Smith v. Kalatzis CA2/5

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Testo completo

Filed 5/8/25 Smith v. Kalatzis CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

NAILAH SMITH, B334125

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BC712013)

CHRISTOS KALATZIS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Gary Rand & Suzanne E. Rand-Lewis and Suzanne E.
Rand-Lewis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza and David Z. Sohn for
Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
Plaintiff Nailah Smith appeals from a judgment following
orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants
Christos Kalatzis, M.D., Ronald Lang, M.D., Olympia Health
Care, LLC, doing business as Olympia Medical Center (Olympia),
and Alecto Heathcare Services, doing business as Olympia
Medical Center (Alecto) in this medical malpractice action.1
Smith contends: (1) the moving parties’ evidence was not
sufficient to shift the burden on summary judgment, and (2)
triable issues of fact exist under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because it is common knowledge that a person with one kidney
may be susceptible to increased risk of renal dysfunction
requiring the care of a kidney specialist. We conclude the trial
court properly granted the unopposed motions for summary
judgment, and therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 25, 2018, Smith filed an action against several
medical treatment providers, including Kalatzis, Lang, Olympia,
and Alecto, for medical malpractice, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, battery, concealment, and breach of fiduciary
duty. Smith alleged that Bruce McLucas, M.D., recommended
undergoing an embolization procedure to treat her uterine
fibroids. McLucas performed the surgery, with assistance from
anesthesiologist Kalatzis. The defendants and their staff
administered and prescribed medications that were
contraindicated for a person with one kidney and were a
substantial factor causing Smith to suffer renal injury. Smith

1 Neither Olympia, nor Alecto, have filed a brief on appeal
and neither is a respondent in this matter.

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was later re-admitted to the facility and treated by several
doctors, including Lang, who continued to prescribe and
administer medication contraindicated for her kidney condition.
She alleged that their treatment fell below the standard of care.
On July 9, 2021, Kalatzis filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that he had complied with the standard
of care in the community at all times and no alleged negligent act
or omission of his was a substantial factor in Smith’s injuries.
Among other evidence, he submitted a declaration from expert
witness Gary J. Nitti, M.D., providing details from Smith’s
medical records, as well as Nitti’s opinion that Kalatzis complied
with the standard of care. Kalatzis’s separate statement of facts
also set forth details about Smith’s treatment and Nitti’s expert
opinion.
On August 19, 2021, Olympia and Alecto filed a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the treatment rendered
by Olympia complied with the standard of care and did not cause
Smith’s injuries. In addition, they asserted that Alecto did not
operate the facility at the time of Smith’s admission. Among
other evidence, Olympia and Alecto submitted Smith’s medical
records, as well as the declaration of general surgery specialist
Leo J. Murphy, M.D., providing his findings and opinion that
Olympia and its employees acted entirely within the prevailing
standard of care. They also provided the declaration of
nephrology expert Madeleine Pahl, M.D. Their statement of
undisputed facts set forth the details of Smith’s treatment,
referring to the supporting evidence, and stated no act by
Olympia caused Smith’s kidney injury.
On October 21, 2021, Smith’s attorney Suzanne Rand-
Lewis filed a declaration “representing plaintiff[’s] preliminary

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opposition” to Olympia and Alecto’s motion for summary
judgment. Smith’s attorney declared that she was unable to
complete Smith’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment
due to her own medical emergency. She asked the trial court to
permit Smith to file her opposition by October 28, 2021, and to
continue the hearing on the motions.
Olympia and Alecto objected to Smith’s request for a
continuance. They noted that Smith’s deposition had been
continued previously due to her attorney’s incapacity resulting
from a medical emergency. In addition, two prior motions for
summary judgment brought by other defendants in the case had
been granted due to Smith’s failure to file any opposition to the
motions or appear for either hearing.
On October 26, 2021, Smith’s attorney filed a second
declaration “representing plaintiff[’s] preliminary opposition” to
Kalatzis’s motion for summary judgment. Based on an adverse
reaction she had during a follow up procedure, the attorney had
been unable to complete Smith’s opposition to Kalatzis’s motion.
She requested a one-week continuance of both the due date for
filing Smith’s opposition and the hearing on the motion. Kalatzis
objected to the continuance.
On November 4, 2021, Kalatzis filed a notice of non-
opposition stating that no opposition had been filed to his motion
for summary judgment. The same day, a hearing was held on the
motion for summary judgment filed by Olympia and Alecto.
Attorney Timothy Rand-Lewis appeared for Smith and asked for
a continuance of the hearing on the ground that Smith’s attorney,

