CourtListener 10407770•People v. Robillard CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 4/29/24 P. v. Robillard CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168085
v.
MICHAEL ROBILLARD, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 21-NF-006085-A)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Michael Robillard of eight offenses,
including second degree robbery. Robillard raises four arguments on appeal.
First, he contends his constitutional rights were violated when his attorney
conceded guilt on all charges except the robbery charge in opening and
closing arguments. Second, he argues the trial court erred in finding he was
competent to stand trial. Third, he argues that he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel. Finally, he contends the court abused its discretion in
ordering him restrained during trial. We reject his contentions and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2021, Oakland police officers were dispatched to a gas station
based on reports of a burglary. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers found
Robillard asleep in the backseat of a truck located in a garage. After officers
woke him up, Robillard climbed into the driver’s seat and started the vehicle,
ignoring commands from the officers to put his hands up. Robillard then
repeatedly drove into the garage door until it broke, and he drove away,
striking a police vehicle in the process.
Approximately a week later, after receiving a report of a stolen vehicle,
San Mateo police officers were dispatched to a shopping center. The officers
located the unoccupied truck parked near a store and placed a tire deflation
device on the vehicle “to help deter a pursuit.” A little later, the officers
observed Robillard enter the truck. After Robillard started driving, police
cars approached the vehicle with their lights and sirens on. Robillard sped
off, and the police pursued him.
After losing sight of Robillard, officers eventually located the truck
crashed into a tree. They found Robillard standing in a nearby pond.
Robillard was in the water for almost two hours before surrendering. Body
camera footage captured some of the pursuit and Robillard’s surrender.
Less than a week later, while Robillard was in custody and being
transported to a medical center, Robillard escaped the transport vehicle. He
was wearing a jail uniform and was secured with chains and wrist cuffs.
Around the time Robillard escaped custody, Alvaro Pirirboch was
parking his car. As Pirirboch got out of his car, Robillard approached him
from behind and yelled at him to hand over his car keys and his phone.
Pirirboch initially refused, but when Robillard grabbed him by his shirt and
made a “boxing gesture,” Pirirboch gave Robillard his keys and phone. After
Robillard tried, but was unable, to start Pirirboch’s car, he ran away.
An officer later spotted Robillard running through a parking lot. The
officer grabbed Robillard as he was scaling a fence, but Robillard kicked the
officer and climbed over the fence. The officer caught Robillard as he was
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climbing over a second fence. Body camera footage captured the pursuit.
Officers recovered Pirirboch’s phone near the first fence.
In an amended information filed March 2022, Robillard was charged
with seven felonies and one misdemeanor: second degree robbery (Pen.
Code,1 § 212.5, subd. (c); count 1); attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a),
664; count 2); fleeing a pursuing peace officer and driving against traffic
(Veh. Code, § 2800.4; count 3); fleeing a pursuing peace officer while driving
recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4); escape by force or violence
(§ 4532, subd. (b)(2); count 5); resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 6);
receiving stolen property (§ 496d, subd. (a); count 7); and misdemeanor
resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 8). The information alleged
as to the first seven counts that Robillard had suffered five prior serious or
violent felony convictions. (§§ 667, 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 12022.1.) The
information further alleged as to count seven that Robillard had suffered
three prior auto theft convictions. (§ 666.5.) Robillard waived a jury trial as
to the prior conviction allegations.
Before trial, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Robillard’s
competency. The trial court suspended proceedings, and three competency
reports were thereafter submitted to the court. Based on the reports, the
court found Robillard competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal
proceedings.
The jury found Robillard guilty as charged. The trial court found the
prior conviction allegations true and sentenced Robillard to 25 years to life
plus four years.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defense Counsel’s Concessions of Guilt
Robillard contends his constitutional rights were violated when, during
opening and closing arguments, his attorney conceded guilt on all charges
except for the robbery charge. The People respond that defense counsel never
explicitly conceded guilt, and even if he had, Robillard is not entitled to
reversal because he never objected to his counsel’s trial strategy. We agree
with the People that Robillard has not demonstrated reversible error.
In his opening statement, defense counsel stated that he probably
would not question many of the witnesses because “intentionality is the
defense here.” He emphasized that “Mr. Robillard’s intention was to escape.
He did not want to return to jail.” Counsel asked the jury to decide whether
this intent was “consistent with the intentionality necessary to commit a
robbery” but did not address any of the other charges.
