CourtListener 10592047•People v. Turner CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Turner CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B336141
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA454718)
JONTAE TURNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark Hanasono, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea
Zaragoza, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Jontae Turner appeals the trial court’s resentencing order
under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. Turner contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a five-year
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) sentencing enhancement. Turner
also contends that the trial court miscalculated his custody
credits. The People assert that the trial court acted within its
discretion when it declined to strike the section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) enhancement, but agree that the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for recalculation of Turner’s custody
credits.
We affirm the trial court’s order, but remand for the court
to file an amended minute order and abstract of judgment that
includes Turner’s custody credits from the date of his sentencing
hearing to the date of the resentencing hearing.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
A probation report dated April 5, 2017, stated that police
responded to a disturbance call at a residence. When they
arrived, the victim reported that Turner, who is her son, had
violently assaulted her in her home on February 14, 2017,
fracturing her ribs and dislocating her shoulder. Turner
returned to his mother’s home on February 17, 2017, and
demanded to be let inside. He struck a window with his fists and
feet until it shattered, and then he walked through the broken
window into the home. Once inside, Turner threatened his
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
mother, who fled and called the police. When officers detained
Turner, he became combative, resisted, and spat on one of the
officers. The officers put a “spit sack” over Turner’s head and
placed him in the patrol car. Turner thrashed and kicked,
breaking the window of the vehicle. At the station, Turner again
resisted arrest and was subdued. When the officers loosened the
spit sack to book him, Turner spat on another officer.
At the time that he committed the offenses, Turner was on
probation in Case No. BA445945 for human trafficking of a minor
for a commercial sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), count 1), pandering
by procuring (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and attempted
pimping of a minor 15 years of age or older (§§ 266h, subd. (b)(1),
count 3). Turner suffered multiple prior convictions and
sustained juvenile adjudications prior to committing the current
offenses.
B. Sentencing
On August 21, 2017, Turner pled no contest in an open plea
in the instant case (Case No. BA454718) to assault with force
likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 1),
misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a), count 2), two counts of
misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b), counts 3
& 4), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a), count 5). Turner
admitted the allegations in count 1 that he had inflicted great
bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he
had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning
of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and the Three Strikes law
(§§ 667, subd. (d) & 1170.12, subd. (b)). As to counts 1 and 5,
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Turner admitted he had served three prior prison terms.
(§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
The trial court struck the prior strike for purposes of the
Three Strikes law. The court imposed a term of 10 years in state
prison as follows: in count 1 (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), the low term of
two years, plus three years for a great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and an additional five years for the prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court imposed
concurrent terms in all other counts: three terms of 364 days,
one term each in counts 2, 3, and 4, and the middle term of two
years in count 5.
Turner admitted that by committing the crimes charged in
Case No. BA454718 he had violated probation in Case
No. BA445945. The court terminated probation in Case
No. BA445945 and sentenced him to a term of four years to run
concurrently with the sentences in Case No. BA454718.
With respect to Case No. BA454718, the court awarded
Turner 186 days of actual credit plus 27 days of good time credit
for a total of 213 days credit. With respect to Case
No. BA445945, the court stated that Turner had received 290
days of presentence credit, for a total of 503 credits when added
to the 213 days of credit awarded in Case No. BA454718.2
2 The record belies Turner’s assertion that the trial court
awarded him 503 credits in Case No. BA454718 at the sentencing
hearing. The transcripts of the hearing and the abstract of
judgment, dated August 28, 2017, reflect that the court awarded
Turner 213 days of credit in Case No. BA454718.
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C. Senate Bill 483
On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3) became effective. Senate Bill
No. 483 added to the Penal Code section 1171.1 (now 1172.75),
which provides: “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed
prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection
667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction
for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally
invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute directs the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to identify
“persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment
that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)”—i.e.,
a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement—and to transmit
the information to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement. (Id., subd. (b).) “Upon receiving the information
described in subdivision (b), the court shall review the judgment
and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing
enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement
described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) “[S]ection
1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial
court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
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D. Resentencing
In 2023, the court placed Turner’s case on calendar for
resentencing pursuant to sections 1172.7, subdivision (a), and
1172.75, subdivision (a). Turner filed a resentencing brief urging
the court to dismiss the five-year enhancement imposed pursuant
to section 667, subdivision (a)(1) in the interests of justice
because the conviction was over five years old.3
At a hearing on the matter, the trial court informed the
parties that the court had reviewed the petition and the contents
of the court file, which included the transcript of sentencing, the
abstracts of judgment, the minute orders, and the probation
report, among other documents. The court conducted a full
resentencing, struck the invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements that it had previously imposed and stayed, and
then imposed the same sentence of ten years. The court
recognized that it had discretion to strike the three-year great
bodily injury enhancement imposed pursuant to 12022.7,
subdivision (a), and the five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
prior serious felony conviction enhancement, but determined that
dismissal of either enhancement would endanger public safety,
which outweighed the mitigating circumstances that the prior
3 Turner also requested that, when sentencing pursuant to
section 654, the court select a base count with a lesser sentence
than count 1, which he believed the court had previously selected
as the base term. As the court pointed out in the resentencing
hearing, Turner had not been sentenced pursuant to section 654
because the offenses were committed on separate occasions
against different victims. There was therefore no basis for
selecting a different base term as requested.
