Rubio v. AmeriPride Services CA2/4

CourtListener 10592128Calctapp23 mag 2025

Testo completo

Filed 5/23/25 Rubio v. AmeriPride Services CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

ANA RUBIO, B337000
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
20STCV13057)
AMERIPRIDE SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.
Pairavi Law, Edwin Pairavi and Joshua M. Mohrsaz for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Jason S. Mills and Eva M. Nofri
for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Ana Rubio worked for AmeriPride Services, LLC1
(AmeriPride) for three-and-a-half months. She missed work or
left early on nine days due to either her granddaughter’s, her
husband’s, or her own medical issues.
AmeriPride terminated Rubio’s employment based on her
attendance record. She then sued AmeriPride for disability-
related claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) (Government Code § 12900 et seq.)2, and for wrongful
termination. The trial court granted AmeriPride’s motion for
summary judgment on the ground that neither Rubio nor her
husband suffered from a qualifying disability under FEHA.3
We conclude that summary judgment was properly
granted, but for a different reason. Even assuming Rubio and
her husband suffered from qualifying disabilities, she failed to
raise a triable issue as to whether AmeriPride knew of her
disability or her husband’s disability when it decided to
terminate her employment. The adverse employment action,
therefore, could not have been “because of” Rubio’s (or her
husband’s) disability—an essential element of her claims.
Accordingly, we affirm.

1 AmeriPride Services, LLC was incorrectly sued as
AmeriPride Services, Inc.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
3 Rubio did not claim that her granddaughter suffered from a
disability.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

AmeriPride is a uniform rental and linen supply company.
StaffWorks, Inc. dba TalentOne (TalentOne) contracts with
AmeriPride to provide the services of temporary workers
employed by TalentOne.
On December 27, 2017, Rubio applied for employment with
TalentOne. TalentOne then assigned Rubio to AmeriPride to
work as a Production Employee. Rubio’s work schedule was
Monday through Friday from 4:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. Her job
duties included sorting garments and products to be washed,
placing garments in the wash-and-dry aisle, offloading the
dryers, and operating and tending to the washing and/or drying
machines. She reported to Jose Sanchez and Arturo Becerra
throughout her employment.
Rubio was absent on seven occasions and left work early on
two occasions during her three-and-a-half month tenure with
AmeriPride. Specifically, on January 3, 2018, Becerra permitted
Rubio to leave work early to tend to her ill granddaughter. A few
weeks later, on January 22, Rubio called Becerra to tell him she
would not be at work because her granddaughter was sick. Then,
on February 5, Rubio called Becerra to tell him she would not be
at work because she took her granddaughter to the doctor’s office.

4 On summary judgment, “we view the evidence in light most
favorable to plaintiffs . . .” and “liberally construe plaintiffs’
evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendants’ own
evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in plaintiffs’ favor.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare
Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) We state the facts
consistent with these standards.

3
On February 21, Rubio took her husband to the doctor
because he was not feeling well. A few hours into her scheduled
shift, Rubio texted Becerra to let him know she would not be at
work because she had to take her husband to the doctor.
On Thursday, March 15, Rubio’s husband was not feeling
well again. According to a declaration Rubio later filed in the
litigation, this was due to his heart condition. According to
Rubio, she called Becerra to tell him she could not come to work
because she “needed to tend to [her] husband[.]” The following
day, again according to Rubio’s declaration, Rubio’s husband’s
heart condition worsened so he went to the hospital. Rubio left
work early so she could be with him. After arriving at the
hospital, Rubio called Sanchez to tell him she left her shift early
to be with her husband in the hospital. During the call, Rubio
asked for the rest of the day off work and two additional days off
work (the following Monday and Tuesday) “to tend to [her]
husband” and be with him in the hospital. Sanchez approved her
request. It is undisputed that Rubio did not tell Sanchez, and
Sanchez was not otherwise aware, what condition her husband
was suffering from.
On April 3, Rubio tripped and fell while pushing a laundry
cart at work. Later that day, while on her way out from work,
she stopped by Sanchez’s office to report the incident. Rubio
testified at her deposition that she told Sanchez “[w]hat had
happened, [her] arm was very swollen and God forbid if [she]
didn’t show up the following day so that he would know what had
happened; that [she] had had a very hard blow.” Rubio reported
to work the following day, and worked her entire shift even
though she was experiencing pain. She therefore asked Becerra
to take the following day off of work (April 5), which Becerra

