People v. Mendoza CA2/8

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Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Mendoza CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B333579

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA150959
v.

CARLOS MENDOZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Two juries convicted a gang trio of murdering a rival. This
appeal, Carlos Mendoza’s, is the third appeal arising from the
shooting. Mendoza raises two forfeited issues: one concerns the
Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1) (the Act), and the
other is a sentencing issue. We affirm. Code citations are to the
Penal Code.
We need not dwell long on the facts due to the nature of the
disposition. We recently set out the facts in our opinion
addressing the appeal of Mendoza’s codefendant, Robert
Medrano. (See People v. Medrano (Feb. 13, 2025, B332155)
[nonpub. opn.] (Medrano).) We incorporate those facts here.
Mendoza and Medrano had a joint trial. This trial, and the
earlier trial of their other codefendant, Daniel Frias, centered on
recorded statements made by Frias to informants posing as
inmates as part of a of a Perkins operation. (See Illinois v.
Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins).) Frias admitted shooting
someone he thought was a gang rival as payback for getting
pistol-whipped and carjacked the day before. Frias said Medrano
and Mendoza (known as Blanco and Downer) helped him plan
and carry out the shooting. (See Medrano, supra; People v. Frias
(Oct. 23, 2024, B329215) [nonpub. opn.].) Video and ballistics
evidence and witness testimony supported Frias’s jailhouse
statements. (See Medrano, supra.)
At the conclusion of Mendoza’s and Medrano’s trial, the
jury convicted both men of second degree murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), convicted Mendoza of possessing a firearm as a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and found true a personal use firearm
allegation as to Mendoza (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Mendoza in September 2023,
after finding he had a prior strike conviction. (See §§ 667, subds.

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(b)-(i), 1170.12.) The court denied the defense request to strike
the strike and stay the enhancement. On the murder count, the
court sentenced Mendoza to 30 years to life—15 years to life
doubled due to the strike. The court added 10 years for the
firearm enhancement for a total sentence of 40 years to life in
prison. The court stayed the sentence on the second count.
I
Mendoza first claims that conducting a Perkins operation
with a Latino suspect using informants posing as Latino
gangsters violated the Act. He argues the trial court then
violated the Act by admitting the recording and by allowing
expert testimony to “explain Latino gang culture.” He appears to
claim the gang expert violated the Act by using “racial
stereotypes and racially biased language.”
Mendoza forfeited these claims by failing to raise them at
the trial court. Traditional forfeiture rules govern claims under
the Act. (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812, 815
(Lashon); People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 38–42
(Corbi).)
Mendoza maintains he preserved his claims because
defense counsel objected to the admission of gang evidence and
the Perkins statements based on Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (Assembly Bill 333) and
based on various federal constitutional amendments. This
argument is mistaken.
Assembly Bill 333 concerned gang enhancements and the
crime of gang participation. It did two key things: 1) it altered
the requirements for this crime and these enhancements,
increasing the threshold for conviction and for imposing the
enhancement; and 2) it added section 1109, which, on defense

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request, requires bifurcation of these gang charges. (See People
v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7, 9.) Our Supreme Court has
recognized that “the legislative findings accompanying Assembly
Bill 333 reflect significant concerns about gang enhancements in
general, including about their usefulness in stemming crime and
their disproportionate impact on people of color in particular” but
also that “gang evidence may still be admissible where relevant
to the underlying charges.” (Id. at pp. 19 & 25, fn. 8; see also id.
at p. 23.)
Mendoza’s trial involved no gang charge or enhancement.
At the trial court, the defense objected that gang evidence was
unduly prejudicial and irrelevant, and admitting it circumvented
Assembly Bill 333. Counsel expressed concern regarding
“bringing in gang evidence when there is no gang allegation”:
“when juries hear gang, they tend to become concerned about
things other than the evidence.” The defense also argued the
Perkins statements were unreliable and admitting them would
violate the Sixth Amendment and other federal law. Counsel
focused on an asserted imbalance between the two older
informants and young Frias and on how the informants
conducted the operation. Mendoza concedes no one mentioned
the Act.
The Act became law in January 2021, two years before
Mendoza’s trial. It aims to eliminate racial bias from our
criminal justice system and to ensure race plays no part in
convictions and sentencing. (See People v. Wilson (2024) 16
Cal.5th 874, 944–946; § 745, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) of the
statute lists categories of conduct that amount to violations, if
proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
(§ 745, subd. (a).) The Act aims for swift and effective action in