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Suzanne Rand-Lewis, was unavailable due to medical issues.2
The trial court asked counsel to submit supplemental briefing
regarding the request for a continuance and encouraged Smith to
associate in counsel to assist with the case.
Kalatzis, Olympia, and Alecto submitted supplemental
briefing. A hearing was held on the motions for summary
judgment on November 9, 2021. Timothy appeared for Smith.
The trial court found that the moving parties had carried their
initial burdens to make a prima facie showing that one or more
elements of the causes of action could not be established, the
burden had shifted to Smith, and Smith failed to meet her
burden. Timothy argued that the declaration of Kalatzis’s expert
Nitti was conclusory, did not state to a reasonable medical
probability that Kalatzis met the standard of care, and never
stated what the standard of care was. Kalatzis’s attorney
responded that Nitti expressly stated that he was familiar with
the standard of care for anesthetic management of patients and
Kalatzis properly cared for and monitored Smith during the
procedure, as well as discussing Kalatzis’s limited role in the
procedure. The trial court instructed the moving parties to each
prepare an order granting the respective motion for summary
judgment. The court noted it had expected to receive proper
opposition pleadings from Smith based on the statements in the
preliminary oppositions, but no additional opposition had been
received.
On November 29, 2021, Lang filed a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that he complied with the standard of

2 Because the attorneys appearing for Smith share the
same last name, they will be referred to individually by their first
names for clarity.

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care in the community at all times and no alleged negligent act or
omission of his was a substantial factor in Smith’s injuries.
Lang’s motion was supported by the declaration of Eric Wechsler,
M.D., who opined that the care and treatment of Smith provided
by Lang complied with the applicable standard of care, that no
act or omission by Lang fell below the standard of care, and that
the care and treatment provided by Lang to Smith did not cause
or contribute to her injuries. Lang’s separate statement of
undisputed facts also provided details about Smith’s treatment
and referred to the opinions in the expert declaration.
On December 2, 2021, the trial court entered an order
granting Kalatzis’s motion for summary judgment. On
December 20, 2021, the court entered an order granting the
motion for summary judgment brought by Olympia Health Care,
LLC, doing business as Olympia Medical Center, and Alecto
Health Care Services Los Angeles, LLC, erroneously sued as
Alecto Health Care Services Los Angeles, LLC, doing business as
Olympia Medical Center.
On March 11, 2022, Lang filed a notice of non-opposition to
his motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on Lang’s
motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2022. The court
issued a tentative ruling to grant the motion. The tentative
ruling noted that Lang submitted evidence in the form of an
expert opinion sufficient to negate the essential elements of
breach of the standard of care and causation. The court ruled
that Lang satisfied his burden and shifted the burden to Smith to
raise a disputed issue of material fact as to breach and causation.
However, because Smith did not file an opposition to the motion,
Smith failed to show a triable issue of fact existed. After the
hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling, granting Lang’s

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motion for summary judgment by minute order that same day.
On April 4, 2022, the court entered an order granting summary
judgment for Lang.
On September 13, 2023, the trial court entered separate
judgments in favor of Kalatzis, Lang, and Olympia and Alecto.
Smith filed a timely notice of appeal from all three judgments.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no
triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).)” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
We generally review a trial court’s granting of summary
judgment de novo, “considering all of the evidence the parties
offered in connection with the motion (except that which the
court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the
evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

B. Expert Witness Declarations

Smith contends the expert declarations submitted by
Kalatzis and Lang in support of their motions were not sufficient
to shift the burden of proof on summary judgment because the
experts did not state that the conduct met the applicable
standard of care “to a reasonable medical probability.” This
analysis is incorrect.

