People v. Inda CA2/7

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Filed 5/13/25 P. v. Inda CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336649

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA075288)
v.

JONATHAN INDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Esther R. Sorkin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Jonathan Inda appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1 as to his attempted murder
conviction by a no-contest plea. The superior court concluded
Inda failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility. While
this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its
decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton), and
we invited supplemental briefing from the parties. We affirm the
superior court’s order and remand with directions to provide Inda
an opportunity to file an amended petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Crime
At the preliminary hearing on Inda’s charges, Anthony
Haire testified that on November 24, 2008 at about 12:45 p.m. he
was mowing a lawn in Duarte, Los Angeles. A lime-green Ford
Taurus drove past him, and he saw two “Hispanic males” in the
car. Haire made eye contact with the front passenger.
The car drove past Haire, made a U-turn, and came back
towards him. Haire heard running footsteps, turned around, and
saw a person standing 10 feet away with a semiautomatic
handgun. The man, who Haire recognized as the passenger in
the Taurus, pointed the gun at Haire and fired one shot. As
Haire ran away he heard four or five more gunshots.
Haire saw the shooter get back into the Taurus’s front
passenger seat, and the car quickly drove away. The next day,

1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Haire identified Inda as the shooter from a six-pack photographic
lineup. Haire also identified Inda in court as the shooter.
Detective Andrew Dahring with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department testified that in December 2008 a beige2
Ford Taurus, which Haire later identified in court as the car
involved in the shooting, was impounded. When Inda’s girlfriend,
Elisabeth Luna, came to the sheriff’s station to retrieve the car,
she told Dahring that Inda drove the Taurus. She also said in
the past she had seen Inda with a semiautomatic firearm.
Dahring also provided gang expert testimony. He testified
the area where the shooting occurred was in Duarte Eastside
gang territory. Inda had the word “Duarte” tattooed across the
back of his head along with other tattoos associated with the
gang. The apartment where Inda lived contained several items of
gang paraphernalia, including two shirts bearing the name
“Duarte Eastside.” In March 2008 Dahring had contacted Inda,
and Inda admitted to him that he was a member of the Duarte
Eastside gang. Based on those facts, Dahring opined that Inda
was a member of the Duarte Eastside gang. Dahring also opined
that the shooting was committed for the benefit of the Duarte
Eastside gang.

B. The Charges, Plea, and Sentencing
The People charged Inda with attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and possession
of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). As to the attempted
murder, the People alleged that Inda personally and intentionally

2 Dahring testified that the car was a “unique color” in that,
“depend[ing] on the angle of the light that reflects off the vehicle,
it can look gold or tan or green.”

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discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and that he
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to both
counts, the People alleged a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(C)).
On August 24, 2010 Inda pleaded no contest to attempted
murder and admitted that he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and committed the
crime for the benefit of a gang within the meaning of section
186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court sentenced Inda to 37
years in prison, consisting of seven years for the attempted
murder, plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement and 10 years
for the gang enhancement. The court dismissed the remaining
count and allegations.

C. The Superior Court Denies Inda’s Petition for Resentencing
On January 5, 2022 Inda filed, pro se, a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as to his attempted murder
conviction. He used a pre-printed form petition wherein he
checked boxes next to statements that correspond to statutory
requirements for relief, including statements that he was
convicted under an invalid theory and could not presently be
convicted because of the changes to homicide law. The superior
court appointed counsel, and the parties filed briefs. The People
argued Inda was ineligible for relief because he was the actual
perpetrator, as evidenced by the preliminary hearing transcript.
Inda argued the court should make a prima facie finding that
Inda was eligible for relief because it must take his factual
allegations as true and must not engage in fact-finding. Inda did
not make any further argument or challenge the version of facts
put forth by the People.

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The superior court denied Inda’s petition without issuing
an order to show cause based on the preliminary hearing and
plea transcripts. The court stated, “Looking at the preliminary
hearing transcript, it does not support a finding that . . . Inda
was being held vicariously liable under felony murder and/or
natural and probable consequences. . . . Inda admitted to the
attempted murder and admitted that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm . . . and there’s no evidence
there was more than one gun used.”
Inda timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Legal Principles
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder.3 (Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 558; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime and requires
proof of malice to convict a principal of murder.4 To provide relief
to those with existing murder convictions based on now-invalid
theories, the Legislature created a path to resentencing. “It has
since expanded this path to allow relief for those with ‘attempted
murder’ convictions based on ‘the natural and probable

3 It also narrowed the felony-murder rule by adding section
189, subdivision (e), but the felony-murder rule is not at issue in
this appeal.
4 The one exception to this rule is stated in section 189,
subdivision (e). (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

