People v. Mora CA2/5

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Testo completo

Filed 4/28/25 P. v. Mora CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B330297

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA115880)
v.

RUBEN EDWARD MORA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Sentence
vacated and remanded with directions.
Adrian K. Panton, under the appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this appeal, we consider whether the unauthorized
sentence doctrine confers to a trial court jurisdiction to
resentence a defendant that it otherwise lacks. We conclude that
it does not.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In two separate incidents in July 2017, Ruben Edward
Mora robbed banks by convincing tellers that he was armed.
Mora did not harm anyone in the commission of the offenses.
In 2018, the jury found Mora guilty of two counts of second
degree robbery. (Pen. Code,1 § 211.) Judge Camacho, who
presided at trial, found true the allegations that, as to both
counts, Mora had been convicted of two prior burglaries (§ 459),
which were serious and/or violent felonies within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and within the meaning of the
Three Strikes law (§§ 667 (b)-(j) & 1170.12).
Mora moved, pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, to strike the two prior burglary convictions
for purposes of the Three Strikes law. Judge Camacho
considered the remoteness and the nature of the burglaries—in
which no one was harmed and all property was recovered—
against Mora’s ongoing criminal history. The judge denied
Mora’s Romero motion, but ran the two 25 years to life strike
sentences concurrently and exercised his discretion to strike the
two prior convictions for purposes of the five-year enhancements
alleged pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Judge
Camacho observed that the 25 years to life sentence was

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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“Draconian” but still “a just and fitting punishment for the
present conduct, also given the defendant’s prior criminal
history.”
Mora timely filed an appeal, but later abandoned the
appeal on the advice of counsel.
In 2022, Mora filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
superior court alleging that he had forfeited his appeal due to
counsel’s ineffective assistance. Mora did not challenge his
sentence in the petition. Mora attached to the habeas petition a
letter from counsel informing Mora that the trial court had
improperly imposed an unauthorized sentence that was highly
favorable to Mora. The letter explained that under the Three
Strikes law, the trial court was required to impose the two 25
years to life prison terms consecutively, for a total of 50 years to
life. The court had instead imposed the two 25 years to life
sentences concurrently. Counsel believed that if Mora pursued
his appeal the appellate court would correct his unauthorized
sentence and Mora’s prison term would be doubled. Because
counsel did not believe that any of the other issues Mora could
raise were likely to succeed, counsel urged Mora to abandon the
appeal.
The petition for habeas corpus was assigned to Judge
Juan C. Dominguez, who summarily denied the petition. Judge
Dominguez also set the matter for recall and resentencing to
correct the unauthorized sentence that defense counsel identified
in the letter. Mora opposed resentencing. He argued that,
having summarily denied his habeas petition, the court lacked
jurisdiction to resentence him.
In April 2023, Judge Dominguez held a resentencing
hearing at which counsel again argued the court lacked

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jurisdiction to resentence Mora. Alternatively, counsel requested
that the court transfer the matter to Judge Camacho for a full
resentencing.
Judge Dominguez found that the court had jurisdiction
because the 25 years to life sentence Judge Camacho had
imposed was unauthorized pursuant to section 1170.12,
subdivision (a)(7) and section 667, subdivision (a)(6). Those
Penal Code sections require the court to impose consecutive
sentences when a defendant’s current conviction is for more than
one felony and the crimes are not committed on the same
occasion and do not arise from the same set of operative facts.
Judge Dominguez stated that if, as here, a sentence is
unauthorized, the sentence must be vacated and a proper
sentence imposed whenever the mistake is brought to the
attention of the court. Mora brought the mistake to the attention
of the court by attaching counsel’s letter to his habeas petition, so
the court was bound to correct it.
Judge Dominguez also denied Mora’s request to transfer
the matter to Judge Camacho, stating that Judge Camacho had
no discretion to exercise in resentencing Mora. However, Judge
Dominguez observed that if Judge Camacho did have discretion,
he would have transferred the case to Judge Camacho. Judge
Dominguez conducted a full resentencing pursuant to section
1172.1.2

2 Judge Dominguez stated that he was resentencing Mora

pursuant to section 1170.03; however, this is inaccurate because
prior to the hearing, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.03
to section 1172.1. (People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376,
378, fn. 2.) The Legislature made no substantive changes to the
statute at that time. (Ibid.)

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He denied Mora’s Romero motion and resentenced Mora to
50 years to life in prison.3 Mora timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue Mora raised in the opening brief is whether
Judge Dominguez erred by refusing to transfer Mora’s case to
Judge Camacho for resentencing.4 After we conducted our initial
review of this matter, we invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefing addressing whether the court had
jurisdiction to resentence Mora. (See People v. Boyd (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 56 (Boyd); People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
976 (Codinha); People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629 (King).)