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conviction was greater than five years old and that multiple
enhancements had been imposed. The court stated:
“The court finds specific deterrence is necessary and
appropriate for this defendant. An earlier release by dismissing
an enhancement would likely result in physical injury or serious
danger to the public.
“Imposition of terms for each enhancement is appropriate
based on the facts which support findings of violent conduct
directed at separate victims. The defendant has a history for
violence based on what is reflected in his criminal history.
Although the prior conviction is greater than five years old, the
defendant has subsequently been convicted of multiple offenses
including four felony offenses and two misdemeanors. Two of the
cases involve serious or violent assaultive conduct. Based on all
of these circumstances, the court finds that dismissal of any
enhancement would not be in the interest of justice.” “The
defendant’s criminal record demonstrates he’s a recidivist and
will continue to commit crimes against persons.” The court called
the current offenses “egregious.”
The court stated that Turner had 186 original presentence
custody credits, plus 27 days of conduct credit for a total of 213
days, and that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
would calculate the post sentence conduct credits.
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DISCUSSION
A. Five-Year Enhancement Pursuant to Section 667,
Subdivision (a)(1)
Turner first contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to strike a prior serious felony
enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Turner
asserts that the trial court was unaware of, and therefore failed
to consider, his mental illness and its connection to the offenses.
We reject the contention.
1. Legal Principles
Section 1385 permits a trial court to dismiss an
enhancement in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a).)
“In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one
or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) As
relevant here, mitigating circumstances include: “[¶] (B)
Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. . . . ¶] . . . [¶]
(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness. [¶] . . . [¶]
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[or] (H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
“For the purposes of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (2), a
mental illness is a mental disorder as identified in the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, including, but not limited to, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or post-traumatic stress
disorder but excluding antisocial personality disorder, borderline
personality disorder, and pedophilia. A court may conclude that
a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense if, after
reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant
displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder
at or near the time of the offense, the court concludes that the
defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”
(§ 1385, subd. (d).)
2. Proceedings
As pertinent here, counsel filed a resentencing brief that
urged the court to conduct a full resentencing and strike the five-
year prior serious felony conviction enhancement imposed
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The brief quoted
section 1385, subdivision (c) and listed factors that a court must
consider when determining whether to dismiss an enhancement.
Turner asserted that dismissal of the enhancement would be in
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the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385 because Turner’s
prior serious felony conviction was over five years old (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(D).
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court informed the
parties that it had reviewed Turner’s brief and the record,
including the probation report. The probation report noted that
Turner’s mother stated Turner was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and had suffered from bipolar disorder since age 13 and that his
mental health disorders required medication. The report
observed that Turner’s “mental health condition renders him to
be a threat to others.” The report stated that Turner was not
eligible or suitable for continued community-based supervision,
but that “[a]t the state level, [Turner] may receive a mental
health recommendation that would address his anger
management impulse and allow for mental health determination
and course of treatment.”
3. Analysis
Turner concedes that counsel failed to raise the issue of his
mental health at the resentencing hearing, but argues that he did
not forfeit the issue because in his resentencing brief counsel
quoted section 1385, subdivision (c), which lists mental illness
among the factors that a court must consider under the statute,
and because the probation report contained substantial evidence
that Turner’s bipolar disorder and schizophrenia were connected
to his commission of the offenses. We conclude that Turner
forfeited the issue because he failed to make any substantive
argument regarding the connection between his mental health
and his commission of the offense.
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Regardless, any error would be harmless. As Turner
himself argues, in the resentencing brief counsel cited the
enumerated factors that the trial court must consider under
amended section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The record
demonstrates that the trial court considered the brief and the
probation report and made its determination based on its
analysis under amended section 1385. The court stated it would
not dismiss the enhancements because it concluded that
dismissal would endanger public safety. Where, as here, the
court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would likely result
in physical injury or other serious danger to others, the court
does not afford great weight to the factors listed in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(A)-(I). The court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to dismiss the 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement.
There is no basis for remanding the matter for resentencing.
B. Custody Credits
1. Legal Principles
“A defendant is entitled to actual custody credit for ‘all days
of custody’ . . . including partial days. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); see
People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 526.) Calculation of
custody credit begins on the day of arrest and continues through
the day of sentencing. (People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d
729, 735.)” (People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42,
48.)
Section 2900.5, subdivision (b) provides that “credit shall be
given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to the
proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant
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has been convicted.” A defendant is entitled to presentence
confinement credit if the defendant can demonstrate that “the
conduct which led to his conviction was the sole reason for his
loss of liberty during the presentence period.” (People v. Johnson
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1485.) “A defendant must prove
that the conduct which led to the conviction was a ‘dispositive’ or
‘ “but for” ’ cause of the presentence custody. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Generally, “when concurrent sentences are imposed at the same
time, presentence custody is credited against all.” (People v.
Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1192, fn. 9.) However, a defendant
cannot “receive credit for time spent in custody before the initial
arrest in any given case.” (People v. Cofer (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
333, 342, rev. granted on another issue, Oct. 2, 2024, S286297;
see also People v. Bravo, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 735 [actual
custody credits include all days between arrest and sentencing].)
2. Proceedings
When Turner was originally sentenced following his plea of
no contest in Case No. BA454718 in 2017, the trial court imposed
a term of ten years in prison. The court then found that, having
pled no contest to the crimes in Case No. BA454718, Turner had
violated the terms of his probation in Case No. BA445945, and
sentenced Turner to a concurrent term of four years in that case.
The court awarded Turner 213 days of custody credit in Case
No. BA454718. In Case No. BA445945, the court awarded
Turner an additional 290 days of custody credit for a total of 503
custody credits.
When the court resentenced Turner in 2023, it again
awarded Turner 213 days of custody credit in Case No. BA454718
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and stated that the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation would calculate the post sentence conduct credits.
The court did not award Turner credit for his time in custody
between the 2017 sentencing and the 2023 resentencing.
3. Analysis
Turner contends, and the People concede, that the trial
court erred in calculating custody credits in Case No. BA454718
because it (1) did not award Turner custody credits accrued
between the 2017 sentencing hearing and the 2023 resentencing
hearing (attributing the responsibility of calculating credit to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation), and (2) did not
award Turner presentence credits accrued before sentencing in
2017 (omitting the 290 credits the court associated with Case
No. BA445945). We accept the People’s concession as to the first
contention only; Turner’s second contention is without merit.
We agree with the parties that Turner is entitled to actual
custody credits accrued between the 2017 sentencing hearing and
the 2023 resentencing hearing, as Turner first contends. It is
well-established that “when a prison term already in progress is
modified . . . the sentencing court must recalculate and credit
against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has
already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or
since he was originally committed and delivered to prison
custody.”4 (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29.) Thus,
4 In contrast, at a defendant’s initial sentencing, the court
that imposes the sentence must calculate the number of days that
the defendant has been in presentence custody, calculate good
time credits pursuant to section 4019, and issue an abstract of
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the task of calculating the number of actual days that Turner was
in custody between his original sentencing on August 21, 2017,
and his resentencing hearing on December 11, 2023, was not the
responsibility of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation as the trial court indicated. We will remand for
the trial court to determine the precise number of days Turner
spent in custody and adjust his custody credits accordingly. (See
People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 394 [remanding
determination of custody credits because it “involves factual
determinations more properly resolved [in the trial court]”].)
With respect to Turner’s second contention, we agree with
the parties that “a defendant who is simultaneously sentenced to
concurrent terms in multiple open cases, where all presentence
custody derives solely from those charges, is entitled to
presentence custody credit toward all of those sentences.” (People
v. Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 342.) Turner is entitled to
credit for the actual days he spent in custody from his arrest in
the instant case on February 17, 2017, until his initial sentencing
on August 21, 2017. As the trial court correctly calculated,
Turner was in custody for 186 actual days. At a credit rate of 15
percent, Turner additionally earned 27 days of conduct credit for
judgment that reflects the total credits to which the defendant is
entitled. (§ 2900.5, subd. (d); see also People v. Buckhalter, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 30.) Once the defendant is delivered to a
designated state prison where the defendant will serve their
sentence, “[t]he agency to which the defendant is committed, not
the trial court, has the responsibility to calculate and apply any
custody credits that have accrued between the imposition of
sentence and physical delivery of the defendant to the agency.”
(Id. at p. 31.)
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a total of 213 days of credit.5 However, Turner is not entitled to
an additional 290 credits for the time he spent in presentence
custody in Case No. BA454718. Turner accrued the 290 days
that the trial court awarded in Case No. BA445945 while in
custody prior to being placed on probation in that case. Those
days cannot be attributed to this case, because a defendant
cannot “receive credit for time spent in custody before the initial
arrest in any given case.” (Ibid.) Once 213 days are added to the
actual days between Turner’s original sentencing on August 21,
2017, and his resentencing on December 11, 2023, all possible
days for which the trial court should have awarded credit have
been accounted for.
In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not err by
failing to consider evidence of Turner’s mental illness contained
in the probation report, there is no basis for resentencing.
(People v. Chilelli (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 581, 591 [“[t]he failure
to properly calculate custody and conduct credit is a jurisdictional
error that can be corrected at any time”].) We remand the matter
for the trial court to recalculate Turner’s custody credit in
conformance with this opinion and to issue a new minute order
and abstract of judgment that reflect the correction.
5 Fifteen percent of 186 days equals 27.9 days, however
section 4019 prohibits “ ‘rounding up’ ” fractional days of conduct
credit. (People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 956, fn. 2.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. The matter is remanded
to the trial court with instructions to prepare an amended minute
order and abstract of judgment in Case No. BA454718 that
include the actual days Turner spent in the custody of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation between his initial
sentencing on August 21, 2017, and his resentencing on
December 11, 2023, in addition to the 213 days of presentence
custody that the trial court already properly awarded. The clerk
of the superior court shall transmit a copy of the amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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