People v. Sanchez CA1/4

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Testo completo

Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Sanchez CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169733
v. (Lake County
PEDRO ZEPEDA SANCHEZ, Super. Ct. No. CR963203)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Pedro Zepeda Sanchez appeals from his conviction on a jury
verdict finding him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of
Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). He also appeals from an order
imposing certain fines and fees on him at sentencing.
Defendant’s principal claim on appeal is that, when the jury foreperson
reported an eleven-to-one deadlock after less than a day’s deliberations, the
court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and instructing the jury to
resume deliberating.
Defendant attacks the fines and fees order on the ground that, despite
having received a full opportunity to demonstrate that he had no ability to
pay—including an evidentiary hearing—the court erred by declining to accept
his testimony that there is no “usable equity” in property shown to be worth
$60,000 on an asset statement subscribed by him under penalty of perjury.

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We reject these arguments and affirm the conviction and sentence.
I.
When the charged offenses in this case took place, defendant and M.M.
had lived together as boyfriend and girlfriend for approximately seven years.
Living with them were M.M.’s five young children, two daughters and three
sons. The victim of defendant’s sexual abuse, A.M., is one of M.M.’s
daughters. The offenses took place between March of 2020, when defendant,
M.M., and M.M.’s children were living in Clearlake, and August 2020, when
they all moved to Kelseyville. A.M. was 12 years old at the time.
The case was tried to a jury over the course of two days in late
November and early December 2023. At trial, A.M. testified to eight
incidents in which defendant touched her in a sexual manner when
defendant was alone with A.M. Each incident took place in a different way,
but they shared certain common patterns. In some of the incidents,
defendant rubbed A.M.’s breasts and vagina, or on one occasion, just her
vagina; in several incidents, defendant placed A.M. on top of him while he
was sitting or reclining, and each time A.M. felt defendant’s erect penis on
her buttocks; once, he pushed A.M. against a sink, began rubbing her
stomach from behind and pushed his erect penis against her buttocks; and
once, he tried to place A.M.’s hands on his erect penis. M.M. testified that,
after A.M. disclosed these incidents, she reluctantly came to believe A.M.
Defendant exercised his privilege not to testify. His defense centered
on whether there was a reasonable doubt as to the credibility of A.M. and
M.M.
In the late afternoon of Friday, December 1, following the close of
evidence and presentation of arguments from counsel, the jury retired to
begin deliberations. They deliberated for an hour that day, then resumed the

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following Wednesday, December 6 at 9:00 a.m. At about 9:45 a.m. the jury
sent a note to the judge inquiring about whether there were any recorded
statements to law enforcement or child protection services from any of A.M.’s
brothers, and after deliberating for less than another half hour, the jury
reported that it was deadlocked.
The judge then met with the jury in court. The jury foreperson
expressed the view that the prospect of resolving the deadlock was hopeless.
The judge inquired how many ballots had been taken, and asked about the
vote breakdown on the last ballot, carefully limiting the questions so that the
identities of the jurors and whether the vote was for or against conviction was
not revealed. The foreperson reported that “less than five” votes had been
taken and that the breakdown was eleven to one. Ten other jurors agreed
that they saw no hope of resolving the deadlock. One juror felt there was
hope the deadlock could be resolved.
At that point, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court conferred
with the parties and with counsel about what to do next. The People took the
position that, in light of the short deliberations to the point of impasse, the
court should direct the jury to resume deliberations. The defense took the
opposite position, arguing that, given the eleven-to-one split after what was a
fairly straightforward trial presentation, and the reports from all but one
juror that the prospect of a verdict was hopeless, it would be inherently
coercive to the holdout juror for the court to order a resumption of
deliberations. The defense moved for a mistrial.
The trial court denied the mistrial motion, and chose to instruct the
jury to continue deliberating. The court’s instruction, drawn from CALCRIM
No. 3551 without material change, read as follows:

