CourtListener 10403259•People v. Hale CA3
Testo completo
Filed 4/29/25 P. v. Hale CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C100674
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CR001485)
JASON EZRA MONROE HALE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jason Ezra Monroe Hale pleaded guilty to injuring a spouse and
admitted a special allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury. Consistent with the
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate seven years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) reversal is required because the trial court did
not advise him of his presumptive ineligibility for probation when it accepted his guilty
plea, (2) his counsel was ineffective in failing to seek an opportunity for defendant to
withdraw his plea and in failing to notify the trial court of the details of the plea
agreement, and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected.1
We will affirm the judgment and direct that the abstract of judgment be corrected.
1 This case has been granted calendar preference.
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BACKGROUND
The background is taken from the preliminary hearing transcript. The victim told
a responding sheriff’s deputy that defendant had assaulted her over the course of several
hours. After an argument the victim went to sleep, but defendant woke her up.
Defendant touched her breasts and tried to force her legs apart, but the victim resisted
and told him no.
Defendant continued the assault and became more aggressive, putting the victim’s
neck in the crook of his arm. They fell off the bed and the victim lost consciousness.
When she regained consciousness, she went to the bathroom but defendant followed her.
He continued assaulting her in the bathroom and then on the bed. The victim suffered
bruising, hemorrhaging in her eyes, and traumatic brain injury.
An information alleged assault with intent to commit a felony (Pen. Code, § 220,
subd. (a)(1)2 – count I), with a special allegation that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); injuring a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a) – count II), with
a special allegation defendant inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); battery
with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) – count III); and misdemeanor sexual battery
(§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1) – count IV).
Defendant signed a written plea form in which he agreed to plead guilty to the
count II charge of injuring a spouse, and to admit the special allegation that he inflicted
great bodily injury, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a seven-year
maximum sentence. Two paragraphs were crossed out on the signed plea form. The first
crossed-out paragraph would have stated that defendant was not eligible for probation,
and the second would have stated that he would not be granted probation unless the trial
court found at the time of sentencing that this was an unusual case in which the interests
of justice would be served by granting probation. The striking of those paragraphs was
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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not discussed during the plea hearing or at sentencing. The remaining portion of that
section of the plea form stated: “I understand the maximum and minimum sentence for
the charges and allegations stated on page 1. No one has made any other promises to me
about what sentence the court may order.” Page one identified a sentencing range of five
to nine years in state prison, but the plea form indicated the parties were agreeing to an
open plea with a seven-year lid.
At his plea hearing, the trial court asked defendant: “Other than what’s on the plea
form or what we talked about in court, has anyone offered or promised you anything or
done anything to force you to enter the plea?” Defendant responded, “No, your honor.”
Nevertheless, the probation report stated that defendant was presumptively
ineligible for probation due to his plea to inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.
Probation recommended a prison sentence.
After receiving the probation report, defense counsel asked the trial court to send
the matter back to probation for reconsideration of defendant’s eligibility for probation.
The trial court granted the request. The trial court and the People did not make any
statement regarding defendant’s eligibility for probation.
In a supplemental filing, the probation department stated: “Pursuant to Penal
Code Section 1203(e)(3), probation shall not be granted to any person who willfully
inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of the crime of which he has
been convicted. [¶] . . . There are no unusual factors overcoming the presumption of
probation ineligibility.” The probation report added, however, that if the trial court was
inclined to find an unusual circumstance and to grant probation, the probation department
would alternatively recommend probation for four years with a suspended prison
sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did not claim the probation department
was wrong in asserting that defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation, and
counsel did not move to withdraw defendant’s plea. Defense counsel argued that the trial
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court should grant probation because, among other things, it was defendant’s first felony,
there were no broken bones, it was an isolated incident that arose from the stress of a
pending divorce, and defendant was employed. The trial court responded: “The Court
has read and reviewed all of the pleadings in this case and has considered those. The
Defendant is ineligible for probation pursuant to [section 1203, subdivision (e)(3)],
in other words, presumed state prison unless there’s an unusual -- unless there’s an
unusual case in which the interest of justice would be served. [¶] In Defendant’s favor,
he does not have any prior felonies. His prior misdemeanors were from 1995 and
1996 . . . . The Defendant’s conduct, however, was egregious. The Defendant strangled
the victim and attempted to sexually assault the victim. The Defendant lied to the police
in making his denials initially. He knocked the victim unconscious. The crime consisted
of basically two separate waves of violence towards the victim. In [regard] to the
strangulation, I believe that’s when the statement was made [by defendant] to probation
that it was blown out of proportion. In other words, [it] does show also a lack of
responsibility. The Court did not see the need for more shown. [¶] The victim was in
bed asleep initially when the Defendant assaulted her. The victim indicated she’s in
constant pain. The aggravated circumstances and other circumstances considered by the
Court was [sic] that the victim was vulnerable and was asleep in bed. I can’t think of any
more vulnerable position than that. The Defendant obviously took advantage of a
position of trust being in the victim’s bedroom, being in a relationship, a marital
relationship, was definitely a position of trust that he took advantage of. The victim
became unconscious during the assault. [¶] The Court believes the aggravating factors
outweigh those in mitigation based on the facts of the case[,] however the People and the
defense entered into a stipulation of a lid of seven years. In other words, the Defendant
could not be sentenced to anything greater than the midterm. The Court believes that in
this case, one, probation is not appropriate based on the nature of the offense, how this
offense took place, the factors that I listed, and the fact that it’s not an unusual case
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pursuant to 1203(e)(3). The Court finds the aggravating [and] mitigating factors weigh
against each other. [¶] We’ll sentence the Defendant to the midterm of three years for
Count II, 273.5, and the midterm of special allegation, which is plus four years, for a total
of seven years.”
Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends reversal is required because the trial court did not advise him
of his presumptive ineligibility for probation when it accepted his guilty plea.
In support of this contention, defendant relies on People v. Spears (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 79, 87 (Spears). There, during plea negotiations, the trial court indicated
to the defendants that there was a “good likelihood” they would be placed on probation
when sentenced. (Id. at p. 83.) There was real anticipation on the part of the defendants
and counsel that probation was likely. (Id. at p. 84.) However, the defendants pleaded to
charges that would make probation “statutorily disfavored and therefore less than
probable.” (Id. at p. 87.) The trial court ultimately denied probation and denied the
defendants’ motions to withdraw their pleas. (Id. at p. 84.)
On appeal, the court in Spears noted that the trial court had referenced probation
without giving defendants the slightest hint that there were statutory hurdles. (Spears,
supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 87.) Defendants had been permitted to believe probation was
likely. (Ibid.) Under those circumstances, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s
denial of the motions to withdraw the pleas. (Id. at pp. 87–88.)
But different circumstances and a different result occurred in People v. Vento
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 876 (Vento). During that plea hearing, the trial court indicated
that although it would not rule out the possibility of probation, it also would not rule out
the possibility of a state prison commitment. (Id. at p. 878.) The trial court ultimately
sentenced defendant to five years in state prison. (Id. at p. 877.) On appeal, the
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defendant argued the trial court’s expression of willingness to consider probation was
misleading because “in fact probation could only be granted in an unusual case where the
interests of justice would best be served.” (Id. at p. 878.)
The defendant in Vento, like the defendants in Spears, had not been told at the
time of the plea that probation was statutorily disfavored. (Vento, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d
at p. 879.) But unlike in Spears, the circumstances in Vento did not show real
anticipation that probation was likely. (Ibid.) The trial court in Vento merely declined to
rule out any of its sentencing options. (Ibid.) Further, the defendant did not move to
withdraw his plea, and the discussion at sentencing focused on whether the probation
officer’s conclusion that his was not an unusual case was correct. (Id. at p. 879.) “There
[was] no indication at the time of sentencing that [the defendant] was surprised by the
statutory limitation on probation or that he felt the plea bargain was being breached either
in letter or in spirit.” (Id. at pp. 879-880.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, the
appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that his plea had been improperly
induced, and it affirmed the judgment. (Id. at p. 880.)
Here, probation was statutorily disfavored because defendant admitted the great
bodily injury enhancement allegation. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(3).) But unlike in Spears, this
record does not demonstrate that defendant was misled into believing probation was
likely or that the parties had “real anticipation” that probation was likely. At the plea
colloquy, there was no verbal mention of probation. Although the plea form had
probation ineligibility language crossed out, that merely left sentencing options open, like
in Vento. It did not create a likelihood of probation. Defendant agreed to a seven-year
lid and he affirmatively represented on the record that he had received no promises other
than what was in the plea agreement and what was discussed at the plea hearing.
At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel asked that the matter be referred back to
the probation department because counsel believed this was an unusual case. But the trial
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court did not indicate any agreement with defense counsel’s belief, and neither did the
People.
During sentencing, defense counsel did not assert that the probation department
was wrong about presumptive ineligibility, that defendant had been surprised or misled,
or that defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Rather, counsel argued
the circumstances were unusual and the trial court should order probation. The trial court
declined to do so and explained its reasoning.
The record does not show that defendant was misled, or misunderstood, the
potential for probation. Like in Vento, the fact he was not advised of his presumptive
ineligibility for probation at the plea hearing did not result in reversible error.
II
Defendant next contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to seek an
opportunity for defendant to withdraw his plea and in failing to notify the trial court that
certain paragraphs in the plea agreement had been crossed out.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.) Defendant has not made such a
showing.
As we have explained, the record indicates that no representations or promises had
been made to defendant regarding a likelihood of probation. Although two paragraphs
regarding probation ineligibility had been crossed out on the plea form, that merely left
sentencing options open. Defendant agreed to a seven-year lid and indicated that he had
received no other promises. Notwithstanding the clear statutory provisions making
defendant presumptively ineligible for probation, defense counsel nevertheless continued
to forcefully advocate for defendant, urging that the matter be referred back to the
probation department for a second probation report so that defense counsel could
continue to argue that a probation grant for defendant was in the interests of justice.
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On this record, defendant has not established that his counsel was deficient.
(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel is not ineffective in declining to take
futile actions].)
III
In addition, defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected, and
the People agree. Defendant admitted the special allegation that he personally inflicted
great bodily injury under section 12022.7, subdivision (e). But the abstract of judgment
references section 12022.7, subdivision (a). We will direct the trial court to correct this
clerical error in the abstract of judgment. (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract
of judgment to reflect that defendant admitted an enhancement allegation under
section 12022.7, subdivision (e), and to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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