content of the statements due to
safety concerns. White cannot show excessive publication or actual malice.
We conclude White cannot prevail on these four communications because the
statements are privileged. Therefore, we need not address whether White has proven
minimal merit as to the other elements of a defamation claim.
2. Two Zipline Communications
a. Minimal Merit
White has not met his burden to prove a prima facie case of defamation based on
Gabriel’s text to another Stanford student regarding Zipline’s investigation into White.7
White fails to demonstrate the text message “has ‘[a]n essential element of libel’ which is
‘a false statement of fact’ about plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC.
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1217, 1230.) Courts determine whether a statement is actionable
fact by applying a “totality of the circumstances” test. (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385 (Franklin).) Courts first examine the language of the
statement to determine whether the words are understood in a defamatory sense. (Ibid.)
Language disclosing incorrect, incomplete, or an erroneous assessment of facts and not
“cautiously phrased in terms of the author’s impression” is more likely to be actionable.
(See Dickinson v. Cosby (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1163-1164 (Dickinson).) Courts

7
The text message stated: “Hey Chloe, this is Ari Gabriel. I am unsure how
much [Wall] & [Harris] have told you about my involvement in the /[White] Situation/. I
just want to give you a heads up that I spoke with Nisha (from zipline where I worked)
and she is speaking with Jen about the potential risk of having [White] on the Zipline
campus and value concerns when/if he applies to join the Zipline team. I wanted let [sic]
you know this conversation was happening in case you also wanted to speak with Jen and
share you [sic] concerns as Nisha and I have. If you have any questions or need
clarification on any part of this vague message please let me know.”
15
then consider the context in which the statement was made, reviewing “the audience to
whom the statement was directed.” (Ibid.) “[T]he dispositive question is whether a
reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a
provably false assertion of fact. [Citations.]” (Franklin, at p. 385.)
A reasonable fact finder could not conclude Gabriel’s text message implies
provably false assertions of fact. The message states Zipline was investigating White,
which Gabriel asserts was true, but does not state or imply any other facts about White.
Instead, Gabriel phrased her statements cautiously, using terms such as “potential risk”
and “value concerns.” (See John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300,
1314-1315 [statements using terms such as “apparently”, “my impression is”, or “I think”
are protected statements of opinion rather than defamatory actionable facts].) While the
student recipient, Glikbarg, was likely aware of the sexual assault allegations against
White due to her participation in previous conversations with defendants, Gabriel’s
message does not detail the factual basis for Zipline’s investigation and is too vague to be
actionable fact. (See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 [statement that a
corporation was “ ‘intoleran[t] of intellectual properties, copyrights, and trade secrets’
was too vague to be actionable”].) We therefore need not address defendants’ arguments
as to the other elements of defamation with respect to this text message.
b. Litigation Privilege
Gabriel’s separate communications with Zipline regarding the Title IX
investigation into White are protected by the litigation privilege. Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b), commonly known as the litigation privilege, bars a civil action for
communications made in any legislative proceeding, judicial proceeding, other official
proceeding authorized by law, or in the initiation or course of any other proceeding
authorized by law. (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360
(Hagberg).) This absolute privilege encompasses “statements made prior to the filing of
a lawsuit, whether in preparation for anticipated litigation or to investigate the feasibility
16
of filing a lawsuit. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 360-361.) “A prelitigation communication is
privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration. [Citations.]” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa
Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251.)
Gabriel reached out to her former employers at Zipline because the Title IX Office
asked her to contact them and identify witnesses for any potential investigation.
Statements made in connection with a Title IX investigation, an official proceeding
authorized by law, are protected by the litigation privilege. (See Laker, supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at pp. 764-765, 770.) Gabriel’s communications with Zipline are therefore
absolutely privileged.
White argues the evidence raises factual questions as to whether the Title IX
proceeding was considered in good faith. But that consideration is inapposite here, as
good faith is relevant only to the privilege’s requirement that statements bear some
logical relation to the litigation. (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
903, 919-922.) As stated above, we do not weigh the evidence at this stage of the
analysis but do consider the facts to determine whether White can establish a prima facie
probability of prevailing on his claim and whether defendants have defeated White’s
claim as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 921.) The record shows Gabriel reached out to Zipline
because she believed she was required to identify witnesses for her Title IX investigation,
demonstrating a logical relationship between her conversation with Zipline and the Title
IX investigation. Gabriel has proven her statements to Zipline are protected by the
litigation privilege.
Based on this determination, we need not address whether White has proven
minimal merit as to the other elements of a defamation claim. We conclude White has
failed to show a probability of prevailing on the allegations involving the two Zipline
communications.

