CourtListener 10387480•People v. Tran CA3
Testo completo
Filed 4/28/25 P. v. Tran CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101305
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 98F03454)
v.
QUYEN TRAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Penal Code section 3051 gives the opportunity of parole to certain youth
offenders, including those sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for first degree murder.
But that opportunity does not extend to those sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for offenses such as first degree murder with a special circumstance.
In People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 (Briscoe), the First District held
that Penal Code section 3051 violated equal protection when it applied “in the narrow
factual context [t]here” to exclude the non-killer defendant sentenced for first degree
murder with robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. The Briscoe
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court observed that the defendant violated “the exact same standard of conduct” as those
convicted of first degree felony murder based on robbery and burglary. (Briscoe, at
p. 491.) Thus, it was irrational to provide parole opportunities to robbery-based or
burglary-based first degree felony murder offenders but not to robbery-murder or
burglary-murder special circumstance offenders such as the defendant. (Id. at p. 490.)
Defendant Quyen Tran was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole for first degree murder with a drive-by shooting special circumstance. Citing
Briscoe, he contends Penal Code section 3051 similarly violates equal protection as
applied to him.
We disagree. Unlike the offenses in Briscoe, a drive-by shooting special
circumstance requires the non-killer to possess the intent to kill, while first degree drive-
by shooting murder does not. It was therefore rational for the Legislature to determine
that offenders of a drive-by shooting special circumstance are more culpable and less
deserving of the opportunity of parole. The trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, 18-year-old defendant drove a car with gang members on board. Shots
fired from the car killed Southalay Ly Vongesedon. A witness testified she did not see
defendant fire shots.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a
drive-by shooting special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). It further found true various firearm and gang allegations
(§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b-(l), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
As relevant here, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for the special circumstance first degree murder.
In 2022, defendant filed a motion seeking an evidence preservation proceeding
under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.
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The trial court dismissed the motion after finding defendant ineligible for a Franklin
hearing in light of People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). Defendant timely
appeals.
DISCUSSION
Franklin allows a youth offender “to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating
factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future.”
(People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 118.) Therefore, defendant’s entitlement to a
Franklin hearing depends on his entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051.
Defendant contends section 3051 violates equal protection as applied to him. He
argues that a first degree drive-by shooting murder is “identical” to the drive-by shooting
special circumstance because both require the non-killer to either possess the intent to kill
or act with reckless indifference to human life. But section 3051 grants parole
opportunities to offenders of the former while excluding the latter. Citing Briscoe,
defendant asserts this differential treatment lacks rational basis. We disagree after a de
novo review of his claim. (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.)
A. Drive-by shooting
“[M]urder that is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death, is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (a).) Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) amended section 189 to add subdivision (e), which provides in pertinent part
that a non-killer in such a drive-by shooting is guilty of first degree murder if he either
(1) “with the intent to kill, aided, abetted . . . the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree” or (2) “was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2) & (3).)
A drive-by shooting special circumstance requires that “[t]he murder was
intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
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intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21).) This special circumstance is true as to a non-killer if he,
“with the intent to kill, aids, abets . . . any actor in the commission of murder in the first
degree.” (§ 190.2, subd. (c).) But the “reckless indifference to human life” standard
applies in a special circumstance only if the non-killer aids and abets in the commission
of certain felonies enumerated in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). (§ 190.2, subd. (d).)
Drive-by shooting is not one of them.
Therefore, first degree drive-by shooting murder and drive-by shooting special
circumstance have different mens rea requirements. Defendant is correct that a non-killer
may be guilty of first degree drive-by shooting murder by acting with either the intent to
kill or reckless indifference to human life; but he is mistaken as to the special
circumstance because a non-killer must possess the intent to kill to offend a drive-by
shooting special circumstance.
With this in mind, we consider whether a rational basis exists for providing
different parole opportunities to these two groups of non-killers.
