CourtListener 10578491•In re G.M. CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 5/8/25 In re G.M. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.M., a Person Coming B334768
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SJ0447A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
G.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Yaroslavsky, Judge. Affirmed with
instructions.
John Schneider, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
The juvenile court sustained the People’s allegation that
minor G.M. carried a loaded handgun in violation of Penal Code
section 25850, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. Accordingly, the
court declared G.M. its ward under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 and ordered home probation. As part of that order, it
also fixed a maximum term of confinement.
We agree with the People that substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding G.M. committed the alleged
criminal act and was therefore a person described in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602. But because the court’s order did
not call for G.M.’s removal from his mother’s custody, we order
the maximum term of confinement stricken.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shortly after midnight on December 28, 2023, Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Carlos Martinez and
Samuel Curameng were on separate patrols in Canyon Country.
Deputy Curameng initiated a traffic stop of a gray Acura sedan
and Deputy Martinez immediately joined in the stop. The driver
pulled over near the intersection of Jakes Way and Sandy Drive.
As the car stopped, G.M. exited the front passenger door and ran
down Sandy Drive towards Zev Drive. Deputy Martinez gave
chase on foot while Deputy Curameng stayed with the car and
driver.
During the chase, Deputy Martinez noticed G.M. gripping
his waistband with his right hand while his “left hand was
running freely.” At the intersection of Sandy Drive and Zev Drive,
Deputy Martinez noticed “both [G.M.’s] hands became free. He
started running with both hands open freely.” This helped G.M.
run faster and escape the deputy’s sight. Deputy Martinez found
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G.M. hiding in the garage of a nearby apartment building soon
thereafter.
After apprehending G.M., Deputy Martinez conducted an
“article search,” retracing the path of the foot pursuit. At the very
place “where [he] noticed [G.M.’s] hands were running freely, [he]
saw and recovered a firearm.” The gun was in an ivy plant. It was
“moist because it was in the plant, it was wet. So it was still kind
of damp when [Deputy Martinez] picked it up.” It was not,
however, dirty. The gun was loaded with .40-caliber ammunition.
Meanwhile, Deputy Curameng performed a search of the
car. On the passenger seat, where G.M. had been riding before
he fled, he found a jacket. When he picked up the jacket, a single
live round of ammunition fell out. It was a “.40-caliber round
matching the same ammo” as Deputy Martinez found in the gun.
The People filed a petition under section 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code alleging that G.M., who was 17 years old at
the time, had violated Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a),
by carrying, both on his person and in a vehicle, the gun Deputy
Martinez found in the ivy plant. The juvenile court sustained the
allegation and found it to be a misdemeanor. On this basis, it
declared G.M. a ward of the juvenile court. It ordered G.M. placed
on probation in the home of his mother. It also ordered, among
other things, that “[G.M.] may not be held in physical
confinement for a period to exceed 364 days.”
G.M. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
section 800 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Id., subd. (a).)
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I. The Order Was Proper Because There Was Sufficient
Evidence G.M. Violated Penal Code Section 25850,
Subdivision (a)
A. Applicable Law
A 17-year-old minor, like G.M. was at the time of his
apprehension and the order below, may be declared a ward of the
juvenile court if the court determines he has committed a
criminal act other than an age curfew violation. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602, subd. (a).) Such a determination may be made only
upon admissible evidence sufficient to constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. (§ 701.)
B. Standard of Review
“When addressing claims of insufficient evidence in the
context of a juvenile court judgment sustaining criminal
allegations, ‘we must apply the same standard of review
applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on
appeal.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘ “ ‘we review the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” ’ ‘ “[W]e presume every fact in support of the judgment
the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the
evidence.” ’ [Citations.] Reversal is warranted only where it
appears ‘ “that upon no hypothesis what[so]ever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the judgment].” ’ ”
(In re Aaron J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1058.)
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C. Analysis
A person is guilty of violating Penal Code section 25850,
subdivision (a) if he (1) carries a loaded firearm on his person or
in a vehicle, (2) knew he was carrying the firearm, and (3) at that
time, was in a public place or on a public street in an
incorporated city or in an unincorporated area where it was
unlawful to discharge a firearm. (See CALCRIM No. 2530.)
Here, G.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that
he ever possessed a firearm. The evidence was plainly sufficient.
At the time of the traffic stop, G.M. was seated in the
passenger seat of the car. Following the stop, he fled on foot.
Deputy Martinez chased after him from a distance of
approximately 10 feet and observed him initially clutching his
waistband with one hand. It is a reasonable inference that he was
securing an object there. Exactly at the place the gun was later
recovered, Deputy Martinez noticed G.M. stopped clutching his
waistband and proceeded to run with both arms free. It is a
reasonable inference that the object he had been securing was, at
that point, no longer in his waistband. When Deputy Martinez
found the gun, it was damp, but not dusty or dirty. It was also
loaded with ammunition that matched ammunition that fell from
the jacket Deputy Curameng found on the passenger seat of the
car—where G.M. had been sitting before he fled.
G.M.’s attack on the evidence fails to show it is legally
insufficient. He observes that no one, including neither Deputies
Martinez nor Curameng, testified they saw the gun in G.M.’s
possession. He also observes that neither fingerprint nor DNA
evidence linked G.M. to the gun or the ammunition in the car.
While the evidence could have been stronger, that is not the
standard for reversal. It is enough that a reasonable trier of fact
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could find from the evidence that G.M. possessed the gun beyond
a reasonable doubt. This is certainly the case here.
G.M. suggests some of the evidence was incompatible with
the juvenile court’s finding. For example, he notes Deputy
Martinez did not see G.M. discard the gun in the bushes even
though he was only 10 feet away, and questions how the gun
could have gotten damp in the short time between the foot
pursuit and when Deputy Martinez found it. G.M.’s attempts to
reargue the evidence fail. Consistent with our obligation to
presume every fact in support of the judgment that the court
could have reasonably deduced, we presume the conditions made
it difficult for Deputy Martinez, who was behind G.M. in the
middle of the night, to see G.M. discard the gun as he rounded a
corner; and that moisture from the wet plants transferred to the
gun as it passed through and sat in the foliage.
II. The Juvenile Court’s Order Regarding G.M.’s
Maximum Period of Confinement Must Be Stricken
G.M. contends, and the People agree, that the maximum
term of confinement for his offense must be stricken from the
juvenile court’s order. As we explained in In re Matthew A. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541, when a minor is removed from the
physical custody of his parent or custodian as a result of criminal
violations sustained under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602, the juvenile court must specify the maximum term of
confinement that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the
same offense. But the Legislature did not require the same where
a minor is not removed and specifying a maximum term under
such circumstances is therefore inappropriate.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order declaring G.M. a ward
of the court except that the statement of the maximum term of
confinement must be stricken.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR :
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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