In defense counsel’s closing statement, he again focused on the intent
element of the robbery charge. He did not dispute that Robillard took
property that did not belong to him against Pirirboch’s will. Defense counsel
argued instead that Robillard did not have the specific intent required to
commit a robbery because he took Pirirboch’s property as “a means of
escape.” “[Robillard] was going to do whatever he had to do, as the
prosecutor and I agree, to get away.” Defense counsel told the jury, “You
have effectively four incidents of Mr. Robillard escaping,” and he summarized
those incidents. He also said he “agree[d] with the prosecutor in terms of the
attempt[ed]” carjacking, stating that Robillard attempted to take Pirirboch’s
vehicle “to make good his escape.” Counsel declined to address the resisting
arrest charge because it was “part and parcel of the escape.”
4
In arguing that his trial counsel violated his constitutional right to
maintain his innocence, Robillard directs this court to McCoy v. Louisiana
(2018) 584 U.S. 414 [138 S.Ct. 1500, 200 L.Ed.2d 821] (McCoy) and Florida v.
Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175 [125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565] (Nixon).
McCoy held that an attorney must abide by his client’s expressed
objective of innocence, even if pursuing that defense is against the attorney’s
better judgment and experience. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 426.) The
defendant in McCoy was accused of murdering three individuals but
maintained his factual innocence of the crimes. (Id. at pp. 418–420.) Despite
this, defense counsel conceded at trial that the evidence would show that the
defendant killed the victims and argued instead that the defendant did not
commit first degree murder. (Id. at pp. 419–420 & fn. 1.) After objecting at
trial to his counsel’s concessions of guilt, the defendant argued unsuccessfully
in a new trial motion that his attorney’s concessions violated his
constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 419–420.) The state supreme court affirmed
the trial court’s decision. (Id. at p. 420.)
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in McCoy to
determine “whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede
guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection.” (McCoy,
supra, 584 U.S. at p. 420.) The court concluded counsel may not concede a
client’s guilt of charged crimes “over the client’s intransigent objection to that
admission.” (Id. at p. 426.)
In reaching this conclusion, the McCoy court distinguished the case
from Nixon, supra, 543 U.S. 175. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at pp. 415, 417–
418.) In Nixon, the defendant was charged with murder. Defense counsel
concluded the best strategy to obtain leniency in sentencing was to concede
guilt. (Nixon, at pp. 180–181.) Defense counsel explained the proposed
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strategy to Nixon, but Nixon was “generally unresponsive” and “never
verbally approved or protested” the strategy. (Id. at p. 181.) Defense counsel
then conceded guilt in his opening and closing statements. (Id. at pp. 182–
184.) The jury returned guilty verdicts and recommended the death penalty.
(Id. at p. 184.)
The McCoy court observed that defense counsel in Nixon “did not
negate Nixon’s autonomy by overriding Nixon’s desired defense objective,” for
Nixon never asserted any such objective. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 424.)
Nixon complained about the admission of his guilt only after trial, in
comparison to McCoy, who repeatedly voiced his objection to conceding guilt
throughout the proceedings. (Id. at p. 415.) McCoy therefore held, “If a client
declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide
the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best
interest. Presented with express statements of the client’s will to maintain
innocence, however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way.” (Id. at
p. 424.)
California courts have consistently held that McCoy applies only where
the record affirmatively shows that “defendant’s plain objective is to maintain
his innocence and pursue an acquittal.” (People v. Eddy (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 472, 482; see People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1056
[McCoy applies “only where defendant actively opposes counsel’s concession”];
People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1166 [“McCoy does not assist
defendant because the record here does not reflect a directive to counsel that
defendant’s objective at trial was to maintain innocence on all charges.”];
People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, 784 [“McCoy is . . . predicated on a
client’s express objection to defense counsel's concession strategy”].)
6
Robillard acknowledges there is nothing in the record showing his
disagreement with his counsel’s decision to concede guilt on some of the
charges. He contends, however, that the court should have held an in camera
hearing to assess his understanding of counsel’s strategy “in light of the
questions as to [his] competency.” We disagree for two reasons.
First, the trial court determined prior to defense counsel’s concessions
of guilt that Robillard was competent to stand trial. As we explain below,
substantial evidence supports this conclusion. Therefore, there is no reason
to consider Robillard’s competency a factor here.