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addressing racial bias “as soon as practical upon a defendant
learning of an alleged violation[.]” (Lashon, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 815.)
Mendoza says two categories of prohibited conduct are at
issue: a judge, law enforcement officer, or expert witness
exhibited racial bias or animus towards him; and his trial
featured racially discriminatory language, meaning language
appealing to racial bias. (See § 745, subds. (a)(1) & (2), (h)(4).)
Trial objections based on prejudice, relevance, reliability,
and a bill on gang enhancements did not put the trial court on
notice that Mendoza was levelling claims of racial bias or use of
discriminatory language against the detective who initiated the
Perkins operation, against the gang expert who testified about
Mendoza’s gang and its rival, or against the trial court who
admitted this evidence. The charge of bias or animus, or of
appealing to racial bias, is distinct from the objections made at
trial, and it was incumbent on defense counsel to raise these
issues then if counsel felt there was any merit. (See Corbi, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43–44 [defense objections that
prosecutor’s comments were “improper” and inflammatory were
insufficient to preserve the claim that the remarks violated the
Act, “a distinct statutory scheme with enumerated procedures
and remedies”].)
Mendoza urges us not to find forfeiture, suggesting we
would deprive him of a substantial right and there is no forfeiture
with important issues of constitutional law. Lashon rejected a
similar argument. (See Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp.
815–816.) Mendoza’s belated claims under the Act are not
constitutional ones and do not involve pure questions of law that
are appropriate to address without further factual development.

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Lashon also rejected another argument Mendoza makes:
that objecting would have been futile. (See Lashon, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 816.) Mendoza similarly fails to demonstrate
an objection would have been futile. His argument is based on
the faulty premise that “identical principles” underlie Assembly
Bill 333 and the Act. Contrary to Mendoza’s arguments, and as
we have explained, the defense objections did not describe the
substance of the violations of the Act claimed on appeal, and the
issue of bias was never litigated. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37
Cal.4th 428, 438 (Partida) [“to the extent defendant asserts a
different theory for exclusion than he asserted at trial, that
assertion is not cognizable”].)
Mendoza alternatively claims his trial counsel was
ineffective in not raising the Act. This claim requires Mendoza to
show deficient performance by counsel and prejudice. (See People
v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 675.) On direct appeal, we find
ineffective assistance only if 1) the record shows counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or 3)
no satisfactory explanation could exist. (Ibid.) It is rare to find
no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s actions. (Ibid.; see
also id. at 695 [“the appellate record usually does not reveal
information sufficient to evaluate counsel’s performance”].)
Mendoza cannot carry his burden. Indeed, he does not
address whether a reasonable explanation could exist for not
raising each of the Racial Justice Act claims he brings now.
Mendoza’s trial counsel had studied the Perkins transcript:
he took issue with certain comments by Frias and the informants,
and he argued the statements as a whole were unreliable given
Frias’s youth and the jail setting. Counsel could have determined