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To prove a medical malpractice action where the negligence
is not obvious to a layperson, the plaintiff must present expert
testimony that the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff and
that breach caused the plaintiff’s injury. (Kelley v. Trunk (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 519, 523 (Kelley).) “ ‘ “California courts have
incorporated the expert evidence requirement into their standard
for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases. When a
defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion
with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the
community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment
unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert
evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 112, 123 (Powell).)
An expert declaration is sufficient if it includes the matter
relied on to form the expert’s opinion, explains the bases for the
opinion, and the matter is a type that an expert may reasonably
rely upon to form an opinion on the subject. (Kelley, supra, 66
Cal.App.4th at pp. 523–524.) An expert’s opinion may not be
speculative, based on assumptions without evidentiary support,
or stated without sufficient certainty. (Powell, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) The expert’s opinion must be rendered
with a reasoned explanation of why the underlying facts lead to
the ultimate conclusion. (Ibid.) A doctor defendant is not
entitled to summary judgment based simply on an unopposed
expert declaration that states a conclusory opinion that no
malpractice occurred, without explaining the basis for the
opinion. (Powell, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)
The case that Smith relies upon, Jones v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402–403,
concerns the element of causation in a personal injury action; it

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states that “causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie
case.” “A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the
absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more
likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” (Id. at
p. 403, emphasis added.)
The elements at issue in this case, however, are duty and
breach, not causation. The expert declarations provided the
relevant facts and bases for the experts’ opinions that the doctors’
conduct met the applicable standard of care. The experts did not
state that the defendants “may have met” the standard of care or
“possibly met” the standard of care; they stated with certainty
that the defendants’ conduct met the standard of care. There is
no requirement that an expert must opine that conduct met the
standard of care to a reasonable medical probability. In fact,
stating the conduct at issue met the standard of care to a
reasonable medical probability would be a lower degree of
certainty than the complete certainty expressed by the experts in
this case. It was sufficient to state that the conduct at issue met
the standard of care, as the expert declarations in this case
stated. Smith has not raised any other issue challenging the
evidence supporting the motions for summary judgment.
Smith also contends the motions for summary judgment
should have been denied because the moving parties’ separate
statements of undisputed facts did not state facts. This is simply
incorrect. All of the separate statements of undisputed facts
contained details about Smith’s treatment and referred to the
opinions contained in the expert declarations. Smith has not
shown any defect in the motions for summary judgment.

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C. Res Ipsa Loquitor

Smith contends there is a triable issue of fact because it is
within the common knowledge of a lay person that a doctor, upon
learning a patient has one kidney, should engage and consult
with a kidney specialist to ensure the patient is not prescribed
contraindicated medications. We disagree.
“ ‘ “The standard of care against which the acts of a
physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice
action and can only be proved by their testimony [citations],
unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is
within the common knowledge of the layman.” [Citations.]’
[Citations.] The ‘common knowledge’ exception is principally
limited to situations in which the plaintiff can invoke the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., when a layperson ‘is able to say as a
matter of common knowledge and observation that the
consequences of professional treatment were not such as
ordinarily would have followed if due care had been exercised.’
[Citations.] The classic example, of course, is the X-ray revealing
a scalpel left in the patient’s body following surgery. [Citation.]
Otherwise, ‘ “expert evidence is conclusive and cannot be
disregarded. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Flowers v. Torrance
Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001, fn.
omitted.)
We do not believe it is well known that a person with only
one kidney may be susceptible to increased risk of renal
dysfunction and failure, and it is certainly not common
knowledge that the harm Smith experienced would occur only if

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someone was negligent. To demonstrate a triable issue of fact,
Smith was required to submit an expert declaration and a
separate responsive statement in opposition to the motions for
summary judgment. The trial court properly granted the
unopposed motions for summary judgment.

DISPOSITION

The September 13, 2023 judgments are affirmed.
Respondents Christos Kalatzis, M.D., and Ronald Lang, M.D., are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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