People v. Prado CA2/2

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Filed 5/8/25 P. v. Prado CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B337094

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA021216)
v.

JAMES PRADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas Rubinson, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Chung L.
Mar and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
____________________
James Prado appeals from the denial of his motion for a
hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin) to preserve evidence for a future youth offender parole
hearing under Penal Code1 section 3051, even though he is
ineligible for relief under that section because he was 20 years
old when he committed the crime and was sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He argues that the
statute’s denial of relief to young offenders sentenced to LWOP
violates equal protection and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
In the early morning of March 26, 1990, appellant
demanded money from Biviano Muñoz. When Muñoz refused,
appellant shot him in the leg, causing him to fall. After
searching his pockets, appellant shot Muñoz in the head, killing
him. Appellant was 20 years old at the time.
A jury convicted him of first degree murder (§ 187) and
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 667, 211), and found true
the special circumstance that he committed the murder in the
course of an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Appellant
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. His
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Prado, supra,
B085171.)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 These facts are drawn from the 1995 opinion affirming
appellant’s conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Prado (Oct. 3,
1995, B085171) [nonpub. opn.].)

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II. Procedural Background
In March 2023, appellant requested a Franklin hearing
based on People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, reversed by
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), in which the
Court of Appeal held that section 3051 violated equal protection
to the extent it treated young offenders (18 to 25 years old) who
were sentenced to LWOP differently from those sentenced to the
functional equivalent of an LWOP.
In March 2024, our Supreme Court in Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at page 864, reversed the appellate court, holding that
the Legislature had a rational basis for treating these youth
offenders differently. Based on this holding, the trial court
denied appellant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 3051
Section 3051 gives certain youth offenders the opportunity
for parole in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration,
depending on the length of sentence they are serving for their
“controlling offense.” (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)–(4); Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
In 2017, the Legislature amended section 3051 to allow
parole eligibility hearings for juveniles—but not young adult
offenders—sentenced to LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4); Stats. 2017,
ch. 684, § 1.5.) The purpose of this amendment was to bring
California into compliance with federal law articulating the
constitutional limits on sentencing young offenders. (Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) Mar. 21, 2017.) In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460
[132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller), the Supreme Court held mandatory
LWOP sentences for juveniles unconstitutional. In Montgomery

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v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 [136 S.Ct. 718] (Montgomery),
the Supreme Court made retroactive the prohibition on
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles. Montgomery provided
that “[a] State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather
than by resentencing them.” (Montgomery, at p. 212.) By
amending section 3051, the Legislature sought “to remedy the
now unconstitutional juvenile sentences of [LWOP],” without the
need for “a resentencing hearing, which is time-consuming,
expensive, and subject to extended appeals.” (Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394, supra, p. 3; People v.
Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346–347 (Morales).)
In Franklin, supra, our Supreme Court held that
defendants eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051 at some point in the future are entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to preserve youth-related mitigation
evidence. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284.) Thus, a
defendant is entitled to a Franklin hearing only if he is entitled
to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051.
II. Equal Protection
Appellant concedes his equal protection argument is
foreclosed by Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, and only asserts it
on appeal “to exhaust his state court remedies for federal review.”
We agree that Hardin squarely rejected appellant’s argument
that treating youth offenders with LWOP sentences differently
from those serving indeterminate life sentences violates equal
protection. (Hardin, at pp. 839, 852–853.)
Appellant also alludes to an equal protection argument that
Hardin did not address (although he includes it in the cruel
and/or unusual punishment section of his brief)—namely, that

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the Legislature acted irrationally in allowing juveniles sentenced
to LWOP to obtain relief under section 3051 while denying relief
to young adult offenders with LWOP sentences, even though
neuroscience has shown that the brain continues to develop until
the mid-20’s. The weight of Court of Appeal precedent has
rejected this argument, reasoning that our Legislature could
rationally treat offenders differently depending on whether they
were juveniles or adults. (E.g., People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 204; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456,
464; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196–197; People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 779; accord Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471
[“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes
of sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [125
S.Ct. 1183] [“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the
line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood”].) We
agree with these cases.
III. Cruel and/or Unusual Punishment3
Appellant does not argue that his LWOP sentence is
inherently cruel and/or unusual; rather, he argues that his
sentence became cruel and/or unusual once the Legislature
granted other similar defendants relief under section 3051. This
appears to be an equal protection argument dressed up in Eighth
Amendment clothing.

3 As the People point out, appellant forfeited this claim by
failing to raise it with the trial court. (People v. Nolasco (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 209, 217.) We nonetheless exercise our discretion to
address the challenge on its merits. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.)

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To the extent appellant is also making a more typical cruel
and/or unusual punishment argument, it also lacks merit. Both
the federal prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment”
contained in the Eighth Amendment and the state prohibition on
“cruel or unusual punishment” enshrined in our Constitution
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 17, italics added) bar sentences that are
“grossly disproportionate” to the crime or so disproportionate
“ ‘ “ ‘ “that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538
U.S. 11, 20 [123 S.Ct. 1179]; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th
672, 719.) Applying this principle, our Supreme Court held in
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429, that a death sentence
was not unconstitutionally disproportionate for a homicide
committed by 18- to 21-year olds. If a death sentence for young
adults in this age range is not disproportionate, then neither is a
sentence of LWOP for young adults in the same age. (Accord, In
re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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