CourtListener 10575819•Rogers v. NES Global CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/8/25 Rogers v. NES Global CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARRYL ROGERS,
F088374
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-23-103371)
v.
NES GLOBAL, LLC, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S.
Clark, Judge.
Jackson Lewis, Dylan B. Carp, Nicky Jatana, Eric J. Gitig and Jing Tong for
Defendant and Appellant.
Josephson Dunlap and William M. Hogg for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
This is an employment related dispute between plaintiff and respondent Darryl
Rogers (Rogers) and his former employer defendant and appellant NES Global, LLC
(NES). The trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration by NES on two
grounds. First, the court found that no agreement to arbitrate existed between Rogers and
NES. Second, and in the alternative, the court found that Rogers’s claims were outside
the scope of the purported arbitration agreement. NES now appeals the denial of its
motion. We conclude the court incorrectly determined that no agreement to arbitrate
existed, but correctly determined that Rogers’s claims were outside the scope of the
purported agreement. Accordingly, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 9, 2023, Rogers filed a class action lawsuit (the Complaint) in the
Kern County Superior Court against NES. Rogers, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, alleged four statutory claims: failure to pay overtime (Lab. Code,
§§ 510, 1194), failure to provide a timely and accurate wage statement (Lab. Code,
§ 226), waiting time penalties/failure to timely pay final wages upon separation (Lab.
Code, §§ 201−203), and unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). The
Complaint alleged that Rogers was not paid for overtime, even though he did not meet a
requirement under 29 Code of Federal Regulations part 541.604 (2024) (section 604) for
an exemption, and was instead paid a “straight time” rate of $75 for all hours worked
over 40 hours per week. The Complaint alleged that the failure to pay overtime also led
to NES’s failure to provide an accurate wage statement and failure to timely and fully pay
Rogers upon separation.
On May 28, 2024, NES filed a joint motion to compel arbitration and dismiss all
of Rogers’s putative class claims.
Oral argument on the joint motion was held on July 11, 2024. The trial court held
that NES failed to meet its burden to show an arbitration agreement existed with Rogers
and, alternatively, that Rogers’s statutory claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement.
On July 24, 2024, NES appealed the denial of its motion to compel.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
NES is a staffing provider that provides engineers and technical workers to
technology and energy related companies. From April 18 to July 22, 2022, NES
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employed Rogers as a commissioning engineer and assigned him to work for a client in
Bakersfield.
Prior to beginning employment, NES sent Rogers a “CONTRACT OFFER
LETTER” (COL). The COL identified the “Parties” as “Company” and “Personnel.” In
turn, “Company” was defined as NES, and “Personnel” was defined as Rogers. The COL
included a number of terms, including compensation and pay structure, hours of work,
duration of the Bakersfield assignment, and training. The COL also stated that Rogers
was considered an “exempt employee” under federal and California law and thus, he was
not entitled to overtime pay but was entitled to meal and rest breaks under California law.
The COL provided that Rogers would be paid a “Retainer” of $1,425, which equaled $75
per hour for 19 hours, for any time worked in a week. For any amount of time worked in
excess of 19 hours, the COL provided that Rogers would be paid $75 per hour. The COL
also explained that the offer of employment was “made subject to the Company’s Terms
of Business and attached Appendix(es),” and included a line that read: “I agree with and
accept Company’s [COL], together with the Terms of Business and the attached
Appendix(es).” The COL included four appendices, and a document entitled “TERMS
OF BUSINESS FOR THE SUPPLY OF SERVICES BY A TEMPORARY WORKER
TO THE CLIENT” (TOB). Rogers signed the COL on April 13, 2022.