A. Legal Background

An order denying a habeas corpus petition is final when
filed. (Jackson v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1051,
1064, fn. 5, citing In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7.)

3 The judge did not address the section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) enhancements at the resentencing hearing, and the minute
order and abstract of judgment do not reference the
enhancements.

4 Because we conclude that Judge Dominguez lacked

jurisdiction to resentence Mora, we do not reach the issue of
whether it was error not to transfer the case to Judge Camacho.
We note, however, that where, as here, the superior court
conducts a full resentencing, the better practice is to transfer the
matter to the judge who originally sentenced the defendant if
that judge is available.

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“Courts have long recognized the general common law rule that ‘a
trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal
defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced.
[Citations.] Where the trial court relinquishes custody of a
defendant, it also loses jurisdiction over that defendant.’
[Citations.]” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.)
There are exceptions to the common law rule. At the time
that Mora was resentenced, section 1172.1, subdivision (a) gave a
trial court “the authority to recall a sentence on its own motion
within 120 days of the defendant’s remand, or at any time upon a
request by various law enforcement officials.” (King, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) “The Legislature has also created other
specific statutory avenues for incarcerated defendants to seek
resentencing in particular cases. (See, e.g., §§ 1170.95 [(now
1172.6)], 1170.126, 1170.18.) If a modification does not make a
substantive change to a sentence but simply corrects a clerical
error, the trial court has the inherent power to correct its own
records at any time. [Citation.] And a trial court may of course
rule on a defendant’s challenge to an unlawful sentence in a
properly filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Ibid.)
The Courts of Appeal are divided regarding whether the
unauthorized sentence doctrine is another exception to the rule
that a court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has
commenced. “A sentence is ‘ “unauthorized” ’ where it could not
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular
case’ [citation], and it ‘is subject to being set aside judicially’
[citation].” (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 65.) The doctrine
permits correction of an unauthorized sentence “ ‘even after
execution of the sentence has begun.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

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In In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1122 (G.C.), G.C.
challenged the juvenile court’s failure, in its dispositional order,
to declare G.C.’s “wobbler” offense either a misdemeanor or a
felony pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.
G.C. failed to timely appeal the dispositional order, but purported
to appeal from a subsequent dispositional order on that basis.
(Ibid.) Among other things, G.C. argued that the juvenile court’s
failure to comply with the statute created an unauthorized
sentence that could be corrected at any time. (Id. at p. 1129.)
The Supreme Court held that G.C. could not challenge the
juvenile court’s failure to comply with its statutory duty after the
time to appeal the first dispositional order had expired. (Id. at
p. 1122.) The Supreme Court rejected the contention because it
concluded that (1) the sentence was not unauthorized, and (2) the
unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the waiver rule
that does not waive the requirement that a court have
jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 1029–1030.) The court explained that “to
invoke this rule [that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected
at any time] the court must have jurisdiction over the judgment.”
(Id. at p. 1130.) “The unauthorized sentence doctrine will not
serve to remedy [a] defect [in jurisdiction].” (Ibid.)
In King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 629, the Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Two, relied on G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th
1119, to hold that the unauthorized sentence doctrine does not
create jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated
defendant’s motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence after
the conviction is final and the execution of the sentence has
begun. In 1986, King was sentenced to 105 years in prison.
(Id. at p. 633.) In 2021, King filed a motion to vacate an
unauthorized sentence with respect to one of the counts of which

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he was convicted. (Ibid.) The superior court denied the motion
on the ground that the original sentence was correct. (Ibid.) The
appellate court agreed with King that the sentence was
unauthorized, but found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
rule on the motion, and therefore the appellate court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) The
Court of Appeal explained that although, as a general principle,
“an unauthorized sentence may be corrected ‘at any time[,]’ . . .
[a]mong the many cases that cite the principle, most assume that
a court always has jurisdiction to correct an unlawful sentence,
no matter when or how the issue arises.” (Id. at p. 634.) The
court held that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an
exception to the waiver doctrine; the unauthorized sentence
doctrine is not an exception to the requirement that a court must
have jurisdiction and the doctrine cannot create jurisdiction
where there is none. (Id. at p. 637.) King’s “freestanding
motion” was “not a proper procedural mechanism to seek relief,”
and did not confer jurisdiction on the superior court. (Id. at
p. 640.) The appellate court dismissed King’s appeal (id. at
pp. 641–642), but noted that a “defendant who is serving a longer
sentence than the law allows may challenge the sentence in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus” (id. at p. 640).
In Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 976, the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation informed the superior court by
letter that the court had imposed an unauthorized sentence in
Codinha’s case. In response to the letter, the superior court
ordered the sentence corrected, which resulted in a greater
sentence. (Id. at p. 983.) Codinha appealed the order. He
acknowledged the court’s authority to correct the sentence, but
argued that the court was not authorized to do so on the basis of