4
approved. She did not relay to Becerra that she was not feeling
well because, according to Rubio, “everybody knew that [she] was
hurt. There was no reason for [her] to tell [him].”
Rubio returned to work on Friday, April 6. That same day,
Sanchez emailed Mary Apodaca, a Customer Administration
Manager at AmeriPride, with the subject line “[S]econd guessing
hiring of Ana Rubio[.]”5 The email stated, in its entirety, the
following: “I know this may be a bit late in the game but I rather
now than later [sic] . . . [¶] I’m really having second thoughts on
hiring Ana Rubio. She keeps having attendance issues, I was
giving her the benefit of the doubt as I understand we all go
through circumstances outside our immediate control. She was
encountering a situation with her husband needing some serious
medical attention and I was trying to empathize with her but it
seems she is going to become one that always has a ‘justification’
for missing and I don’t want to proceed with hiring her at this
point. [¶] Let’s further discuss before the actual hiring takes
place if it hasn’t happened yet please[.]”
Rubio then reported to work on Monday, April 9 and
Tuesday, April 10. During her shift on April 10, she again asked
Becerra to take April 11 off of work because, according to Rubio,
she was experiencing pain from her injury. Becerra approved the
request.
Rubio worked her full 8-hour shifts on April 12 and 13. On
April 13, however, Sanchez informed Rubio that her employment

5 AmeriPride’s contract with TalentOne provided that
AmeriPride had the option to “convert a skilled TalentOne
Associate currently on assignment with [AmeriPride]”, i.e.,
directly hire an employee provided by TalentOne in exchange for
a fee.

5
was being terminated (and/or that she would not be hired directly
by AmeriPride). Rubio testified that Sanchez told her “‘I’m going
to let you go. I’m sorry, I am not interested in people who miss
time over family matters.’”
Two years later, in April 2020, Rubio filed this lawsuit
against AmeriPride.6 The complaint asserts six causes of action:
(1) disability discrimination; (2) associational disability/medical
condition discrimination; (3) failure to provide reasonable
accommodation; (4) failure to engage in a good faith interactive
process; (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA; and (6) wrongful
termination.
AmeriPride moved for summary judgment or, alternatively,
summary adjudication. After a hearing, the trial court took the
matter under submission. It then requested supplemental
briefing addressing whether triable issues of material fact exist
regarding whether Rubio and/or her husband suffered from a
“disability” as defined by FEHA.
After receiving supplemental briefing7, the trial court
granted AmeriPride’s motion for summary judgment, concluding

6 Rubio also sued two staffing companies, but they are not
parties to this appeal.
7 Rubio also submitted a supplemental declaration in
support of her supplemental brief. The trial court sustained
AmeriPride’s objection to the declaration on the ground that the
court did “not invite new evidence[.]” The trial court further
stated that even if it were to consider the supplemental
declaration, the result would not change. On appeal, Rubio
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding
the supplemental declaration (which primarily goes into further
detail about her husband’s heart condition). However, even if the

6
there was neither evidence that Rubio suffered from a disability,
as defined by FEHA, nor evidence that AmeriPride regarded
Rubio as disabled. The court further concluded “the evidence in
support of [Rubio’s] husband’s disability demonstrates only an
acute, non-specific injury that cannot support an associational
discrimination claim.” The trial court entered judgment for
AmeriPride. Rubio timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standards
“On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been
granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the
evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except
that to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) A defendant
moving for summary judgment must show “that one or more
elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that
there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.
Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the moving party makes a prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary
judgment “to make [his or her own] prima facie showing of the
existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic

trial court erred, Rubio’s argument fails because she neither
argued nor demonstrated prejudice from any purported error.
(See Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 119 [a party
challenging a trial court’s evidentiary rulings on summary
judgment has two burdens on appeal—to show affirmatively the
rulings were error and to establish prejudice].) We also note
Rubio’s supplemental declaration provides no additional facts
regarding whether AmeriPride knew of her or her husband’s
asserted disabilities—the dispositive issue in this appeal.