The TOB stated in part that, in case of a conflict between documents, the order of
precedence for resolving the conflict was the COL, followed by the TOB, followed by
other “Documents.” The TOB included a definition section that in part defined
“Company” as NES; “Personnel” as Rogers; “Law” as “any and all laws of the country in
which the Company is incorporated including any legislative or regulatory provisions”;
and “Assignment Contract” as “the contract between the Company and the Personnel for
the execution of Services by the Personnel and comprises of the [COL], these [TOB,] and
the Appendices.” In relevant part, the TOB contained two undefined paragraphs under a
section entitled “General.” Paragraph 16.11 of the TOB (Paragraph 16.11) read:
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“The construction, validity and performance of this Assignment
Contract including any disputes or claims in connection with it or its
subject matter shall be governed by the Law and the Parties irrevocably
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the country in which the
Company is incorporated save that the Company may seek interim
injunctive relief in any court worldwide accepting jurisdiction in relation to
the protection of the Company’s and/or Client’s IPR and/or Confidential
Information. The Personnel irrevocably acknowledges that it is contracting
with the Company and that its only cause of action shall be against the
Company and not against any other member of the NES Group of
companies.”
Next, in all capital letters, paragraph 16.12 of the TOB (Paragraph 16.12) read:
“Company and Contractor are each giving up the right to a jury trial
and the right to participate in a class action for all disputes required to be
submitted to arbitration and such disputes arising under this agreement will
be resolved exclusively through arbitration. Additionally, the Parties agree
that for all disputes required to be submitted to arbitration pursuant to this
section, Company and Contractor shall each bring such disputes against the
other only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member
in any purported class or representative proceeding.”
DISCUSSION
I. Agreement to Arbitrate
A. Parties’ Arguments
NES argues the trial court erred by finding that no arbitration agreement exists.
NES explains that the purpose of the contract is to define the relationship between itself
and Rogers and the most reasonable interpretation of the arbitration agreement is to
recognize that Rogers is the “Contractor.” NES also argues that the term “Contractor” is
used in three other sections of the employment contract and that adopting the court’s
interpretation would render Paragraph 16.12 meaningless surplusage.
Rogers argues that the trial court did not err. Rogers argues that the COL and
TOB expressly defined Rogers as “Personnel” but did not define the term “Contractor.”
The most reasonable interpretation of the TOB is that it means what is says, “Personnel”
means Rogers and “Contractor” does not. Rogers argues that interpreting “Contractor” to
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mean someone other than Rogers does not render Paragraph 16.12 surplusage, it simply
means that Paragraph 16.12 does not impose duties on him. Rogers also argues that it
does not make sense that Paragraph 16.11 would use the term “Personnel” when
submitting to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court, but then use the term “Contractor” to
negate that submission by waiving a jury trial in favor of arbitration.
As to this issue, we agree with NES.
B. Legal Standards
Before a trial court may order parties to arbitration, the court must determine the
threshold question of whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (Casa Del Caffe
Vergnano S.P.A. v. Italflavors San Diego, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) 816 F.3d 1208, 1211;
Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 843–844.)
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing a valid
agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Engalla v. Permanente
Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972; Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1195 (Jones).) General principles of California contract law apply
to determine the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower
Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle
Museum); B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 943; Mitri v.
Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1170 (Mitri).) Mutual assent or
consent, meaning that the parties agreed to the same thing in the same sense, is essential
to the existence of a binding arbitration agreement. (Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising,
LLC (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 23, 30; B.D., at p. 943.) Further, courts interpret an
arbitration agreement so as to give effect to the parties’ intentions. (Flores v. Nature’s
Best Distribution, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 (Flores); Mitri, at p. 1170.) Thus, “ ‘a
contract entered into for the mutual benefit of the parties is to be interpreted so as to give
effect to the main purpose of the contract … .’ ” (Strong v. Theis (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d
913, 918 (Strong), italics omitted; Chevron U.S.A. v. Bragg Crane & Rigging Co. (1986)
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180 Cal.App.3d 639, 644 (Chevron).) Unless given a special meaning by the parties, the
words of an arbitration agreement are interpreted in their usual and ordinary meaning and
should be considered in light of the circumstance under which the agreement was made.
(Bunker Hill Park Ltd. v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327;
see also Mitri, at p. 1170.) The whole of the agreement is “to be taken together, so as to
give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the
other.” (Civ. Code, § 1641; Flores, at p. 9; Mitri, at p. 1170.)
“When a trial court’s order denying arbitration is based on the finding that the
appellant failed to carry its burden of proof, the question on appeal is whether that finding
is erroneous as a matter of law.” (Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1195–1196.)