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the letter. (Id. at pp. 983–984.) Codinha asserted that the
superior court’s authority must be based on section 1172.1 or the
unauthorized sentence doctrine, and in either case the court was
required to conduct a full resentencing. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, held that the superior
court had authority to resentence Codinha under the
unauthorized sentence doctrine. (Id. at pp. 988–993.) The Court
of Appeal declined to follow King because it believed that King
interpreted G.C. too broadly. (Id. at pp. 992–993.) The court
characterized the issue in G.C. as “whether the appellate court
had jurisdiction in an appeal from a dispositional order in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding to correct an allegedly
unauthorized dispositional order made by a different juvenile
court in a prior proceeding concerning different offenses when the
prior order had not been timely appealed.” (Id. at p. 992.) The
Codinha court observed that in G.C. the Supreme Court “did not
consider whether a trial court in an adult criminal proceeding
has jurisdiction to correct its own unauthorized sentence
whenever the error comes to its attention. It did not disapprove,
nor even mention, the body of case law . . . that acknowledges the
existence of such jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 993.) Codinha identified
and discussed several Supreme Court cases that the appellate
court viewed as holding that the unauthorized sentence doctrine
confers jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence. (Id. at
pp. 984–-993 [discussing People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335
(Karaman); People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753 (Serrato); In re
Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412 (Sandel)].) Codinha concluded that
“the line of Supreme Court cases recognizing an unauthorized
sentence is a void judgment that may be vacated or corrected
whenever it is brought to the trial court’s attention, even after

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execution of the invalid sentence has begun or the judgment has
become final [citation], remains valid and authorized the trial
court to modify Codinha’s sentence in response to the
Department’s letter.” (Id. at p. 993.)
In Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 56, at page 61, Boyd, who
had served almost two decades of his 27-year prison sentence,
moved for resentencing on the basis that the trial court
miscalculated his custody and conduct credits. The People
conceded the error and the court awarded Boyd additional days of
credit. (Ibid.) Boyd appealed, arguing that he was entitled to full
resentencing. (Ibid.) On its own motion, the court ordered the
parties to address whether the court had jurisdiction to address
Boyd’s motion although his sentence had been made final many
years earlier. (Ibid.) The appellate court discussed the split of
authority, and agreed with the approach taken in King. (Ibid.)
The court gave two reasons for declining to follow Codinha.
(Id. at pp. 67–68.) First, in G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th 1119, and other
cases, the Supreme Court identified “the unauthorized sentence
doctrine as ‘ “an exception to the waiver doctrine.” ’ (In re G.C.,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1129.)” (Id. at p. 67.) Second, none of the
cases Codinha cited “hold that trial courts can act to correct
unauthorized (or unlawful or invalid) sentences outside of a
habeas petition or some other posture where they independently
have jurisdiction to do so.” (Id. at p. 68.) The Boyd court
continued: “We are unaware of any controlling authority holding
that trial courts possess inherent jurisdiction to correct
unauthorized sentences where cases are final. To the contrary,
the availability of habeas relief to correct unauthorized sentences
suggests that trial courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to
correct such sentences, as habeas relief would be superfluous if a

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freestanding trial court motion could at any time achieve the
same result without the procedural limitations that habeas law
imposes.” (Ibid.)

B. Analysis

Both parties filed supplemental briefing. Mora contends
that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him, and urges us
to follow Boyd and King. The People, relying on Codinha,
disagree. We agree with Boyd for the reasons stated therein. As
Boyd explained, in all of the cases that Codinha cited, the court
had jurisdiction independent of the unauthorized sentence
doctrine. (See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 67 [explaining
that in G.C. the minor appealed from a dispositional order in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding; in Karaman the court had
ordered a brief stay prior to execution of the sentence; in Serrato
the defendant appealed from an “ ‘order granting probation, such
an order being a judgment for the purpose of appeal’ ”; and
Sandel involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus].) There is
no conflict between the Supreme Court’s opinions in G.C.,
Karaman, Serrato, and Sandel and the opinions of the Courts of
Appeal in King and Boyd. In our view, G.C. described the
application and scope of the unauthorized sentence doctrine
clearly: the unauthorized sentence doctrine “ ‘is an exception to
the waiver doctrine [citation], not to the jurisdictional
requirement. . . .’ ” “to invoke this rule the court must have
jurisdiction over the judgment.” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th
1119, 1129.) We conclude that the superior court, which
summarily denied Mora’s petition for habeas corpus, lacked