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“Sometimes juries that have had difficulty reaching a verdict are able
to resume deliberations and successfully reach a verdict. Please consider the
following suggestions. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views. Fair
and effective jury deliberations require a frank and forthright exchange of
views. Each of you must decide the case for yourself and form your individual
opinion after you have fully and completely considered all of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with the goal of
reaching a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your individual
judgment. Do not change your position just because it differs from that of
other jurors or just because you or others want to reach a verdict. Both the
People and the defendant are entitled to the individual judgment of each
juror. [¶] It is up to you to decide how to conduct your deliberations. You may
want to consider new approaches in order to get a fresh perspective. Let me
know whether I can do anything to help you further such as give you
additional instructions or clarify instructions I have already given you. [¶]
Please continue your deliberations at this time. If you wish to communicate
with me further, please do so in writing as you have been doing.”
Upon receiving this instruction, the jury resumed deliberations. After
requesting and receiving a readback of A.M.’s testimony and playback of a
video interview A.M. gave to an investigator, the jury announced a guilty
verdict at 3:46 p.m. on December 6, 2023. Speaking to the entire panel after
the verdict was delivered, the judge confirmed the unanimity of the jurors’
votes by asking any juror who felt the verdict did not reflect his or her views
to raise a hand. No one raised a hand.
At that point, defendant waived his right to jury trial on the alleged
aggravating factors, and the judge found true that he had abused a position
of trust. The court found in mitigation that defendant had an insignificant

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criminal record and satisfactory prior performance on probation. Based on
the balance between aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a
midterm sentence of 12 years imprisonment.
In addition, the court imposed a $3,600 restitution fine pursuant to
Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), a $40 assessment pursuant to
Penal Code section 1465.8, a $30 assessment pursuant to Government Code
section 70373, and a $300 fine pursuant to Penal Code section 290.3.
Defendant objected to the imposition of the fees and fines under People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). After holding an evidentiary
hearing on the ability to pay issue, the court found defendant had the ability
to pay the fines and fees.
II.
A.
Defendant urges reversal of his conviction on the ground that the trial
court erred by giving an instruction directing the jury to resume deliberations
after reporting a hopeless deadlock. He contends that, because this was a
simple and straightforward case and all but one of the jurors reported that
further deliberations would be pointless, it was an abuse of discretion to give
this instruction. He also argues that the instruction violated his due process
rights to a fair and impartial jury. He also reiterates the contention he
argued below that, given the eleven-to-one vote split, the giving of CALCRIM
No. 3551 was inherently coercive to the holdout juror.
The People respond that defendant forfeited any objection to CALCRIM
No. 3551 by failure to object in the trial court, and that, even if we address
the objection on the merits, we should reject it because, on this record, under
the governing abuse of discretion standard of review, defendant has failed to
carry his burden of showing that the trial court’s decision to give CALCRIM

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No. 3551 was irrational, arbitrary, or not grounded in reasoned judgment and
guided by correct legal principles.
We do not agree that defendant has forfeited his objection to CALCRIM
No. 3551, since he made a mistrial motion before the giving of the instruction
and in the course of doing so plainly objected to the giving of any instruction
directing the jury to resume deliberations. His argument here is an attack on
the giving of CALCRIM No. 3551, not on the form of the instruction. On the
merits, however, the People are correct. We see no error in the giving of the
instruction on the record presented here.
Long ago, in People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 845 (Gainer),
overruled in part in People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 163 (Valdez), the
California Supreme Court discussed in depth the practice of trial judges
giving exhortatory instructions “as a means of ‘blasting’ a verdict out of a
deadlocked jury . . . .” (Gainer, at p. 844.) At the time, some 50 years ago,
this practice was controversial, having been subject to a “withering barrage of
attacks” from some courts. (Id. at p. 846.) Such an instruction—given the
moniker of an “Allen charge” in the reported cases1—could be so heavy-
handed that it had the effect of hectoring holdout jurors into sacrificing their
independence for the sake of unanimity. (Id. at pp. 844, 848.)
The Gainer court focused specifically on two issues raised by the form
of instruction at issue there. First, the instruction was a “discriminatory
admonition directed to minority jurors to rethink their position in light of the
majority’s views” (Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 845) and was therefore
improper, inasmuch as, by counseling minority jurors to consider the

1 The name comes from Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492,

where the United States Supreme Court approved a jury instruction which
encouraged minority jurors to reexamine their views in light of the views
expressed by the majority. (Id. at pp. 501–502.)

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majority view, whatever it might be, the instruction encouraged jurors to
abandon a focus on the evidence as the basis of their verdict. (Id. at p. 848.)
A second issue identified in Gainer was a direction that the jury “ ‘should
consider that the case must at some time be decided.’ ” (Id. at p. 851.) This
feature of the instruction, the court noted, was simply inaccurate because of
the possibility the case might not be retried. (Id. at p. 852.) Neither of these
two problematic features is present in this case.
The law pertaining to “Allen charge” instructions has also evolved
significantly since Gainer. Many of the most controversial forms of these
instructions were adopted as ad hoc “embellishments” on the instructional
text approved by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States,
supra, 164 U.S. 492. (Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 844.) Since the late
1970s, with the increased utilization of standardized jury instructions—
vetted in our state by the Judicial Council to avoid the particular problems
Gainer identified—cases reversing for error in the giving of an “Allen charge”
are few. In fact, while defendant cites more than a dozen California cases
decided since Gainer addressing the propriety of Allen charges, not one of
them reverses a conviction for error in such an instruction. And the only case
defendant cites that involved asserted error in the giving of CALCRIM
No. 3551, which was adopted in 2012, approves that standard form
instruction in particular. (People v. Sta Ana (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 44, 62–
64.)
We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that, on this record, it
was error to give CALCRIM No. 3551 to a deadlocked jury because the case is
simple, and while the deliberation time to deadlock (a few hours) was
relatively brief, it amounted to half the time it took to try the case. People v.
Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105 is instructive. “[P]resumably because of