Second, Robillard cites no authority to support his assertion that the
trial court was required to ascertain his agreement with his counsel’s trial
strategy. While an attorney has an obligation “to consult with the defendant
on important decisions” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688
[104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]), it is “not the trial court’s duty to inquire
whether the defendant agrees with his counsel’s decision to make a
concession, at least where . . . there is no explicit indication the defendant
disagrees with his attorney’s tactical approach to presenting the defense.”
(People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 30, overruled on another ground in People
v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17.) In this case, there is no evidence defense
counsel failed in his duties. As such, there is a “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389; see People v.
Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891, fn. 2 [appellate court will not
presume defense counsel failed to consult defendant about counsel’s trial
strategy].)
Robillard also attempts to distinguish Nixon by noting that the record
there “demonstrate[d] beyond doubt that [defense counsel] fulfilled his duty
7
of consultation by informing Nixon of counsel’s proposed strategy and its
potential benefits.” (Nixon, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 189.) Nothing in Nixon
suggests, however, that an attorney violates his client’s constitutional rights
where, as here, the record is silent as to whether the attorney informed his
client of counsel’s proposed trial strategy. To hold otherwise would require us
to presume error on appeal, which we cannot do. (See People v. Franks,
supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 891, fn. 2, citing People v. Farrara (1956)
46 Cal.2d 265, 268.)
Accordingly, because the record does not demonstrate Robillard’s
express disagreement with his counsel’s proposed trial strategy, McCoy does
not apply to defense counsel’s concessions of guilt. (See McCoy, supra,
584 U.S. at pp. 415, 425.)
B. Robillard’s Competence to Stand Trial
Robillard next argues that his conviction must be reversed because the
record shows he was incompetent to stand trial. We disagree that reversal is
required here.
1. Guiding Principles
“ ‘ “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or
convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” ’ ”
(People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230, 236; see People v. Marshall
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.) A conviction or sentence imposed upon a person at a
time when they are not mentally competent must be vacated. (People v.
Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 386.)
A defendant is mentally incompetent “if, as a result of a mental health
disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand
the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a
8
defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant is presumed
to be competent unless the trial of fact finds by “a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(3).)
The party claiming incompetence bears the burden of proof. (People v.
Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 387.)
2. Additional Background
At a preliminary hearing in July 2021, defense counsel declared a
doubt about Robillard’s competency. The trial court suspended criminal
proceedings and appointed two psychologists, Drs. Rami Mogannam and
David F. Berke, to evaluate Robillard. Because the psychologists’ reports
were transmitted to this court as part of a confidential clerk’s transcript, we
will limit our discussion of the information in the reports to that addressed in
the parties’ appellate briefs, which were filed without redactions or a sealing
request. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.47(c)(1), (2) [to maintain
confidentiality, a party may file a motion to file a document under seal];
People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 617, fn. 38, overruled on other
grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069 & fn. 13, and
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Verdin v. Superior Court
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1107, fn. 4.) We clarify or expand upon the facts
discussed by the parties where necessary “to adequately consider the issues
presented.” (In re M.T. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 322, 328–329.)
Dr. Mogannam’s August 18, 2021 report included results from a
psychological test called the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test
(M-FAST), which is designed to detect the feigning of psychological
symptoms. The report explained that a score above six on the test “suggests
an individual may be overtly feigning symptoms.” Robillard’s score was 12,
9
and the report stated that this “suggest[s] he may be feigning psychiatric
symptoms.”
Dr. Mogannam concluded that Robillard was competent to stand trial.
Although Robillard “did not demonstrate many competency related abilities,”
Dr. Mogannam attributed this to “a general lack of effort and overt feigning
of symptoms” based on Robillard’s score on the M-FAST and his refusal to
answer basic questions.
Dr. Berke’s September 2, 2021 report reached a different conclusion
regarding Robillard’s competency. Dr. Berke found that while Robillard
demonstrated a basic understanding of the trial process, he was “impaired by
his delusional thinking” and did not demonstrate “an ability to make rational
decisions in relationship to his criminal-legal case” or an ability to assist in
his defense.
Because the two reports from Drs. Mogannam and Berke were in
conflict, the trial court appointed a third psychologist, Dr. E. Robert Cassidy,
to evaluate Robillard. Dr. Cassidy submitted his report to the court on
December 1, 2021.