“ ‘Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”
(Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978–979; see Jones, at
p. 1196.) However, if “ ‘the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial court’s denial
of arbitration de novo.’ ” (Pinnacle Museum, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Mar v. Perkins
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 201, 211 (Mar).)
C. Analysis
1. Applicable Standard of Review
Initially, the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review, either
de novo or erroneous as a matter of law. The record indicates that the trial court sua
sponte held that no agreement to arbitrate existed. There was no testimony taken on the
existence of an agreement, nor were there any conflicting declarations or other evidence
submitted regarding the existence of an agreement. Instead, the issue was decided based
only on an evaluation of the COL, the TOB, and the four appendices (collectively the
Contract). In other words, the issue was decided based entirely on undisputed evidence.
6.
For this reason, we conclude that the correct standard of review is de novo.1 (Pinnacle
Museum, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Mar, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)
2. Existence of an Agreement to Arbitrate
The basis of the trial court’s conclusion that no agreement to arbitrate existed is
the definitions employed by the Contract. The arbitration agreement in Paragraph 16.12
states that it is between “the Company” and “the Contractor.” “Contractor” is nowhere
defined in the Contract, but the COL and the TOB expressly define Rogers as
“Personnel.” Although we certainly see the appeal of focusing on these definitions, when
the Contract is viewed as a whole (Civ. Code, § 1641; Mitri, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1170), it is apparent that the term “Contractor” refers to Rogers.
First, the TOB is part of the Contract, and the purpose of the Contract was to
create and define the scope of an employment relationship between NES and Rogers.
The Contract has no signature blocks for any entities other than NES and Rogers. It is
unknown why a clause between “the Company” and “the Contractor” would be inserted
into an employment contract between Rogers and NES if the clause did not actually relate
to Rogers. To interpret the term “Contractor” as referring to someone other than Rogers
would not further the purpose of the Contract. In contrast, interpreting the term
“Contractor” in Paragraph 16.12 to refer to Rogers is perfectly consistent with an
employment relationship. It is common for employers and employees to agree to resolve
disputes through arbitration. (E.g. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237,
1241.) Therefore, NES’s interpretation is more consistent with the purpose of the
Contract. (Strong, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 918; Chevron, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at
p. 644; see also Civ. Code, § 1636 [“A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to
the mutual intention of the parties as it existed[.]”]; Flores, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 9.)
1 However, even if the standard of review is erroneous as a matter of law, the
result would not change.
7.
Second, and relatedly, Rogers’s interpretation of Paragraph 16.12 would impose a
duty on NES to resolve through arbitration certain disputes it may have with an
undisclosed third party but would impose no duties or obligations on Rogers. The point
of such a clause within the Contract would be completely unknown. Indeed, although
Rogers acknowledges that his interpretation would free him of any obligations under
Paragraph 16.12, he conspicuously does not explain what function Paragraph 16.12
would then serve within the Contract. In contrast, interpreting the term “Contractor” to
refer to Rogers would give Paragraph 16.12 meaning and purpose in that it would impose
a mutual obligation on NES and Rogers to resolve through arbitration certain disputes
that may arise between them. Interpretations that render a contractual provision
surplusage should generally be avoided. (Civ. Code, § 1641; Boghos v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, 503 (Boghos) [noting that
“constructions of contractual provisions that would render other provisions surplusage”
are disfavored]; Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 185 (Rice) [“An
interpretation that leaves part of a contract as surplusage is to be avoided.”].) Because it
would render Paragraph 16.12 entirely nugatory, Rogers’s argument is not persuasive.
(Civ. Code, § 1641; Boghos, at p. 503; Rice, at p. 185.)
Finally, the Contract uses the term “Contractor” in sections 5.2 and 6.2 of the TOB
and in appendix D. Generally, identical terms used in an agreement should be given the
same meaning throughout the agreement. (E.M.M.I. Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 465, 475; Mirpad, LLC v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1069; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 516, 525.) A review of these sections confirms that their use of
“Contractor” refers to Rogers, and Rogers himself does not contend otherwise.
