CourtListener 10554681•Hagopian v. Maher CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 5/7/25 Hagopian v. Maher CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PAUL HAGOPIAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, G062639
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-01256155)
KATHLEEN C. MAHER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard Lee, Judge. Reversed.
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, R. Scott Brink, Dan P. Sedor,
Matthew D. Hinks, and Raef Cogan for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Berman North, Scott A. Berman, and Rebecca Wildman-Tobriner
for Defendant and Appellant.
* * *
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration. Defendant Kathleen C. Maher sought to enforce an arbitration
agreement signed by the parties during her employment with plaintiffs.
Maher contends defendants promised to pay her $1,000,000 upon the sale of
the company. Instead, when the individual plaintiffs sold the company, they
paid Maher a $100,000 bonus conditioned on her signing a broad release of
any liability. The trial court ruled this broad release constituted a waiver of
the arbitration agreement. Although the release is clearly relevant to the
merits of Maher’s claims, we disagree that it displaced the pre-existing
arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we will reverse the order denying the
motion to compel arbitration.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Paul Hagopian, Jonathan Peischl, Joshua McCasland,
and Kevin Stokes (collectively, the “Splice Members”) were the founding
members of Splice Agency, LLC (“Splice”). Splice was founded in April of
2016. Splice was a healthcare marketing agency located in Alameda County.
Although there is some dispute in the record regarding when
Maher was hired (Maher says sometime in 2016, plaintiffs alleged it was in
December of 2018), it is undisputed that Maher was given the title
“Managing Partner.” From a legal standpoint, this is a somewhat confusing
title since Splice was never a partnership, and Maher never held any
ownership interest in Splice. Maher was an employee. According to Maher,
her responsibilities included managing finances, handling matters relating to
human resources, insurance, loans, employee benefits, and payroll.
2
In carrying out her responsibilities, Maher, on behalf of Splice,
employed the services of TriNet Group, Inc. (TriNet) to handle the company’s
payroll and benefits. In order to receive payroll benefits through TriNet, all
employees and (according to Maher) members had to sign TriNet’s Terms and
Conditions Agreement (TriNet Agreement). Under the TriNet Agreement,
TriNet became a “co-employer” of each employee. That Agreement contained
a Dispute Resolution Protocol that contained an arbitration provision.
The arbitration provision provided, “Subject to the limitations in
subsection (b), this DRP [Dispute Resolution Protocol] covers any dispute
arising out of or relating to your co-employment with TriNet, including your
TriNet co-employer, and/or arising out of or relating to your employment with
your company, as well as any dispute with an employee, officer, or director of
TriNet or of a TriNet customer (all of whom, in addition to TriNet customers,
are intended to be beneficiaries of this DRP).” “This DRP will survive
termination of the employment relationship. With only the exceptions
described below, arbitration will replace going before a court for a
judge or jury trial . . . .” (Emphasis in original.) As relevant here,
subsection (b) contained the following carve out: “If at the time of a
covered dispute there is an agreement between you and your
company governing the resolution of the covered dispute, then to the
extent inconsistent with this DRP, that agreement will be controlling
as between you and your company (and its employees, officers, and
agents).” (Emphasis in original.)
In June 2021, the Splice Members sold their interests in Splice to
a third party, a company called Fingerpaint. Around that same time, Splice
paid a “transaction bonus” to all employees, conditioned on them signing a
3
Transaction Bonus Agreement. Maher was offered $100,000, signed the
agreement, and was paid the money.1
The Transaction Bonus Agreement contains the following broad
release of all claims: “In consideration for the Transaction Bonus, you hereby
agree to give up any rights or claims you may have to any compensation,
bonus, severance or other payment payable by the Company arising out of or
in connection with the consummation of the Transaction. In addition,
effective as of the closing of the Transaction and upon payment to you of the
Transaction Bonus, you hereby unconditionally and irrevocably waive,
release and forever discharge the Company and each of its . . . members . . .