7
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor
of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“[W]e must view the evidence in a light favorable to
plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing [his or]
her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’
own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) We accept as true both the facts
shown by the losing party’s evidence and reasonable inferences
from that evidence. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856.)
“While we must liberally construe plaintiff’s showing and resolve
any doubts about the propriety of a summary judgment in
plaintiff's favor, plaintiff’s evidence remains subject to careful
scrutiny. [Citation.] . . . [P]laintiff’s subjective beliefs in an
employment discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of
fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving declarations.” (King
v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433.)
“We must affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any
of the grounds asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial
court’s stated reasons.” (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637.)

II. Rubio’s Claims for Disability Discrimiation Based on
Her Own Disability and Associational Disability
Discrimination Based on Her Husband’s Disability
Fail as a Matter of Law
FEHA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is an unlawful
employment practice . . . : [¶] (a) For an employer, because of
the . . . physical disability [or] medical condition . . . of any

8
person, to refuse to hire or employ the person . . . or to bar or to
discharge the person from employment . . . .” (§ 12940, subd. (a);
see Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42
Cal.4th 920, 925-926.) “A prima facie case of disability
discrimination under FEHA requires a showing that (1) the
plaintiff suffered from a disability, (2) the plaintiff was otherwise
qualified to do his or her job, with or without reasonable
accommodation, and (3) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse
employment action because of the disability.” (Castro-Ramirez v.
Dependable Highway Express, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1028,
1037.) While the standard case of disability discrimination under
FEHA involves a plaintiff’s own disability, this basic framework
has also been adopted to cases in which “the ‘disability’ from
which the plaintiff suffers is his or her association with a
disabled person,” sometimes known as “associational disability
discrimination.” (Id. at pp. 1036-1037.)
Whether the discrimination is direct or associational, the
employer’s knowledge of the disability is an essential element of a
claim for disability discrimination under FEHA—since without at
least some knowledge of a disability, an employer cannot make a
decision adverse to an employee “because” of a disability. “An
adverse employment decision cannot be made ‘because of’ a
disability, when the disability is not known to the employer.”
(Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236 (Brundage).)
“While knowledge of the disability can be inferred from the
circumstances, knowledge will only be imputed to the employer
when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of
the known facts. ‘Vague or conclusory statements revealing an
unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on
notice of its obligations under the [FEHA].’” (Id. at p. 237.)

9
Here, even assuming there are triable issues as to whether
Rubio or her husband suffered from a qualifying disability within
the meaning of FEHA, there is no evidence in the record that the
decisionmaker, Sanchez, or Rubio’s other supervisor, Becerra,
knew of Rubio’s asserted disability or her husband’s disability, or
perceived either to be disabled, when Sanchez made the decision
to terminate Rubio’s employment.
As to her own disability, as discussed above, Rubio testified
that she reported her workplace injury at the end of her shift on
the day it occurred (April 3) to Sanchez. According to Rubio, she
told Sanchez “[w]hat had happened” and that “[her] arm was very
swollen[.]” Rubio worked her entire shift the following day, but
was absent (after receiving permission from Becerra) on April 5
and 11 because (she asserts in her declaration) of the pain she
was experiencing from her workplace injury. It is undisputed,
however, that Rubio did not tell Becerra she was in pain because,
according to Rubio, “everybody knew [she] was hurt” so there was
“no reason for [her] to tell [him].” It is also undisputed that at no
point after Rubio reported her injury to Sanchez did she tell him
she was still in pain.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Rubio,
at the time Sanchez terminated Rubio he knew only that she had
fallen at work, her arm was swollen that day, and she was absent
on two non-consecutive workdays after the injury. Thus, even
viewing all inferences in Rubio’s favor, the circumstances suggest
that Sanchez reasonably knew only that Rubio had suffered a
relatively minor injury at work, not that Rubio had a qualifying
disability. (§ 12926, subd. (m)(1) [a qualifying physical disability
under FEHA includes “[h]aving any physiological disease,
disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss

10
that” both affects one or more of the body’s major systems and
“[l]imits a major life activity”].) Certainly, Sanchez’s knowledge
of Rubio’s purported disability is not the “only reasonable
interpretation of the known facts.” (Brundage, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at p. 237.) An equally, if not more, reasonable
interpretation of the circumstances from Sanchez’s perspective is
that Rubio suffered a sprain or experienced muscle aches, which
is precisely the type of condition excluded from the definition of
“physical disability” under FEHA. (See Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 2,
§ 11065, subd. (d)(9)(B) [“‘[d]isability’” does not include conditions
that have “little or no residual effects, such as . . . sprains, muscle
aches, soreness, bruises”].)
Thus, AmeriPride met its initial burden of showing that an
element of Rubio’s prima facie case—knowledge of the asserted
disability—is lacking. The burden therefore shifted to Rubio to
demonstrate a triable issue of material fact on this issue. Rubio
relies on evidence that: (1) she knows everyone knew she was
hurt because “[g]ossip runs wild” at the company so “[e]verybody
knows everything”; (2) Scott Feeney, a floor manager, provided
her with ibuprofen on two occasions after she fell at work; and (3)
in November 2018, seven months after her injury, a doctor
diagnosed her with “sprain of ligaments of cervical spine”; “sprain
of ligaments of lumbar spine”; and “injury of unspecified muscle,
fascia and tendon at shoulder and upper arm level” and placed
her on “modified duty” including “[n]o lifting over 25 pounds.”
This evidence fails to raise a triable issue of material fact. First,
Rubio’s testimony that everyone knew she was hurt is not only
speculative, but misses the point. Not every injury qualifies as a
disability under FEHA. (See, e.g., Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 327, 348 [“Pain alone does not always constitute

11
or establish a disability”].) Second, evidence that another
employee (not the decisionmaker) provided Rubio with
medication at work, and that she received a medical diagnosis
several months after her termination, is irrelevant to
determining whether the decisionmaker acted with
discriminatory animus. (See Brundage, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 236-237 [decisionmaker must be aware of the disability “when
the adverse employment decision was made”]; see also Avila v.
Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1247
(Avila) [affirming grant of summary adjudication of employee’s
disability discrimination claim because neither medical forms
confirming the employee was hospitalized, nor the employee’s
statements to coworkers that he had pancreatitis demonstrated
that the decisionmakers knew of the employee’s asserted
disability].)
Rubio attempts to analogize her case to the facts in Soria v.
Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570
(Soria). The Soria court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the employer based on its conclusion that triable issues of fact
existed as to whether the employer regarded the employee as
having a disability when it terminated her employment. (Id. at p.
590.) But that case only highlights what is missing from the
record here. In Soria, the employee told her supervisor she had
been diagnosed with a potentially cancerous tumor and the
doctors wanted to remove it, which would require removal of part
of her stomach and esophagus. (Id. at p. 593.) Based on this
specific information, the Soria court held “[t]he only reasonable
interpretation of this information, if the jury finds [the
employee’s] testimony credible, is that [the employee] had a

12
serious condition that would interfere with her ability to work.”
(Ibid.)
In contrast to the facts in Soria, Rubio testified she had
only relayed to Sanchez that she fell at work and her arm was
swollen. She then missed two non-consecutive days of work
because, according to Rubio, she was in pain. But it is
undisputed that she did not tell Sanchez she was in pain after
the day she reported the injury, and no other specifics regarding
her condition were provided to Sanchez or any other employee of
AmeriPride. Soria is, therefore, unhelpful to Rubio.
We acknowledge the courts “‘“‘must construe the FEHA
broadly, not . . . restrictively.’”’” (Vernon v. State of California
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 123; § 12993, subd. (a).) Consistent
with this legislative directive, although it is the employee’s
burden to notify her employer of her disability, she need not use
the term “disability” or other specific terms to invoke the
protections of FEHA. (See Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.)
However, here, Rubio did not take even the most minimal steps
to inform AmeriPride of her asserted disability or potential
disability, such as the level of pain she was experiencing, the
location of pain, or how the pain affected her in her daily life. On
this record, we discern no basis upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that Sanchez knew Rubio was disabled within
the meaning of FEHA or regarded her as being disabled when he
terminated her employment.
As to Rubio’s claim for associational disability
discrimination, again, there is no evidence that Sanchez knew
Rubio’s husband was suffering from a disability or perceived him
to be disabled. AmeriPride presented the following undisputed
evidence: (1) Rubio did not need or want further time off to care