Section 5.2 provides for the submission and payment of “Authorized Expense Claims,”
which are certain expenses authorized by the client to be paid to “the Personnel” directly
by “the Company.” The “Personnel” are to submit “Authorized Expense Claims” to NES
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on “the first Monday of every month (or such other time as the Company notifies the
Contractor in advance) so it can be verified and processed for payment.” Because
“Personnel” are to submit these claims for direct payment from NES, the term
“Contractor” would refer to Rogers. Similarly, section 6.2 is part of section 6, which is
entitled “PAYMENTS TO THE PERSONNEL.” Section 6.2 requires the “Company” to
“make payment to the Contractor by bank transfer and such bank transfer will be
processed in accordance with the Pay Schedule.” At other points throughout section 6,
the term “Personnel” is used. Nevertheless, the substance of section 6.2 clearly shows
that “Contractor” refers to Rogers. Finally, appendix D is the “CONTRACTOR
SAFETY, HEALTH, AND ENVIRONMENTAL (SHE) POLICY.” Appendix D states
that the “safety and health of our contractor workforce is of paramount importance.”
Appendix D then addresses responsibilities that NES has with respect to safety, health,
and environmental concerns, as well as “CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITIES.”
Several of appendix D’s responsibilities are noteworthy for purposes of this appeal. NES
is obligated to bring SHE arrangements to the attention “of both client and contractor,”
while “Contractors” are obligated to cooperate with NES and “the client to ensure
compliance with their SHE duties” and to report all “accidents and incidents” to “the
Client and [NES].” Even though the term “Personnel” is never used in appendix D, the
term “Contractor” as used in appendix D clearly refers to members of NES’s workforce,
including Rogers. Accordingly, because the term “Contractor” refers to Rogers in
sections 5.2, 6.2, and appendix D, the term “Contractor” as used in Paragraph 16.12
should be given the same meaning. (E.M.M.I., at p. 475; Mirpad, at p. 1069; People ex
rel. Lockyer, at p. 525.)
Rogers contends that interpreting “Contractor” in Paragraph 16.12 to refer to him
would be inconsistent with Paragraph 16.11 and render that paragraph surplusage. We
disagree and believe that Paragraph 16.11 and Paragraph 16.12 can be read together in
such a manner as to give effect to the personal jurisdiction and venue clause.
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Paragraph 16.11 has three clauses, one of which is relevant to Rogers’s argument.
Paragraph 16.11’s second clause is a personal jurisdiction and venue provision in which
NES and Rogers “submit[ted] to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [trial] courts of the
country in which [NES] is incorporated[.]” As explained below, Paragraph 16.12 is a
narrow arbitration clause. Therefore, the second clause of Paragraph 16.11 can be read as
establishing venue and personal jurisdiction in American courts for claims that fall
outside of the arbitration clause. Additionally, for claims or disputes that fall within the
scope of Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause, Paragraph 16.11 still has meaning and
purpose because it establishes venue and personal jurisdiction in American courts in
order for a party to compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. (Boghos, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 503.) For these reasons, defining the term “Contractor” as referring to
Rogers does not render Paragraph 16.11 surplusage.
In sum, based on the entirety of the Contract, we conclude that the term
“Contractor” as used in Paragraph 16.12 refers to Rogers. Because Rogers is the
“Contractor” of Paragraph 16.12, the trial court erred by concluding there was no
agreement to arbitrate.
II. Scope of Arbitration Agreement
A. Parties’ Arguments
NES argues that the trial court erred because the arbitration clause is broad, has no
limitations, and encompasses Rogers’s claims. However, even if the arbitration clause is
narrow, Rogers’s claims involve issues of contract interpretation and performance. NES
contends that to resolve Rogers’s claims, the Contract must be interpreted to see if it
complies with part of an overtime pay exemption under section 604. Because Rogers
cannot demonstrate that his claims are outside the scope of the arbitration agreement,
NES argues arbitration must be ordered.
Rogers argues that the trial court did not err. Rogers argues the scope of
Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause is narrow and applies only to disputes relating to the
10.
interpretation and performance of the Contract. Rogers argues that the claims alleged do
not arise under the Contract, rather, they arise under the Labor Code. Therefore, Rogers
argues that the court correctly determined that his claims were outside the scope of the
arbitration clause.
We agree with Rogers.