from any and all liabilities, obligations, damages or other losses of any kind
or nature whatsoever, in each case whether absolute or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated, known or unknown, and you shall not seek to recover any
amounts in connection therewith or thereunder from the Releasees.” The
agreement then set forth a waiver of all unknown claims under Civil Code
section 1542. The agreement continued: “You understand that this is a full
and final release of all claims, demands, causes of action and Adverse
Consequences of any nature whatsoever, whether or not known, suspected or
claimed, that could have been asserted in any legal or equitable proceeding
1 There is some ambiguity in the record regarding Maher’s
signature. The Transaction Bonus Agreement was sent to Maher’s e-mail,
bears her initials, and bears a signature that appears to say K Maher.
However, DocuSign populated the “Print Name” field with the name of
Lauren Horton, who is apparently Maher’s daughter.~(CT 1039-1041)~ It
also populated the “amount” field with $2,000, notwithstanding that Maher
was actually paid $100,000. Despite these ambiguities, the trial court found
Maher had signed the agreement for $100,000~(CT 1399)~, and this finding
is supported by substantial evidence.
4
against the Releasees, including, but not limited to, any matter related to
your services to the Company through the date of this Agreement . . . .”
Maher’s signed agreement is dated June 21, 2021.
Afterward, Maher claimed that although she was never formally
made a member, she participated in the transaction discussions with the
Splice Members and was treated as an owner in those discussions, which
included the Splice Members verbally offering her $1,000,000 as part of the
transaction closing, which she agreed to. This agreement was allegedly
reaffirmed repeatedly. In the end, however, the plaintiffs reneged on the deal
and instead fired her from the company.
In response to Maher’s claims, plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit
seeking declaratory relief. They sought a judicial declaration that Maher was
never an equity holder and was not entitled to any share of the proceeds of
the sale of Splice.2
Shortly after, in May 2022, Maher filed a demand for arbitration
with JAMS against the Splice Members and Splice. Maher relied on the
arbitration provision found in the TriNet Agreement. Plaintiffs did not
respond to the demand for arbitration or participate in any way.
2 Plaintiffs also asserted causes of action for fraud, conversion,
and receipt of stolen property (Penal Code section 496). This was based on
Maher allegedly either destroying the Transaction Bonus Agreement she had
signed, or falsely telling plaintiffs she had signed it when she had not.
However, the record indicates that plaintiffs later found the agreement
Maher signed (which, per footnote 1, contains her daughter’s name). It is
unclear to us whether plaintiffs are still pursuing the additional causes of
action.
5
In the judicial action, Maher filed a motion to compel arbitration.
The court denied the motion. The court first addressed the
threshold issue of who decides the arbitrability of the dispute—the court or
the arbitrator? As we explain in greater detail below, Maher contends that a
reference to the JAMS rules of procedure in the TriNet Agreement requires
that the arbitrator decide arbitrability. The court disagreed and found that
the issue was for the court to decide. The court then found that the broad
releases found in the Transaction Bonus Agreement superseded the
arbitration provision in the TriNet Agreement. Maher appealed from the
order denying the motion to compel arbitration. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1294.)
DISCUSSION
Maher raises essentially two issues on appeal. First, she contends
that the issue of arbitrability was for an arbitrator to decide, not the court.
Second, she contends that, regardless of who decides arbitrability, plaintiffs
should have been compelled to arbitrate.
“‘There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is
based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
[Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Interpreting a written document to determine whether it is an enforceable
arbitration agreement is a question of law subject to de novo review when the
parties do not offer conflicting extrinsic evidence regarding the document’s
meaning.” (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 50, 60.)
6
I.
ARBITRABILITY WAS FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE
Maher’s first argument is that the court erred in deciding
whether her claims against plaintiffs are arbitrable; she contends that was
an issue for the arbitrator to decide.