13
for her husband other than the three days in March; (2) Sanchez
was not aware of what condition Rubio’s husband was suffering
from; and (3) Sanchez did not have direct conversations with
Rubio about her husband’s illness and did not know whether or
not it was an ongoing condition.
In opposing summary judgment, Rubio declared she is the
primary caregiver for her husband who suffers from a heart
condition. She further declared that she left work early, and
requested two additional days off, which Sanchez approved, so
she could “tend to [her] husband[.]” in the hospital. Critically,
however, she did not declare that she relayed to Sanchez the
reason for her husband’s hospitalization. Simply informing
AmeriPride that her husband was hospitalized for a few days for
an unspecified condition was not sufficient to put AmeriPride on
notice that her husband was suffering from a qualifying
disability. (See Avila, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249 [hospital
forms stating the plaintiff was unable to work on four workdays
due to an unspecified condition, and that plaintiff was
hospitalized for three days is not sufficient to inform the
employer that she suffered from a qualifying disability].)
Moreover, neither the statements in Sanchez’s April 6
email, nor his alleged statements during the termination
meeting create a triable issue of fact regarding whether
Sanchez knew or perceived Rubio’s husband as suffering from a
disability. In the April 6 email, Sanchez acknowledged Rubio
was encountering “a situation with her husband needing some
serious medical attention” and he was “trying to empathize
with her[.]” He ultimately felt, however, that “she is going to
become one that always has a ‘justification’ for missing [work].”
And during the termination meeting, Rubio testified that

14
Sanchez said he is “not interested in people who miss time over
family matters.” As noted above, Rubio missed work not only
to care for her husband, but also several days to care for her
granddaughter (whom Rubio does not claim has a disability).
It would be mere speculation to infer from these statements
that Sanchez perceived Rubio’s husband as having a condition
that was ongoing and disabling. As discussed above, Sanchez
knew only that Rubio’s husband was hospitalized for a few days
for an unspecified condition—Rubio did not even relay to
Sanchez that the condition was heart-related. On these facts,
Sanchez had no reason to believe Rubio’s husband’s condition
was disabling.
Accordingly, we conclude Rubio cannot demonstrate an
essential element of a prima face case of disability discrimination
and associational disability discrimination, i.e., that she suffered
an adverse employment action because of her disability or her
association with a disabled person.

III. Rubio’s Remaining Claims
Rubio’s remaining claims—for failure to provide reasonable
accommodation, failure to engage in good faith interactive
process, retaliation in violation of FEHA, and wrongful
termination—all also depend on a finding that the AmeriPride
employee who decided to discharge her knew of Rubio and/or her
husband’s asserted disabilities or perceived Rubio and/or her
husband as having a disability. (See, e.g., Avila, supra, 165
Cal.App.4th at p. 1252 [“Section 12940, subdivision (m) requires
an employer to accommodate only a ‘known physical . . .
disability’”]; § 12940, subd. (n) [employer engages in unlawful
employment practice if it “fail[s] to engage in a timely, good faith,
interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine

15
effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a
request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or
applicant with a known physical . . . disability”]; Hodges v.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 894, 914
[“Section 12940, subdivision (m), prohibits retaliation by an
employer for requesting an accommodation under that
subdivision—i.e., for a ‘known physical or mental disability’”];
Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 355 [“The
elements of [plaintiff’s] common law disability [wrongful]
termination claim are the same as those of his FEHA
claim. . . . As a result, the wrongful termination claim fails for the
same reasons as the FEHA claim”].) For the reasons discussed
above, AmeriPride met its initial summary judgment burden of
establishing Rubio cannot establish this element of her case, and
Rubio has not raised a triable issue of fact. We therefore affirm
the trial court’s summary adjudication of these additional claims.
Finally, because the trial court properly granted summary
judgment on all of Rubio’s substantive claims, preventing Rubio
from recovering compensatory damages, the trial court also
correctly summarily adjudicated Rubio’s punitive damages claim
in favor of AmeriPride. (See Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 530 [“There must be a recovery of actual
damages to support an award of punitive damages”]; see also
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801-802 [a
defendant must have committed a tortious act before punitive
damages can be assessed].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal. (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 947-951.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

DAUM, J.*
We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P.J.

MORI, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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