B. Legal Standard
“Once an agreement to arbitrate is established, the party opposing arbitration has
the burden to show the arbitration provision does not encompass the claims in the
complaint.” (Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 230, 241–
242; see Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.) Whether a particular dispute is subject
to arbitration substantially rests on whether an arbitration clause is considered broad or
narrow. (Ahern v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 675, 688
(Ahern); Rice, at p. 185.) Trial courts apply ordinary principles of contract interpretation
to establish the scope of an arbitration agreement. (Laymon v. J. Rockcliff, Inc. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 812, 819; Rice, at p. 185.) Courts are to give effect to the parties’
intentions by considering the ordinary meaning of the agreement’s language and the
circumstances under which the agreement was made. (Ahern, at p. 687; Laymon, at
p. 819; Rice, at p. 185.) Arbitration is a favored procedure under both federal and
California law. (Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown (2012) 565 U.S. 530, 533;
OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) As a result, arbitration should be ordered
unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. (Ahern, at p. 688; Victrola 89, LLC v.
Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) Thus, “ ‘any reasonable
doubt as to whether a claim falls within the arbitration clause is to be resolved in favor of
arbitration.’ ” (Victrola 89, at p. 356.) Nevertheless, for arbitration to be ordered, the
terms of the arbitration clause still must reasonably cover the dispute in question. (Ahern,
at p. 688; Rice, at p. 186; see also Victrola 89, at pp. 356–357.) When there is no factual
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dispute as to the language of an agreement or conflicting extrinsic evidence as to an
agreement’s terms, the scope of an arbitration provision is reviewed de novo on appeal.
(See Victrola 89, at p. 355; Laymon, at p. 819.)
C. Analysis
1. Scope of the Arbitration Clause
Recent California appellate cases have addressed the scope of different types of
arbitration clauses. Arbitration clauses that use language such as “any claims arising
from or related to this agreement” or “arising in connection with the agreement” are
considered to be broad clauses. (See Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 208,
220 (Vaughn); Ahern, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 689; Howard v. Goldbloom (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 659, 663, 667 (Howard); Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
1042, 1052 (Ramos); Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Arbitration clauses that
use language such as “arising from,” “arising out of,” or “arising under,” standing alone
and without additional language such as “relating to this agreement” or “in connection
with this agreement,” are considered to be narrow clauses. (See Vauhgn, at p. 221;
Ahern, at p. 689; Howard, at pp. 664, 667; Ramos, at p. 1052; Rice, at pp. 186–187.)
These narrow arbitration clauses “ ‘encompass only disputes relating to the interpretation
and performance of the agreement.’ ” (Ahern, at pp. 689–690; Rice, at p. 187; see
Vaughn, at p. 221; Howard, at p. 664; Ramos, at p. 1052.)
Here, the Paragraph 16.12 arbitration clause provides: “[S]uch disputes arising
under this agreement will be resolved exclusively through arbitration.” Unlike
Paragraph 16.11 which in part uses the phrase “in connection with [the Contract],”
Paragraph 16.12 includes no expansive language in addition to the phrase “arising
under.” Because Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause uses only the phrase “arising
under,” it is a narrow clause. (Vaughn, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 221; Ahern, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 689–690; Howard, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 664, 667; Ramos,
supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052; Rice, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186–187.) As a result, to
12.
be within the clause’s scope, Rogers’s claims must relate “ ‘to the interpretation and
performance of the agreement.’ ” (Ahern, at pp. 689–690; Rice, at pp. 186–187; see
Vaughn, at p. 221; Howard, at p. 664; Ramos, at p. 1052.)
NES contends that, under EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 1311, the Contract’s arbitration clause is actually broad. The arbitration
clause in EFund applied to “ ‘[a]ny dispute or other disagreement arising from or out of
[the agreement].’ ” (Id., at p. 1317; see also Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.)
Rice has classified EFund’s arbitration clause as being “unusually worded” and expressed
skepticism that EFund represented a change in California law. (Rice, at p. 190.) To the
extent that EFund did represent a change in the law, Rice held that the parties did not take
advantage of that change because they did not agree to an arbitration clause that was
worded as EFund’s clause. (Ibid.) In our case, the Contract’s arbitration clause also does
not use the same language as the “unusually worded” clause in EFund. Instead,
Paragraph 16.12 uses the phrase “arising under” alone. Because the Contract’s
arbitration clause does not use the wording of EFund, the analysis of Rice and its progeny
controls. (Id., at pp. 186–187, 190; see also Vaughn, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 221;
Ahern, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 689–690; Howard, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 664,
667; Ramos, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.)