As a general rule, parties can agree to arbitrate threshold issues
of arbitrability. “An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an
additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the . . .
court to enforce, and the [Federal Arbitration Act] operates on this additional
arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.” (Rent-A-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70.) However, the agreement must
furnish “‘clear and unmistakable’” evidence that the parties so intended.
(Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 69; see
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944 [“Courts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless
there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”]; see also
Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1286 [“there is a presumption
that they have not agreed to this.”].) This is because “the ‘who (primarily)
should decide arbitrability’ question . . . is rather arcane. A party often might
not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having arbitrators
decide the scope of their own powers. [Citations.] And, given the principle
that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has
agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why courts might
hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the ‘who should decide
arbitrability’ point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too
often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
7
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.” (First Options, at p.
945.)
Maher acknowledges, as she must, that the TriNet Agreement
does not explicitly state that an arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability.
Instead, she contends the TriNet Agreement obliquely addresses arbitrability
because in explaining how to initiate an arbitration, the agreement says,
“Arbitration begins by bringing a claim under the applicable employment
arbitration rules and procedures of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc. (‘JAMS’) or any other dispute resolution provider agreed to by
the parties, as then in effect and as modified by any superseding provisions in
this [Dispute Resolution Protocol].” The JAMS Employment Arbitration
Rules (JAMS Rules), Rule 11(b), provides, “Jurisdictional and arbitrability
disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence, validity,
interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought,
and who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and
ruled on by the Arbitrator. Unless the relevant law requires otherwise, the
Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues
as a preliminary matter.”
We conclude the trial court was correct in ruling that issues of
arbitrability were for the court to decide.
We disagree that the TriNet Agreement manifests a “clear and
unmistakable” intent by the parties to enforce any particular version of the
JAMS Rules. The Agreement itself does not address who resolves issues of
arbitrability. The issue is supposedly addressed by the JAMS Rules, but
those rules are not required by the contract, they are simply a default set of
rules to be used if the parties were unable to agree upon another arbitration
provider and its rules. The parties were free to choose a different arbitration
8
provider, in which case the JAMS Rules would not apply. And even if the
JAMS Rules were to apply, the version of the rules that applied would be the
version “as then in effect”—in other words, at the time of the signing of the
contract, it was not yet determined what the rules would be at the time of the
arbitration. Given these circumstances, we cannot view the mere default
choice of some future version of the JAMS Rules as a “clear and
unmistakable” manifestation of intent to reserve arbitrability issues for the
arbitrator.
We recognize that some courts have found the incorporation of
particular arbitration rules to constitute a “clear and unmistakable”
manifestation of intent.
In Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413, for
example, the arbitrator issued an award and the appellants had opposed a
petition to confirm the award. (Id. at p. 1435.) The parties there had
submitted the matter to arbitration and, during the arbitration, agreed that
the then-current JAMS Rules would apply. (Id. at p. 1426.) The appellant
argued the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by resolving an issue that
went beyond the pleadings in that case. The Court of Appeal held that was an
issue for the arbitrator to decide, relying on the identical JAMS Rule that we
discussed above. (Id. at p. 1440-1441.)
Greenspan is readily distinguishable from the present case
because, there, the parties submitted to arbitration and the JAMS Rules.
After the arbitration commenced, it was appropriate for the arbitrator to
decide the scope of the arbitration. Here, by contrast, the parties have not
submitted to arbitration.
9
In Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 1110 the court held that by incorporating AAA rules into a
contract, which specified that the “‘arbitrator shall have the power to rule on
his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement’” (Id. at p. 1123), the
parties had clearly and unmistakably conferred exclusive authority to the
arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability. However, the issue was not
analyzed in depth in that decision, which was largely focused on an unrelated
issue. For the reasons stated above, we simply disagree with that broad
assertion.