17
3. Two Defamatory Communications to the Larger Stanford Community
a. Preliminary Considerations
White pled two defamatory communications to the larger Stanford community:
the SSI Slack post and the Fountain Hopper article. The trial court reviewed the merits
of Wall and Harris’s motion to strike the defamation claim based on these two
communications but determined Gabriel and Thompson did not have to address the
protected nature of the two communications in their motions to strike because White did
not allege either defendant was involved in either publication. The court subsequently
granted Gabriel and Thompson’s motions to strike in full. “To support a claim for
defamation, [a plaintiff] need only establish that the individual defendants took a
‘responsible part’ in the publication of defamatory matter. [Citations.]” (Hawran, supra,
209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275-276.) White generally pled SSI leadership and the Fountain
Hopper made a defamatory post about him, and the record shows all defendants were
involved in the creation and dissemination of both publications. We conclude White has
established all defendants took a responsible part in the publication of both
communications and can prevail on these two allegations against all defendants if he is
able to demonstrate the allegations have minimal merit. (See id. at p. 277.)
The trial court also found White had not properly pled libel as to the Fountain
Hopper allegation. Libel is the written form of defamation. (Civ. Code, §§ 44-45.)
“ ‘The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically
identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.’ [Citation.]” (Medical Marijuana,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 888, italics omitted.) Assertions of libelous statements not
properly alleged in the complaint need not be considered in an anti-SLAPP motion. (Id.
at p. 893.) White identified the Fountain Hopper article verbatim in the complaint. The
situation here is not one where the plaintiff merely attached a pages-long article to plead
a libel case. (Cf. id. at pp. 894-895.) Instead, the Fountain Hopper article consists of a
couple of sentences and is more akin to a social media posting reviewable for defamation.
18
(See GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 145-146, 155-156
[reviewing entire three-line tweet]; Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 664-665,
675-676, 687 [reviewing several Facebook posts for defamation].) We conclude White
properly pled libel that we must address at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
b. Minimal Merit
White has proven the claims based on the two communications to the larger
Stanford community have minimal merit. The gist of the communications concern
White’s violation of SSI’s membership agreement due to his unethical behavior and
White’s alleged sexual harm and violence.8 (See Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.)
The statements consist of non-conditional and inflammatory terminology that harms
White’s reputation. (See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385; Dickinson, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163-1164.) The statements were also published in a Slack
channel accessible by 3,000 individuals—including faculty, recent graduates, and

8
The SSI Slack post stated: “Hello everyone, in light of recent events DEI would
like to make a statement about the removal of [White] from the SSI Slack: [¶] [White],
former SSI copresident, has been found to have severely violated several clauses of the
general membership agreement, and has gone against the ethics and general contracts of
the club. In accordance with SSI policy, he has been barred from any future involvement
in SSI and therefore removed from the slack. As DEI, we want to offer our support for
anyone who may have experienced harm on behalf of [White] and invite you to reach out
us. [¶] -The DEI team.”
The Fountain Hopper article, titled “Rocket Man Takes Flight, Former SSI
President Removed Amid Accusations of Physical and Sexual Violence,” stated: “A
former Stanford Space Initiative (SSI) President (rocket man [rocket emoji]) was
removed from the organization earlier this month after allegedly sexually assaulting and
threatening multiple students with weapons. [knife emoji] [¶] SSI members first heard
about the former president’s history of violence in an all-club (general) slack message
sent out by their DEI team in late October. The slack message announced the former
president was banned for violating a number of club ethical and membership agreements.
SSI then offered resources for anyone who may have experienced harm from the former
president. A source close to the issue told FoHo, his removal came after a number of
students were assaulted and threatened with physical violence by the former president.
[eyes emoji] [¶] This story is still developing, so expect updates soon. [¶] Want to help
this story take off [rocket emoji]? Hit reply. Anonymity guaranteed.”
19
aerospace professionals—and in a widely disseminated school newspaper. Defendants
shared these communications while they were contacting Stanford students with
information about White’s alleged sexual assaults. Considering the content and context
in which the statements were made, we conclude the totality of the circumstances
supports a reasonable fact finder could conclude the two published statements declare
provable, defamatory assertions of fact. (See Franklin, at pp. 385-386.)
The evidence is also sufficient to demonstrate minimal merit on the issue of
reasonable care. (Hecimovich, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.) Defendants’
allegations of sexual assault were partially based on White’s refusal to admit to certain
facts or allegations. The incendiary nature of their statements to the larger public without
confirmation of the truth demonstrate a minimal showing of a lack of due diligence to
determine their accuracy. (See ibid.)
Defendants’ privilege defenses fail. The SSI Slack post was made in a channel
containing thousands of members, and the Fountain Hopper publication was available to
almost tens of thousands of Stanford community members. Because common interest
privilege does not apply to broad media statements, neither publication falls under the
common interest privilege. (Brown, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 727.) Both communications
are also not subject to the litigation privilege because defendants did not make the
statements with the intent they would assist the Title IX investigation. (Hagberg, supra,
32 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Neither communication is subject to the fair and true
reporting privilege because the communications do not reference a potential Title IX
proceeding. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d); Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 278
[privilege only applies if the substance of the publication captures the gist of the
statements made in the official proceedings].)
White has demonstrated his defamation claim based on the SSI Slack and
Fountain Hopper communications has minimal merit.

20
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions is reversed. The trial
court shall vacate the order and enter a new order: (1) denying Gabriel’s, Thompson’s,
and Wall and Harris’s motions to strike the defamation claim arising out of the SSI Slack
post and Fountain Hopper publication and (2) granting defendants’ motions to strike the
defamation claim arising out of all other activities, communications, and statements. The
trial court shall reinstate the defamation allegations based on the SSI Slack post and
Fountain Hopper publication and strike references to all other statements from the
complaint. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

21
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Grover, J.

______________________________________
Danner, J.

H051530 White v. Gabriel et al.

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