Norris v. 1st Lending Solutions CA4/1

CourtListener 10587376Calctapp20 mag 2025

Testo completo

Filed 5/20/25 Norris v. 1st Lending Solutions CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LYNDA NORRIS, D085017

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. CVSW2301688)

1ST LENDING SOLUTIONS, INC.,
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Raquel A. Marquez, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Robert V. Richter and Robert V. Richter for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Raymond N. Haynes for Defendants and Respondents.
Lynda Norris agreed to sell her home for $400,000. The buyers
retained a mortgage broker, 1st Lending Solutions, Inc. (doing business as
First Lending), to connect them with a lender, Michigan Mutual, Inc.
(MiMutual). In processing the buyers’ home loan, MiMutual had the
property appraised and the estimated value was about $550,000. MiMutual
approved the loan, escrow closed, and the transaction was complete. At
some point, Norris learned of MiMutual’s independent appraisal. She sued
First Lending, its Chief Executive Officer, and MiMutual, contending they
were liable for financial elder abuse within the meaning of the Elder Abuse

and Dependent Adult Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 15600 et seq.)
because they did not advise her that she might be selling her home for less
than it was worth.
But these defendants had no relationship with Norris, the property
seller. They were assisting the buyers in purchasing the property, and they
had no obligation nor any reason to share any information with Norris.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendants.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Norris moved into the home in 1996 with her husband and two
children. After losing her husband to cancer in 2015, and then going through
the COVID-19 pandemic, Norris decided to move to Nevada to be closer to her
adult children. By this time, Norris was in her seventies.
According to Norris, on March 29, 2021, she called her longtime friend
and neighbor, Penny Sargent, seeking a recommendation for a realtor to help

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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her sell her home. Sargent—a realtor herself who lived two doors down from
Norris—immediately walked over and offered to help Norris personally.
Sargent advised Norris that her home was worth about $400,000 as it needed
significant repairs. She also said that she had a potential buyer, but Norris
“would have to act fast to not lose this opportunity.” Norris trusted Sargent
and agreed to sell the home at that price.
One or two days later, Norris signed a real estate purchase contract,
agreeing to sell the home to the buyers Sargent had identified for $400,000.
Sometime in the following two months, Norris hired an appraiser who
reported in June 2021 that her home was worth approximately $619,000.
Meanwhile, the buyers retained mortgage broker First Lending to
arrange their financing. First Lending secured MiMutual to provide the
home loan. During the underwriting process, MiMutual obtained an
independent appraisal of the property, which reported an estimated value of
$550,000. The appraisal report noted some “deferred maintenance” issues,
such as dry rot, peeling paint, possible mold on the stucco, and neglected
landscaping. At least some of these issues were remediated prior to closing.
MiMutual ultimately approved the loan for $392,755.
Escrow closed and a deed of trust was recorded on July 8, 2021.
In a First Amended Complaint, Norris alleged that everyone involved
in the transaction knew she was selling her property for less than it was
worth, and they were all culpable in taking equity from her. She sued the
buyers and Sargent, as well as several other individuals and entities involved
in the transaction, including First Lending, its Chief Executive Officer, Alan

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Vogan, and MiMutual (the latter three defendants are collectively referred

to as the Lending Defendants).2
Norris initially asserted four causes of action as to all defendants:
(1) negligence; (2) conversion; (3) “aiding and abetting”; and (4) financial
elder abuse (§ 15610.30). She later dismissed the first three claims against
the Lending Defendants, leaving only the elder abuse claim.
In April 2024, the Lending Defendants moved for summary judgment
of the financial elder abuse claim. They argued they processed the loan as
normal, and owed no duty to tell Norris about the independent appraisal.
Moreover, they could not have acted with an intent to defraud or by undue
influence, since it is undisputed they never met or spoke to Norris, and were
unaware of her age.
In opposition, Norris maintained that—by financing a transaction in
which Norris sold her home for less than its appraised value—the Lending
Defendants “assisted in the taking” of at least $150,000 of her equity “for a
wrongful use” knowing that the taking would be harmful to her within the
meaning of the financial elder abuse statute (§ 15610.30). She further
asserted that the Lending Defendants were on notice that she was elderly
because they knew (1) escrow was delayed when she had trouble securing
housing in Nevada, (2) her adult children were helping her with escrow,
and (3) her husband had died. In any event, she argued, the statute does not
require that the defendants know the plaintiff’s age.
On reply, the Lending Defendants contended that Norris’s argument,
if accepted, would effectively impose strict liability on anyone involved in a
transaction with a senior who does not receive the benefit of the bargain,

2 Norris also sued Sargent’s real estate company, a broker at the
company, the escrow company, and the title company. Only the Lending
Defendants are involved in this appeal.
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which is not what the financial elder abuse statute contemplates. They also
emphasized that First Lending owed a fiduciary duty to the buyers, and if
they communicated the results of the independent appraisal to Norris, they
would breach that duty.
The trial court granted summary judgment. The court found that
Norris failed to show facts establishing that the Lending Defendants violated
the financial elder abuse statute. More specifically, under the statute, “the
‘property taken’ must be taken as a result of fraud and/or undue influence”
and Norris failed to submit evidence on those issues. The court agreed with
the Lending Defendants that “the law does not impose a strict liability
standard on businesses or people when they transact with seniors covered by
the statute.”

