CourtListener 10407778•Nesbit v. Walgreen Co. CA2/2
Testo completo
Filed 4/29/25 Nesbit v. Walgreen Co. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ANDRE NESBIT, B338853
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 23STCV17983)
WALGREEN CO.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Andre Nesbit, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Leibl, Miretsky & Mosely, Loren Leibl, Michael Miretsky,
and J. Adam Laufer for Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
Andre Nesbit (Nesbit) appeals from an order declaring him
a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(2).)1
Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I. The Complaint
In August 2023, Nesbit sued Walgreen Co. (Walgreen) for
alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51
et seq.) (Unruh Act) and the relevant municipal equivalent (L.A.
Mun. Code, § 51.03).3 Nesbit alleged that he was discriminated
against by a cashier on the basis of his race, and, when he tried to
reenter the store, was battered and/or assaulted by a third-party
contractor working as a security guard (security guard).
II. Walgreen’s Motion to Declare Nesbit a Vexatious Litigant
On March 6, 2024, Walgreen filed a motion to declare
Nesbit a vexatious litigant. The motion identified 17 lawsuits
filed by Nesbit, in propria persona, between 2018 and 2023.
Walgreen argued that these lawsuits qualified Nesbit as a
vexatious litigant because at least nine of them had been
“adversely determined against him[.]” And in many of these
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2 The appellate record is missing several key items, including
the operative complaint. To the extent possible, we describe
omitted documents and exhibits as they are characterized
elsewhere in the record.
3 The operative first amended complaint (FAC) was filed in
October 2023. From the incomplete appellate record, it does not
appear that the allegations in the FAC differed materially from
the original complaint.
2
actions, Nesbit demonstrated a “tendency for meritless and
frivolous litigations[.]” One case was “dismissed . . . because it
. . . was frivolous or malicious.”4 Three other suits were filed
against a judge who had previously decided “a domestic case
which had unfavorable results to” Nesbit.5 Three others were
“dismissed for want of prosecution.”6
Additionally, Walgreen asked the trial court to order Nesbit
to provide a security to continue litigating, as he had no
reasonable probability of success on the merits. (§ 391.1.) In
support of its contention, Walgreen relied on (1) videos of the
alleged incident taken by Nesbit and the security guard and
(2) declarations from the security guard and Ruby Rivas-Flores
(Rivas-Flores), a Walgreen employee who intervened in Nesbit’s
confrontation with the cashier.7 Walgreen argued that this
4 Nesbit v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (C.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 2023,
No. 2:23-cv-01280).
5 Nesbit v. Prude (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2019,
No. 2018CH11206); Nesbit v. Bates (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County,
2020, No. 2020-L0005033); Nesbit v. Cook County (C.D. Cal.,
Jul. 6, 2021, No. 2:21-cv-05320).
6 Nesbit v. KBP Foods (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2018,
No. 2018-M6000121); Nesbit v. Richton Park Police Department
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2019, No. 2019-CH-03170); Nesbit v.
Progressive Insurance (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2018,
No. 20186000079).
7 Rivas-Flores’s declaration attested that she responded to a
cashier’s call for help following the initial confrontation with
Nesbit. Nesbit “complained that the cashier had been rude to
him” before voluntarily leaving the store. Rivas-Flores “later
spoke to the cashier . . . and determined from her that . . . Nesbit
was adding money to a ‘cash card.’ Per policy, [the cashier] asked
3
evidence established that defendant was neither denied service
nor discriminated against.
III. Nesbit’s Response
Nesbit filed a written response to the motion, arguing that
one of the nine lawsuits Walgreen identified was pending appeal
and thus had not yet been finally determined against him.8 As to
the remaining eight lawsuits, Nesbit accused Walgreen of
“compil[ing] a fraudulent record to support a flawed vexatious
litigant motion” by searching for “out-of-state cases in which
[Walgreen] has not proved anything other than [Nesbit’s] names
match[.]”
IV. Trial Court’s Orders
On May 28, 2024, after entertaining oral argument, the
trial court granted Walgreen’s motion to declare Nesbit a
vexatious litigant. The court found that Nesbit had commenced,
prosecuted, or maintained, in propria persona, at least five
litigations over the last seven years that were finally determined
adversely to him. The court noted that Nesbit “d[id] not deny
that” the cases Walgreen identified “were, in fact, brought by
him[.]”