Instead, we are persuaded by the extensive and well-reasoned
analysis in Ajamian v. CantorCO2E, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 790
(Ajamian). There, an employee signed an arbitration provision that provided
for arbitration under the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc. or, at
one party’s sole discretion, AAA or any other dispute resolution service. (Id.
at p. 777.) The AAA rule applicable at the time stated, ‘“The arbitrator shall
have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections
with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.’”
(Id. at p. 788.) The court rejected the argument that this rule meant the
arbitrator had exclusive authority to determine questions of arbitrability.
After observing there was an extensive split of authority across the county on
this issue, it stated, “In our view, while the incorporation of AAA rules into
an agreement might be sufficient indication of the parties’ intent in other
contexts, we seriously question how it provides clear and unmistakable
evidence that an employer and an employee intended to submit the issue of
the unconscionability of the arbitration provision to the arbitrator, as
opposed to the court. There are many reasons for stating that the arbitration
10
will proceed by particular rules, and doing so does not indicate that the
parties’ motivation was to announce who would decide threshold issues of
enforceability.” (Id. at p. 790.) However, the Ajamian court declined to issue a
sweeping ruling on the broader question of whether incorporation of a set of
rules ever satisfies that standard because two aspects of the agreement
before it failed the standard: the fact that the arbitration agreement
contemplated multiple potential arbitration services, and the fact that the
AAA rule did not clearly state the arbitrator has exclusive authority to decide
issues of arbitrability. (Id. at pp. 790-791.) As the court explained, “the rule
merely states that the arbitrator shall have ‘the power’ to determine issues of
its own jurisdiction, including the existence, scope and validity of the
arbitration agreement. This tells the reader almost nothing, since a court also
has power to decide such issues, and nothing in the AAA rules states that the
AAA arbitrator, as opposed to the court, shall determine those threshold
issues, or has exclusive authority to do so, particularly if litigation has
already been commenced.” (Id. at p. 790.)
We share the Ajamian court’s broader concern about whether
simply incorporating a set of rules could ever constitute a clear and
unmistakable manifestation of intent regarding who decides issues of
arbitrability. But even if it could, the same flaws present in Ajamian are
present here, as explained above: it was not clear which arbitration rules
would apply to any given conflict, and the JAMS Rules do not clearly confer
exclusive authority to decide preliminary issues of arbitrability. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in determining the existence of any arbitration
agreement.
11
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ARBITRATION
Having determined that the court was acting within its authority
in deciding whether a valid arbitration agreement existed, we next address
its holding that the arbitration provisions in the TriNet Agreement were
waived by execution of the Transaction Bonus Agreement. We conclude the
court erred.
The TriNet Agreement provided that the Dispute Resolution
Protocol would survive the termination of the employment relationship, but it
carved out an exception as follows: “If at the time of a covered dispute
there is an agreement between you and your company governing the
resolution of the covered dispute, then to the extent inconsistent
with this DRP, that agreement will be controlling as between you
and your company (and its employees, officers, and agents).”
(Emphasis in original.)
As the trial court correctly pointed out, “to determine whether the
claims at issue are subject to the exception to arbitration, the Court must
determine (1) if at the time of the covered dispute there was an agreement
between Maher and Splice governing the resolution of the covered dispute,
and (2) whether such agreement is inconsistent with the DRP. If the answer
to both inquiries is yes, then such agreement, and not the DRP, is controlling
between Maher and Splice.”
The court then found that (1) was satisfied because the
Transaction Bonus Agreement “broadly released all claims against Splice and
the Splice Members related to Maher’s services to Splice,” and (2) was
satisfied because “the DRP mandates that covered disputes must be
arbitrated while the Transaction bonus Agreement has no arbitration
12
agreement and waived and released such claims, [and thus] the Transaction
Bonus Agreement is inconsistent with the DRP.”
We conclude the court erred on both counts.
On the first component of the arbitration exception—whether
there is an agreement “governing the resolution of the covered dispute”—the
court incorrectly interpreted this language as referring to the merits of the
dispute. Instead, the correct interpretation is that this refers to a dispute
resolution procedure governing the claim.