NES also relies on Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
1186 and Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 677 to argue that Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause is broad. However,
in both of these cases, the arbitration clauses did not simply provide for arbitration of
disputes “arising under” an agreement. In Vianna, the arbitration clause provided: “ ‘[i]n
the event of any dispute of any kind whatsoever, regarding the meaning, interpretation or
enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement[.]’ ” (Vianna, at p. 1188.) In Coast
Plaza, the arbitration clause provided: “Any problem or dispute arising under this
agreement and/or concerning the terms of this Agreement … shall be arbitrated.” (Coast
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Plaza, at p. 681, fn. 2.) Because the clauses in Vianna and Coast Plaza do not simply use
the phrase “arising under,” the clauses are broader than, and insufficiently comparable to,
Paragraph 16.12. Accordingly, we conclude the analysis of Rice and its progeny
controls. (Rice, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186–188, 190; see also Vaughn, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 221; Ahern, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 689–690; Howard, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 664, 667; Ramos, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.)
In sum, Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause is a narrow clause. (Rice, supra,
248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186–187, 190.)
2. Rogers’s Claims
Rogers alleges only statutory claims, three violations of the Labor Code and
one violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The Labor Code claims are all
dependent on Rogers’s entitlement to overtime. The UCL claim is based on and
derivative of the Labor Code claims and will rise and fall with those claims. (See
Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185.) Thus, the UCL claim
also depends on Rogers’s entitlement to overtime. The parties dispute Rogers’s
entitlement to overtime because they disagree about whether Rogers is actually an
“exempt” employee under federal regulations. Based on the nature of Rogers’s claims
and the dispute between Rogers and NES, we conclude that Rogers’s claims are not
encompassed by the Paragraph 16.12 arbitration clause.
First, case law recognizes that the Labor Code imposes duties on employers that
“[are] not derived from any contractual obligation” and that “arise independently of the
terms of [a] plaintiff’s employment contract.” (Soltero v. Precise Distribution, Inc.
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 887, 896, fn. 5 (Soltero); see also Elijahjuan v. Superior Court
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 15, 21–23 (Elijahjuan).) Such independent obligations in the
Labor Code include: (1) paying overtime compensation, (2) providing accurate wage
statements, and (3) paying final wages within 72 hours of ending employment. (Soltero,
at p. 896, fn. 5 [citing Lab. Code, §§ 201, 202, 203, 226, subd. (a), and 1194, subd. (a)].)
14.
These independent obligations are the three Labor Code claims alleged in counts one
(failure to pay overtime), two (failure to provide an accurate wage statement), and three
(failure to timely provide final pay) of the Complaint.
Second, case law also recognizes that an agreement’s characterization of an
employee’s status or classification is not dispositive; rather, the key is whether the
employee meets the legal criteria for the classification at issue. (Elijahjuan, supra,
210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21, 23.) In this case, the parties dispute whether Rogers meets an
exemption through section 604. Rogers’s Complaint expressly alleges that he is actually
a nonexempt employee and separately alleges that he does not meet the requirements of
section 604, subdivision (b), while NES contends in its opening brief that Rogers is
exempt under section 604, subdivision (a). “If an employee is paid a predetermined or
guaranteed salary but receives additional compensation beyond that salary, the employer
must comply with [section 604] to avoid losing the exemption.” (Wilson v. Schlumberger
Technology Corp. (10th Cir. 2023) 80 F.4th 1170, 1174.) Specifically, an employer must
satisfy three tests: “(1) the ‘job duties’ test; (2) the ‘salary level’ test; and (3) the ‘salary
basis’ test.” (Gentry v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions, LLC (5th Cir. 2024) 102 F.4th 712,
718 (Gentry).) As relevant here, there are two ways to meet the “salary basis” test, either
through section 604, subdivision (a)2 or section 604, subdivision (b).3 (Gentry, at
2 Section 604, subdivision (a) permits an employer to provide an exempt employee
with “additional compensation” as long as “the employment arrangement also includes a
guarantee of at least the minimum weekly-required amount paid on a salary basis.”