[Nesbit] if he understood that once [he] added cash to the card,
the card could not be used to get cash. When . . . Nesbit did not
respond, she repeated the question two more times. He finally
confirmed his knowledge and the transaction was completed.
[The cashier] laid two $20[] bills on the counter . . . . It was then
that . . . Nesbit became loud, angry, and demanding.”
Neither the videos nor the security guard’s declaration
appear in the appellate record.
8 Nesbit v. FF Firearms (Super Ct. L.A. County, 2024,
No. 23STCV1949).
4
The trial court also found that Nesbit could not “show a
reasonable possibility of prevailing on the merits” of his
discrimination claims. Walgreen submitted evidence showing
that its cashier asked Nesbit a routine question, “as [she] was
required to ask of all such patrons[;]” when Nesbit did not
respond, the cashier repeated the inquiry. Moreover, Nesbit’s
“own video demonstrates that it was [he] who caused the contact”
with the security guard: Nesbit “walked forward and would have
walked into the security guard but for [the security guard]
putting up his hand.” “The videos show that [Nesbit] was out of
control, threatening, angry and making racist comments toward
the security guard[.]” And Nesbit did “not submit[] any evidence
to show a reasonable possibility of prevailing on the merits[.]” In
particular, although it was “undisputed that [the security guard]
is not a Walgreen . . . employee” and “works for an independent
third-party contractor[,]” “[t]here is no evidence that would
impose liability against Walgreen . . . for the actions of a non-
employee third party contractor.”
Based on these findings, the trial court “grant[ed]
[Walgreen]’s request to furnish a security of $25,000, and issue[d]
a prefiling order.”
V. Appeal
Nesbit timely appealed.
5
DISCUSSION9
I. Standard of Review
“The trial court exercises its discretion in determining
whether a person is a vexatious litigant. Review of the order is
accordingly limited and the Court of Appeal will uphold the
ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. Because the
trial court is best suited to receive evidence and hold hearings on
the question of a party’s vexatiousness, we presume the order
declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings
necessary to support the judgment. [Citations.]” (Golin v.
Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 636 (Golin).)
“Likewise, a court’s decision that a vexatious litigant does
not have a reasonable chance of success in the action is based on
an evaluative judgment in which the court weighs the evidence.
If there is any substantial evidence to support the court’s
determination, it will be upheld.” (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 636.)
The “conflicting evidence” and “conflicting inference” rules
are corollary to the substantial evidence rule and require the
appellate courts to view the record in the light most favorable to
the respondent and to resolve all evidentiary conflicts and
9 Nesbit’s appellate briefs fail to comply with multiple rules
of appellate practice; for example, he often fails to support factual
assertions with citations to the record (Wentworth v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 595–596),
and makes little effort to identify relevant standards of review
(Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947,
948). In the interest of thoroughness, we will address the merits
of his appeal. However, we disregard all arguments that are
unsupported by citation to legal authority. (Tanguilig v. Valdez
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520 (Tanguilig).)
6
indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s
order. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614; Nestle v.
City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925–926.)
II. Relevant Law
“The vexatious litigant statutes were created to curb
misuse of the court system by those acting in propria persona
who repeatedly file groundless lawsuits[.]” (Goodrich v. Sierra
Vista Regional Medical Center (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1260,
1265 (Goodrich).) One of these statutes authorizes “a defendant
[to] move the court . . . for an order requiring the plaintiff to
furnish security . . . . The motion . . . shall be based upon the
ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a
vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability
that they will prevail in the litigation.” (§ 391.1, subd. (a).) “At
the hearing upon the motion the court shall consider any
evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be
material to the ground of the motion.” (§ 391.2.)
Another vexatious litigant statute provides that “the court
may, on its own motion . . . enter a prefiling order which prohibits
a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of
this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the
presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the
litigation is proposed to be filed.” (§ 391.7, subd. (a).)
III. Analysis
The record amply supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant is a vexatious litigant. “[T]o be declared a vexatious
litigant, the plaintiff must come within one of the definitions in
section 391, subdivision (b).”10 (Goodrich, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th
10 Nesbit urges us to substitute various federal tests for
California’s statutory definition of vexatious litigant, but cites no
7
at p. 1265.) As relevant here, the statute defines a “‘[v]exatious
litigant’” as a person who, “[i]n the immediately preceding seven-
year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria
persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court
that have been . . . finally determined adversely to the
person[.]”11 (§ 391, subd. (b)(1), italics added.)