DISCUSSION

For purposes of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection
Act, an “elder” is anyone “residing in this state, 65 years of age or older.”
(§ 15610.27.) Financial elder abuse occurs when a person or entity “[t]akes,
secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an
elder” (a) “for a wrongful use” and/or (b) “with intent to defraud” or (c) “by
undue influence, as defined in [s]ection 15610.70.” (§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(1) &
(3).) A person or entity may be liable for financial elder abuse by “assist[ing]”
in any of the foregoing conduct as well. (Id., subd. (a)(2) & (3).)
Here, Norris does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that there are no
triable issues of material fact as to whether the Lending Defendants took her
home equity, or assisted in taking her equity, with the intent to defraud or by
undue influence. Norris maintains, however, that there is a triable issue on
whether they did so for a wrongful use.

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A. Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Summary judgment is appropriate
only ‘where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Regents of University of California
v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, “considering all of
the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that
which the trial court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences
the evidence reasonably supports.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26
Cal.4th 465, 476.) We “liberally constru[e] the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.” (State of California v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1008, 1018.) “Because we review ‘the ruling, not the rationale,’
we may affirm summary judgment on a different basis than the trial court.”
(Vulcan Lands, Inc. v. Currie (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 113, 122.)

B. No Triable Issue On Wrongful Use

The financial elder abuse statute specifies that “[a] person or entity
shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained
property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes,
secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person or
entity knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to
the elder . . . .” (§ 15610.30, subd. (b), italics added.) It further clarifies that
“a person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or

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personal property when an elder . . . is deprived of any property right,
including by means of an agreement . . . .” (Id., subd. (c).)
Two appellate cases applying these provisions are instructive here.
In Paslay v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
639, the plaintiffs—one of whom was elderly—alleged the defendant insurer
committed financial elder abuse by failing to pay certain policy benefits and
forcing the plaintiffs to move back into their home while it was still under
construction after sustaining water damage. (Id. at p. 643.) In evaluating
whether the evidence created a triable issue regarding a wrongful use of
policy benefits, the Palsay court observed “that to establish a ‘wrongful use’ of
property to which an elder has a contract right, the elder must demonstrate a
breach of the contract, or other improper conduct” as well as the defendant’s
actual or constructive knowledge “ ‘that this conduct is likely to be harmful to
the elder.’ ” (Id. at p. 657.) In that case, there were triable issues as to
whether the insurer breached the insurance contract by refusing to pay
benefits. (Ibid.) But there were no such issues as to the latter requirement,
since there was no evidence that the insurer “acted in subjective bad faith or
unreasonably in denying additional benefits.” (Id. at p. 658.)
In Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522,
the plaintiffs—one of whom was a dependent adult—borrowed on their home
and fell behind on payments, so the defendants (entities involved in making
the loan) foreclosed on the property. (Id. at p. 525.) The trial court granted
summary adjudication of a financial abuse claim, finding the plaintiffs “failed
to allege any property was taken wrongfully,” and the appellate court agreed.
(Id. at p. 527.) The appellate court observed, “ ‘It is simply not tortious for a
commercial lender to lend money, take collateral, or to foreclose on collateral
when a debt is not paid. . . . [A] commercial lender is privileged to pursue its

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own economic interests and may properly assert its contractual rights.’ ” (Id.
at p. 528.) And in that case, there were no allegations that the defendants
took anything the plaintiffs were entitled to. (See id. at p. 527.)
While neither of those cases are factually identical, we distill from
them a threshold requirement that the defendant do something wrongful or
improper. Norris fails to create a triable issue on this point. It is undisputed
that the buyers retained First Lending to arrange their home loan, that First
Lending secured MiMutual to provide the loan, and that MiMutual requested
the independent appraisal in the course of its underwriting process. Norris
fails to demonstrate on these facts that the Lending Defendants had any duty
to inform her about the results of the independent appraisal designed to
protect the lender’s economic interests.
A lending institution does not owe any fiduciary duty to its borrower-
client. (Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
1089, 1093, fn. 1.) And generally, when an institution acts within the scope
of its regular activities as a lender of money, it does not owe any duty of care
to the borrower. (Id. at pp. 1092, 1096.) Thus, when a lender appraises a
property in the usual course and scope of its loan processing—the purpose of
which is to protect itself by ensuring the property provides adequate security
for the loan—it owes no duty of care to the borrower regarding that appraisal.
(Id. at pp. 1096–1097.) Norris does not allege that MiMutual acted beyond
the scope of an ordinary lender, such that it owed any duty of care to the
buyers, much less Norris herself, a stranger to the loan transaction.
As the mortgage broker, First Lending (and Vogan) owed a fiduciary
duty to the buyers. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2923.1.) Norris offers no argument
as to how this duty could possibly include communicating the results of the
independent appraisal to her, the seller, which would jeopardize the economic

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interest of the buyers. Nor can we conceive of any such theory. Notably, we
see neither prejudice nor injustice in the result here considering it is
undisputed that Norris hired her own appraiser, who reported to her one
month before closing that her home was worth approximately $619,000, yet
she still decided to proceed with the sale.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

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