CourtListener 10384480•People v. Brady CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/24/25 P. v. Brady CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063549
v. (Super. Ct. No. 95HF1058)
PATRICK DAMIAN BRADY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions. Request for judicial notice denied.
Christopher Stansell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Patrick Damian Brady appeals from the denial of his petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75 (all
undesignated statutory references are to this code). Brady contends the trial
court erred in concluding he was not entitled to relief because his
enhancement for a prior prison term under former section 667.5, subdivision
(b) (prison prior) was stricken for purposes of sentencing. We agree with
Brady and conclude he is entitled to be resentenced under section 1172.75.
Thus, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, Brady pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
handgun and relevant here, he admitted, in addition to having suffered a
prior felony “strike” conviction, to having a prison prior. Relevant here, the
trial court found the prison prior to be true which was “stricken for purpose of
sentencing only.”
In November 2023, Brady filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.75, which the trial court denied, finding
Brady was “ineligible for relief because all related enhancements were either
stayed or stricken at time of sentencing.”
DISCUSSION
“Prison priors are governed by section 667.5. When first enacted
in 1976, this section required trial courts to impose a one-year enhancement
for any nonviolent felony for which a prison sentence was imposed, unless the
defendant remained free of custody for at least five years after completing
that sentence.” (People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194, review
granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino).) Now, section 1172.75 deems certain
one-year sentence enhancements for prison priors, imposed before January 1,
2020, to be invalid and sets forth a mechanism for resentencing individuals
2
“serving a term for a judgment” that includes one or more prison priors.
(§ 1172.75, subds. (a) & (b).) The sole issue before us in this appeal is whether
section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to a resentencing hearing if the
defendant’s prison priors were imposed but stricken for the purposes of
sentencing.
There is a split of authority in the appellate courts regarding
whether a trial court must conduct a full resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75 when an invalidated prison prior was imposed and stayed,
and the issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in
People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted February 21,
2024, S283169 (Rhodius).1
To determine whether a prison prior that was stricken for
purposes of sentencing entitles a defendant to a full resentencing hearing
under section 1172.75, we follow the well-established principles of statutory
interpretation. “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we
review de novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) The
1 In Rhodius, the court concluded section 1172.75 does not apply
if the defendant’s prison priors were previously imposed and stayed.
(Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41–42, 45, 49, rev.gr.) However,
several other Courts of Appeal have concluded section 1172.75 applies when
prison priors were imposed in the original judgment, regardless of whether
the punishment was stayed or stricken. (People v. Mayberry (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 665, 668 [prison priors stayed], review granted Aug. 14,
2024, S285853; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1272–1274
[prison priors stayed], review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana);
People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 305 [prison priors stayed],
review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson); People v. Renteria
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282–1283 [prison priors stayed]; Espino, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 193 [prison prior stricken for purposes of sentencing],
rev.gr.)
3
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent and effectuate
the law’s purpose. (Ibid.) “‘“‘“We begin by examining the statute’s words,
giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.”’”’” (Ibid.) “‘We examine that
language, not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a
whole to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of
the enactment. [Citation.] “If the language is clear, courts must generally
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language
permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other
aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”’”
(People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975–976.)
Under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to [former
section 667.5, subdivision (b)], except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of
Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” Citing to
the reasoning in Rhodius, People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118
(Gonzalez), and the dissent in Espino, the Attorney General argues Brady is
4
ineligible for resentencing because his prison prior was “struck, not
imposed.”2 We disagree.
Subdivision (b) of section 1172.75 directs “[t]he Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county correctional
administrator of each county [to] identify those persons in their custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an [invalid]
enhancement . . . and . . . provide [their information] to the sentencing court
that imposed the enhancement.” This obligation in subdivision (b) is not
limited to the identification of only those defendants who are actually serving
a sentence for the prison prior. The absence of such a limitation indicates the
Legislature did not intend to restrict relief to those defendants whose
sentences had been imposed and executed as the Attorney General argues. If
the Legislature had intended such a limitation, it had the ability to do so.
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313, rev.gr.)
