People v. Vasquez CA2/2

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Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Vasquez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B333708

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA448415)
v.

SERGIO LESTER VASQUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Idan Ivri,
Lauren N. Guber and Megan Moine, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A jury convicted Sergio Lester Vasquez of murder. He
asserts evidentiary and instructional errors on appeal. Because
there was no prejudicial error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On the evening of July 10, 2016, appellant’s girlfriend
Raquel Martinez (Martinez) drove with appellant, who is a
member of the Temple Street gang, around the area of Rampart
Boulevard and Beverly Boulevard in Los Angeles—Temple Street
gang territory. A group of people stood outside a nearby banquet
hall, and this group included members of the rival 18th Street
gang. Martinez parked her car down the street from the hall,
and appellant got out of the car. He walked toward the group
standing outside and yelled, “Puro 18,” to elicit a response and
identify 18th Street gang members. Someone in the group
responded, “18,” and another person working in concert with
appellant (who police never identified) shot that man dead.
II. Procedural Background
The People charged appellant with six counts, four of which
involved incidents unrelated to this appeal. In connection with
the above incident, the People charged appellant with murder
(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and unlawful firearm activity
(§ 29820, subd. (b)). As to the murder, the People further alleged
that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), causing death (id., subd. (d)), personally
used a firearm (id., subd. (b)), and that he committed the murder
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The People later dropped the gang allegation.

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
A jury convicted appellant of murder, found him not guilty
of unlawful firearm activity, and found not true the firearm
allegations.
DISCUSSION
I. Admitting the Hearsay Was Harmless Error
A detective who interviewed appellant after the shooting
testified at trial about what appellant had told him.2 Appellant
said that although he was present at the incident and helped
identify the rival gang member, it was someone named “Messy”
who shot him. In response to the detective’s questioning,
appellant stated that Messy had planned the ambush with
appellant by call or text message. Appellant gave the detective
his own phone number, but said that he no longer had the phone.
The detective ran a search and found that the number belonged
to a bandwidth company, and when he sent a preservation letter
to that company, it responded that it rents that number to
another company. When the detective contacted that other
company, it informed him that the phone number is used only “to
gather responses from an advertisement.” Over defense counsel’s
hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the detective’s
testimony about the information he received from the companies
regarding the phone number appellant gave.
The People concede, and we agree, that the trial court erred
in admitting this testimony. Appellant urges that this amounted
to constitutional error, but we need not decide that, because the
error was harmless whether assessed under Watson or Chapman.
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705].) Our

2 Appellant did not testify at his trial.

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review of the record shows that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because while the challenged testimony was
relevant to show appellant had lied and to raise doubt about his
story that someone else had been the shooter, his interview with
the detective contained other major inconsistencies, casting doubt
on his credibility. For example, he first said he had learned
about the shooting on the news, but later admitted he was there
and had assisted the shooter in identifying the 18th Street Gang
member. More important, though, appellant ultimately
succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt as to whether he was the
actual shooter (the jury found not true the personal firearm use
allegations).
II. Martinez’s Appearance in Physical Restraints
The People twice called Martinez (appellant’s girlfriend) to
testify, and she twice refused to answer questions. The first time,
she asserted the Fifth Amendment, and the trial court ordered
her to answer the questions. She refused, and the court held her
in contempt. Later in the trial, Martinez took the stand again,
and again she refused to testify, this time simply stating, “I
refuse to answer any questions.” The court allowed this to occur
in front of the jury, over defense counsel’s request that she be
questioned outside its presence. The trial court later granted
defendant’s motion to strike Martinez’s testimony, and instructed
the jurors that, “[Y]ou cannot consider whatever she said . . . and
you cannot use that in your evaluation with regard to her
testimony.” However, the trial court allowed the People in their
closing argument to “comment on the fact that she was before us”
and “she was uncooperative.”

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A. Appellant forfeited his claim about restraints,
and his counsel was not ineffective.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in allowing Martinez to wear jail clothes and restraints when she
took the stand in front of the jury. Appellant forfeited this
argument by failing to object below. (In re Avena (1996) 12
Cal.4th 694, 731; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629;
People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 495–496.)
Appellant contends that his forfeiture resulted from
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). We reject this claim
because appellant has not shown a reasonable probability of a
more favorable outcome had his counsel objected. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674] [“a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”].)3
Martinez refused to give any testimony, let alone testimony
that might have absolved appellant of his guilt. More to the
point, appellant admitted his involvement in the killing. On this
record, we are unable to discern any possibility, let alone a
reasonable probability, that Martinez’s attire or physical
restraints played a role in the outcome of this case.

3 We need not decide whether, as appellant asserts,
Martinez appearing in restraints implicated appellant’s
constitutional rights because IAC claims are governed by “the
Strickland ‘reasonable probability’ standard . . . even when
defense counsel’s alleged error involves the failure to preserve the
defendant’s federal constitutional rights.” (People v. Mesa (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008–1009.)

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B. The trial court properly omitted CALCRIM
No. 3374
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing “to
give the jury a limiting instruction concerning [Martinez’s]
appearance in physical restraints and jail clothes.” Where a
witness has been physically restrained in a manner that is visible
to the jury, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
that the restraints should have no bearing on the determination
of the defendant’s guilt. (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694,
732; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292.) If the
restraints are not visible to the jury, however, a court need only
give the limiting instruction on request. (Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 337.)
We agree with the People that the record does not show
that the jury was able to see Martinez’s physical restraints.
Although defense counsel speculated that she “think[s] the jury
would be able to see” the restraints, and later mentioned them in
her closing argument, neither of these statements show the
restraints were visible from the jury box. (See People v. Ervine
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 773 [record did not show the restraints
were visible to jury, despite defense counsel’s statement “ ‘[y]ou
can see’ ” the restraint, “ ‘but you have to look’ ”]; see also People
v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 155 [rejecting
contention that the People must show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jurors did not see the restraint].) Because defense
counsel made no request for CALCRIM No. 337, the trial court
did not err in failing to give it. Even if the omission had been

4 CALCRIM No. 337 instructs the jury not to speculate
about the reason a witness is physically restrained, and not to
consider that circumstance for any purpose.

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error, it was harmless. Martinez gave no testimony, so her
credibility was never at issue. It is entirely unclear what
negative inference might have been drawn from her appearance
in restraints, and similarly difficult to conceive of how such
inference could have impacted the outcome of this case.
III. No Cumulative Error
Appellant contends that he suffered prejudice from the
cumulative effect of errors, even if any error was alone harmless.
“ ‘[A] series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may
in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible
and prejudicial error.’ ” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th
926, 1009.) We have rejected all of appellant’s claims (finding
either no error or no prejudice), and we are unable to discern any
cumulative prejudice that would warrant reversal of the
judgment.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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