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the relatively brief duration of deliberations conducted by the jurors before
they announced they could not reach a verdict,” the Moore court stated, “the
trial court concluded further deliberations might be beneficial . . . . The fact
the jury was able to reach a verdict relatively quickly after being further
instructed reflects the court properly exercised its discretion.” (Id. at
p. 1122.) So too here.
Defendant contends that unlike in Moore—where the trial court made
no inquiry about the jury’s vote split—in this case the trial judge knew the
vote was split eleven to one and was aware that one juror was taking an
isolated position contrary to all of his fellow jurors. But while the California
Supreme Court has recognized that an eleven-to-one split may increase the
potential for coercion, the court has consistently rejected the argument that it
is inherently coercive. (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 617–618,
overruled on other grounds, People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686,
fn. 13; People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 901; People v. Sheldon (1989)
48 Cal.3d 935, 959.)
Notably, when we survey the pertinent case law, instructions to resume
deliberating have been upheld after a wide range of deliberation times
leading to impasse. (See People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 402 [no
abuse of discretion where jury deliberated four hours before announcing
deadlock at penalty phase]; People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 208–209
(Debose) [two-month trial, day and a half of penalty phase deliberations];
People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 195 [three days deliberation after a
five-month trial]; People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 958–959 [two
days of deliberation, only one vote taken before announcing deadlock in
penalty phase of multiple special circumstance case including alleged prior
kidnapping and attempted murder offenses].)

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No formulaic rule for handling deadlocked juries may be drawn from
these cases. So long as balanced instructions are given that do not put a
judicial thumb on the scale for or against any juror’s point of view (Valdez,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 164), trial courts have broad discretion to order
further deliberations. The applicable test is simply that, in the specific
circumstances presented, courts may order further deliberations based on a
reasonable assessment that such an instruction will enable the jurors to
“ ‘ “ ‘enhance their understanding of the case . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Debose, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 209.) Presented with an appellate challenge to such a
determination, our review is for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) We see no abuse
of discretion here.
B.
Citing Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, and People v. Cowan (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 32, review granted June 17, 2020, S261952, defendant claims
the court erred by imposing various fees and fines on him despite his claim of
inability to pay.
At an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ability to pay, the court
received into evidence “a statement of assets signed under penalty of
perjury.” In his testimony about that asset statement, defendant
acknowledged he had signed a statement under penalty of perjury showing
he owned 1.3 acres of property valued at $60,000. His mortgage was $735 per
month, he owed about $20,000, and he had $40,000 in equity. Defendant was
“certain” the bank would not “hold the mortgage open” if he were
incarcerated for 12 years, during which he claimed to have no way of earning
money and no passive income.
Based on defendant’s sworn statement that he owned property worth
$60,000 and the inference from his testimony that he had at least $40,000 in
equity in that property, the court rejected defendant’s claim of inability to

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pay his fines and fees. Here on appeal, the gist of defendant’s argument is
that the court erroneously relied on defendant’s ability to sell the property
and realize profit from the sale, because, legally, he could not do so because
he financed the property under a land sale contract.
We are unpersuaded. Inability to pay fines and fees is a factual issue
for trial courts to assess. The trial court was not required to delve into,
determine, and resolve in defendant’s favor, defendant’s claim that the listed
property on his asset statement had no “usable” equity in it. The premise of
that argument turned on self-serving testimony from defendant—at that
point a convicted felon—about the legal status of his ownership of the
property on his asset statement and conjecture about events in the future.
Plainly, the court disbelieved defendant’s testimony about his inability
to access any equity value in property he admittedly owned. Without that
testimony, defendant’s sworn asset statement, by itself, constitutes
substantial evidence that he had the ability to pay his fees and fines.
Defendant was fully heard on the ability to pay issue, which is all that
Dueñas and Cowan require.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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