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that an additional objection under the Act was meritless because
the detective who set up the operation simply sought to get Frias
to talk and because there was no factual basis for asserting this
detective harbored racial bias or animus against Frias or others.
Mendoza offers nothing to undermine this conclusion.
Similarly, Mendoza’s trial counsel reasonably could have
concluded the evidentiary rulings concerning the Perkins
statements and the gang evidence were sound and free from bias,
and the expert’s testimony appropriately explained the evidence.
Mendoza’s first appellate claim fails.
II
Mendoza’s second appellate claim concerns Senate Bill No.
81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which took effect on January 1, 2022.
This bill added subdivision (c) to section 1385. The provision
requires trial courts to give great weight to mitigating
circumstances when considering dismissing an enhancement that
is not necessary for public safety. (People v. Walker (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1024, 1028; § 1385, subd. (c).) The onus is on the
defendant to provide evidence of applicable factors. (See
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
The trial court sentenced Mendoza in September 2023, a
year and a half after these changes took effect.
Mendoza claims the trial court was unaware of amended
section 1385. He argues several factors under the amended
statute are applicable or potentially applicable, yet the court did
not apply them or mention public safety when considering his
enhancement ahead of sentencing.
Mendoza forfeited this attack on his sentence by failing to
raise this issue or any potentially applicable mitigating
circumstance at the trial court. (See People v. Scott (2015) 61

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Cal.4th 363, 406 [absent an objection at trial, a defendant may
not raise appellate claims involving the trial court’s failure to
make or to articulate discretionary sentencing choices]; see also
Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435 [“A party cannot argue the
court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct”].)
The record signals the court was aware of amended section
1385. Before Mendoza’s sentencing, the prosecution filed a
sentencing memorandum telling the court it had discretion to
strike or to dismiss the firearm enhancement under section 1385.
At the September 2023 sentencing hearing, Mendoza’s counsel
asked the court to stay his enhancement and strike the strike.
The trial court stated it had read the prosecution’s memorandum
and the probation report. The court discussed Mendoza’s strike
and his lengthy criminal history afterward, noting Mendoza
“continued to obviously engage in a violent, persistent gang
lifestyle.” The court also discussed the facts of this murder case,
noting Mendoza’s role was “not de minimis.” The court stated it
had the ability to strike or stay the firearm enhancement but
declined to do so, noting Mendoza “was engaged in a gang-related
retaliation against an individual at his home, and he acted as an
aid[er] and abetter and a lookout to the murder . . . he was clearly
armed at the time, and he just didn’t have it in his pocket. He
used that firearm while he was waiting out in front of the house
that the victim was killed in.”
The trial court appeared to ground its decision to keep the
enhancement in concerns about Mendoza’s persistent violence
and thus public safety. We presume the trial court knew the law
and followed it, in the absence of a record showing otherwise.
(People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; see also People v.

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Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“The court is presumed to
have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary”].)
Mendoza does not argue ineffective assistance of counsel
this time, which is wise, as defense counsel’s failure to raise
amended section 1385 and various factors listed therein appears
rational.
Mendoza points to four factors on appeal:
● Subdivision (c)(2)(A): Mendoza inadequately supports the
claim that application of his firearm enhancement would
result in a discriminatory racial impact under the Act. The
only relevant provision of the Act for purposes of this
subdivision concerns sentencing (see § 745, subd. (a)(4)),
and Mendoza’s belated claim under the Act does not
concern sentencing.
● Subdivision (c)(2)(C): On its face, this subdivision applies
when “application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)(C), italics
added.) Mendoza acknowledges he “was already facing a 30
to life sentence” on the murder count “without the 10 year
enhancement.” (See Couzens, Bigelow & Prickett,
Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2024)
§ 12:11, subd. (F)(3) [“There will be no entitlement to relief
unless it is the application of the term for the enhancement
that results in a sentence of longer than 20 years”].)
● Subdivisions (c)(2)(D) & (E): While Mendoza notes his
mother tried to tell the court about his birth and
upbringing, he points to nothing suggesting his crimes were
connected to any mental illness or childhood trauma, as
required by these subdivisions. Mendoza’s trial counsel

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reasonably could have determined these subdivisions held
no promise for Mendoza.
In short, it was reasonable for trial counsel not to raise any
factor in amended section 1385 or to demand an explicit ruling on
whether Mendoza posed a threat to public safety.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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