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consequences doctrine.’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2.)” (Patton, at p. 558.) Under the current resentencing
statute, codified in section 1172.6, “[a] person convicted of . . .
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” may petition the superior court to vacate the conviction
and be resentenced on any remaining counts if the petitioner
could not now be convicted of attempted murder because of the
changes to the homicide laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(3); see also People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 962-963
(Lewis).) The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition,
the petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the attempted murder or murder
convictions and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; accord, Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.)
“[T]he court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima
facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of

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law.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; see Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court may consider the record of
conviction, which will “necessarily inform the . . . court’s prima
facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; accord, Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; accord, Patton, at
p. 563.)
“[P]etitioners confronting a record of conviction that
demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming
forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution
and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would
entail.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567.) “[A] section 1172.6
petitioner who, despite having access to counsel upon submission
of a facially sufficient petition, offers only conclusory allegations
of entitlement to relief, in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid
theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing. Where
facts from the record of conviction are undisputed, accepting
them over contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is
not ‘ “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.” ’ ” (Patton, at pp. 565-566, fn. omitted.)
Under these circumstances, a superior court may deny a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (Patton, at p. 569.)
Our Supreme Court recently clarified that “the record of
conviction the parties may consult at the prima facie stage
includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty

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plea.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568.) A superior court
may, at the prima facie stage, “rely on unchallenged, relief-
foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute
conclusory, checkbox allegations” asserting legal conclusions to
determine whether a petitioner is eligible for relief under section
1172.6. (Patton, at p. 564.) The Supreme Court concluded the
petitioner in Patton failed to make a prima facie showing because
his petition contained only such a checkbox declaration, and he
“offer[ed] no factual counterweight” to the People’s contention
that the preliminary hearing transcript showed he was the sole
perpetrator of the attempted murder. (Ibid.) The court affirmed
the denial of his petition but “out of an abundance of caution”
ordered the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the superior
court with directions for the superior court to consider an
amended petition should the petitioner seek to file one within 30
days. (Id. at p. 569.)
“We review de novo whether the trial court conducted a
proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).” (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; see People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [denial at the prima facie stage “is
appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law,” which “is a
purely legal conclusion . . . we review de novo”].)

B. The Superior Court Properly Denied Inda’s Petition for
Resentencing
In his opening brief, Inda argued the superior court
engaged in “impermissible fact finding” by relying on the
preliminary hearing transcript. Both parties noted on appeal
there was a split of authority regarding the use of a preliminary
hearing transcript at the section 1172.6 prima facie stage.

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However, while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
settled this split in Patton, and, as discussed, held the
preliminary hearing transcript may be considered at the prima
facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) We requested
supplemental briefing to address the impact of Patton on this
appeal.
The People assert in their supplemental brief that the
superior court’s order should be affirmed under Patton. The
preliminary hearing transcript shows Inda was the sole shooter:
Haire testified he saw Inda approach to within 10 feet of him and
point a gun in Haire’s direction and shoot it. And, as the People
argue, Inda “offered only conclusory allegations of entitlement to
resentencing relief under section 1172.6.” (Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)
Inda argues for the first time on appeal that he made a
prima facie showing of relief because “the record contains
indications that someone else might have been the actual
perpetrator.” Inda specifically contends “at least two potential
witnesses who did not testify at the preliminary hearing . . . could
have provided testimony . . . that [he] may not be the sole
shooter.”5 But in the superior court, Inda offered only
“conclusory, checkbox allegations” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 605) of entitlement to relief in response to a record of
conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, that
demonstrated his conviction rested on the theory that Inda was
the actual perpetrator of the attempted murder of Haire. Thus,

5 Inda did not attach witness statements or provide any offer
of proof regarding the testimony of the two potential witnesses.

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Inda has failed to establish a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief under section 1172.6. (See Patton, at pp. 605-606.)
Inda also argues that “[a]t the very least, the existence of
two potential witnesses justifies him in requesting that this court
remand this matter, granting him leave to amend his
resentencing petition to allege the specific facts required.” We
follow the Supreme Court’s directive “out of an abundance of
caution” and remand the matter to the superior court with
directions to consider an amended petition should Inda seek to
file one within 30 days of the remand. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 569; see People v. Glass (Apr. 22, 2025, D084008)
__ Cal.App.5th __ [2025 WL 1165276] [granting section 1172.6
petitioner’s request to remand for opportunity to amend petition,
because petitioner did not have the benefit of Patton’s guidance
during prima facie stage].)

DISPOSITION

This matter is remanded to the superior court to consider
an amended petition should Inda file one within 30 days of
remand. We otherwise affirm the order denying Inda’s petition
for resentencing.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.

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