In Gonzalez, our Supreme Court analyzed the words “‘impose’”
and “‘imposed’” in different subdivisions of section 12022.53 to harmonize its
provisions. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1126–1127.) Construing
sections 12022.53 and 12022.5 in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court stated: “[I]t is
important to understand that the word ‘impose’ applies to enhancements that
2 The Attorney General also argues Brady is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75 because he “is not currently serving time
for a judgment that includes a now invalid prison prior.” He also asks this
court to take judicial notice of the court records in Brady’s Los Angeles
County case to support the contention Brady “is not currently in custody” on
the judgment at issue here. We deny this request as section 1172.75 provides
not only relief for those “currently serving a sentence based on the [prison
prior]” (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2)), but for “all other individuals” (id.,
subds. (b)(2) & (c)(2)).
5
are ‘imposed and then executed’ as well as those that are ‘imposed and then
stayed. However, as a practical matter, the word “impose” is often employed
as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while the word “stay” often refers
to the latter.’” (Gonzalez, at p. 1125 [quoting a case also addressing firearm
enhancements under §§ 12022.5 & 12022.53].)
However, multiple courts have found Gonzalez to be
distinguishable. (See, e.g., Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277, rev.gr.)
Here, there is no issue of contradicting subdivisions in section 1172.75, unlike
the situation in Gonzalez. (See Saldana, at p. 1277.) Also, the legislative
intent guiding the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Gonzalez is the opposite
of the legislative intent behind section 1172.75. In Gonzalez, “the
Legislature’s stated intent was to ensure that ‘“substantially longer prison
sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms in the commission of
their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent crime.”’”
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313, rev.gr.) Here, the Legislature
had a different intent in enacting section 1172.75. As the Christianson court
explained, “[T]he statutory scheme at issue here involves statutory
amendments expressly aimed at reducing sentences by retroactively
eliminating a sentencing enhancement described as exacerbating ‘existing
racial and socio-economic disparities in our criminal justice system.’
[Citation.] Consistent with that intent, the other provisions of the statute
require that the trial court conduct a full resentencing for those defendants
impacted by the now invalid enhancement in light of all associated
sentencing reform. . . . Thus, it appears the Legislature intended to provide
broad relief to all defendants impacted by the now invalid section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements.” (Christianson, at p. 314; accord, Saldana, at
p. 1278.)
6
The Attorney General also notes “striking an inert enhancement
does not result in a lesser sentence.” But the reasoning in Christianson would
still apply here. Unless the enhancement has been stricken altogether by the
sentencing court, it remains “imposed” for purposes of relief under section
1172.75.
We acknowledge the well-reasoned dissent in Espino, which
concludes, in instances where the punishment for an enhancement was
stricken, the enhancement has not been imposed within the meaning of
section 1172.75. (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 202 (dis. opn. of Lie,
J.), rev.gr.) We have also considered the Attorney General’s arguments as
well as the reasoning in Rhodius and acknowledge the Rhodius court makes
valid points in its discussion of the legislative intent behind section 1172.75.
But this does not convince us the statute must be interpreted as only
applying to defendants whose prison priors were imposed and executed.
Indeed, we struggle to find ambiguity in the statute’s text warranting the
need to examine the legislative history for guidance. (See People v.
Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 976.)
An enhancement found to be true becomes part of the judgment
and must be addressed as part of the sentencing process. The sentence on the
enhancement may then be imposed and executed, or imposed and stayed or
stricken for the purposes of sentencing, so that the enhancement does not
increase the defendant’s sentence. The prison prior is accounted for in the
judgment whether or not the sentence is increased because of such.
Consequently, we do not draw a distinction between an executed sentence
and a stayed or stricken one in the application of section 1172.75.
Pending direction from the California Supreme Court, we
conclude, in line with the weight of authority, the term “imposed” in section
7
1172.75 applies to defendants, like Brady, regardless of whether the prison
prior was originally stayed, stricken for purposes of sentencing, or executed.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s postjudgment order and remand to the
trial court.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Brady’s petition for recall and
resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded to trial court for
resentencing. Upon conclusion of the new sentencing hearing, the court is
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
MOTOIKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
8
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.