(§ 604, subd. (a); Gentry, supra, 102 F.4th at p. 719.) Examples of “additional
compensation” are commissions on sales, a percentage of sales or profits, or “additional
compensation based on hours worked for work beyond the normal workweek.” (§ 604,
subd. (a); Gentry, at p. 719.)
3 Section 604, subdivision (b) provides that an “exempt employee’s earnings may
be computed on an hourly, a daily or a shift basis, without losing the exemption or
violating the salary basis requirement, if the employment arrangement also includes a
guarantee of at least the minimum weekly required amount paid on a salary basis
regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked, and a reasonable relationship
15.
pp. 718–719.) An employee’s status as exempt from overtime pay is an affirmative
defense of the employer. (Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc. (2d Cir. 2021) 995 F.3d 315,
322, fn. 6; Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 794–795; Furry v. East
Bay Publishing, LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1079.) Therefore, whether Rogers is
entitled to overtime ultimately depends on whether NES will be able to factually meet the
requirements of the “job duties” test, the “salary level” test, and the “salary basis” test
through either section 604, subdivision (a) or subdivision (b). (§ 604; Gentry, at
pp. 718−720; Whiteside, at p. 322, fn. 6; Ramirez, at pp. 794–795; Elijahjuan, at pp. 21,
23.) Rogers’s entitlement to overtime does not depend on how the Contract classifies
Rogers, nor does it depend on whether NES performed as required by the Contract.
(Elijahjuan, at pp. 21, 23.)
Finally, and relatedly, the Complaint seeks to enforce rights afforded to Rogers
under the Labor Code. There are no claims that are based on rights afforded to Rogers
under the terms of the Contract. (Elijahjuan, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21, 23.) To
be sure, it is highly likely that the Contract will be consulted and used as evidence to
prove or disprove various issues in this case, particularly exemption status in relation to
section 604. (Elijahjuan, at p. 21; see also Narayan v. EGL, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 616 F.3d
895, 899 (Narayan).) However, whether Rogers is entitled to receive overtime or is
exempt from the overtime laws pursuant to section 604 does not depend on the meaning
of a particular contractual term, nor does it depend on how the Contract requires the
exists between the guaranteed amount and the amount actually earned.” (§ 604,
subd. (b).) The exemption under section 604, subdivision (b) applies “only if: (1) [the
employee] also receive a ‘minimum weekly required amount paid on a salary basis,’ and
(2) there is a reasonable relationship between the weekly guaranteed salary and the
employee’s actual earnings.” (Gentry, supra, 102 F.4th at p. 720; see also Helix Energy
Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt (2023) 598 U.S. 39, 47.) “The reasonable relationship
test will be met if the weekly guarantee is roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual
earnings at the assigned hourly, daily or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled
workweek.” (§ 604, subd. (b); see also Helix Energy, at p. 47.)
16.
parties to perform their contractual obligations to each other. Instead, the exemption and
entitlement to overtime depend on evaluating Rogers’s circumstances and the
requirements and obligations of Labor Code section 510, Industrial Welfare Commission
wage orders, and section 604, each of which are independent of the Contract. (See
Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 896, fn. 5; Elijahjuan, at pp. 21, 23.)
NES argues that the Complaint’s allegations show that Rogers’s claims are based
on contract performance because he alleges that NES “breached” the $1,425 weekly
retainer obligation. We disagree. NES cites the following two paragraphs/allegations
from the Complaint in support of its argument that a “breach of contract” is alleged:
“NES does not pay its Straight Time Employees a guaranteed salary that is not subject to
deduction based on the quality or quantity of work. [¶] If the Straight Time Employee
worked fewer than 40 hours, NES only pays them for the hours they actually worked.”
However, the Complaint alleges immediately before these paragraphs that “NES never
paid the Straight Time Employees on a ‘salary basis.’ ” Also, immediately after these
allegations, the Complaint alleges that to the extent “Straight Time Employees” are paid a
weekly salary, the salary does not meet the “ ‘reasonable relationship’ ” test of
section 604, subdivision (b). After providing an example in support of the assertion that
the salary does not meet the “ ‘reasonable relationship’ ” test, the Complaint concludes
that, “[i]n sum, Rogers and the Straight Time Employees are non-exempt employees and,
therefore, entitled to premium overtime wages.”