The context makes this clear. Under the TriNet Agreement,
TriNet became a “co-employer” with Splice of its employees. The Dispute
Resolution Protocol inured to the benefit of TriNet as well as Splice and its
members. What the exception to the Dispute Resolution Protocol does is allow
Splice, if it so desired, to set up a separate dispute resolution procedure that
would apply between Splice and its employees—but, importantly, not
between TriNet and the employees. This is clear from what comes next:
“then to the extent inconsistent with this DRP, that agreement will be
controlling as between you and your company . . . .” The DRP does not
address the merits of any claims. It is simply a set of procedures for resolving
disputes. It would not make any sense to postulate an inconsistency between
the DRP and another rule “governing” a dispute unless that other rule could
potentially be inconsistent with the DRP by setting forth an inconsistent
procedure. Accordingly, we interpret the language “governing the resolution”
of a dispute as referring to procedural rules.
This brings us to the second element of the exception to
arbitration—that the alternative agreement must be inconsistent with the
DRP. Here, the trial court’s finding is on shaky ground: it reasoned that the
Transaction Bonus Agreement’s silence as to the procedure for resolving
13
disputes was somehow inconsistent with the DRP. We see it precisely the
opposite: silence about the procedure for resolving disputes is wholly
consistent with the pre-existing dispute resolution procedures remaining in
place.
For the contractual exception to arbitration to trigger, both
elements had to be satisfied: a separate agreement governing resolution of
the claim, and an inconsistency between the separate agreement and the
DRP. Neither condition was satisfied here. Accordingly, the arbitration
provision governs the dispute.
Alternatively, Splice argues (apparently, for the first time on
appeal) that the broad nature of the release in the Transaction Bonus
Agreement displaces all obligations under the TriNet Agreement. In support
of that argument, Splice cites Gustafson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 361, 365 (Gustafson), where the court stated, “[A] valid
release signed by [a party] constitutes a waiver of the right to compel
arbitration.” However, that case arose in the context of a policy of uninsured
motorists insurance, which, pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2,
subdivision (f), “shall provide that the determination as to whether the
insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the
amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the
insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration.” Under this regime,
arbitration is only available if no settlement is reached, and thus it is natural
that if a settlement is reached, it forfeits the right to arbitration.
However, we are not aware of any authority that a broad release
of claims per se vitiates prior arbitration agreements where the release is
silent as to the form for dispute resolution. Here, according to Maher’s
allegations in her demand for arbitration, she continued working with Splice
14
for two months after she signed the Transaction Bonus Agreement,
presumably continuing to receive paychecks via the TriNet system. This is
consistent with the nature of the Transaction Bonus Agreement. Nothing
about the Transaction Bonus Agreement suggests that the parties are
terminating the employment relationship moving forward. Instead, the basic
gist of the agreement is that in exchange for $100,000, Maher agreed to
release Splice and its Members for liability for any claims accrued to that
point. Although we recognize that the Transaction Bonus Agreement released
all “obligations,” that term occurs in the context of a release of “all liabilities,
obligations, damages or other losses . . . .” In context, we interpret that to
refer to accrued financial claims, not a broader release of all legal obligations
whatsoever. It is arguable that this agreement dooms Maher’s claims on the
merits (that issue was not litigated below or on appeal), but nothing about
the agreement either explicitly or implicitly indicates the parties were
terminating or fundamentally reconstituting their pre-existing employment
rights and obligations. Accordingly, those rights and obligations remained in
force, including the obligation to arbitrate, which, by the terms of the TriNet
Agreement, survived the termination of the employment relationship.
Because the TriNet Agreement survived and the arbitration
provision was consistent with the Transaction Bonus Agreement, the court
should have enforced the arbitration provision. In not doing so, the court
erred.
15
DISPOSITION
The court’s order denying Maher’s motion to compel arbitration is
reversed. Maher shall recover her costs incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
16
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.