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jurisdiction to resentence Mora. (Jackson v. Superior Court,
supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064, fn. 5.)
The People do not contest that, if we determine the
superior court lacked jurisdiction as we have, the superior court
lacked fundamental jurisdiction, which renders its order void, not
voidable. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) Regardless,
they argue that vacating the sentence in Mora’s case would
“ ‘needlessly exalt[] form over substance’ ” because the superior
court could have resentenced Mora prior to denying his habeas
petition, and “a later resentencing is inevitable.” The People
assert that “denying the trial court the authority to correct the
unauthorized sentence accomplishes nothing more than delaying
an order that is legally correct.” They cite People v. Lopez (2025)
17 Cal.5th 388, 400 to argue that “the California Supreme Court
has cautioned against limiting the scope of a trial court’s
jurisdiction in way that will do nothing more than ‘tax judicial
resources’ by requiring multiple appeals.” Lopez does not support
the People’s argument, however. There, the Supreme Court
emphasized that “the superior court had jurisdiction to provide
relief under applicable ameliorative laws, such as Assembly Bill
[No.] 333, after the case was conditionally reversed and
remanded to correct a sentencing error.” (Lopez, at p. 400.) The
Supreme Court did not confer jurisdiction upon a lower court for
the sake of judicial economy in Lopez. The People identify no
other authority that would permit this court to confer jurisdiction
upon the superior court and affirm a void order, and we know of
none.
Moreover, we do not consider vacating the sentence to be
exaltation of form over substance under these circumstances.
Although Judge Dominguez stated that he was conducting a full

12
resentencing, he did not dismiss, impose, or impose and strike
the two five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) sentence
enhancements as required. Because we conclude that the court
lacked jurisdiction to resentence Mora, the issue is moot.
However, we observe that if the court had jurisdiction to
resentence Mora, it is questionable whether the sentence the
court imposed would itself be legal. It would be incumbent upon
this court to raise the issue of the legality of the sentence (and
likely to remand the cause) if we were to permit the sentence to
stand.

DISPOSITION

We vacate the sentence and remand to the superior court
with directions to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that
Mora’s prior sentence is reinstated. The superior court is ordered
to forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

BAKER, J.

13
The People v. Ruben Mora
B330297

BAKER, J., Concurring

I have signed the opinion for the court, but I write
separately to further explain why. The law on whether the
unauthorized sentence rule confers jurisdiction to resentence a
defendant is unsettled. As the opinion for the court identifies,
there is a split in the Courts of Appeal on the point. (Compare
People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 62 [“when a case is
final, the mere fact that a sentence is unauthorized does not
confer jurisdiction on a trial court to vacate that sentence or on a
reviewing court to entertain an appeal based on a claim the
sentence was unauthorized”]; People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 633 [same] with People v. Codinha (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 976, 993 [“an unauthorized sentence is a void
judgment that may be vacated or corrected whenever it is
brought to the trial court’s attention, even after execution of the
invalid sentence has begun or the judgment has become final”].)
What today’s opinion for the court does not mention, however, are
the seemingly conflicting observations on this point in the
Supreme Court’s own case law. (Compare In re G.C. (2020) 8
Cal.5th 1119, 1129-1130 [unauthorized sentence rule is “an
exception to the waiver doctrine” that cannot be invoked absent
jurisdiction over the judgment] with People v. Picklesimer (2010)
48 Cal.4th 330, 338 [“Nor is Picklesimer’s obligation to register
part of an unauthorized sentence, which the trial court would
have had jurisdiction to correct at any time,” italics added];
People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044-1045 [“[I]t is
settled that an unauthorized sentence is subject to correction
despite the circumstance that an appeal is pending. Because the
trial court was not authorized simply to waive sentencing on
these counts, any error in failing to impose sentence in this
regard would have been subject to judicial correction when it
ultimately came to the attention of the trial court or this court,”
italics added].)
In concurring with the result the court reaches today, I
have resolved the ambiguity in precedent by deferring to the
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the
unauthorized sentence rule in G.C. But, to reiterate the Codinha
court’s observation, it would be better if the law in this area were
clearer. (Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at 993.)

BAKER, J.

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