In Dr. Cassidy’s interview of Robillard, Robillard indicated that he had
previously experienced hallucinations of a man named “Malcolm,” but he
denied that he was currently experiencing any hallucinations. Robillard also
reported suffering a traumatic head injury in 2015.
Dr. Cassidy administered the Competency Assessment Instrument
(CAI), which he described as a tool that “has long been used to empirically
assess adjudicative competence.” The CAI appears to be a series of
competence-specific questions. Dr. Cassidy reported that Robillard
responded to the questions “without any claims or overt evidence of”
hallucinations or cognitive impairment. Rather, Robillard’s responses were
10
“invariably precise, often relatively sophisticated and in accordance with
known facts.” Dr. Cassidy therefore concluded that Robillard was able to
understand the nature and purpose of the legal proceedings and was able to
cooperate in a rational manner with his trial counsel.
The parties submitted on the expert reports. Based on the reports and
the arguments of counsel, the trial court found Robillard competent to stand
trial, and it reinstated criminal proceedings.2
3. Analysis
Robillard contends his constitutional rights were violated when he was
put on trial because substantial evidence that he was incompetent to stand
trial is “clearly present” in the record.
We review the trial court’s finding of competency for substantial
evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict.
(People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.) “ ‘Evidence is substantial if it
is reasonable, credible and of solid value.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[I]f the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier
of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of
the fact finder.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
Here, as summarized ante, the record shows that two of the three
doctors who evaluated Robillard concluded that he was competent to stand
trial. As noted, the trial court agreed that Robillard was mentally competent,
even though Robillard reported experiencing hallucinations.
2 Robillard notes that after trial and before sentencing, his trial counsel
declared a doubt as to his competency a second time. We need not discuss the
facts pertaining to the second competency proceeding because Robillard does
not claim that he was incompetent to be sentenced.
11
For at least three reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that Robillard was competent to stand trial. First,
Robillard received a high score on the M-FAST test administered by
Dr. Mogannam, which suggests Robillard was feigning his mental health
deficits. Second, the CAI test administered by Dr. Cassidy demonstrated that
Robillard adequately understood the nature and purpose of the criminal
proceedings and was able to assist in the preparation of his defense. Third,
two of the three psychologists’ observations of Robillard during their
interviews with him indicate that he was not currently suffering from
delusions, at least not to the extent that it was impacting his ability to stand
trial. Contrary to Robillard’s assertion, Dr. Cassidy’s report does not indicate
that Robillard was unable to maintain rational thought; rather, Dr. Cassidy
observed that Robillard was coherent and “easily engaged in focused
conversation,” and he saw no evidence of any symptoms of a serious mental
illness.
Robillard does not challenge the evidence supporting the trial court’s
competency finding as inherently improbable or incredible. (See People v.
Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728–729.) Thus, his contention that we
should reverse his conviction because there is substantial evidence to support
mental incompetence essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence differently
than the trial court. This is beyond our purview. (People v. Ghipriel (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 828, 832.) Indeed, “ ‘[i]t is of no consequence that the [trier of
fact] believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have
reached a contrary conclusion.’ ” (Ibid.) So long as any substantial evidence
exists to support the trial court’s finding of competency, we must affirm. (See
People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 31.) We will do so here.
12
Robillard asserts in a footnote that his trial attorney should have
sought an examination by a forensic neuropsychologist, though he does not
develop an argument that the failure to do so constitutes reversible error. We
will “not consider [any] loose and disparate argument[] that [is] not clearly
set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument.” (Dinslage v.
City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 377–378, fn. 3.)
We also disregard the arguments Robillard raises for the first time in his
reply brief regarding certain inferences that he believes should have been
drawn from the evidence. “For obvious reasons of fairness, points raised for
the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered.” (Rubinstein
v. Fakheri (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 797, 809.)
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Robillard argues that his trial counsel violated his right to effective
assistance of counsel by conceding guilt on most of his charges and by
submitting the question of Robillard’s competency after the trial court
received the third psychologist’s report. We disagree.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant
ordinarily must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for counsel’s errors and/or omissions,
the trial would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. (In re Visciotti
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 352.)
