CourtListener 10387482•People v. Sanchez CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 4/28/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B332655
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA102162
v.
JOHN MICHAEL SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
After a hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court
resentenced John Sanchez. The trial court then denied Sanchez a
hearing pursuant to section 1172.1 about seven months later. We
affirm and remand for the trial court to correct Sanchez’s custody
credits. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
On May 29, 2013, Sanchez pleaded no contest to driving
under the influence of alcohol. He had been driving about 130
miles per hour with a blood alcohol content of 0.13 percent. The
court placed him on probation and ordered him to surrender
himself for a 60-day jail sentence on June 14. The court ordered
Sanchez not to drive and read him a Watson advisement, warning
him that continuing to drink and drive could lead to a murder
charge if he killed someone.
On June 7, a week before he was supposed to surrender,
Sanchez and his girlfriend, Rachel Nixon, went to a club in
Rancho Cucamonga and had several drinks. Sanchez was driving
them back at about 2:30 a.m. An earlier accident had caused
traffic, and the cars on Sanchez’s side of the highway were
stopped. Sanchez failed to stop and slammed into a car,
propelling the car into a wall. Sanchez hit two more cars before
his car hit the center divider wall.
Cassandra Bonilla was driving the first car Sanchez hit,
with four passengers. The impact threw passengers Joanna
Balderas and Alexandria Garcia out of the car. Balderas died
without regaining consciousness. Garcia’s leg was lacerated and
her ankle broken. The crash fractured Bonilla’s femur, dislocated
her hip, and caused her brain to bleed. Passenger Vincent
Canales suffered a subdural hemorrhage and damage to his
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short-term memory. The collision inflicted painful injuries upon
passenger Amaysa Alvarez.
Robert Estrado-Ramos drove the second car, with two
passengers. Marlene Jaramillo drove the third car, with two
passengers. Four of these people suffered trauma to their backs
and necks.
When police arrived, Sanchez claimed Nixon, who was still
trapped in the passenger seat, had been the driver. He also
insisted the officers call his father, a lieutenant in the Los
Angeles Police Department. At 5:30 a.m., Sanchez had a blood
alcohol content of 0.14 percent. Nixon had to be resuscitated at a
hospital and had multiple fractures and lacerations requiring
surgery and prolonged hospitalization.
Sanchez entered an open plea and pleaded no contest to
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under
the influence causing injury, driving with a blood alcohol content
of 0.08 percent or above, causing injury, and driving with a
suspended license for a prior driving under the influence
conviction. Sanchez admitted to three enhancements for causing
great bodily injury, four enhancements for causing bodily injury,
several prior convictions, one strike, and a serious felony
conviction.
The trial court sentenced Sanchez to a total of 30 years 4
months. The sentence was made up of 20 years for vehicular
manslaughter (10 years for the high term, doubled); 16 months
for driving under the influence causing injury (one-third of the
midterm doubled); three years for the three great bodily injury
enhancements (one-third of the three-year terms); five years for a
prior serious felony conviction; and one year for a prior prison
term.
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In March 2023, the trial court recalled Sanchez’s sentence
under section 1172.75 because changes in the law had made the
provision providing enhancements for a prior prison term no
longer valid in his case. Sanchez’s counsel and the prosecutor
both submitted briefing addressing additional changes in the law,
including those relating to section 1385. Sanchez identified four
enumerated mitigating factors he argued applied: 1) multiple
enhancements alleged in a single case; 2) the enhancement could
result in a sentence over 20 years; 3) the current offense is
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma; and 4) the
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years
old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (C), (E) & (H).) He submitted a
report of a forensic neuropsychological examination finding that
Sanchez exhibited characteristics consistent with “drug baby
syndrome,” which made him particularly susceptible to drug and
alcohol addiction. Sanchez submitted substantial documentation
relating to the mitigation factors, including his postconviction
behavior.
At the July 2023 hearing, Sanchez stated his remorse. Two
victims and several family members and friends of deceased
victim Balderas spoke of their loss and pain. The trial court
invited argument. The court then eliminated the now-invalid
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (b), but otherwise
maintained the same sentence, for a total sentence of 29 years 4
months. The court calculated Sanchez’s custody credit days as
3,750 days.
On December 28, 2023, the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation wrote to the court
recommending Sanchez’s sentence be recalled and reconsidered
under section 1172.1.
4
The trial court held an informal status conference in
February 2024. Sanchez’s counsel was present; Sanchez was
not. The court said it would not hold a second hearing, as this
would duplicate the one from seven months before. The only
possible difference would be Sanchez’s behavior in prison during
the last few months, the court said, and even a stellar
performance would not prompt the court to change its mind about
the sentence.
Sanchez argued section 1172.1 required the trial court to
hold a hearing. The court noted Sanchez’s objection and declined
to set a formal resentencing hearing. The court also corrected an
error in calculating the appropriate subordinate term for the
great bodily injury enhancements, reducing Sanchez’s total term
to 27 years 4 months.