Accordingly, in context, it is apparent Rogers is alleging that section 604’s
requirements, and in particular section 604, subdivision (b), cannot be met, (cf. Gentry,
supra, 102 F.4th at pp. 718–720); he is not alleging a breach of contract. This conclusion
is confirmed by the fact that NES’s cited paragraphs do not use the term “breach,” the
Complaint does not allege a claim for breach of contract, and the term “breach” or
“breached” appears nowhere in the Complaint. Further, as explained above, Rogers’s
entitlement to overtime does not depend on whether NES adhered to the Contract; it
17.
depends on whether the legal criteria established in the Labor Code, wage orders, and
federal regulations are met. Because Rogers is not alleging a breach of contract claim, he
is not creating a dispute over the performance of the contract or pursuing claims that arise
under the Contract.
NES also appears to argue that, because it contends two contractual provisions4
mean that section 604, subdivision (a) applies to the employment relationship, but Rogers
contends that those provisions mean that section 604, subdivision (b) applies (but whose
requirements cannot be met), the Contract will have to be interpreted. We disagree with
NES. The Complaint does not identify an ambiguous term within the Contract, nor does
the Complaint allege that the parties have conflicting interpretations of a contractual term
which would determine Rogers’s entitlement to overtime pay or Rogers’s status as a
nonexempt employee. The Complaint also does not identify conflicting interpretations of
the Contract about how Rogers is to be paid or what amounts Rogers is to be paid.
Moreover, the Complaint does not allege that the language of the Contract must be
interpreted to mean that only section 604, subdivision (b) could possibly have application
to Rogers. Instead, the Complaint simply alleges that, despite NES’s possible
contentions to the contrary, the payments Rogers receives from NES do not meet any
exemption, but particularly do not meet aspects of the section 604, subdivision (b) test.
The dispute between the parties is not over the meaning of contractual provisions or
whether the Contract means one exemption is mandated to the exclusion of another; the
dispute is over whether Rogers is exempt from overtime payments. Whether Rogers is an
exempt employee through section 604 does not depend on the interpretation of any terms
4 The two contractual provisions cited by NES are: (1) “In a work week in which
any time is worked, Personnel is entitled to a guaranteed weekly salary of USD
$1,425.00, which equals to 19 hours of work in a particular work week at the hourly
rate;” and (2) “In the event Personnel works more than [19 hours], Personnel will be paid
on an Hourly Rate of USD $75.00 for all additional hours worked.”
18.
in the Contract; it depends only on whether NES can factually show that the applicable
regulatory tests, including section 604’s “salary basis” test, are met. Despite its efforts,
NES’s arguments do not explain how the Contract will have to be interpreted to resolve
the parties’ dispute over overtime pay or exemption status. Again, while the Contract
will surely be used as evidence to support findings regarding section 604 and overtime,
that is not the same as alleging claims that require an interpretation of the Contract in
order to be resolved. (Elijahjuan, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 21; see also Narayan,
supra, 616 F.3d at p. 899.) Accordingly, because Rogers’s claims will not involve the
interpretation of the Contract, his statutory claims do not arise under the Contract.
In sum, because Rogers’s statutory claims all arise under the Labor Code and are
independent of the Contract, Rogers’s claims are outside of the scope of
Paragraph 16.12’s arbitration clause. As a result, the trial court correctly denied NES’s
motion to compel arbitration.
III. Class Action Waiver
The parties dispute the applicability of Paragraph 16.12’s class action waiver. The
plain language of Paragraph 16.12 shows that the class action waiver applies only to
“disputes required to be submitted to arbitration pursuant to [Paragraph 16.12’s
arbitration clause.]” We have determined that the trial court correctly found Rogers’s
statutory claims do not fall within the narrow scope of the arbitration clause. Therefore,
because Rogers’s statutory claims are not required to be arbitrated pursuant to Paragraph
16.12, the class action waiver also does not apply to Rogers’s statutory claims.
19.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Rogers is awarded his costs on appeal. This matter is
remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
20.
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