Not counting the one case pending appeal at the time of the
May 2024 vexatious litigant hearing, Walgreen proffered eight
civil actions that were maintained by Nesbit, in propria persona,
within the past seven years.12 These cases included three
matters targeting judges who had previously adjudicated matters
involving Nesbit. (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 634–635
[“‘“The purpose of the [vexatious litigant statutes] is to deal with
the problem created by the persistent and obsessive litigant who
has constantly pending a number of groundless actions, often
against the judges and other court officers who decide
authority allowing us to do so. (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 520.)
11 In this context, the term “‘[l]itigation’ means any civil
action or proceeding, commenced, maintained, or pending in any
state or federal court.” (§ 391, subd. (a).)
12 Nesbit v. Progressive Insurance (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County,
2018, No. 20186000079); Nesbit v. KBP Foods (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook
County, 2018, No. 2018-M6000121); Nesbit v. Richton Park Police
Department (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2019, No. 2019-CH-
03170); Nesbit v. Prude (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, 2019,
No. 2018-CH-11206); Nesbit v. Bates (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County,
2020, No. 2020-L0005033); Nesbit v. Cook County (C.D. Cal.,
Jul. 6, 2021, No. 2:21-cv-05320); Nesbit v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC
(C.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 2023, No. 2:23-cv-01280); Nesbit v. Speedway,
LLC (C.D. Cal., Mar. 23, 2023, No. 2:23-cv-00912).
8
. . . previous actions adversely to him.”’ [Citations.]”].) And,
contrary to Nesbit’s assertions, at the time of the hearing, all
eight cases were “finally determined adversely” to him. This is
more than enough to justify declaring Nesbit a vexatious litigant.
The record also supports the determination that there is no
reasonable probability that Nesbit could succeed on the merits of
his discrimination claims. Both his Unruh Act and municipal
causes of action required Nesbit to show that Walgreen denied
him service on the basis of his race. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 51,
subd. (b) [providing that no person shall be denied “full and equal
. . . services in all business establishments” regardless of their
race]; L.A. Mun. Code, § 51.03 [prohibiting discrimination in
commerce on the basis of actual or perceived race].)
Nesbit insists that Walgreen “presented no evidence” on
the probability of his success on the merits. He is wrong.
Walgreen proffered declaration testimony from Rivas-Flores, who
explained that, despite Nesbit’s confrontational and aggressive
behavior, a Walgreen cashier offered routine service and sold him
the cash card he requested; Nesbit then left the store voluntarily.
And Walgreen pointed to video evidence—including a video
filmed and sent to Walgreen by Nesbit himself—showing that
Nesbit later returned to the store and instigated an altercation
with a security guard who was not employed by Walgreen.
On this record, Nesbit could not prove his allegations that a
Walgreen cashier discriminatorily denied him service and a
third-party security guard assaulted him, or establish that
Walgreen should be liable for the latter incident. Yet Nesbit
submitted no competing evidence for the trial court to weigh
against Walgreen’s.
9
On appeal, Nesbit accuses Walgreen—and the trial court—
of “falsely claim[ing] that the [FAC] stated that [he] was suing
under the Unruh [A]ct” even though he actually “su[ed] under the
Tom Bane Act” and/or “the Doctrine of Negligence Per Se”.
Similarly, Nesbit insists that the court “falsely stated that it
received no evidence” from him when the FAC “ha[d] seven
different exhibits” that purportedly demonstrate his
discrimination claims. But because Nesbit failed to include a
copy of the FAC or its exhibits in the appellate record, we must
assume that the absent documents supported the trial court’s
findings. (Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 977
[the appellant bears the “burden of showing error by an adequate
record”]; Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412
[“We cannot presume error from an incomplete record”].)
In short, because substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings that Nesbit is a vexatious litigant and has no
probability of succeeding on the merits of his claim, we affirm the
order declaring him a vexatious litigant, requiring him to furnish
security, and entering a prefiling order.13
13 Because we resolve the appeal on this ground, the parties’
alternate arguments regarding whether this appeal should be
stayed by the trial court’s prefiling order are moot.
10
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Walgreen is entitled to costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
11
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