II
Sanchez argues the trial court abused its discretion by
failing properly to weigh mitigating factors in section 1385. He
also argues the court erred by denying him a hearing. We
affirm.
A
Sanchez argues the trial court failed to follow the statutory
directive to give “great weight” to mitigating factors identified in
section 1385. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) The record does not support
this claim.
A resentencing court shall apply any changes in the law
that reduce sentences or provide judicial discretion. (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) Thus, the changes to section
1385 applied to Sanchez’s case once the court undertook to
resentence him. Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 requires courts
to “afford great weight” to evidence of certain mitigating
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circumstances, unless the court finds dismissing the
enhancement would “endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) The statute defines endangering public safety as “a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.) We
review courts’ resentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377–378.)
Sanchez and the prosecutor agree the trial court did not
find dismissing the enhancements would endanger public
safety. We need not determine whether the court’s statement—
that it could not make a finding that it was “convinced [Sanchez]
has learned his lesson, and once he’s released on parole, his life
will be much different than it was prior to these events in terms
of his behavior”—constitutes a finding that he would endanger
public safety. The court’s weighing of factors was appropriate
even without such a finding.
The court stated twice on the record during the hearing
that it had reviewed the materials submitted by both parties, as
well as the papers from the previous sentencing hearing. The
court acknowledged that Sanchez’s “performance while
incarcerated is exceptional” and his “stellar reputation in terms
of [his] compliance with their rules and regulations.”
The court then heard victim impact statements from two
passengers in the cars involved in the accident, as well as
Balderas’s brother, Balderas’s cousin, four of Balderas’s friends,
and the mother of one of Balderas’s friends, detailing how the
accident affected their lives and their ongoing trauma. Sanchez
expressed his remorse.
After these presentations, the court noted it “came into this
sentencing hearing this morning thinking that Mr. Sanchez
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deserves some type of leniency, some type of consideration for [his
excellent behavior in prison and taking responsibility by entering
an open plea]; but what I’ve heard this morning from surviving
family and certainly victims is this case went beyond the general
maxims of pain and suffering to, quite frankly, devastation and
destruction of their lives.” Despite the passage of 10 years, the
“pain, the tragic consequences of Mr. Sanchez’s act continues to
again devastate this family.” “How can Mr. Sanchez’s mitigating
factors outweigh what I continue to hear on behalf of Joanna
[Balderas] as well as the other individuals that were injured and
suffered some type of injury as a result [] of Mr. Sanchez’s
conduct?” The court noted “recent changes in the law, which,
again, require this court to focus on those mitigating factors and
to presume, quite frankly, mid-term sentencing rather than high
term sentencing and, of course, certain exceptions apply.” The
court went on to impose the high term, as it had previously.
Sanchez argues these statements show that the court
considered only the mitigating factors in determining the proper
term. Because the court did not repeat this analysis before
announcing judgment on the enhancements, Sanchez claims the
court did not apply the appropriate factors. This is incorrect.
The court’s statements reflect its considered judgment that
the aggravating factors, as articulated by the victims’ statements,
outweighed even the significant mitigating factors that originally
led the court to think leniency might be appropriate. (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028–1030 [although courts must
give great weight to mitigating factors, they can still decline to
dismiss an enhancement where it would not be in the furtherance
of justice].) A court need not repeat these comments before each
portion of its sentencing judgment. We assume trial courts know
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and follow the law absent evidence to the contrary. (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) This record is fully
consistent with this assumption.
B
Sanchez argues the trial court erred in denying him a
hearing after the Secretary recommended recalling and
resentencing him under section 1172.1. The prosecutor agrees,
but argues the error was harmless. The prosecutor is correct.
The error was harmless by any standard. (See People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18.)
Sanchez argues the denial of a hearing prejudiced him
because a different standard would have applied at a section
1172.1 hearing. This argument is unmeritorious.
Sanchez correctly points out that, where the Secretary
recommends recall and resentencing, there is a presumption in
favor of recalling and resentencing. That presumption is
satisfied, however, where the court recalls the defendant’s
sentence and provides an individualized opportunity for
resentencing. (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820
[“the presumption is intended to apply to the initial
determination of whether to grant a request to recall and
resentence, but that the sentence ultimately imposed by the court
is left to its discretion without any further application of the
presumption”].) The court gave Sanchez that consideration at the
July 2023 hearing. As the court noted, it knew of and exercised
its discretion regarding striking the enhancement the Secretary
identified at the previous hearing. The only potential changed
circumstance would be an additional seven months of good
behavior in prison, which the court stated would not, in its view,
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alter the appropriate sentence. The court’s failure to hold a
second resentencing hearing was harmless error.
C
The parties agree the trial court erred in calculating
Sanchez’s custody credits. We remand for the trial court to
recalculate Sanchez’s custody credits and amend the abstract of
judgment.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
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