B. Equal protection
“[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable
groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with
equal protection,” we inquire “whether the challenged difference in treatment is
adequately justified under the applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850-851.)
We review defendant’s challenge to section 3051 for rational basis because it does
not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th, at
p. 847.) Under this standard, “[w]e find a denial of equal protection only if there is no
rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government
purpose.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288-289.) “The underlying
rationale for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ “ ‘ever actually articulated’ ” ’
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by lawmakers, and it does not need to ‘ “ ‘be empirically sustained.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 289.)
We may engage in rational speculation as to the justifications for the legislative choice.
(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) “To mount a successful
rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “ ‘negate every conceivable basis’ ” ’ that might
support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Ibid.)
Section 3051 “grants different parole opportunities to youth offenders based on the
‘controlling offense’ for which they received the longest sentence.” (Briscoe, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.) Depending on the youth offender’s age which is not at issue
here, section 3051 provides parole opportunities to youth offenders sentenced to 25 years
to life in prison but excludes those sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(3) & (4).) Thus, a youth offender who committed first degree
drive-by shooting murder could be eligible for a parole hearing if he received a prison
term of 25 years to life (§§ 190, subd. (a), 3051, subd. (b)(3)); but a youth offender such
as defendant who committed first degree murder with a drive-by shooting special
circumstance is ineligible for a parole hearing because he could be sentenced to only
death or life in prison without the possibility of parole (§§ 190.2, subd. (c); see 3051,
subd. (b)(4)).
“[I]n designing section 3051, the Legislature consciously drew lines that altered
the parole component of offenders’ sentences based not only on the age of the offender
(and thus the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation) but also on the offense and
sentence imposed.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 855.) “While section 3051 is not, in
terms, a statute prescribing sentences for particular crimes, it does ‘set[] the consequences
of criminal offenses.’ [Citation.] It is reasonable to infer that in setting those
consequences through operation of the youth offender parole system, the Legislature
balanced multiple considerations, including both concerns about increasing opportunities
for release for young adults able to show growth and maturity and concerns about
calibrating the level of punishment appropriate for certain serious criminal offenses.”
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(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 857.) Therefore, a rational basis exists for denying a
parole hearing to an offender convicted of special circumstance murder because “there is
no violent crime or set of violent crimes considered more serious, or that trigger more
severe punishment, than special circumstance murder.” (Id., at p. 863.)
The same logic applies to first degree drive-by shooting murder and drive-by
shooting special circumstance. As discussed above, a non-killer in a special circumstance
drive-by shooting must possess the intent to kill, while a non-killer in a first degree drive-
by shooting murder may not. It is plausible that the Legislature decided the former is
more culpable and less deserving of the opportunity for parole.
It is true that some non-killers guilty of first degree drive-by shooting murder also
possess the intent to kill, making them arguably as culpable as the non-killer offenders of
the drive-by shooting special circumstance. (See § 189, subd. (e)(2).) But legislative
line-drawing “ ‘inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong
claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the
line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather
than judicial, consideration.’ ” (F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S.
307, 315-316.) “When conducting rational basis review . . . [a] plausible reason for
distinguishing between [two groups of individuals] need not exist in every scenario in
which the statutes might apply.” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 77-78.)
And Briscoe is distinguishable. It concerned “the narrow factual context”
involving first degree felony murder based on robbery and burglary and robbery-murder
and burglary-murder special circumstances. (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.)
Because robbery and burglary are among the enumerated felonies in section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17), a non-killer could offend the special circumstances if he acted with
either the intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life. (Briscoe, at p. 491.) In
other words, first degree felony murder based on burglary and robbery have the same
elements as robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance. The Briscoe
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court thus concluded that offering parole opportunities to youth offenders convicted of
the former but not the latter lacks rational basis. Briscoe shows that Hardin did “not
foreclose the possibility of other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special
circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more focused as-applied
inquiry.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 862.) But this is not the case here.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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