In this case, however, Robillard relies on a distinct line of authority to
argue that his trial counsel’s actions at trial require a presumption of
prejudice. Under United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 [104 S.Ct. 2039,
80 L.Ed.2d 657] (Cronic), if, “[a]s a result of counsel’s performance, the
prosecution’s case was not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing, . . .
there is a presumption that the result [of the trial] is unreliable and prejudice
13
need not be affirmatively shown.” (In re Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 351,
citing Cronic, at pp. 658–659.)
The application of Cronic is limited. (In re Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th
at p. 353; Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 658–660.) “Defendants have been
relieved of the obligation to show prejudice only where counsel was either
totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical
stage.” (In re Visciotti, at p. 353.) Where, as here, a claim of Cronic error is
based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, “the attorney’s
failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697, 696
[122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914].)
We cannot conclude that defense counsel completely failed to subject
the prosecutor’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. (See In re Avena
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727 [finding no Cronic error even though defense
counsel’s “representation was minimal at best”].) Rather, defense counsel’s
decision to acknowledge Robillard’s culpability in certain counts was likely a
tactical choice to refute the robbery charge, especially considering the strong
evidence (which included video footage) supporting his guilt on the other
charges. “When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others,
there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than
sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [124 S.Ct. 1,
157 L.Ed.2d 1]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing
the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly
rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of
guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the
permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the
weaknesses in the defense in closing argument.”].) Nor does defense
counsel’s submission on the psychologists’ reports constitute a complete
14
failure to test the prosecutor’s case, even when combined with his concessions
of guilt on some of the charges. Defense counsel was never “ ‘totally absent’ ”
or “ ‘prevented’ from assisting [Robillard] at trial.” (In re Avena, at p. 727.)
As such, we must abide by the usual legal standards governing a
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 684–689.) But because Robillard has not
addressed the elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will
not consider any such claim. (See People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
442, 467 [deeming insufficient an argument that “merely presumes counsel’s
failure to object” was unreasonable and prejudicial].) We therefore reject
Robillard’s argument that his trial attorney violated his right to effective
assistance of counsel.
D. The Use of Restraints During Trial
Finally, Robillard contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered the use of restraints without finding that he posed a threat of
violence or had a “present intent” to escape custody. We agree with the
People that Robillard fails to show prejudice.
For trial, Robillard was placed in a “weighted chair,” his hands were
shackled, and he was in leg chains. On the second day of trial, outside the
presence of the jury, defense counsel requested that Robillard’s right hand be
unshackled so that he could take notes. He informed the court that when a
deputy removed the shackles from Robillard’s right wrist earlier that
morning, when the jury was not present, the deputy placed a “cuff” onto the
arm of the weighted chair where it was “clearly visible.” Robillard also “had
concerns about being able to rise when the jury enters” and leaves. Defense
counsel noted that the trial court was required to make certain findings
before ordering a defendant restrained, and he stated that he had not “made
15
any kind of record” previously because “there aren’t any shackles that are
visible to the jurors.”
The trial court responded, “[Robillard] is able to rise now.” The court
ordered Robillard’s right hand be released from shackles, and it directed the
placement of the cuff so that it was hidden under Robillard’s clothing. “But
everything else will remain on.” After deputies unshackled Robillard’s right
hand, defense counsel confirmed the restraints were not visible.
“ ‘[A] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind
in the courtroom while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a
manifest need for such restraints.’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301,
1321; see Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 629 [125 S.Ct. 2007, 161
L.Ed.2d 953] [“the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of
physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in
the exercise of discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to
a particular trial”], abrogated on other grounds in Fry v. Pliler (2007)
551 U.S. 112 [127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16].)
But even absent a showing of manifest need, the verdict will not be
reversed unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice. “ ‘[W]e have
consistently held that courtroom shackling, even if error, [is] harmless if
there is no evidence that the jury saw the restraints, or that the shackles
impaired or prejudiced the defendant’s right to testify or participate in his
defense.’ ” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1259; accord, People v.
Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 935.)
There is no evidence here that Robillard’s restraints were visible to the
jury at any time during the trial. At most, the record indicates that a cuff
placed on Robillard’s chair was briefly visible when the jury was not present.
Nor is there any suggestion the restraints impaired Robillard’s ability to
16
testify or participate in his defense. While defense counsel asked that
Robillard’s right hand be unshackled so that he could take notes, Robillard
does not claim the restraints actually impaired or prejudiced his ability to
participate in his defense.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
17
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A168085
People v. Robillard
18
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