CourtListener 10578488•People v. Cervantez CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 5/8/25 P. v. Cervantez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336795
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA204837)
JOSE OCTAVIO CERVANTEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig Elliott Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Jose Octavio Cervantez appeals the summary denial of his
petition under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), which
permits juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) to petition for recall and
resentencing. Appellant argues that his sentence of 32 years to
life is the functional equivalent of LWOP because he has a
developmental disability, rendering him less likely to be released
on parole. We reject this contention and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002, a jury convicted appellant of attempted murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)),
and attempted robbery (§§ 211 & 664). The jury also found true
firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (c)
and (d), and that appellant personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Appellant was 15 years old at the
time of these offenses. The trial court sentenced him to life, plus
25 years to life for one of the firearm enhancements.2 The court
either stayed or ran concurrently the sentences for the other
offenses.
In December 2023, appellant filed a petition under section
1170, subdivision (d)(1), to recall his sentence. The People
1 Undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2 The trial court and counsel below referred to appellant’s
sentence as 32 years to life. This is accurate, given that the
sentence imposed for an enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) runs consecutively to that imposed for the
predicate offense, and the requirement that a defendant who
receives a life sentence must generally serve at least seven years
in prison before being considered for parole (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1)).
2
opposed, and on February 15, 2024, the trial court denied his
petition for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) generally permits a juvenile
offender who “was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole” and has been incarcerated for at least 15
years to “submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) People v. Heard (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 608 extended relief under this provision to
juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP based on equal protection principles.
(Heard, at pp. 612, 633–634 [sentence of 103 years was functional
equivalent of LWOP]; accord, People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435, 440 [sentence of more than 100 years was
functional LWOP sentence].) Courts have made clear, however,
that not all lengthy sentences equate to LWOP. (E.g., People v.
Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33 years to life was not
functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Munoz (Apr. 8, 2025,
B336656) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2025 Cal.App. Lexis 233] (Munoz)
[nor was 50 years to life, at least not for purposes of section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)].)
Appellant does not argue that 32 years to life imposed on a
juvenile offender always, or even typically, is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. That argument would be unpersuasive on
its face, given that such offender would be eligible for parole in
his or her early fifties, at the latest. (See People v. Perez (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [“by no stretch of the imagination” can a
sentence resulting in eligibility for parole at age 47 be called a
functional LWOP].) Rather, appellant argues that his sentence is
the functional equivalent of LWOP because he has a
3
developmental disability, and such disabilities render individuals
less likely to benefit from programs offered in prison and less
likely to behave in a manner conducive to being granted parole.
We are not persuaded.
Whether a sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP
hinges on whether the defendant, “ ‘during his or her expected
lifetime’ ” (Munoz, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2025 Cal.App.
Lexis 233, *11]) will have “a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate [his or her] rehabilitation and fitness to reenter
society in the future” (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262,
268). Appellant invites courts to employ a different test for
developmentally disabled defendants—one that disregards both
the length of the determinate prong of their sentences and their
parole-eligible status.3 Instead of focusing on whether such
defendants have the opportunity to show their fitness to reenter
society, appellant wants courts to focus exclusively on whether,
despite having the opportunity, their developmental disabilities
render it unlikely that the parole board will find them suitable
for parole. In essence, appellant is asking courts to inject a new
policy consideration into the mix, and to make that consideration
the sole focus in determining whether a sentence amounts to an
LWOP sentence for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (d). But
it is the Legislature’s province, not ours, “to sift through studies
and research and to make policy decisions.” (Munoz, supra, ___
Cal.App.5th ___ [2025 Cal.App. Lexis 233, *13].) The
Legislature’s purpose in enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
3 As the trial court observed and appellant’s counsel below
conceded, this position would mean that “anything short of a
determinate sentence” would be the functional equivalent of an
LWOP sentence, given his developmental disability.
4
was to address the “ ‘developments in scientific research on
adolescent brain development confirming that children are
different from adults in ways that are critical to identifying age-
appropriate sentences.’ ” (People v. Bagsby (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1040, 1048.) The Legislature did not account for
differences in intellectual capacity (beyond those related to age)
or developmental disabilities, nor was it required to. (People v.
Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 888 [“When the Legislature
reforms one area of the law, it is not required to reform other
areas of the law”]; ibid. [“It may elect to make reforms ‘ “ ‘one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind’ ” ’ ”].) The trial court
correctly concluded that appellant is ineligible for relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) because he was not sentenced to
LWOP or its functional equivalent.
5
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
6
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