CourtListener 10519098•People v. Negrete CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 5/5/25 P. v. Negrete CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334887
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA039526)
v.
SALVADOR NICOLA
NEGRETE, IV,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, defendant Salvador Nicola Negrete, IV, was
convicted of second-degree murder and attempted voluntary
manslaughter for crimes that he committed when he was 20
years old. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to
life in prison. In 2023, defendant filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A) (section 1170(d)(1)(A)), which permits juvenile offenders
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) to
petition for recall and resentencing under certain circumstances.
The trial court summarily denied the petition on the grounds that
defendant had not been sentenced to LWOP and was thus
ineligible for resentencing. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
On February 25, 1999, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney charged defendant in a second amended information
with the murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) of Johnny Gutierrez,
and the attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a),
count 2) of Marcus Gutierrez.
On March 29, 1999, a jury found defendant guilty of second
degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664,
192, subd. (a)). The jury found true allegations that defendant
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53,
subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally and intentionally
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury or death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). For count 2, the jury also found true an
allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury
upon Marcus Gutierrez. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 50 years to life.
On June 30, 2023, defendant filed a motion for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1170(d)(1)(A) and People v.
Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). He conceded that he
was not under the age of 18 when he committed his crimes but
argued that he was nonetheless a “youth offender” because his
“youth and immaturity” were “further exorbitant [sic] due to [his]
early drug abuse, starting at adolescence, stunting [his]
emotional, physical and psychological growth . . . [c]ausing all the
hallmarks of youth to be prolonged.” In support of his petition,
defendant submitted evidence of achievement in educational
pursuits that does not suggest an intellectual disability including
his GED certificate, a certificate of career readiness from Baylor
University, an Associate in Arts degree in Social and Behavioral
Sciences, and Associate in Science degree in General Business
from Coastline Community College. He also submitted copies of
letters that he had sent to the families of his victims and the
community of La Puente, where the crimes occurred.
On August 25, 2023, the trial court summarily denied the
petition, stating that “defendant was not sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole or its
functional equivalent pursuant to [Heard, supra,] [83]
Cal.App.5th 608. The defendant was sentenced on July 28,
1999[,] to 40 years to life with the possibility of parole.[2] In
addition, the defendant was eligible for parole and had his first
2 As noted, defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life.
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parole hearing on December 15, 2022[,] and was denied parole for
3 years. His next parole suitability hearing is set in December
2025.” (Emphasis omitted.) Defendant timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s denial of a petition for recall and
resentencing of abuse of discretion. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 858, 863–864.) A court abuses its discretion when it
bases its decision on an incorrect legal standard. (People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) Whether a defendant is
eligible to petition for a recall and resentencing under section
1170(d)(1)(A) is a question of statutory interpretation that we
review de novo. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides: “When a defendant who
was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for
at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing
court a petition for recall and resentencing.” Although section
1170(d)(1)(A) thus applies, by its own terms, to those juvenile
offenders sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole,” the Attorney General does not dispute that
under Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, “juveniles sentenced to
the functional equivalent of life without parole” are “eligible to
petition for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).”
(Id. at p. 633.) The Attorney General also does not dispute that
defendant’s 50 year to life sentence is the functional equivalent of
LWOP. Thus, the Attorney General impliedly concedes that the
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court misapprehended the law when it denied defendant’s
petition.
The Attorney General nonetheless urges us to affirm the
trial court’s ruling on a ground the court did not consider,
namely, that notwithstanding defendant’s contention on appeal
that his intellectual disability rendered him the functional
equivalent of a juvenile, defendant was an adult at the time he
committed his offenses and therefore was not entitled to relief in
any event. He also contends that defendant forfeited his
argument on appeal by failing to raise it below and that it fails on
the merits.
Because the trial court made no findings regarding
defendant’s intellectual abilities at the time of his offense, the
record on this issue is undeveloped. Defendant cites to a 1999
psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Ronald Fairbanks, in
connection with a hearing to determine whether defendant was
competent to stand trial. That report reflects that defendant had
a verbal IQ score of 63 and a performance IQ of 62. It was “the
examiner’s diagnostic impression that this young man is mildly
retarded with intellectually and adaptively [sic].” The record
includes reference to another psychological report, prepared by
Dr. Kaushal Sharma, which is not included in the record on
appeal. Following the court’s review of the two reports, the court
declared that defendant was competent to stand trial within the
meaning of section 1368. (See § 1367, subd. (a) [“A defendant is
mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of a mental health
disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to
understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner”].)
5
Because the parties agree that the trial court erred when it
concluded that defendant had not been sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP, we conclude that the best course
here is to reverse the court’s summary denial and remand for
further proceedings where the parties can further develop the
record on defendant’s intellectual abilities at the time of his
offense. Moreover, the trial court should appoint counsel for
defendant, if he so requests. (See Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24
Cal.3d 22, 33.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s summary denial of defendant’s petition is
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the
court is ordered to appoint counsel to defendant, if defendant so
requests, and allow the filing of an amended petition that may
raise defendant’s contention, raised on appeal, that he suffered
from an intellectual disability such that he was the functional
equivalent of a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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